Air University Review, January-February 1981

A Response

Major Richard A. Gabriel’s "Professionalism versus Managerialism" is a valuable addition to the professional military reading list. An initial reaction may be that it involves ground units and can contribute little to an Air Force officer’s education. However, on reflection, one soon realizes that a study that provides enlightenment on improving the effectiveness of men in combat is of value to any military professional, whether soldier, sailor, or airman.

Gabriel’s examination of Army and Marine performance in Vietnam demonstrates sharp contrasts between the two services when indicators of unit divisiveness such as fragging and mutiny are compared. Of particular interest was the fact that both services reflected similar rates of drug use, desertion, and absence without official leave (AWOL), which, although definitely harmful to a unit’s effectiveness, are more an individual than a group act.

According to Gabriel, the reason for the higher level of unit cohesiveness in the Marine Corps was the different approach each service took to leadership: The Army had moved toward more "moderns" methods of management, while the Marines relied on the "old-fashioned" traditional mechanisms of discipline, leadership, and professionalism. The first area where differences were obvious was in small unit officer leadership. The high standards of marine junior officer leadership proved to have a significant impact on unit effectiveness.

The Gabriel study provides much food for thought for Air Force officers. As a newer military branch, different in many respects from the older services, the Air Force may have tended to neglect the study of men in combat. Gabriel’s article should stimulate the Air Force to ponder the effect of putting senior but inexperienced pilots into positions of leadership in tactical fighter squadrons as flight commanders and flight leaders.¹ When a unit's leadership is somewhat unfamiliar with a unit's mission and type of aircraft, the logical result could be loss of credibility and less effective leadership. This could result in increased accident rates in peacetime and avoidable losses to combat. Studies of World War II combat have proved the value of credibility for small unit leaders.²

It is also important to note with a better understanding of the importance of stable leadership, perhaps we could minimize the turmoil caused by the present assignment process. The growing shortage of experienced pilots in the Air Force leaves fewer pilots to serve in various staff functions. A virtue of this staff draw-down may be in the realization that many staff functions do not require rated officers but were so staffed only because the Air Force had an excess of experienced pilots.

With fewer duties requiring rated officers, perhaps assignments could bc stabilized to the point where the average pilot might expect to remain in a particular unit for extensive periods of time, say for ten years or even longer. In order to man overseas responsibilities, units based in the continental United States (CONUS) might rotate periodically to overseas locations. Such home basing would provide several major advantages in addition to unit stability. By deploying as a unit, every wing should in turn become more familiar with their overseas responsibilities. Leaving dependents at the CONUS base eliminates the concern members experience when they feel their families are vulnerable to enemy action. Recent studies also indicate that frequent moves and the resulting dislocative effect on a civilian working spouse are becoming major reasons why members leave the service.³ Also, by remaining in one location longer, couples who are both members of the military would experience less of the upheaval of reassignment and separation. In addition, with less frequent individual moves, the saving in moving expenses would be a major benefit for both the Air Force and the individual.

Reflection on the performance of men in combat brings to mind exercise Red Flag. The Air Force established Red Flag exercises based on the perception that a pilot who survives the first ten combat missions experiences a significant enhancement in the probability of his surviving subsequent missions.⁴ Yet this finding raises the question of why these early combat missions are so dangerous.

If the reason is lack of adequate training, Red Flag will be particularly valuable. However, if part of the reason is something else, then further action is warranted. Studies by experts, such as F. M. Richardson, place high emphasis on comradeship in a combat organization.⁵ The United States military in World War II, Korea, and Southeast Asia, in line with this emphasis, developed a rotation policy for individuals rather than units. In itself this policy was not wrong. However, when a replacement arrived in the midst of intense combat, problems developed. Without the opportunity to establish personal bonds of comradeship with experienced members of the unit, the "new guy" often remained a relative stranger for critical days. With no one to show him the ropes or look out for him to the degree they would for an established comrade, the new guy often made elementary mistakes and was subsequently lost.⁶ If comradeship played a role in the dangers of the first ten missions, reconsideration of the mechanics of replacements in combat is warranted.

Although Gabriel’s survey did not address it, other studies of men in combat have demonstrated two interrelated areas with which all Air Force commanders should be intimately familiar. These areas are the relationship of fatigue and fear and the ability of man to renew himself rapidly when given adequate rest. General S. L. A. Marshall noted that ". . . fear and fatigue impacted on the body in the same way, draining it of energy." He also noted that ". . . just a little rest will work a miracle of recovery."⁷

Reading the memoirs of pilots who flew intensively for long periods during the Battle of Britain or with the Luftwaffe over Germany in 1944 and 1945, one is struck by the frequency with which exhaustion is mentioned. One cannot help wondering whether many highly talented pilots might have survived and continued to be effective if they had been given adequate rest at appropriate times. The failure to comprehend and compensate for the debilitating effects of fear and fatigue could result in penny-wise, pound-foolish leadership, resulting in more but less effective sorties in the short term and the avoidable loss of highly experienced pilots. As General Marshall noted, peacetime exercises, by ignoring the effects of fire (fear) on fatigue, often sets goals that would be impossible to attain or maintain in combat.⁸ This fact is particularly significant when crew ratios and turnaround capabilities are determined for tactical aircraft.

With these factors in mind, the Air Force officer should realize that the study of men in combat is perhaps the most important area of professional military study. Learning the appropriate lessons from historical experience could prevent a combat leader from painfully reinventing the wheel.

Holloman AFB, New Mexico

Major Price T. Bingham is an Action Officer on the Air Staff, Washington, D.C.

1. This issue was addressed in Captain John T. Barry’s article "The Credibility of Fighter Squadron Supervisors," Air University Review, September-October 1980, pp. 35-44.

2. Robert K. Merton, editor, The American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1949), p. 247.

3. Melvin R. Laird, "People, Not Hardware the Highest Defense Budget Priority," Armed Forces Journal, March 1980, p. 65.

4. Major Arnold Terry, "Red Flag TAC’s Realistic Approach to Readiness," Air Force, January 1977, p. 41.

5. F. M. Richardson, Fighting Spirit, Psychological Factors in War (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1979), pp. 6-13.

6. Merton, p. 277.

7. S.L..A. Marshall, Bringing up the Rear: A Memoir, edited by Cate Marshall (San Rafael, California; Presidio Press, 1979), pp. 204, 206.

8. Marshall, p. 207.

A Response

In comparing U.S. Marine Corps and Army performance in Vietnam, Major Richard G. Gabriel adopted an unusual and interesting approach to describe the value of traditional leadership in combat. As a Marine, I take pride in the fact that the Corps has not allowed its leaders to assume a managerial role. It has adhered to its concepts of professionalism, discipline, and esprit de corps. I concur with his thesis that, throughout the history of the Marine Corps, this philosophy has led to a high degree of unit cohesion, combat effectiveness, and superior battlefield performance. Assuming that Major Gabriel’s statistics are correct, I believe he has favorably reflected the value of this leadership philosophy in his analysis of Marine combat performance in the Vietnam conflict. However, in discussing reasons for this performance, he posed several incomplete arguments.

Although I concur that our officer leadership was indeed highly effective, especially at the company level, equally important was the leadership provided by staff noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and others. NCOs have long been considered the backbone of the Marine Corps, and they have traditionally been rewarded with greater responsibility than NCOs of the other services. These experienced combat veterans provided valuable assistance to new commanders in leading, training, and caring for their people. Indeed it is difficult to imagine a new, inexperienced lieutenant assuming command of a platoon in Vietnam without the assistance and advice of a dedicated NCO in a wide variety of military and combat areas. These NCOs provided the link between new commanders and their troops. Because of their effectiveness, the Marine Corps was able to maintain the low ratio of commissioned officers to enlisted strength, a factor that Major Gabriel associates with cohesive battle units. For the same reasons he applies to the quality of the officer corps, the superior leadership provided by these NCOs in Vietnam was a key element in maintaining unit cohesion.

Equally important in the development of unit cohesiveness was the quality of training received by each Marine prior to his entering combat in Vietnam. Marine Corps training have traditionally centered around the development of the small unit concept. In addition to receiving individual training in basic combat skills, endurance, and discipline, each recruit undergoes an intensive period of combat training with heavy emphasis on combat teamwork. This teamwork is built around the fire team, a concept unique to the Marine Corps in application, which is the basic unit of the rifle platoon. Within this unit each Marine learns his specific function and realizes that the performance and survival of the unit depends on the actions of each individual. He develops a sense of loyalty toward his fellow Marines and cannot envision forsaking his buddies in combat. Counterinsurgency operations conducted in Vietnam depended for their success on the performance of just such a small unit trained to react instantly and individually. Prior to combat, Marines were given an opportunity to perfect unit skills through extensive training exercises conducted in a simulated environment. Heavy emphasis was placed on physical and mental conditioning in a climate and surroundings similar to the environment in Vietnam. This training applied to both officer and enlisted personnel and produced combat-ready Marines who quickly adapted to the combat environment of Vietnam and who fully understood the value of unit cohesiveness. It was this training that drove our performance.

Another area requiring clarification is Major Gabriel’s statement: "The effectiveness of Marine units may also be demonstrated by the disproportionately high casualty rates absorbed by them." (p. 80) Any student of military science would be quick to note that a high casualty rate is normally an indicator of poor combat effectiveness. History reports numerous battles in which heavy combat losses were associated with inept leadership, improper employment of forces, or engagement with an overwhelmingly superior force. I am certain that Major Gabriel did not intend to portray the effectiveness of Marine combat units in this light hut was attempting to highlight the intensity of fighting engaged in by these units. He alludes to this fact in the closing sentence of the same paragraph: "They demonstrated this fighting tenaciousness, if our assumptions are correct, under conditions of conflict more intense than those to which Army units were generally exposed." (p. 80) Marine units did indeed fight well, and they fought in the Northern I Corps area where they faced fresh North Vietnamese regulars, well armed, well supplied, and, in many cases, supported by artillery. The type of enemy and the intensity and frequency of the conflicts involving Marine units, in many cases, dictated the rate of casualties.

On the whole, Major Gabriel’s ana1ysis of combat performance leans very favorably toward the practice of traditional leadership in the Marine Corps. With the exceptions noted, he has accurately reflected the value of this leadership in maintaining unit cohesion and ensuring the success of Marine units in combat. Marine Corps adherence to the basic principles of training and discipline, combined with the quality of officer and NCO leadership, resulted in effective combat performance.

Air Command and Staff College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

A Response

Major Richard Gabriel presents some interesting observations in his article, "Professionalism Versus Managerialism in Vietnam," but I find it difficult to accept his conclusion that the Marine Corps was more effective than the Army in Vietnam. His conclusion was neither supported by, nor logically based on, the information he provided.

The author would have the reader believe that the basic difference between the two services was Marine professionalism versus Army managerialism. His choice of words is unfortunate because the terms cannot be equated. Professionalism is the character of an organization, whether the organization includes Marines, lawyers, doctors, or even Army personnel. Managerialism refers to a skill or technique applied by a manager to remove the risk of decision-making in the day-to-day routine. It helps achieve maximum use of resources and reduce the probability of errors. Apparently, Major Gabriel was really discussing leadership in the sense that leaders motivate people to accomplish a mission. He attempted to compare the traditional, discipline-oriented leadership style of the Marine Corps with a more permissive style that he perceived in the Army during the Vietnam era.

Major Gabriel begins by comparing instances of absence without official leave (AWOL), desertion, drug use, fragging, and mutiny in the Army and the Marine Corps. He posits that the only two instances worthy of consideration are fraggings and mutinies because they are overt acts against authority. The former three actions he dismisses as individual acts. This, I believe, is incorrect because those actions are also indicators of a unit’s health rather than mere individual acts. Unit consciousness developed through peer pressure can just as easily prevent a fragging as it can prevent a soldier from using drugs or going AWOL. The use of drugs and AWOL is not, as Major Gabriel suggests, simple individual acts. These acts represent a breakdown in a unit’s command structure, though hardly to the degree of outright violence. The leaders of a unit must bear part of the responsibility for such a breakdown because they create—or tolerate—the environment for such acts.

One of Gabriel’s more serious errors was his measure of unit effectiveness on the basis of high Marine casualty rates. This is a naïve view of the world. High casualties may indicate a number of things, but none of them connote effectiveness. High casualties can lead to conclusions concerning the intensity of the battle, the quality of leadership, or the wisdom of battlefield tactics. Effectiveness means mission accomplishment; casualties are by-products of the mission and not necessarily equate to getting the job done. According to Major Gabriel’s definition, General Custer and his unit could have been considered effective. General Patton reportedly said that the important thing in war is not for you to die for your country, but to make the other poor . . . die for his country. And this does not mean that body count is the measure of effectiveness either. It does dramatize the fact that one aspect of accomplishing the mission is destruction of the enemy and his equipment at minimum expense to friendly units.

Major Gabriel’s article focuses on leadership at the platoon and company level. He indicates that, at that level, the Army managed the conflict in Vietnam. The Army may have managed a great deal, but not at the small unit level. One had to lead platoons and companies to ensure success and survival. At these levels, there was a direct leadership relation between followers and leaders. It was not a management relationship. The assets were provided, and the company commander and platoon leader were doers who executed the mission rather than managed it.

His points concerning the relative quality of the officer corps may be correct, but size was not the driving force. The size of the Marine officer corps was proportionately smaller than the size of the Army officer corps for a simple reason. The Marines did not have the same overhead as the Army. Most of their planning and support came from headquarters populated by Navy officers. Their inclusion in Major Gabriel’s equation would change the ratio of officers to enlisted men.

The author does offer some excellent insights into the root of many Army problems, and the root can be identified in one word, personnel. Rapid expansion of the Army diluted the trained cadre of officers and NCOs by spreading them among newly formed units. It further resulted in quick promotions that did not allow full development of commissioned and noncommissioned officers. Lowered entrance standards for draftees to help meet the need for additional soldiers also had a negative impact on the quality of soldiers. These soldiers brought the problems of the sixties into the Army with them. I believe the Marines experienced these problems to a far less degree because they were a volunteer force, and their soldiers were thus better motivated and ready to accept Marine Corps standards. Marine officers’ emphasis on discipline and the stability of officers in command positions also contributed significantly to unit cohesiveness in the Marines.

The strength of Major Gabriel’s article does not stem from his attempt to compare leadership styles and then assess unit effectiveness in terms of these styles. However, he does provide some sound observations concerning the impact of personnel actions on units. His conclusions appear every bit as true today as then, especially as they affect the development of leaders who require the training and experience to do their jobs. He never satisfactorily proved his thesis that the Marine Corps was more effective than the Army in Vietnam.

Air Command and Staff College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama