Air University Review, November-December 1981
the situational professional
Captain James H. Slagle
After three years as a Squadron Officer School (SOS) section commander and chief of training, I have discussed professionalism with more than 200 students. In October 1980, I conducted a survey of 613 officers, attending SOS Class 81-A.1 The purpose of the survey was to measure the company grade officers’ attitude toward the subject of professionalism. The survey results were consistent with the attitudes and feelings displayed in these conversations. Professionalism is an important subject among company grade officers. They all have their own ideas of professional qualities, what they are, and what the Air Force requires.
Officers entering the Air Force in the 1980s are not entering as occupationalists or professionals. They are a generation shaped by the nuclear age, Korea, Vietnam, the civil rights movement, space exploration, Watergate, and, of course, television. "What the changing of the guard promises America in the 1980s is not a pat solution to all its problems, but a long-overdue fresh look at these concerns."2
The decade of the '80s is also witness to a change in the military. Emphasis on management as well as leadership, increased technology, and greater destructive weapons has slowly introduced a change in the dialogue between military professionals and civilian leaders. This emphasis has also introduced new rules into the military establishment. There are some who feel that these changes are forcing a new definition of the military professional. "Under these circumstances, many of the supports that shore up traditional military professional attitudes have been knocked out, and military officers tend to be as much bureaucrats as professionals. . ."3
I do not defend occupational characteristics displayed by some officers; my concern is with understanding the climate and the factors that shape and determine the desired professional characteristics that senior leaders are demanding. I am more concerned with helping senior leaders understand the junior officer and the junior officer’s view of professionalism. To aid in this understanding, a composite picture of the junior officer, in the form of a monologue, was developed. The monologue was developed by analyzing the statistical data and constructing a mythical officer who incorporates a majority view of SOS Class 81-A.
Who am I and how do I feel
about professionalism?
As a captain with a regular commission and five years in the service, I find it hard to understand why there is so much concern and emphasis as to whether I am a professional or not. If you asked me whether I feel I am a professional military officer right now, I would probably say yes. However, I am not sure that my definition is consistent with that of the Air Force leadership.
I understand the concern of our senior leaders that the occupational needs of people should not be the major motivators in the military career. I agree with what I read and with my commanders that professionalism is extremely important in the military today. But I also feel that how I view professionalism does not match my commander’s views. To tell the truth, I am not sure there is an agreement on what professionalism is and what its qualities are. I know I do not really agree with Huntington’s view of a very traditional, institutionally oriented, and conservative military professional. Although I have not had combat experience, I know there might be a need someday to go into combat. But this is also an era of ever-changing world conditions. I need to have a firm knowledge of world politics and an understanding of major world events. Because of my current job in the
squadron, I feel I am a specialist, and as a specialist, managerial and technical skills are important. Also, I know operational requirements are important, but so are my personal interests and desires. I do not deny the traditional values of "duty, honor, and country"; however, in my job they just do not seem to be a major issue. From day-to-day, I do my job. Duty, honor, and country have never been explicit parts of the workplace.
What then are my motivators?
My job and the satisfaction I get from doing it are my principal motivators. When you ask me what I do for a living, I most closely identify with the people in my career field. I know I am an Air Force officer, but since I have come into the service, I have had only one or two jobs. I have come closely to associate with these jobs and the skills I have learned. I guess this does make me a "specialist," but I do not think it makes me any less a "professional." Another major motivator is base pay. As a married officer with one child, I am naturally concerned about things like pay and the retirement system. Although I think there is a need for improvement in our benefits, I would not want to see them substituted for an advertised dollar value. My spouse works, and the income my spouse brings in has been important in our efforts to maintain an acceptable standard of living. Understandably, because of the importance of that salary, my partner provides a great deal of input into my career decisions. I want to know my family is secure and provided for.
I guess the big question that I ask myself from time to time is whether I will make a career in the Air Force. Right now, I plan to, although about 36 percent of my classmates are either undecided or say they will get out. One reason is that, so far, I have not had to worry about career progression. Also, I feel that job security is important, and I am satisfied with the current promotion system. Although 36 percent of my classmates have never been pressured to compromise their integrity, I have. Promotion should be a reward for good performance, yet I know that I am still rated on my potential as well. How do you measure potential unless it is by observation of actual behavior? I guess I need more guidance to help me understand what my senior leaders are looking for.
But this is today, and tomorrow my feelings may change. I am relatively new to the Air Force and, at 28 years of age, relatively young. I do not consider my views radical in nature. I do not, for example, want to see military unions bargaining for pay and benefits. I accept that there will be assignments that will not always be my first choice. Squadron Officer School is my first introduction to professional military education, and it is my first chance to find out about the rest of the Air Force. One thing I have learned is that we all have different views and attitudes about the military. At any one time, my motivation may be oriented toward the concept Dr. Charles Moskos calls "occupationalism" or job orientation. On the other hand, I sometimes find that I am at the other end of the spectrum, having a deep patriotic feeling or "calling." Whatever my decision, I have come from a different background than my senior leaders, and I bring to the Air Force a different set of needs and values. I believe professionalism is extremely important, and all the theories and concepts of professionalism are important. Some traditional values are essential—but I question the utility of others. My senior leaders are going to have to accept that my views as an officer in the 1980s are different from theirs. I view myself as a "professional," but frequently I get the impression that senior officers do not view me as such. Until they can give me some specifics, I will continue to feel that they do not know what they really want.
The era of the situational professional calls for a new insight and understanding of what is influencing and motivating the junior officer. The junior officer of today is walking on a thinner tightrope than the junior officer of yesterday. Historically, the military and its role in society have never been popular. Public support of the military, economic problems, etc., will continue as major influences on the career decision-making processes of our junior officers. Studies support the premise that Moskos’s concepts of occupationalism and institutionalism are not zero sum concepts.4 Rather, these two classifications should be viewed as independent dimensions. In a University of Maryland study on the Army, presented at the 1979 Southeast Regional Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, the authors concluded:
What our analysis seems to suggest is that the Army may not have to choose between institutional and corporate models. Rather, it may be able to make good use of both . . There may be no harm in making service in the Army a job, as long as it is not just a job.5
In the article, "An Empirical Examination of the Moskos Institution-Occupation Model," the author states: "that there is room for ‘pragmatic professionalism’ among military members . . . it can exist with traditional values and norms associated with the military."6 The University of Maryland study indicates that career intent and job satisfaction positively correlate to institutional values. The junior officers responded to career intent in the following way:
I Plan to Stay in the Air Force at Least 20 Years
|
Strongly |
Agree |
Neutral |
Disagree |
Strongly |
|
26% |
39% |
29% |
5% |
2% |
When the SOS officers were asked to rank in order the factors influencing them to stay in the Air Force (covered later), job satisfaction was, by far, the number one reason. The University of Maryland study concludes: "In the military, instead of simply talking about institutional and occupational orientations we perhaps need to talk about different balances of these two orientations as appropriate for different levels of and perhaps for different types of service units."7 We can expect the junior officers will support either of these concepts at any one time and that this should not be considered negatively. Most junior officers desire a fulfilling career in the USAF, but the commitment involves many influencing factors.
Sir John Hackett, in The Profession of Arms, points out that military professionals are expected to "get out there and get killed if that’s what it takes." But as Arthur J. Dyck states in his article, "Ethical Bases of the Military Profession," much of the expertise that officers require and many of the tasks of the military are not directly related to anything we could call the management of violence.8 When the SOS Class 81-A was asked, Do you have combat experience? 84 percent had no experience, 10 percent had been stationed in a combat area but had no direct combat experience, and only 6 percent were directly involved in combat. While the surveyed officers saw their actual behavior as being professional, this was/and is an "untested" junior officer force. Senior leaders, speaking from the frame of reference of combat experience, may find it hard to relate to today’s company grade officer.
An area that has received criticism from senior leaders is that junior officers are technicians and are "too specialized."9 As noted, in every Air Force specialty code (AFSC) group the majority of officers felt they were specialists. Seventy-six percent of the operations group felt they were specialists. Because of the increased technological needs of the Air Force, a climate has been created that emphasizes specialization. This study showed that the junior officers surveyed identify with the people in their career field and the people they work with more than they identify with the officer corps. These officers are rated on their job performance and are influenced and motivated by job satisfaction. A great deal of emphasis is placed on the company grade officer in the area of job performance. For example, in the operations group, evaluation of individual and crew performance is critical in maintaining weapon system proficiency. The career progression of operations officers is directly related to how well the officers perform.
As technology drives the Air Force, so it creates more and more specialist functions. "The specialist must resist the temptation to become an advocate of only the requirements of his specialty. . . ."10 The need for highly trained specialists in the specialized areas can create a unique allegiance to the local command and to the functional area.11 This may explain why junior officers have a low relationship to the officer corps and identify more closely with the people in their career field and in their workplace.
As noted, specialization tends to give one a narrow view of one’s role. However, 90 percent of the officers surveyed felt that being a specialist did not detract from their being professional military officers. The majority of officers surveyed had had only one or two assignments and five years of active duty service. A generalist officer is one who probably has technical knowledge in more than one area and command and staff experience as well. One can make a strong argument, then, for maintaining the "broadening experience" of professional military education. Attending a school like Squadron Officer School or Air Command and Staff College removes officers from their specialized roles and enables them to broaden their perspectives, increase their knowledge of the officer corps, and prepare for responsibilities beyond the scope of narrow career specialties.
Surprisingly, the analysis of the Operations career group (see Chart I) revealed that these officers had a significantly lower sense of duty, corporate identification, and institutional alignment than officers in the Support group. Although it might have been speculated that the Operations group would have a higher sense of duty and a greater corporate feeling because of their closeness to the overall mission of the Air Force, this did not prove to be true. This finding counters the hypothesis that by being closer to combat organizations, sharing unique hardships, and wearing the unique patches and scarves of the operation units, the institutionalism, corporateness, and sense of duty would be greater than that of the support areas.12 It should be noted that while actual combat experience can produce higher duty, corps, and institutional values, just being a member of an operations unit does not have the same effect. Again the cross-tabulations showed the high percentage of officers who feel they are specialists.
Although I cannot present conclusive reasons, my many discussions with operational officers have provided insights that may affect these findings. Operational officers felt that their job skills were important, but a highly proficient performance was the expected norm and, therefore, received little recognition. If an officer did poorly on a checkride or other evaluation, that officer would receive a perceived open and unjust amount of criticism. The officers also felt that due to budget restrictions, maintenance problems, parts availability problems, etc., there was little opportunity perform in a combat-simulated environment. There was a perceived lack of interaction with their senior leaders in the form of USAF career counseling or job performance feedback. More one-to-one interaction between senior and junior officers might alleviate areas of perceived inequities and reduce differences in attitudes and values. Another possible explanation for lower sense of duty, etc., displayed by the operations group relates to the very nature of operations. For example, the operators are at the cutting edge of the USAF mission and may not be conscious of the vast supporting elements behind them. The support officers, on the other hand, may be more conscious of inherently supportive role in the ultimate mission of the operators.
Samuel P. Huntington states that "an officer corps is professional only to the extent to which its loyalty is to the military ideal."3 In other words, individual officers within the corps must understand the standards that comppse the military ideal required of professionals. The problem, however, is that no one is quite sure what the "military ideal" actually is. As this research has shown, almost all who were surveyed consider themselves to be professional—exemplifying the military ideal—yet they also exhibit numerous behavior traits that relate to occupationalism.
I Consider Myself a "Professional" Military Officer
|
Strongly |
Agree |
Neutral |
Disagree |
Strongly |
|
44% |
51% |
4% |
1% |
0% |
If professional military education is the solution, it would appear that the study of professionalism could become a double-edged sword. Since no consensus on the meaning of the word exists, there is danger in making the lack of definition obvious through class discussion, thereby weakening the "aura" surrounding the concepts of professionalism. Like "integrity," we all claim to have it until specific challenges are thrust upon us. Professionalism is a term that will set heads nodding in agreement. It is a term that is frequently used in juxtaposition to the "moral decay" of occupationalism.
For those senior leaders concerned with the perceived decline in the "level of USAF professionalism," it might be well to relay to their audiences, in specific terms, exactly what they mean when they decry the "lack of professionalism" in the junior officer corps. Individuals cannot effectively relate to professionalism unless the discussion is directed to the types of factors identified in this survey. For example, when a general officer (or any officer) exhorts his audience to "maintain our high standards of professionalism" or claims that junior officers are less professional than they should be, he has failed to communicate for two reasons: He does not share a common definition of professionalism with his audience, and he has not identified the specific issues that support the statement(s).
To communicate effectively, the speaker or writer must identify the specific issues; e.g., a working spouse normally exerts pressures on an officer that run counter to traditional professionalism: willingness to go where the personnel people send you, willingness to work long hours and weekends, etc. If children are involved, there will be times when the officer must "take up the slack" in child rearing, necessitating absences from the office to take children to doctor’s appointments, etc. The responses of the junior officers support the conclusion that meaningful communication in this area has not yet taken place.
Some suggest that we may be facing a generation of officers whose metamorphosis into the professional officer role is unlike that of the generations before them. Morris Massey has stated:
The focus should not be so much on how to change other people to conform to our standards, our values. Rather, we must learn how to accept and understand other people in their own right, acknowledging the validity of their values, their behaviors.14
Senior leaders may have to reevaluate the Huntington term "managers of violence" associated with traditional values of the military officer. Instead, a substitute term, "the situational professionalism," might better describe the junior officers of today’s Air Force.
Four groupings of Air Force specialty codes were analyzed to provide a more specific picture of the attitudes of officers in different career fields. The four groups determined significant for this analysis are categorized as Operations, Professional, Scientific, and Support. The Operations area includes officers who are primarily pilots, navigators, and missile officers. These officers represent a group that is closest to the weapon systems, weapon system training, and the combat mission. The Professional group consists of officers whose career fields most closely match those of the civilian professions, such as law and medicine, and fields, such as chemistry, physics, and engineering; it should be noted that the Professional and Scientific groups were small, with 18 and 28 officers respectively. (The validity of their responses when compared to those of the other groups is questionable.)
Chart I. Air Force specialty code groupings
Sense of Duty
| Low | Neutral | High | Total | |
| Operations | 14% | 47% | 40% | 101% |
| Professional | 11% | 33% | 56% | 100% |
| Scientific | 11% | 50% | 40% | 101% |
| Support | 10% | 32% | 59% | 101% |
Institution vs Occupation
| Occupation | Neutral | Institution | Total | |
| Operations | 10% | 61% | 30% | 101% |
| Professional | 6% | 44% | 50% | 100% |
| Scientific | 8% | 54% | 39% | 101% |
| Support | 5% | 47% | 49% | 101% |
Corporateness
| Low | Neutral | High | Total | |
| Operations | 42% | 42% | 17% | 101% |
| Professional | 28% | 39% | 33% | 100% |
| Scientific | 25% | 54% | 21% | 100% |
| Support | 28% | 44% | 27% | 199% |
Specialist vs Generalist
| Generalist | Neutral | Specialist | Total | |
| Operations | 1% | 23% | 76% | 100% |
| Professional | 0% | 50% | 50% | 100% |
| Scientific | 4% | 36% | 61% | 101% |
| Support | 2% | 35% | 33% | 100% |
The Support group is made up of the remaining AFSCs. Chart I data show the results when the AFSC groups were cross-tabulated against the four categories.
Ramstein Air Base, Germany
Notes
1. Joseph R. Daskevich and Paul A. Nafziger, Majors, USAF, "The Pulse of Professionalism," Air Command and Staff Report No. 0520-80 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1980).
2. David S. Broder, Changing of the Guard: Power and Leadership in America (New York, 1980), p. 22.
3. Adam Yarmolinsky, "What Future for the Professional in American Society?" Daedalus, Winter 1978, p. 167.
4. Michael J. Stahl, "An Empirical Examination of the Moskos Institution-Occupation Model," Armed Forces and Society, Winter 1980, pp. 257-69.
5. David R. Segal et al., "Institutional and Occupational Values in the US Military," Unpublished paper presented at the 1979 Southeast Regional Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 3-5 June 1979, p. 28.
6. Stahl, p. 269.
7. Segal, p. 27.
8. Arthur J. Dyck, "Ethical Bases of the Military Profession," Parameters, March 1980, p. 39-46.
9. Major Thomas S. Allman, USAF, "External Evaluation for Curriculum Development at Squadron Officer School," Air Command and Staff Report No. 0055-80 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1980), p. 16.
10. Franklin D. Margiotta, The Changing World of the American Military (Boulder, Colorado, 1978), p. 269.
11. Ibid., p. 283.
12. Ibid., pp. 432-33.
13. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957), p. 74.
14. Morris Massey, The People Puzzle (Reston, Virginia, 1979), p. 21.
Contributor
Captain James H. Slagle (B.S., University of Illinois; M.A., University of Oklahoma; M.S., Troy State University) is Chief, Ground Launch Cruise Missile Procedures and Requirements Branch, Ramstein AB, Germany. He was previously Chief of the Training Division, Squadron Officer School, and held assignments in the missile field including instructor, teaching Titan II flight control, guidance, and electronic systems. Captain Slagle is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command Staff College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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