An Air Force Research and Development Corps

A manning crisis in any particular Air Force career area inevitably leads to a suggestion, at least at the grassroots level, to create a specialty corps. A specialty corps is a group of officers who wear the military uniform but who are handled separately from line officers. In my view, the best example is probably the medical corps. Observation of the career aspects of medical corps duty, specifically as they apply to physicians, leads me to the common perception that the corps concept has three major benefits: rapid advancement in rank, absence of up-or-out competition for promotion, and monetary bonuses. Before examining these perceived benefits, one might ask how this relates to research and development (R&D).

The Problem and Its Causes

R&D manning problems have not yet reached crisis proportions, but the trends are in that direction. General Alton D. Slay, Commander, Air Force Systems Command, has noted that the scientific and engineering career fields are seriously undermanned and the situation is getting worse.¹(Admittedly, there is a difference between the terms scientific and engineering and research and development, but, in the context of this discussion, they are considered interchangeable terms since most statistics pertain to the scientific and engineering category.) Statistics provided by the Air Force Manpower and Personnel Center support General Slay’s remark. The scientific career area (26xx) is 88 percent manned in the grades of second lieutenant through lieutenant colonel, and the engineering area (28xx less test pilots) stands at 86 percent.²The accompanying table shows approximate retention rates for R&D officers with 4 through 11 years of service.³

26xx: FY77 = 37%

FY78 = 33%

FY79 = 29%

28xx: FY77 = 40%

FY78 = 37%

FY79 = 33%

The Air Force Recruiting Service may be able to stop-gap the crisis with large numbers of second lieutenants, but the recruiting news is not good either. Despite an FY79 goal of 698 scientists and engineers, only 422 entered active duty.⁴The goal for FY80 was 864, and recruiting service faces an even tighter market.

The market for engineers is a special problem. In the last 20 years, production of engineers in the United States has ranged from approximately 40,000 to 50,000 per year,⁵but the U.S. economy now generates a need for approximately 55,000 new engineers each year.⁶ Consequently, it is not surprising that engineers received the highest average salaries among recent recipients of bachelor’s degrees.⁷ Lieutenant General Andrew P. Iosue, Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Personnel, told the Air Force Times: "We pay a 2Lt about $12,000, whereas industry usually starts a graduate at $20,000."⁸ General Slay described the problem in these remarks:

Admittedly, the R&D career area faces a serious manning problem, but any proposed solution should address the causes of the problem rather than the symptoms.

Researchers have conducted surveys to determine the factors that cause scientists and engineers to leave the Air Force. Interestingly, the survey responses varied when the questions were phrased positively and negatively. When the question was, "What would motivate you to stay in the Air Force?" the answers included job satisfaction, fair performance evaluations, family values, etc.¹⁰ But when a Hq USAF survey asked the question both ways ("What would motivate you to stay?" and "What would motivate you to separate?"), the answer to the first question was job satisfaction, while the answer to the second question was pay."¹¹

The lure of higher pay is a powerful motivator and may be the key to recruiting and retention efforts. Major Gerald Winchell noted significant improvement in recruiting during the 1950s, when Congress implemented a combination of rank and pay incentives to attract physicians to military service, but there was no comparable improvement when rank only was used as an incentive for lawyers.¹²Many people who have studied the current manning situation conclude that pay is the key problem. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird blames the "deplorable state of military pay and benefits for the recruiting and retention problems in all US military services." Representative Paul S. Trible, Jr., (R-Va.) states, "In the past few years, the military has lost increasingly great numbers of … engineers … who are vital to our national defense. And I believe our military compensation system is the most important reason. . . ." Representative Marjorie S. Holt (R-Md.) and former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown both state that pay is the key issue in our retention problems.¹³

Another problem commonly discussed among R&D officers is forced attrition caused by the promotion process, more commonly known as "up or out." This problem includes two issues: the strength of the career irritant manifested in the threat of up or out and the actual losses caused by the process. Richard J. Mosbach and Thomas J. Scanlan specifically tested for the importance of the threat of up or out as a career irritant and found that it is insignificant.¹⁴I experienced several difficulties in trying to find reliable statistics regarding actual losses. For one thing, the separation process underwent a radical change a few years ago. Normally, the Air Force eliminates officers twice deferred for promotion. During a few promotion cycles in the post-Vietnam drawdown, however, Reserve officers once deferred to temporary major were separated unless they applied for one-year extensions to be eligible for another chance at promotion. Most of the applications for extension were approved. Thus, are once-deferred Reserve officers considered as forced out if they separate? And it is difficult to define a career R&D officer in computer language. For example, a permanently grounded pilot may have worked in R&D for one and a half years at the time of promotion deferral. To what extent was the deferral based on performance in rated versus R&D duties? In any event, forced attrition has apparently played a very minor part in R&D manning. With an authorized strength of 5540 R&D officers (26xx and 28xx excluding test pilots), only 80 officers with a primary Air Force specialty code (AFSC) of 26xx or 28xx were separated because they were not selected for promotion in FY78 and FY79 combined.¹⁵Nevertheless, anyone who has participated in career motivation conferences or has read the letters to the editor of the Air Force Times is aware that up or out is a highly emotional issue of great concern to at least a vocal minority.

Many causes could be listed for R&D manning problems, but they would be less significant. While no one proposes corps formation as a cure for job dissatisfaction, family values, etc., some people view the corps concept as a way of resolving these two major issues, pay and up or out. However, an examination of the corps concept in terms of its three perceived benefits (rapid attainment of rank, elimination of up or out, and monetary bonuses) shows that it does not actually address the causes of the problem.

Advantages and Disadvantages
of a Specialty Corps

One should consider two aspects in the rapid attainment of rank, both highlighted by the medical corps: higher than the usual rank awarded at commissioning and more rapid advancement to promotion phase points. The purpose of commissioning a physician in a grade higher than second lieutenant is to bring the individual in line with his or her age group.¹⁶ For example, a physician who completes five years of medical school and internship enters active duty as a captain, the same grade attained by an undergraduate contemporary after five years on active duty.

As a rule, this policy would not help scientists and engineers because they generally enter the Air Force with bachelor degrees. Another aspect of the rank issue, promotion phase points, involves the very complex officer promotion process, an area involving the temporary and permanent systems, regular and reserve commissions, public law, and Air Force policy. But, simply stated, there is no direct cause-and-effect relationship between promotion phase points and the corps concepts. The corps is simply a much smaller group that may have different characteristics from the line and, hence, may precipitate a different promotion situation.

Second, the formation of a specialty corps does not guarantee avoidance of the up-or-out promotion system. Although boards with an authorized maximum quota of 100 percent have recently promoted scarce physicians to major, they remained under the up-or-out system. No matter what the quota, an officer is not promoted unless fully qualified for the next grade. Two successive deferrals in the permanent promotion system would result in mandatory separation or retirement, as appropriate.¹⁷ But the very separateness of the corps concept offers a potential promotion advantage. Since each corps can promote its people independently of the line officers, it has the theoretical ability to promote up to 100 percent of its eligible officers when the situation permits. Of course, line officers can also be promoted up to 100 percent if the situation permits, but that possibility is not as likely in the vast line as in a much smaller corps.

Third, there is no need to create a corps merely to facilitate bonuses. Fliers (line officers) have received aviation career incentive pay (flight pay) for some time, and serious proposals are currently under consideration at high levels for an engineering bonus without a concomitant corps.¹⁸

Thus, one might conclude that the three main benefits are not really as significant as they at first appear and discard the corps concept out of hand. But there are persuasive arguments favoring a corps. For one thing, the corps concept is a logical career management alternative for certain specialties. For example, physicians are so highly trained and specialized that they would rarely, if ever, be used in other career fields. It just does not make sense to require medical officers to compete with, say, aircraft maintenance officers for promotion. Furthermore, scientists and engineers are similar to physicians in several respects. In the first place, both career areas rank among the top four occupations in terms of the intelligence quotients of their practitioners.¹⁹Both professions spend much time in reading highly technical journals to keep abreast of new developments within their respective fields. And one expects such professionals to be highly competent in their fields. This relationship for R&D officers is stated quite clearly in AFR 80-3, Management of Air Force In-House Research and Development Laboratories: "Laboratory Directors will be the best qualified persons available in their fields," and they will be "appointed partly on the basis of their technical qualifications.…"²⁰

However, before accepting these arguments, one should examine the disadvantages of a corps. One disadvantage that comes quickly to mind is the separation of weapon system planners from the mainstream of Air Force operations. To avoid this phenomenon, the corps could be limited to pure R&D.

An exclusive R&D corps would include only officers who work in or manage laboratory research and development in the scientific and engineering career fields. It would not include officers in program management, acquisition program management, or experimental test pilot fields. Nor would it include officers in the scientific and engineering fields when they are assigned to operational commands or work in stages of the system acquisition process beyond pure R&D.

Two unique factors make the pure R&D corps an important concept. First, it precludes isolation of weapon system planners from the mainstream of Air Force operations. Some sources are concerned that thinkers and users are already too widely separated. Richard W. Haffner noted that there is no substitute for the "coupling function" provided by scientific/engineering officers between Air Force and civilian contractors.²¹ And, on the same theme, General Slay recently commented: "The need is very great for engineers who understand the various disciplines; who can ride herd on contractors."²²Obviously, the "couplers" or "herders" must have a feeling for Air Force needs, and they could not develop this feeling in an R&D laboratory.

Second, a pure R&D corps concept conforms with overall Air Force policy on manpower utilization. This policy defines three basic kinds of functions—combat, direct combat support, and indirect combat support—and indicates that persons in the last category need not be military.²³Therefore, if R&D is defined as indirect combat support, one might ask whether R&D positions could be civilianized. Obadiah Dugan studied that question in depth and concluded with a qualified yes.²⁴Although one may disagree with Dugan’s arguments, it does seem clear that if a case can be made for civilianization, a case can also be made for a corps.

This concept for an R&D corps, however, implies a number of unique problems. For one thing, it might mean that line officers and corps officers with the same skills would perform in adjacent areas. This would surely create confusion, requests for changes from line to corps and vice versa, and a general sense of unfairness in the promotion process. Another problem would be the reduction in management prerogatives in the selection of future leaders. A primary element of the corps concept is that the command authority of officers designated to perform specialized functions is

generally limited to this function.²⁵Still another problem would be reduced crossflow opportunity caused by fragmenting the career paths of officers qualified in R&D. Finally, the corps concept represents another step toward management by specialty. Management by specialty works well for enlisted personnel because, theoretically, they are technicians. But officers are leaders, and Air Force policy is to select the best leaders available for rank/command regardless of their specialties.

An R&D corps would provide a possible advantage in promotion rates and a practical career path for R&D officers, but it would create several unique problems. These problems are more numerous and more concrete than the advantages. Furthermore, establishment of a corps would do nothing to ameliorate the key problem in the career field: the military/civilian pay differential. Therefore, to return to the question, Do we need an Air Force research and development corps? The answer is no.

1. General Alton D. Slay, transcript of a panel discussion on "Air Force Graduate Education in the 1980s," Air Force Institute of Technology, 16 November 1979.

2. Telephone conversation with Major Dennis A. Bernia, Hq AFMPC/MPCROS5, 12 December 1979.

3. Telephone conversation with Major Mike Tinney, Hq AFMPC/MPCF. 14 March 1980. These figures are "normalized" to show early separations as though they had occurred at the end of the scheduled tour of active duty. Note also that the figures are projections of retention rates in years 4-11 should current separation rates continue.

5. Standard Education Almanac, 1978-79, eleventh edition (Chicago: Marquis Academic Media, 1978), p. 42.

6. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook, 1978-79, U.S. Department of Labor, p. 332.

8. M.L. Craver, "Iosue: Hike Opportunities Look Good," Air Force Times, 29 October 1979, p. 18.

10. For examples of these studies, see Captain Roger M. Vrooman, "An Analysis of Factors Associated with the Job Satisfaction and Career Intent of Air Force Personnel with Less than Six Years of Service," Master’s thesis, Air Force

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, December 1976; and Captain Logan M. Lewis, "Expectancy Theory as a Predictive Model of Career Intent, Job Satisfaction, and Institution-Occupation Orientation among Air Force Officer Scientists and Engineers," Master’s thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, September 1978.

11. M.L. Craver, "Survey Finds Pay Biggest Gripe," Air Force Times, 10 December 1979, p. 18.

12. Major Gerald J. Winchell, "How Can the Retention Rate of Scientific and Development Engineering Officers Be Increased?" Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, June 1965, pp. 25-30.

13. "Pay Held Responsible for Retention Problem," Air Force Times, 4 February 1980, p. 4; Andy Plattner, "Price Wants Boost in Pay and Benefits," Air Force Times, 10 March 1980, p.14; Richard C. Barnard, "Carter Tells DOD: Stop Complaining about Pay," Air Force Times, 17 March 1980, p. 16.

14. Major Richard J. Mosbach and Captain Thomas J. Scanlan, Jr., "An Investigation of the Factors which Affect the Career Intentions of Air Force Systems Command Company Grade Officers," Masters thesis, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright Patterson AFB, Ohio, December 1979, Executive Summary, p. 9.

16. United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, vol. 2 (St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Company, 1956), pp. 2453-55.

19. Irving Lorge and Raphael D. Blau, "Broad Occupational Grouping by Intelligence Levels," Occupations, March 1942, p. 421.

21. Captain Richard W. Haffner, "A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Air Force Systems Command Scientific and Development Engineering Officers," Research Study (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, Air University, June 1965), p. 122.

23. The USAF Manpower and Personnel Plan, Volume 7 (Washington: Department of the Air Force, 3 August 1979), p. 2-1.

24. Major Obadiah A. Dugan, "Is Civil Service the Answer to the US Air Forces Scientific and Engineering Shortage?" Research Study (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, Air University, May 1963).

Major Lauren K. Vaughn (B.S., Syracuse University; MS, Abilene Christian University) is a student FB-IIIA pilot assigned to 4007th Combat Crew Training Squadron, Plattsburgh AFB, New York. Major Vaughn is a Distinguished Graduate of Officer Training School, Squadron Officer School, and Air Command and Staff College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.