Air University Review, January-February 1981

Laos

three perspectives on a secret war

Five years after the American withdrawal from Indochina, the war in Laos remains a mystery. From mid-1961, when President Kennedy made the American ambassador the de facto military commander in Laos, the conflict was shrouded in secrecy. Even today only glimpses of that war are becoming available.

The war in Laos was as complex as it was politically sensitive. It was a civil war—sometimes a three-way civil war—in which there was overt intervention from North Vietnam and covert involvement by the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. Furthermore, there were diverse theaters of action in that small country. In northern Laos the Royal Laotian Army (RLA) and Meo guerrillas, trained and supported by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with American air support battled indigenous Pathet Lao guerrillas and North Vietnamese Army regulars. In southeastern Laos the North Vietnamese controlled the border area, where they operated the Ho Chi Minh Trail network funneling men and supplies to the war in South Vietnam. Pathet Lao guerrillas fought RLA units that menaced the trail while they extended their own control into central and finally western Laos.

Likewise, the complexity of the political situation in Laos contributed to the overall sensitivity of the war. The country had not one but two capitals. There was an administrative capital in Vientiane which, while it was the seat of the neutralist government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, also hosted representatives of the Pathet Lao. A hundred miles or so to the north was the royal capital of Luang Prabang, where the god-king Savang Vathana reigned as a figurehead ruler over all Laotians regardless of their political alignment.

In Vientiane rightists and neutralists intrigued against one another as they vied for power, while the Americans worked in secrecy to continue the war effort against the Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese. Further complicating the situation, the Soviets and the Communist Chinese supported the communist forces in the countryside. For the Americans’ part, the State Department, the Defense Department, the CIA, and the Agency for International Development were intertwined in the conflict, often at cross purposes, which may make the story of American involvement in Laos politically sensitive for a long while.

Classified as fiction, John Clark Pratt’s Laotian Fragments is actually only thinly disguised history in that most of the characters and incidents are based on fact.* Pratt takes the reader into the world of the Air Force's Raven forward air controllers (FACs), and Ravens were special indeed. Each pilot selected for duty as a Raven FAC in Laos had to have at least six months’ experience in Southeast Asia. In Laos the Ravens were attached to the American Embassy, where they worked for the American air attaché and the ambassador. The ambassador had the authority to approve or disapprove any bombing mission in the politically sensitive war, where it was feared that one misplaced bomb might cause massive Chinese intervention. The Chinese Communists had several thousand workers and troops constructing a road from their border through western Laos to a point just north of the Thai border. Additionally, they had a "cultural’’ center in Xieng Khouang province.

*John Clark, Pratt, The Laotian Fragments (New York: The Viking Press, 1974, $7.95), 245 pages.

Pratt, a former Raven FAC, has captured the spirit of the men who flew those risky missions where capture meant almost certain death. Ravens were considered an odd lot by the Air Force and, indeed, many of them encouraged the "Terry and the Pirates" image in their dress and life-style. Nevertheless, Raven FACs had a reputation For professionalism in the conduct of their job that has made them a very special part of the Air Force tradition. Although fictionalized history, The Laotian Fragments provides a good insight into one way that a conventional service like the U.S. Air Force can fight an unconventional war.

In Air America by British journalist Christopher Robbins, the reader continues to delve into the Laotian war by examining the CIA’s contract airline in action.* As enjoyable as Air America is, it is not a definitive history. Such a history will not be written until the CIA opens its files. Furthermore, the author relied on secondary works to a great extent and has, in some instances, flawed the book by relying on sources that were themselves based on fantasy as much as fact and conjecture instead of evidence.

*Christopher Robbins, Air America (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1979, $10.95), 323 pages.

Nevertheless, considering the dearth of available official sources, Robbins has made a valuable contribution to public knowledge of the war. His greatest contribution was to depict accurately the characters that flew for Air America. Through numerous personal interview Robbins got to know the kind of adventurers who have worked for the airline from its beginnings at the end of World War II. In Laos there were several types, ranging from the freebooting soldier of fortune superpatriot out to stop communism to the old war-horses who have been discarded by the services but still longed for the thrill of flying in combat.

In Laos there was plenty of combat flying. There, as elsewhere, Air America lived up to its slogan of "Anything, Anywhere, Anytime: Professionally." Throughout its turbulent history, which Robbins traced from the struggle for China after World War II through the fall of Saigon in April 1975, Air America hauled cargoes of supplies and men to areas too hot for more orthodox airlines and too sensitive for the military.

Robbins, by tracing Air Americas’ operations in Laos, gives us a good account of the CIA’s involvement in that war. Although the CIA has received some bad press over the past few years, in Air America it emerges as an efficient organization whose agents had a good understanding of the complex military and political situation in Laos. Because the Geneva Convention of 1962 forbade an American military presence in Laos, CIA officers took over the task of advising the Laotian military forces. These CIA officers, unlike military advisers in Vietnam, remained in Laos for longer than a year— many of them taking Laotian wives and making Laos their home. Consequently, they had a better understanding of the relationship that existed among culture, politics, religion, geography, and the war.

While the United States committed half a million men to Vietnam in an effort to defeat the enemy with overwhelming firepower and superior numbers, in Laos the CIA-sponsored guerrillas, with significant American air support directed by Raven FACs, fought and often defeated Pathet Lao forces and regular units of the North Vietnamese Army.

The impact of Robbins’s book may be lessened by the fact that he was not greatly experienced in Indochina. Names and places are sometimes inaccurate. He seems unfamiliar with some basic designators for military equipment, for instance the AK-47 assault rifle was called a "47 AK’’ on one occasion and F-4s from Udorn became "F-11s." Geographical locations were sometimes misnamed. In a discussion of Air America activities in South Vietnam, the provincial capital of Ban Me Thout became "Tan" Me Thout. These editorial indiscretions do not, however, detract from the overall high quality of an exciting piece of journalistic history.

A book long awaited by students of the Indochina War; Dieter Dengler’s Escape from Laos far exceeds expectations.* Dengler’s tale began in early 1966 when his Navy A-1 Skyraider was shot down near the Mu Gia pass along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. His book is the story of his captivity and escape, and, in that respect, it is an absorbing adventure saga.

*Dieter Dengler, Escape from Laos (San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1979, $10.95), 211 pages.

Beyond adventure, Escape from Laos provides important insights into the character of the Pathet Lao. One must be impressed by the totality of their commitment to fighting the "American aggressors.’’ Unlike Dengler and his comrades, who if they were not killed or captured could look forward to going home at the end of a year’s tour, the Pathet Lao realized that they were in the war for the duration, and their lives were built around prosecuting the war over the long haul. Furthermore, the Pathet Lao, although far from being supermen (many were boys and girls still in early puberty) were tough—sturdy enough to trek all day through the bush without sandals, thrive in the jungle that almost killed Dengler, and live on rations only a little better than those given their captives.

In his account of captivity along the trail, Dengler offers interesting information on the sociopolitical conditions in that area of Laos. What was generally perceived to be a society united in moving men and supplies from North Vietnam into South Vietnam turned out to be not so monolithic. According to Dengler, at one village, deep within the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex, armed men and women refused to let him and his Pathet Lao captors enter. Additionally, while most Laotians he met were hostile, in several villages he was treated with kindness and sympathy.

Although the American experience in Southeast Asia is fading from memory, the attempts to understand that war are only just beginning. After the mea culpas on the Indochina War are finally completed, military officers ought to remember that special operations like those so integral to the conduct of the war in Laos are fundamental to a world where military and political aims are often indistinguishable. Meanwhile, the war in Laos, especially, remains blanketed in secrecy. These three books give important glimpses into three diverse facets of that conflict and provide an excellent starting place for further investigation.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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