Air University Review, July-August 1981

A Narrow Victory

the Berlin blockade and the American military response

The Berlin crisis began in June of 1948 when Soviet Union forces blockaded surface routes between Berlin and Germany’s western zones, thus denying Allied powers free access to the divided city. Despite its monopoly of atomic weapons, the United States had few options. Berlin lay deep inside Soviet-controlled Germany, and the United States maintained approximately two divisions in Europe. In ground strength, Joseph Stalin held the trump cards. Thus, although President Harry Truman refused to use military force to open the surface routes, he resisted Soviet pressure to withdraw Americans from the city and sent 90 B-29 bombers to England. Meanwhile, the Air Force began airlifting food to the western sectors of Berlin. To the surprise of Soviets and Americans alike, Operation Vittles was soon supplying all the necessities for West Berlin. After nearly a year, the Soviets lifted their blockade, leaving the Western position intact. The U.S. response seemed firm, bold, imaginative, correct, and obviously successful.

Yet the victory in fact was a narrow one for three reasons. At the time of the crisis, American military capability was severely limited. Second, military planning was incomplete and inadequately coordinated. Third, the United States had not clearly defined its foreign policy objectives, as reflected by Truman’s cautious response to the crisis.

Much Cold War scholarship has emphasized American intentions in the context of foreign policy. Most historians, despite their varied interpretations, have focused on diplomatic, economic, or political considerations. Few have paid sufficient attention to American military plans for supporting foreign policy objectives or the military capability needed to execute plans. Many scholars have assumed the monopoly of atomic weapons alone demonstrated military preponderance. For a more comprehensive and balanced understanding of the Cold War and the Berlin crisis, in particular, all three factors must be considered together. Until recently, classification restricted scholars from documents needed to examine military planning and capability fully. Now, it is possible to show the critical relationships among military capability, planning, and foreign policy objectives during the Berlin blockade.

In June 1948 American military strength, especially that of the air arm, was unable to meet the threat of Soviet aggression in Western Europe, the Middle East, or in East Asia. The problem stemmed from a shortage of men and materiel and from unrealistic training. The dilemma had begun in the days just following World War II when the American military establishment demobilized. Public will and congressional pressures resulted in a crippling plan that permitted the most experienced servicemen to separate first. The Army Air Forces (AAF), heavily dependent on skilled, experienced technicians, suffered severely. The number of airmen belied actual combat capability; grave shortages existed in all critical skills. By the end of 1946, General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General of the AAF, could claim only two combat effective groups in his entire organization. Thus rebuilding became a key objective in 1947. Some units made important progress, but aging airplanes, rising procurement costs, and small budgets clouded the future.¹

Differences over military strength soon arose between President Truman and the Congress. Both had agreed to initial demobilization plans, but in late 1947 many congressional leaders grew concerned about U.S. military weakness. Truman’s own Air Policy Commission (the Finletter Commission) investigated and concluded that America’s military air power was hopelessly inadequate, and it called for a dramatic increase in procurement funds to build a seventy-group air force.² Several months later, the Congressional Aviation Policy Board (the Brewster Board) reached the same conclusion. Both reports expressed grave concern at U.S. military weakness and supported the Air Force goal of seventy groups. That solution, however, carried costs which neither the President nor Congress wished to impose on the taxpayer. Truman preferred to hold aviation expenditures constant; congressmen looked for budget items that might be reduced to permit more spending for the newly independent Air Force.³

Shortages affected the nation’s air arm in several ways. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) could maintain about 160 operational B-29 bombers; only 27 were modified to carry the larger atomic bomb.⁴ Shortages of planes and skilled manpower impelled the SAC commander, General George C. Kenney, to experiment with a cross-training program designed to use fewer men in each group.⁵ Although SAC worked toward greater efficiency, the command failed to develop a realistic training program. Aircrew skills deteriorated. By the summer of 1948, Air Force leaders seriously questioned the ability of SAC to deploy its aircraft and men quickly and to bomb accurately.⁶ In July the most elite B-29 group, the 509th, averaged a circular error of more than one statute mile when bombing by radar from high altitudes.⁷ In 1948, therefore, SAC’s ability to deliver atomic and conventional weapons was in serious doubt.

The problems SAC and the Air Force faced were compounded by incomplete planning at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) level, where progress had been slow and quarrelsome. Not until May 1948 did the Chiefs agree on an integrated war plan. The Brewster and Finletter reports addressed the JCS failure to develop unified plans and joint procurement practices for all services, noting that future requirements were merely consolidated, not integrated. Thomas K. Finletter later described a telling committee experience. After repeated committee requests to examine the JCS war plan, Admirals William Leahy and Chester Nimitz and Generals Dwight Eisenhower and Hoyt Vandenberg delivered a plan, "pages thick, pages and pages," accompanied by an oral presentation. The committee found the briefing very confusing. After several questions, Eisenhower apologized, "I’m sorry, I guess my mind is worse than I thought it was; I can’t understand what the war plan is." After more fruitless discussion, he continued,

Gentlemen, these five civilian gentlemen who are here are just patriotic American citizens trying to do something they’ve been asked to do by the President. I think we owe it to them to tell them that there is no war plan.⁸

The JCS had failed to develop adequate war plans for several reasons. Demobilization and military reorganization demanded immediate attention and required the time and energies of the military chiefs. But more important, the U.S. government had not clearly outlined post-World War II objectives, so military men formulated plans without sorely needed direction.⁹

Lacking specific guidance, the JCS had begun planning independently in the fall of 1945. The Joint Intelligence Committee estimated what it considered to be the Soviet Union’s immediate foreign policy objective: the establishment and consolidation of Soviet hegemony in areas peripheral to the U.S.S.R. Though American planners doubted the Red Army could wage a major war before 1950 (war damage to Soviet industry was estimated to be 25 percent of the prewar capital stock), they believed the Red Army could overrun one of three areas: continental Europe; Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan; or Korea-Manchuria-North China. If the Soviets initiated war, the best U.S. hopes rested on the use of atomic weapons. The Joint War Plans Committee recognized that "the only weapon which the United States can employ to obtain decisive effects in the heart of the USSR is the atomic bomb delivered by long-range aircraft." The committee estimated that 196 atomic bombs would cause "…such destruction upon the industrial sources of military power in the USSR that a decision could eventually be obtained."¹⁰ The JCS, however, had no detailed plan for executing an atomic attack.

To correct this deficiency, the JCS developed a series of special studies under the name Pincher, to provide the basic data for a joint outline war plan. After successful preliminary work, the JCS directed its Joint War Plans Committee to prepare a joint outline war plan in August 1947, based on the assumption that "…within three years, war would be forced upon the United States by acts of aggression by the USSR and its satellites."¹¹ The committee, however, labored under a cloud of uncertainty. It still lacked a definitive statement of the long-range objectives of the United States or reasonable estimates of the nation’s industrial and manpower mobilization capabilities. Moreover, America’s immediate war aims were not clear. What was the goal? To destroy the Russian peoples, Soviet industry, or the Communist Party and its hierarchy? Equally important, what would be the objectives following victory? The State Department and, after 1947, the National Security Council (NSC) held the responsibility for giving direction in these matters. Neither provided the needed guidance.¹²

Nonetheless, the JCS had formulated a so-called "Over-all Strategic Concept" that gave some general direction to planning. In the event of war, the concept held, the will of the U.S.S.R. had to be destroyed by a main offensive effort in Western Europe and a strategic defense in the Far East. Initially, the United States would launch a powerful offensive against the vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity. By exploiting the destructive and psychological power of atomic weapons, the United States could protect the Western Hemisphere, the United Kingdom, and the Bering Sea-Japan Sea-Yellow Sea line. Other efforts, employing political, psychological, and underground warfare could reduce the Soviet war potential, but atomic weapons held the key.¹³

In late 1947, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee of the JCS incorporated this concept into plan Broiler, which relied principally on atomic attack. The plan presumed that an adequate stockpile of atomic bombs would be available at the outset and more would be produced during hostilities. Given Soviet numerical superiority in manpower and mobilized tactical air power, the best hope for American victory lay in long-range bombing of vital centers of Soviet war-making capacity. The principal strategic targets would he governmental centers, urban industrial areas, and selected petroleum targets within the U.S.S.R.

Clearly the success of the overall strategic concept depended on the effectiveness of the early air offensive, particularly that of aircraft delivering atomic bombs. Forward base areas from which to launch the campaign, specifically the United Kingdom, Japan-Ryukyus, and the Cairo-Suez area, would be critical. The bases had to be secure enough to permit deployment and operations, suitable for use without extensive construction, and logistically supportable. Lastly, they had to lie within range of vital Soviet targets. Early drafts of Broiler considered the Cairo-Suez region a promising forward base area. It lay within reach of most Soviet targets. But planners soon realized that Egyptian bases could not be developed quickly enough to support strategic bombing operations and could be overrun. In the final analysis, English bases offered the best prospects for launching a massive air offensive though other areas would be used as available.¹⁴

The strategic concept and the Broiler plan rested on the critical assumption that atomic weapons would be used in a war with the U.S.S.R. Yet Truman had never given defense leaders firm guidelines on future use of atomic weapons. Although he expressed no regrets over his 1945 decision to bomb Japan, the President did not want to use the atom bomb again.¹⁵ Consequently, he remained vague in his attitude toward its use. Necessary decisions, he believed, could be made when and if the need arose.

The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) posed yet another problem. Composed of five civilian members, the AEC totally controlled the production of atomic weapons; military units designated to deliver atomic bombs were severely restricted in their access to these weapons. Defense officials and military leaders quite naturally objected to this arrangement. SAC; insisted that quick and effective use of atomic weapons depended on familiarity and immediate availability.¹⁶ The generals fully supported the principle of presidential approval for the use of atomic bombs, but they found little reason for a civilian agency to exercise control over the stockpile. Charged with the responsibility for being prepared to launch a prompt retaliatory atomic attack, the Air Force required a strong, highly trained fighting team. General Spaatz argued that,

. . . this fighting team should have available to it for prompt use, when required, such atomic weapons as are available and which are appropriate to its use. It is not clearly evident how this state of immediate readiness can be achieved if atomic weapons remain under the control of the Atomic Energy Commision.¹⁷

The situation was confusing. Planners anticipated the use of atomic bombs in war plans, but they had no assurances from civilian leaders that use of the atomic bomb would be authorized. Military units had neither access to atomic bombs nor a direct voice in their production and disposition.

In addition to these problems, nonmilitary developments in 1947 and early 1948 brought new concerns to defense planners. Substantial economic aid to Western European economies through the proposed Marshall Plan promised to undercut support for Communist parties in those countries. Success, however, might prompt the U.S.S.R. to resort to military action. In 1947, Averell Harriman expressed a commonly held view when he said time was running out for peace in Europe. Communist demonstrations in France and Italy, he warned, indicated more than a tactical maneuver.¹⁸ Later that year, a JCS report voiced similar warnings concerning the increased danger of war as the result of American economic aid. Immediate and firm Soviet action seemed likely since a delay in response would work against the Soviets.¹⁹ During the autumn, the European scene featured strikes and antigovernment demonstrations, while Stalin established the Cominform. The fall of the Czechoslovakian government in February 1948 dramatically confirmed American fears of aggressive Soviet actions and intentions.

In Germany, prior to February 1948, General Lucius Clay had scoffed at the possibility of war with the U.S.S.R. Then he began to notice a serious change in the attitude of every Soviet, "faintly contemptuous, slightly arrogant, and certainly assured."²⁰ In March, he cabled General Omar Bradley, Army Chief of Staff, revealing a growing apprehension:

For many months, based on logical analysis, I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years. Within the last few weeks. I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitudes which I cannot define but which gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness.²¹

On 31 March, preliminary sparring began. The Soviets told the Allied powers that, effective 1 April, military passenger trains en route to Berlin from the West would be stopped and their baggage and passengers checked by Soviet troops. With Washington’s support, Clay continued to move the American trains eastward. The Russians responded by shuttling them onto side tracks. Within days the trains retreated, and the Soviets lifted the restrictions. Some traffic resumed by the end of April, but the issue of U.S. occupation in Berlin remained volatile.²²

Tensions in Germany generated several important actions. Congress approved a $22 million increase in the Air Force budget to permit expansion to 70 air groups, and the JCS planners finally submitted an acceptable integrated war plan to the service chiefs. Truman had unsuccessfully pushed for a $4 billion Universal Military Training Act. Cost would not permit both. Moreover, the President’s scheme was politically distasteful, and it was not clear how an expanded army could bolster the U.S. military position in Western Europe.²³ Congressmen voted instead for an expanded air arm. Shortly thereafter, on 19 May, the Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a short-range emergency war plan called Halfmoon, nearly three years after World War II.²⁴

The authors of Halfmoon continued to operate under the assumption that atomic weapons would be used but admitted that no political guidance had been received. The plan contained the same national war objectives adopted by Broiler six months earlier.²⁵ Halfmoon also acknowledged certain shortcomings; specifically, the authors recognized that the plan did not provide adequate assistance to the countries of Western Europe. In fact, Halfmoon called for Allied forces in Germany to withdraw to the Rhine and offered little support for retaining Middle East bases and oil resources. Planners believed the Mediterranean could be closed to the Allies after a week of hostilities. Therefore, the United Kingdom had to be protected, for its air bases held the key to Allied operations. Like Broiler, the plan called for an early attack against vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity. Strategic Air Command would deploy available units to bases in England and to the Khartoum-Cairo areas and conduct operations from these bases and Okinawa. Atomic weapons and operating bases in Great Britain were the critical elements of the plan.

Halfmoon left important questions unanswered and ignored certain realities. Three weeks after the acceptance of the plan, the Joint Logistics Plans Committee concluded that if war came within the next several months, parts of the planned operation would fail because of logistical deficiencies. The committee doubted if adequate personnel with proper qualifications could be provided to the right units to make a balanced force. Moreover, a serious shortage of aircraft existed, and all three services were short of certain other supply items. The committee suspected that further deficiencies would be uncovered as more detailed planning evolved. Energetic action was needed to correct these deficiencies.²⁶

There was another key shortage: the number of atomic bombs available for delivery. To conduct an air offensive powerful enough to destroy the Soviet war machine, the Russian will to resist, and to protect the United States from attack, General George C. Kenney believed he would need to delivered 200 atomic bombs simultaneously, a figure suggested earlier by the JCS.²⁷ Although the 70-group air force, when reached, would provide the necessary airplanes, the United States did not have 200 atomic bombs and, even worse, did not have sufficient teams to assemble existing weapons. Although efforts were undertaken in 1948 to increase the number of teams, General Vandenberg advised Kenney that it would be 1951 before enough teams would be available (under the projected training program) to dispatch simultaneously 100 bombs of the current design. With the teams available in mid-1948, only two bombs could be assembled per day--hardly the capability needed to destroy the Soviet war machine and its will to fight.²⁸ Simply put, the Air Fore could not deliver the atomic attack so central to Halfmoon.

Despite increased attention to plans after early 1948 and the acceptance of Halfmoon, the United States still had very few options on 24 June when the Soviets established the Berlin blockade. On the 27th, the defense leaders convened in Washington to discuss possible actions. They considered three alternatives: withdrawal, stiff reaction followed by a military response, or the compromise action of remaining in Berlin while striving for diplomatic recognition of U.S. rights in that city. On the following day, they made their recommendations to the President, who had already selected the third alternative.²⁹ Truman elected to stand pat, without any definite reaction plans except for evacuation.

From this high-level meeting came another decision that has misled journalists and historians alike: the deployment of 90 B-29s to Europe in July. Most observers assumed that the deployment demonstrated U.S. willingness to use atomic weapons. In mid-1948, however, only two SAC groups had bombers configured to carry atomic weapons. Only the 509th and the 43rd bomb groups of SAC’s Eighth Air Force had programs in cooperation with the AEC and organized to handle atomic weapons. Neither of these units was deployed overseas. Before the Berlin crisis erupted in June, Fifteenth Air Force had deployed one conventional unit from the 301st to Europe on a normal rotation tour. In July, the President sent the remaining two squadrons from the 301st along with conventional units from Fifteenth Air Fore. Contrary to popular belief, Truman did not send to Europe any atomic weapons or the capability to deliver them in July 1948.³⁰

Soviet leaders may have realized what American observers did not and could have considered Truman’s response a cautious move. It is not clear what information the U.S.S.R. possessed regarding the three deployed groups; Russian knowledge depended on the level of Soviet intelligence within the United States between 1945-48. Enemy order of battle, a primary concern of any military intelligence organization, would have directed Soviet attention to the 509th Composite Group. The 509th had bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki and was now operating from Roswell Field, New Mexico; that much information was commonly available. And, because of an unpleasant U.S. experience in 1944, the Soviets could also surmise that no B-29 modified to carry atomic weapons would overfly territory not controlled by the United States. During the war, two B-29 Superfortresses had landed in Siberia, and the Soviets had refused to return the aircraft to the Americans. Indeed, AAF officials were extremely bitter when the U.S.S.R. subsequently used these bombers as models for its own developing strategic air arm. Therefore, the United States would certainly not risk losing a specially modified B-29 (Silver Plate) and more valuable information; the Soviets could have confirmed this conclusion by observing the 509th. That unit never left the North American continent except for atomic tests in the Pacific, always flying from U.S. controlled bases and territory.³¹ If the Soviets were observing the 509th and 43rd groups during the summer of 1948, they found the former training in Labrador while the latter was testing and converting to the new B-50 in the States. On the other hand, the 301st, the 28th, and the 307th had all rotated units to Europe or Japan during 1947 or 1948, suggesting only conventional capabilities.

Scholars have usually assumed that the B-29 groups dispatched to England possessed an atomic capability and believed Truman showed firm determination by deciding to use these weapons if the need arose. Certainly the public, reporters, and government observers associated the B-29 with automatic capability. But the deployment in fact revealed Truman’s great reluctance to take that critical step. Moreover, it demonstrated that his intentions were unclear, since conventional bombing would have little impact upon the U.S.S.R. If President Truman had wanted to rattle his saber, he would have sent at least one squadron from the 509th. In that event, no one would have had any doubts about potential actions. By deploying groups with conventional capability only, Truman implied that he hoped for a diplomatic settlement. He also gave the Soviets time; ironically, time was the very factor that would make the blockade work and force the Allied powers from Berlin.

Strategic Air Command generals puzzled over the B-29 deployment and considered the action to be a strictly political move, not a show of force.³² Militarily, the deployment left too many unanswered questions. What operational plans would follow? Would atomic weapons eventually enter the picture? The commander of the first squadron arriving in Germany did not even know what bomb-loading configuration to expect; thus, he could not pre-position any weapons. In fact, he suspected that the B-29s would be used for hauling coal in the airlift and expressed relief when spared from this duty.³³ General Kenney chafed at the limited leverage offered by the conventional B-29s, complaining,

The Russians may of course be worried about our 90 B-29s now in Europe, but we don’t seem to be using them as a club. Perhaps in time, the Russians will figure that as long as we don’t mention them around the green table, that they are no good anyhow.³⁴

In Europe, General LeMay realized that "…as far as combat capability was concerned the B-29s weren’t too much good."³⁵

The deployment confused even Secretary of Defense James Forrestal. He believed it impossible to carry out his responsibilities without resolving certain questions. He wanted objectives set down and plans drawn up for the use of conventional or atomic weapons. Forrestal initiated action on 10 July by writing to the President:

I am convinced that the formulation of a sound military program and intelligent decisions concerning the size and character of our future Armed Forces depend upon a prior determination of our basic national objectives, and of the roles which military strength and other nonmilitary activities should play in furthering these objectives.³⁶

At the height of the Berlin crisis, Forrestal was requesting the National Security Council,

. . . to prepare a statement which specifies and evaluates the risks of the future, states our objectives, and outlines the measures to be followed in achieving them.³⁷

The secretary believed that,

. . . such a statement is indispensable to the National Military Establishment in determining the level and character of forces which it should maintain.³⁸

In a memo to the NSC, Forrestal added,

. . . I believe it is imperative that a comprehensive statement of national policy be prepared particularly as it relates to Soviet Russia….³⁹

This correspondence revealed serious flaws in the administration’s conduct of foreign affairs. Containment and the Marshall Plan represented the foundation for America’s Foreign policy in Europe, yet the NSC had not outlined specific actions, policies, or plans in support of Truman’s program. Consequently, the military, with its limited capability, had no detailed responsibilities. Moreover, the generals did not understand clearly the President’s attitude toward use of the atomic bomb, and tile dispatch of conventional B-29s to Europe compounded their confusion.

In seeking more direction, Forrestal and the Air Force reopened the matter of control of the atomic weapons stockpile.⁴⁰ The President agreed to reconsider the issue. On 21 July representatives of the AEC, defense officials, and the military leaders met to discuss the matter. Two days later, Truman advised Forrestal that the AEC would continue to control atomic weapons.⁴¹ A major change in the summer of 1948 could have a negative impact on the forthcoming presidential election; he would reconsider the idea after November.⁴² Thus the Air Force and Forrestal continued to operate without guidance on the conditions under which atomic weapons might be used. The clearest indication came on 13 September during a meeting between the President and Forrestal. The Defense Secretary noted that Truman,

. . . prayed that he would never have to make such a decision, but that if it became necessary, no one need have a misgiving but that he would do so. . .⁴³

Nonetheless, military men at all levels remained unclear about the U.S. role in Western Europe. The JCS continued to revise Halfmoon while the Air Force adopted an emergency plan called Harrow for its forces in Europe. Harrow confused Lieutenant General John K. Cannon, however, when he assumed command of the United States Air Force in Europe in late 1948, and he immediately asked for specific guidance. In a long letter to General Hoyt Vandenberg, he outlined his concern over current operational responsibilities:

Is the basic role of the Air Force in Europe one of occupation or is it one of occupation plus preparation for combat operations on the continent?

The organization as now constituted and as currently disposed, is of very dubious value as a fighting force and cannot be considered adequate even in terms of the broad mission laid down in . . .USAF Plan Harrow. . . .⁴⁴

Cannon wanted to ". . . set up a command capable of combat action in the event of trouble."⁴⁵ He took preliminary steps on his own, realizing that his actions conflicted with the evacuation-of-the-continent concept contained in Harrow. But he believed his efforts followed the lines previously drawn for him by Air Force officials in Washington.

Although Harrow had stressed evacuation, the developing Western Union Defense Plan could change the thrust of U.S. intent, and Cannon wanted clarification.⁴⁶ Not until late November did the NSC finally establish peacetime and wartime objectives in Europe, incorporating them into NSC 20/3 and 20/4.⁴⁷

The Berlin crisis ended in the spring of 1949 after the Soviets realized that the Allied airlift could support West Berlin despite the blockade. Operation Vittles proved to be the big surprise for both sides and the key to success. In retrospect, the margin of victory was close. The United States did not have the capability to halt a Russian military drive into West Berlin or Western Europe; only atomic attack offered any hope of stopping a U.S.S.R. war effort. Military planning for the use of these weapons, however, was incomplete and suffered from poor direction and guidance from its civilian masters; foreign policy objectives were general and beyond the support of existing military capability. Even though defense leaders anticipated a possible confrontation in early 1948, the United States entered the crisis unprepared. Its war plans held little promise for breaking a blockade of Berlin. President Truman, an accomplished poker player, held and played a weak hand. He dispatched 90 conventionally equipped B-29s to England; fortunately his hand was not called. Airlift, not the threat of atomic destruction, brought the United States its narrow victory.

United States Air Force Academy

1. Carl Spaatz, Report of the Chief of Staff USAF to the Secretary of the Air Force (Washington, June 1948), p. 13

2. President’s Air Policy Commission, Survival in an Air Age (Washington, 1948), pp. 24-25.

3. Congressional Aviation Policy Board, National Aviation Policy (Washington 1948), pp. 7-8.

4. Letter, General Clements McMullen to General Ennis C. Whitehead, 31 May 1947, Strategic Air Command, "History of Strategic Air Command 1947" (Offutt AFB, Nebraska: Hq Strategic Air Command, 1949). Hereafter cited as "SAC History, 1947."

5. Letter, General Clements McMullen to General Roger Ramey, 14 March 1947; letter, Carroll L. Zimmerman, Chief Operations Analysis to AC/S, A-3 SAC, subject: Proposed Cross Training Program, 22 August 1947; "SAC History 1947." See also Memorandum for General Kenney from Major General F. H. Smith, 11 August 1948. Record Group 341, DCS/OPNS Administrative Officer, 452.1, "Programming General."

6. Memorandum for General Lauris Norstad from Major General F. H. Smith, 9 August 1948; Record Group 341, DCS/OPNS Administrative Officer, 452.1, "Programming General."

7. "Bombing DATA by Groups of the Strategic Air Command for Month of July 1948," Fairchild Collection, Library of Congress.

8. Oral history interview with Thomas K. Finletter by Colonel Marvin Stanley, February 1967, pp. 35-37. Interview #760, Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell AFB, Alabama.

9. Record Group 341, "COS Operation/Ex. Office T. #28." Memorandum for the Secretary from General Hoyt Vandenberg, subject: Status of Current Joint War and Mobilization Planning, 6 November 1947. Hereafter cited as Record Group 341, COS Operations.

10. Record Group 319, "Records of the Army Staff," ABC Russia, 22 August 1943, Section 1-A. J.I.C. 250/6, "Soviet Capabilities," 29 November 1945.

11. Record Group 341, COS Operations.

12. Ibid.

13. Record Group 218, "Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff," CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), Section 10. JSPG 496/4, "BROILER," 11 February 1948.

14. Ibid.

15. Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), p. 60. Haynes and others believe that Truman did have some private doubts.

16. Letter, General Kenney (SAC A3-77 A5C) to Hq USAF, subject: Requirements for Initiation of Atomic Warfare, 4 June 1948.

17. Memorandum, General Spaatz to General Lewis Brereton, Chairman, Military Liaison Committee to the Atomic Energy Commission, subject: Delivery of Atomic Weapons to the Armed Forces, 3l October 1947, Spaatz Collection, Library of Congress. At the time, the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project was responsible for the storage of such atomic weapons as the President might direct the Atomic Energy Commission to transfer to the military.

18. Memorandum, Bruce Hopper to General Spaatz, 22 November 1947, Spaatz Collection.

19. Record Group 218, "Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, "CCS 092 (10-9-46). Enclosure JSPC 814/3, 1947.

20. Memorandum for the record, "Interview with General Clay, July 25, 29, 30, 1946," by Secretary Symington, Spaatz Collection; Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (New York, 1950), p. 354.

21. Jean Edward Smith, editor, The Papers of General Lucius Clay, vol. II (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), pp. 568-69.

22. Ibid., pp. 597-613.

23. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Selective Service, Hearings, before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 80th Congress 2d session, 1948, pp. 6079-6161, specifically 6098 & 6161 Walter Millis, editor, The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), p. 415.

24. Record Group 218, "Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff," CCS 381 U.S.S.R (3-2-46) Section 12, "Decision on J.C.S. 1844/4," 19 May 1948.

25. Halfmoon did not contain the "Overall-Strategic Concept," but it was inserted in a late July revision (1844/13). It was probably omitted to facilitate acceptance by the three service chiefs, which might suggest that one or two chiefs were troubled by the concept.

26. Record Group 218, "Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff," CCS 381 U.S.S.R. (3-2-46), Section 16, "The Logistic Feasibility of Operations Planned, ‘HALFMOON’," JLPC 84/16, 15 June 1948.

27. Record Group 319, "Records of the Army Staff," ABC Russia (22 August 1943) Section 1-A. J .I.C. 250/6, "Soviet Capabilities," 29 November 1947; letter, General Kenney (SAC A3-77 A5C) to Hq USAF, subject: Requirements for Initiation of Atomic Warfare, 4 June 1948.

28. Letter, General Hoyt Vandenberg to Commanding General, Hq Strategic Air Command, 13 July 1948, Air Force OPD A/AE 381 (Atomic Weapons Test). See also Memorandum for General Schlatter from William E. Kennedy, Office Assistant Operations for Atomic Energy, 27 August 1948, AF OPD A/AE 381 (HARROW).

29. Millis, pp. 452-55.

30. "History of Strategic Air Command 1948." Typescript history prepared by Headquarters Strategic Air Command, Offutt AFB, Nebraska, 1949, pp. 54-55. Hereafter cited as "SAC 1948." See Exhibit #35, Appendix 1 (509th Bombardment Wing), and Appendix 2 (43rd Bombardment Wing), n.p. The National Security Council recommended the deployment of B-29 bombers on 15 July. See Record of Actions by the National Security Council at its Fifteenth Meeting, 15 July 1948, NSC Action 77.

31. One exception occurred in February 1948, but it was during the time of an atomic test in the Pacific. A squadron of the 509th visited Japan for two weeks and conducted training and other classified work. See "SAC 1948," pp. 182-87.

32. Memorandum, General J. B. Montgomery, SAC Director of Operations to SAC Historical Section, 18 August 1949; "SAC 1948."

33. Comments cited from letter, General Leon Johnson, C/G Fifteenth Air Force to General McMullen, 13 July 1948; "SAC 1948."

34. Letter, General Kenney to General Whitehead, 9 August 1948. File 168.6008-3-Kenney, Simpson Historical Research Center.

35. Oral history interview with General Curtis E. LeMay by John Bohn, March AFB, California, 9 March 1971; Interview #736, Simpson Historical Research Center.

36. Record Group 319, "Records of the Army Staff," NSC 20 P&O 092 (12 July 1948), case 116/2. Letter, Secretary Forrestal to President Truman, l0 July 1948.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid. Memorandum, Secretary Forrestal to the Executive Secretary, National Security Council subject: Appraisal of the Degree and Character of Military Preparedness Required by the World Situation, 10 July 1948.

40. In late April, Senator Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska had unsuccessfully proposed legislation to return atomic bomb production to the military during the world crisis. He felt the move would have great effect upon the Soviets, New York Times, April 26, 1948, p. 1.

41. Millis, p. 461. For a detailed narrative of this meeting. see David E. Lilienthal, Journals of David E. Lilienthal, Vol II: The Atomic Energy Years 1945-1950 (New York, 1964), pp. 387-92.

42. George Elsey, "Will We Use the Bomb?" Unpublished manuscript n.d. (circa Fall 1948), papers of George Elsey, Harry S. Truman Library.

43. Millis, p. 487.

44. Letter, General John Cannon to General Hoyt Vandenberg, 16 November 1948, Vandenberg Collection, Library of Congress.

45. Ibid.

46. The Western Union Defense Plan emerged from the Brussels Pact of January 1948, which included the Benelux countries, England, and France. The United States did not actively consider joining until July, in part because it did not want to provoke the U.S.S.R. Participating nations finally resolved organizational problems by October, although the United States did not sign the treaty until April 1949. See Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (New York, 1956), pp. 243-51.

47. Record Group 319, "Record of the Army Staff," NSC 20/3 and 20/4, P&O 092 (2 November & 23 November 1948), case 116/l0 and 116/13.

This article will appear as part of a chapter in the forthcoming Greenwood Press publication A Hollow Threat: Strategic Air Power and Containment before Korea by Harry Borowski. It is presented here with permission of the publisher.

Contributor

Major Harry R. Borowski (B.A., Kearney State College; M.A., University of Colorado: Ph.D., University of California, Santa Barbara) is Associate Professor of History at the United States Air Force Academy. He has also served as a tanker navigator in the KC-135. Major Borowski is the author of a forthcoming book. A Hollow Threat: Strategy Air Power and Containment before Korea, and has written articles for Military Affairs and the Review. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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