Air University Review, November-December 1981

The Utility of Military Forces

The utility of military forces is often seen as limited to the tasks that provide the principal bases for force structure and budget, e.g., deterrence of strategic nuclear war and meeting NATO responsibilities. Essential as these tasks are, they incompletely identify the spectrum of utility of military forces in supporting national objectives. Recognition of this spectrum will contribute to both a better understanding of military forces needed and development of strategies for their direction. In developing this thesis, I emphasize the different rather than the familiar; historical examples are used to explain ideas. I take comfort in Clausewitz’s view that "Historical truth is not even essential . . ."¹ for such use.

The purpose of military forces is self-evident: to support their nation’s policies and objectives. However, the utility of these forces in accomplishing this purpose is not self-evident. Thomas Schelling and Clausewitz offer commonly held views on the utility of military forces. Schelling maintains that,

In addition to seizing and holding, disarming and confining, penetrating and obstructing, and all that, military force can be used to hurt…. The power to hurt can be counted among the most impressive attributes of military force.²

Clausewitz held that:

Force—that is, physical force, . . . is thus the means of war; to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare.³

I do not suggest that these authors are incorrect or that their views are atypical. I do suggest that there are alternate ways to describe how military forces support national objectives and policies and that these forces have a broader spectrum of utility than is implied by these quotations.

The process through which a nation supports its policies and objectives clarifies the role of military forces in this process. I believe that the behavioral scientists have a contribution to make in understanding this process. Relationships between nations, hostile and pacific, share characteristics with relationships between individuals: a need to effect change or work together to meet objectives. In this context the process nations use to support their policies and objectives is similar to that used by individuals—the process of influencing human behavior and, more precisely, the behavior of specific individuals. If this is the process of the nation-state, military forces must be able to contribute to it. My central point is that the utility of military forces is not described by its application to a large impersonal structure, force or nation. The utility is described by its contribution to the process of the nation-state influencing the behavior of specific individuals or groups of individuals.

In a nation-state context, France was once influenced by influencing Charles de Gaulle. President Kennedy, during the Cuban missile crisis, sought to influence the behavior of an individual, Premier Khrushchev. Obviously, if we wish to influence individuals, we must know who they are, who or what influences them, their values, interests, and objectives. "The personalities of statesmen and soldiers are such important factors that in war, above all, it is vital not to underrate them."⁴

The process used to support a nation’s policies and objectives is that of influencing the behavior of discrete, frequently identifiable, individuals. These individuals, limited in number, bring values and interest to the matter at issue. Nations seek to identify means that will bear on these values and interests in a way that will effect the desired behavior.

For example, in 1935 Italy under Mussolini invaded Ethiopia. The League of Nations wished to take action to cause a change in this behavior. The means selected—an oil embargo—has as its proximate objective the domestic economy in Italy. However, the real objective was to influence the values of an individual, Mussolini. The League sought to place at risk an interest—domestic economy—thought to be of relatively greater value to him than territorial conquest in Ethiopia. If successful, the League’s action would have resulted in change in Mussolini’s values and priorities with a resultant change in behavior.

The utility of, as well as the need for, military forces is described by their contribution to the process of effecting a change in behavior which supports their nation’s policies and objectives.

Military forces have the potential to influence behavior in two different ways: first, presence, the existence and perceived capabilities of military forces influence the way people and nations behave; second, the use of military forces can influence behavior.

Presence

A nation can seek to support its policies and objectives through the presence of military forces. Our forces in Berlin have this effect. A nation can, through presence alone, express concern. During the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, it appeared that the Soviets might deploy forces to Egypt. As a way of expressing our concern about such a deployment, U.S. Armed Forces, including strategic offensive forces, were placed on increased alert.

Through the presence of military forces, and even their mere existence, nations can advance political objectives. As an example, the Soviets speak of the change in the correlation of forces. In their descriptions of these changes, they cite specifically the role that has been played by their armed forces in effecting this change. In negotiations, the presence of military forces affects attitudes and incentives on both sides.

The presence and capabilities of forces can serve as a deterrent to war. Nations seek to structure forces so that adversaries understand that the cost of their employment would exceed the value of challenging them.

The classical military strategists specifically recognize the utility of presence even in war. Sun Tzu wrote, "To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."⁵ Clausewitz recognized, in an atypical statement, ". . . that engagements do not always aim at the destruction of opposing forces, that their objectives can often be attained without any fighting at all. . . ."⁶ In context he seems to recognize this possibility only "when one force is a great deal stronger than the other. . . ."⁷ Liddell Hart sees the true aim of strategy as ". . . not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this."⁸

Although presence affords a range of options, at the same time it presents a series of limitations—limitations that must be recognized by nations which hold deterrence through presence as a fundamental objective of their national security policy.

The first limitation of presence is that its power depends on perceptions. A nation cannot unilaterally establish its effectiveness; it is only as good as some other party permits it to be. For example, in the 1850s, Commodore Matthew Perry sailed into Tokyo Bay and, through this action, brought the Japanese to open their ports to U.S. trade. Implicit in Perry’s presence was, perhaps, a threat that his ships might be employed. The Japanese elected to yield—induced to do so by their perception of the meaning of the presence of Perry and his ships. Perry did not establish his capability; the Japanese accorded it to him.

A second limitation is that the effectiveness accorded will vary widely, based on the importance of the issue involved. While Perry had success in opening Japanese ports, it is difficult to believe that he would have been as successful in, for example, obtaining the displacement of the emperor.

A third limitation is that there is no necessary correlation between what we wish to say through military presence and how that message is heard by others. The Soviets may say that their presence in Angola serves only to support national independence. What we hear can be quite different, e.g., a Soviet attempt to gain political influence in Africa south of the Sahara. Military presence can be ambiguous. This ambiguity can be a source of both strength and weakness. We must recognize the potential for misunderstanding.

Finally, the crucial component in relying on presence to influence behavior is that the presence must be credible. During the last war between India and Pakistan, we deployed a large naval force into the Indian Ocean. India ignored it. She seemed not to believe that we would ever bring it to bear. Credibility is bounded by the perception and the reality of the national will to bring forces to bear. Obviously, in many of these cases it was not mere presence that influenced behavior but rather the implicit or explicit option for the effective employment of these forces.

Use of Military Forces

The potential represented by the use of military forces dominates the literature. There is a spectrum of uses for military forces.

Forces can be moved or positioned as a way of influencing behavior. The movement of ships through the Formosa Strait and the positioning of tactical aircraft on Formosa once sought to influence both the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China. Changes in location of United States forces during the Cuban missile crisis sought to influence Premier Khrushchev.

Military forces can be employed over a wide range of contingencies, e.g., from the rescue of hostages through general nuclear war.

Military forces, through either presence or use, can yield a spectrum of results.

• Military forces can permit or encourage things to occur. Military forces are not inherently hostile in nature, but rather can serve a broader purpose, one which contributes to a stability within which both our friends and our nation can prosper. For example, the presence of U.S. military forces in Japan has made a contribution to their stability. The Japanese do not face an overt threat; our contribution is not so much that of deterrence as of assistance in developing a feeling of confidence and security that has better permitted and fostered development.
• Military forces can cause things to occur, as Commodore Perry caused things to occur in Japan.
• Military forces can prevent something from happening, e.g., the functions of deterrence and defense.
• Military forces can compel something to occur: e.g., we compelled the Japanese to surrender; the Germans compelled the French to sue for peace.

There is a spectrum of "hows" to attain these results.

Make an action desirable or possible. Through NATO we have made it possible for the Western Europeans to have an increased sense of security and confidence.

Send a message. We sought to send a message by deploying the fleet at the time of the Indian-Pakistani War.

Make an action hazardous. The increased alert of our armed forces during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War sought to make greater Soviet involvement in the war hazardous.

Make the enemy’s task difficult or expensive. This is the classic strategy of attrition, it is " . . . usually employed by a strategist whose means are not great enough to permit pursuit of the direct overthrow of the enemy and who therefore resorts to an indirect approach."⁹ A fundamental characteristic of this alternative is that its effectiveness cannot be established by those who select it. This judgment is made by those subjected to this strategy. Only they can judge when the task is too difficult or too expensive.

Make something impossible. A subset of this potential is the classic concept of annihilation. It is Russell Weigley’s view that the American way of war is annihilation,¹⁰ the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces—an option available only to strategists relatively rich in manpower and resources. However, there are other ways to make an enemy’s task impossible. For example, in World War II, if the U.S. Navy had had adequate numbers of submarines and fewer limitations on torpedo performance, they might have made it impossible for the Japanese to maintain their overseas bases. The use of air power against Germany in World War II came very close to making it impossible for the Germans to maintain and support their forces.

The really unique characteristic of this concept is that its realization lies in the hands of its advocate. Unlike making something difficult, the adversary does not get a vote. If you are successful in making the adversary’s task impossible, then, by definition, he has no effective counter. The decision lies in your hands, not his. No other concept provides this assurance. As the World War II examples suggest, this can be a feasible objective.

As a further example, a successful Soviet civil defense program could make impossible the execution of a mutual assured destruction strategy. Similarly, if the Soviets believed they bad an effective civil defense program, whether they did or not, this could make impossible a deterrent strategy based on mutual assured destruction.

I have argued that the process through which nations support their policies and objectives is that of influencing the behavior of a limited number of people. The utility of military forces is described by their contribution to this process. Military forces offer two potentials, presence and use, as their contribution. There is a spectrum of results available from these potentials: permit, cause, deter, and compel. There is also a spectrum of ways to achieve these results by sending a message, by making something desirable, hazardous, difficult, or impossible. The examples below use this framework to illustrate the contribution of military forces to national policies and objectives.

In the 1930s, the Germans used military force to occupy the Rhineland. The result sought was to compel the French and the British to acknowledge German presence and domain over this piece of real estate. They did this by sending a message to the French and the British that the Germans were determined to assert sovereignty over the Rhineland and at the same time to convey that it would be hazardous for the French and the British to resist.

In the 1960s, the United States used force in response to an internal crisis in the Dominican Republic; the result sought was to prevent an overthrow of the existing government. Through the use of force, we made it difficult, if not impossible, for the rebel forces to succeed in their objective.

In 1948, the Soviets sought through the presence of their forces in Germany to compel a change in existing status of allied forces in the city of Berlin. They sought to make it impossible for the allies to sustain their forces in this isolated city.

In describing the utility of military forces, I accept that the concepts advanced are not unique to these forces. They are similarly applicable to other means available to meet a nation’s policies and objectives. It could hardly be otherwise. All means are applied in a common process, that of influencing behavior. This commonality of process compels a commonality of concept in application of the unique attributes of the various means. My purpose has been to seek a better understanding of scope of the utility of military forces to provide a broader basis for the development of both their capabilities and strategies for their direction.

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, New Jersey, 1976), p. 171.

2. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven and London, 1966), p. 2.

3. Clausewitz, p. 75.

4. Ibid., p. 94.

5. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York, 1963), p. 77.

6. Clausewitz, p. 96.

7. Ibid.

8. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy (New York, 1967), p. 339.

9. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New York, 1974), p. xxii.

10. Ibid.

Lieutenant General Raymond B. Furlong, USAF (Ret) (B.S., Ursinus College; M.B.A., Harvard University) is presently a graduate student at Auburn University), is presently a graduate student at Auburn University. Following his retirement from the Air Force, he was Assistant Director for Finance, Alabama Commission on Higher Education. General Furlong was Commander, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, when he retired from active duty after a 35-year military career. He is a previous contributor to the Review and other military and professional journal.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor