Air University Review, January-February 1981

The Western Alliance and the Presidency

The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and the crisis with I ran over the American hostages have intensified concern about the United States’ ability to defend its national interests and lead the Western alliance against Soviet expansionism. The recent disagreements among the Western allies over issues of inflation, energy, and trade protectionism have bolstered questions as to whether the United States and its NATO allies could put aside their differences in order to cooperate against the Kremlin’s advances. These crises, moreover, have reawakened the public’s awareness that, in crisis situations, the enormous powers and responsibilities of the President bring the White House to center stage with enhanced opportunities for public support and criticism. These current crises and President Jimmy Carter’s response to them provide a pertinent perspective for assessments of the status of the Western alliance and presidential decision-making.

The Western alliance was reviewed in a provocative but flawed analysis by Mary Kaldor, a Fellow of the Science Policy Research Unit at the University of Sussex.* Kaldor traces the disintegration of the West to conflict among the members of the alliance as opposed to significant shifts in the Cold War conflict. Thus she persuasively stresses the real conflicts of interest on monetary policy, trade, oil, and defense issues of weapons procurement and general policies. Kaldor notes that behind the disagreements on these issues a deepening conflict exists between parochial forces representing labor and domestic producers and internationalist forces led by multinational corporations.

*Mary Kaldor, The Disintegrating West (New York: Hill & Wang, Inc., 1978, $10.00), 219 pages.

Diplomats on both sides of the Atlantic should heed Kaldor’s analysis of conflict within the Western alliance, but there is a quasi-deterministic quality to her assessment. She assumes, for example, that the problems within the alliance are unresolvable unless there is radical social change, which is never very well defined by the author. This reflects her assumption that conflict among nation-states results from domestic economic and social conflict, with the multinational corporation being the most important source. In a chapter entitled "The Corporation and the State,’’ Kaldor asserts that the state’s main functions are to promote corporate expansion and preserve a stable society with corporate hegemony. She also stresses the critical impact of conflict between American capitalism and world capitalism. This represents, however, not only a rather narrow perspective on the functions of the modern welfare state but also a dismissal of the role of astute statesmanship. The history of the Western alliance and NATO from its origins in the Cold War to the present suggests that there has always been substantial conflict of interest. But this conflict has often been managed successfully, in part as a result of the perceived threat from the Soviet Union and skillful diplomacy.

The most serious flaw in Kaldor’s assessment is her dismissal of the Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union as a ritual designed to mask the deeper conflict within the Western alliance. Thus Kaldor views the emergence of the NATO alliance and rearmament of West Germany as primarily designed by the United States to prevent the creation of an independent power bloc. This interpretation, which relies on revisionist historians who have been severely criticized on many grounds, ignores not only the impact of Soviet-American estrangement but also the complex nature of policymaking (pp. 17-18).¹

Kaldor further denigrates the reality of the Cold War in her chapter on "East versus West." Whereas the West is fundamentally expansionistic because corporations must expand or die according to the author’s assumptions, the Soviet Union lacks this "compulsion to expand, although the leadership may have particular expansionist ambitions." (p. 31) Soviet expansionism as a result of traditional national ambitions, the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology, or competition with China receives little consideration from Kaldor. Instead, she views Soviet policy toward the Third World after 1955 as defensively designed to force the West into détente and weaken the American monopoly in this area. Most specialists on Soviet policy, however, consider the Soviet pursuit of power and influence in the Third World since 1975 as a relentless and skillful exploitation of opportunities that has disrupted regional balances of power.²

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan highlights the serious flaws in Kaldor’s analysis. The Kremlin’s willingness to overthrow a government and send in the Red Army contradicts her assertion that "it would be wrong to interpret this political Soviet interest in the Third World as expansionist.’’ (p. 42) The way in which the crisis has stimulated unity in the Western alliance is also illustrative of the critical influence of the Cold War in contrast with Kaldor’s preoccupation with clashing corporate capitalism. Finally, at a time of international crisis, Americans turn to the President for leadership, but Kaldor fails to consider the impact of different policymakers on the Western alliance.

In a thorough study of the U.S. presidency, Richard Pious, a political scientist at Barnard College, corrects Mary Kaldor’s neglect of policymakers.* Pious concludes that the U.S. presidency is simultaneously too strong in some areas and too weak in others. The weakness rests in the President’s political powers, for Pious believes that the President neither gains much of an effective mandate in elections nor is able to use party machinery to maneuver domestic programs through Congress. Pious is particularly sensitive to the complex relationship among the executive branch, Congress, and the bureaucracy, in which the President’s chain of command principle competes with the checks and balance principle of Congress. Standing between the President, his staff, and the cabinet on the one hand and Congress on the other are the careerists in their bureaus who may serve or obstruct the White House.

*Richard M. Pious, The American Presidency (New York: Basic Books, 1979, $16.00), 491 pages.

The President’s prerogative powers include far more than the enumeration of specific powers in Article II of the Constitution, for, as Pious points out, the great presidents have interpreted their powers far beyond the specifics of Article II. Pious’s discussion of foreign policy is particularly revealing on this issue. The President has always used prerogative powers to make foreign policy, whereas Congress has only rarely dominated in this area and sometimes checks Presidential initiatives. Instead, the executive’s major problem has been to manage the executive branch, particularly the national security bureaucracies.

Pious’s assessment of the results of a "too weak, too strong’’ presidency is not entirely persuasive. Faced with weakness in domestic affairs, the author concludes that presidents have and will turn no prerogative government in foreign affairs: "In real or manufactured crises they institute forms of prerogative government, and such crises will continue to occur precisely because presidents remain too weak to manage most problems until they get out of hand." (p. 422) A review of the presidents of the sixties and seventies, however, does not support Pious’s prediction. Although some revisionist historians assert that John Kennedy sought out foreign policy crises when faced with resistance in Congress to his New Frontier domestic program, Kennedy exhibited a strong orientation toward foreign policy before the stalemate with Congress, and on priority issues such as a tax cut and civil rights legislation in 1963 Kennedy persisted against stubborn opposition.³ Richard Nixon also started off with an inclination toward foreign affairs, and Lyndon Johnson’s career directly contradicts Pious’s admonition. Despite success with Congress and a massive electoral mandate, Johnson turned to Vietnam and prerogative government in a deceptive, manipulative manner that ultimately undermined much of its domestic program and his presidency. President Carter, on the other hand, may be the best candidate for Pious’s model. Americans wanted the President to solve the problems of inflation, unemployment, energy, and post-Vietnam foreign policy, but all of these issues except unemployment have intensified since 1976. Carter certainly did not seek out the Iranian or Afghanistan crisis; yet he has relied on prerogative powers to handle both situations.

Pious and the authors of a valuable study on presidential decision-making—Colonel Richard C. Head, USAF, Colonel Frisco W. Short, USA (Ret), and Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. McFarlane, USMC—disagree on the merits of the War Powers Resolution of 1973, a significant effort to curb the President’s prerogative powers.* The resolution does not change the conditions under which the President as commander in chief can resort to force, but it does introduce new requirements for consultations before the use of force and an automatic cutoff of a "presidential war" within sixty days unless Congress makes a declaration of war, a concurrent resolution, or provides specific statutory authorization. Pious hopes that the resolution will increase collaboration in foreign affairs and set ‘‘stricter standards for the exercise of prerogative powers in genuine national emergencies." (p. 422) Yet in practice he concludes that the Ford administration in the Mayaguez incident in 1975 briefed but did not consult with congressional leaders in the sense of asking for their views of what should be done when Cambodian Khmer Rouge forces seized a vessel of U.S. registry with American crew members. (pp. 403-15)

*Richard Head, Frisco W. Short, and Robert C. McFarlane, Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision-Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978, $20.00), 323 pages.

The authors of Crisis Resolution offer a different hut unpersuasive perspective. Although they commend President Ford for his consultation, they make no distinction between consultation and merely informing congressmen about the White House decisions to use aircraft to prevent the movement of the crew from an island to the mainland. Head, Short, and McFarlane question the value of the resolution because extensive consultation would not only "jeopardize the security and speed of the decision-making process’’ but also "suggests unreliability in U S. behavior" and may engender public debate in a period when quiet diplomacy is needed to avoid conflict." (pp. 254-55) Despite its ambiguities and limitations, the resolution does not require consultation with 535 members of Congress. In the aftermath of Vietnam it would seem particularly important that a President faced with a decision to introduce U. S. forces into hostilities ensure that Congress not only be briefed on the crisis situation but also provide input into the decision-making process.

Crisis Resolution offers a thorough review of decision-making in a crisis context and especially good case studies of the Mayaguez incident and the Korean tree crisis of August 1976. Using interviews of key participants, Head, Short, and McFarlane effectively criticize the 1976 report of the Comptroller General on the Mayaguez incident (pp. 144-46).⁴ The General Accounting Office (GAO) review, for example, criticizes President Ford’s decision to use force before further diplomatic approaches. The authors, however, point out that memories of the Pueblo affair in 1968 highlighted the necessity to act fast when the Cambodian government failed to respond to Washington’s initial approaches. The quick use of force may also have prompted Cambodia to release the ship and crew before further escalation took place. By indicating the time that each action took place, the authors make the introduction of Marines onto Koh Tang Island and their difficult withdrawal on the evening of the same day more understandable than the GAO report.

The Korean tree crisis merits the overall approval that Crisis Resolution extends to the White House. Beginning with the North Korean murder of two American officers supervising the trimming of a poplar tree in the Joint Security Area of the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the White House responded in a measured way that included a show of force, the removal of the tree and illegal North Korean gates, and demands for North Korean acknowledgment of responsibility and punishment of the murderers. A message of regret from Kim Il-sung was ambiguous, but negotiations did create a new Joint Security Area to keep the military personnel of both sides separated.

The current crises with Iran and Afghanistan provide a good perspective on the strengths and weaknesses of the three books under review. The intensification of the Cold War flowing from Afghanistan discredits Kaldor’s dismissal of the Cold War as a ritual, although there are muted undertones of disagreement within the Western alliance that reflect different perspectives, priorities, and some of Kaldor’s economic concerns. The central role of the President’s prerogative powers highlighted by Pious’s analysis is fully confirmed by the way Americans have turned to President Carter for leadership in both situations. Head, Short, and McFarlane suggest that Americans want thoughtfulness, firmness, and success in crisis decision -making. President Carter has fallen short in all three categories, partly because of his failure to integrate force and diplomacy. On Afghanistan, Carter’s admission of misinterpretation of the Kremlin’s intentions and Washington’s failure to aid the anti-Marxist, and anti-Russian forces in Afghanistan has weakened the President's record. The crisis may finally force the United States to develop a coherent strategy to deal with Soviet expansionism as Stanley Hoffmann argues,

to wage both cooperative competition and confrontations at the same time, and to do so even when, at a given moment, the United States seems faced by more challenges than collaboration.⁵

California State University, Northridge

Notes

1. Kaldor relies on revisionist historians such as David Horowitz, William Appleman Williams, Gar Alperovitz, Denna Frank Fleming, and Walter LaFeber, who, with the exception of LaFeber, view Soviet policy as defensive, nonexpansionistic, and eager to cooperate with the West after 1945. For a more balanced view of the forces shaping U.S. policy and the complex process involved in policymaking, see Scott Jackson, "Prologue to the Marshall Plan: The Origins of the American Commitment for a European Recovery Program, "Journal of American History, March 1979, pp. 1043-68.

2. Kaldor, pp. 39-43. The following authors differ somewhat in their emphasis on Soviet objectives and appropriate U.S. strategy, but they all reject Kaldor’s interpretation: Donald S. Zagoria, "Into the Breach: New Soviet Alliances in the Third World," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1979, pp. 733-54; Robert Legvold, "The Super Rivals: Conflict in the Third World," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1979, pp. 755-78; Stanley Hoffmann, "Muscle and Brains,’’ Foreign Policy, Winter 1979-80, pp. 3-27; Dimitri K. Simes, "The Anti-Soviet Brigade," Foreign Policy, Winter 1979-80, pp. 28-42.

3. For revisionist views on Kennedy, see Bruce Miroff, Pragmatic Illusions: The Presidential Politics of John F. Kennedy (New York, 1976); and Richard J. Walton, Cold War and Counterrevolution: The Presidential Politics of John F. Kennedy ( Baltimore, 1972). For more balanced assessments, see Carl M. Brauer, John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction (New York, 1977); and Jim F. Heath, Decade of Disillusionment: The Kennedy-Johnson Years (Bloomington, Indiana, 1975).

4. Seizure of the Mayaguez, Report of the Comptroller General of the United States, 94th Congress., 2d Sess., October 4, 1976.

5. Hoffmann, p. 27.

Thomas K. Maddux (B.A., Dartmouth College, M.A., Ph.D., University of Michigan) is Professor of History at California State University, Northridge. Dr. Maddux has published articles on Soviet-American relations in the 1930s and is author of Years of Estrangement: American Relations with the Soviet Union, 1933-1941. He is a contributor to the Review.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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