Air University Review, January-February 1981

Professionalism Versus
Managerialism in Vietnam

Two years ago in a book called Crisis in Command, Paul Savage and I developed a schema of analysis that made it possible to examine the levels of battle cohesion demonstrated by U.S. Army units during the Vietnam War. In that analysis several indicators of unit disintegration were used. These included desertion rates, AWOL rates, rates of drug use, mutinies, and assassinations of leaders (fragging). These indicators were linked to several organizational practices that seemed to contribute strongly to their occurrence. Thus, it was argued, as a consequence of adopting and implementing certain managerial and entrepreneurial practices while dismantling the more traditional modes of leadership behavior, levels of unit cohesion fell while overt indicators of unit disintegration rose at alarming rates. The ultimate result of these low levels of unit cohesion, we felt, was the inability of many Army units to engage in effective combat against the enemy.¹ My purpose here is to undertake the same type of analysis with the limited data available and assess, briefly, the combat performance of U.S. Marine Corps units during that same war. Comparisons are always suspect and such is the case here when comparing Marine Corps data, which are heavily ‘‘tooth’’ with Army data that includes much of the ‘‘tail" as well as the ‘‘tooth, there is rightfully some doubt. Regardless, I think the lesson is still valid.

A Comparison of Marine
and Army Performance

A comparative analysis of Army and Marine Corps performance is possible now that some data of Marine performance are finally available. Moreover, the Marine effort in Vietnam differed significantly from that of the Army in a fundamental and important respect: The Marines consistently refused to change traditional leadership practices and imitate the modern managerialism of the Army. Accordingly, Marine performance presents an interesting case study of how American units fought when managerial practices were not allowed to alter traditional values and norms associated with small unit cohesion. I contend then that a comparison of Marine and Army battlefield performance highlights the effectiveness of such traditional military ways while casting substantial doubt on the effectiveness of managerial substitutes on the battlefield.

Examination of the basic indicators of unit disintegration—desertion, AWOL, drug use, fragging, and mutiny—suggests that Marine Corps units suffered problems equal to or even greater than those found in Army units. With regard to desertion, the rate at which this pathology was demonstrated the Marine units were certainly commensurate with comparable Army rates. Between 1964 and 1972, the average rate of desertion within all Army units was 36 per thousand. This figure compares closely with a rate of 37 per thousand for Marine units.² If the data are examined as a percentage of base increase over pre-Vietnam rates, both services reflected substantial rates of increase. The Marine rate increased by 205 percent while that of the Army increased by 277 percent over the same period. If desertion rates are examined on an annual basis, the Marine rate per thousand in the enlisted ranks exceeded that of the Army for every year except 1971.³ On balance, the data support the conclusion that desertion rates for Marine units during the Vietnam conflict were roughly commensurate with those suffered by Army units during the same period. Certainly there is no evidence currently available that desertion rates were appreciably lower in Marine units.

AWOL

Much the same picture emerges when AWOL rates of Army and Marines units are examined. In this important indicator of unit cohesion, the Marines seem actually to have fared worse. From 1967 through 1972, the only period for which data are available, the Marine AWOL rate averaged 141 per thousand. By comparison the overall Army AWOL rate averaged 103 per thousand.⁴ To the extent that AWOLs indicate a lower level of unit discipline than required for effective battlefield performance, it would appear on the surface that the Marines had a much more serious problem than the Army.

drug use

With regard to the question of drug use among the soldiery hard data are difficult to obtain. Yet, if Marine disciplinary records are examined for 1969 through 1972 (again the only period for which data are available), the total number of Marines discharged for drug offenses was 5136. The number charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) for drug offenses in that same period was 4210.⁵ Taken together, this would comprise slightly more than 1 percent of total Marine troop strength involved in drug use. However, it is probable that such an indicator is inaccurate since it reflects only those users who were apprehended. A more reliable indicator of drug use among Marines emerges from the presentation given by Lieutenant General W. K. Jones, USMC (Ret), at the Manpower Seminar of the General Officers Symposium held in 1972. That report notes that 48 percent of Marine troops reported having used drugs "at some time or another" while 32 percent indicated that they "were present users." Fully 21 percent said that they had used drugs for the first time while in the Marines.⁶ Extrapolating from the data, one can conclude that the level of drug use among Marine units during the Vietnam period was at least close to the 28 percent rate that was found to exist among all Army units during the same period.⁷ Indeed, the data may be interpreted to suggest that Marine drug use may have been slightly higher.

While drug use, desertions, and AWOLs are all important indicators of cohesion and discipline, there is a sense in which they remain highly individual acts that may or may not affect the larger sense of unit cohesion. There are, however, two unambiguous indicators of unit cohesion and discipline, which need examination: Those are the rates at which unit leaders were "fragged" or assassinated and the rate of overt mutiny or combat refusals. In both instances the rates of occurrence were much lower across the board in Marine units than in Army units.

fragging

There is perhaps no more crucial indicator that a unit has lost its discipline and cohesion than when soldiers kill their leaders for whatever reason. Information provided by the Office of the Secretary of the Navy does

suggest that the problem of assassination of leaders may have been less of a problem among Marine units than in Army units. Between 1964 and 1972, for example, the number of Marines charged with murder or attempted murder under the relevant articles of the UCMJ in all instances was only 121.⁸ An examination of the battle journals kept by Marine units reveals that in the First Marine Division 47 incidents of fragging were reported.⁹

The limited data indicate then that the incidence of fragging in Marine units may have been considerably below that found in Army units, which reported a total of 1016 admitted fraggings during the entire Vietnam War.¹⁰ The Marines may have done better in preventing the pathologies of individual soldiers within units from surfacing in the specific act of striking at unit cohesion by the assassination of unit leaders.

mutiny

Another area in which Marine units fared consistently better than Army units was in the rates of mutiny and combat refusals. If the numbers of Marines charged under Article 94 (mutiny) and Article 94/80 (attempted mutiny) are combined for the period 1964 through 1972, the total number of offenses amounts to only 26.¹¹ By comparison there were 245 cases of mutiny and attempted mutiny in a single division in the Army in 1970 alone. ¹² The Marine combat refusal/mutiny rate then was considerably lower than that for the Army.

The lower rates of mutiny and of assassination of leaders in Marine units are very important data. They suggest that although desertion, AWOL, and drug use may have been in evidence at fairly high levels within Marine Corps units, these problems remained focused on individual soldiers and did not as a rule provoke a state-of-unit mutiny or even individual combat refusal. Whatever provoked desertions, AWOLs, and drug use among Marines, it was seldom serious enough to provoke direct, "in combat" acts of overt disobedience or refusals to execute unit missions. Moreover, it was rarely serious enough to provoke what I feel is the ultimate act of unit discohesion, the assassination of leaders. Intriguingly, the low rates of mutiny and fragging in Marine units as compared to all Army units suggest that individual problems of drug use, desertion, and AWOL in Marine units remained focused on the individual soldier and never combined to impact upon the levels of combat performance as they did in Army units. While both Army and Marine units had relatively large numbers of soldiers who practiced behavior that was potentially devastating for unit cohesion, the Marines seem to have succeeded in controlling the problem and stopping it before it affected unit cohesion. It must be kept in mind, however, that some of the Army fraggings did occur in support areas and had no bearing on combat unit cohesion, but it is very hard to shread out these instances.

Combat Ability

The best indication of the ability of Marine units to contain the potentially disruptive effects of individual pathologies is to examine their performance under fire. If the data on combat performance are examined, it seems that Marine units fought courageously and well. Moreover, in fighting several large unit actions, Marines often fought an intensity of war greater than the relatively low intensity of combat experienced by many Army units.¹³ This is not an endorsement or a virtuism of Marine tactics; the author is well aware that many, particularly in the Army, felt Marine tactics to be excessively direct and bloody, making too little use of supporting firepower. For the purpose of our discussion, however, this is irrelevant. The point is that Marine units, on the whole, came under greater combat pressure than did the Army units. Whatever else, casualty rates may prove or disprove, they are a good indicator of the intensity of combat.

The effectiveness of Marine units may also be demonstrated by the disproportionately high casualty rates absorbed by them. During the Vietnam War, Marine forces constituted 17 percent of total ground troop strength. However, they absorbed fully 28 percent of total forces killed in action. Thus, of the 45,915 Americans killed in action between 1964 and 1972, a total of 12,983 were Marines. In the same period they absorbed an amazing 33.5 percent of the total wounded in action (WIA), a rate of WIA almost exactly twice what statistically they may have been expected to absorb.¹⁴ The data strongly suggest then that in terms of combat behavior, Marine units generally fought often and presumably well; Marines were wounded proportionately twice as frequently as members of Army units; and Marine units suffered a much greater burden of death relative to their size than did Army units. They demonstrated this fighting tenaciousness, if our assumptions are correct, under conditions of conflict more intense than those to which Army units were generally exposed.

The analysis resolves itself into the following question: If Marine units reflected nearly the same levels of desertion, AWOL, and drug use as Army units and if, despite this, Marine units continued to perform well in combat, how can this be explained? How was it possible for Marine units to prevent these pathologies from overwhelming the sense of unit purpose, unit mission, unit cohesion, and unit effectiveness so as to allow them to perform well under fire? The answer is to be found in an examination of those traditional practices of military order and discipline that the Marine Corps refused to abandon despite some pressures to move to more managerial and "modern" ways of handling troops. Precisely because they were able to maintain the traditional mechanisms of discipline, leadership, and professionalism, largely through a superior NCO cadre, the Marines were able to mitigate if not negate altogether their problems of drug use, AWOL, and desertion and to hold their units together so that they could perform well on the battlefield.

One critical respect in which the Marine Corps differed from the Army dluring Vietnam was in the quality of its small unit officer leadership. It is difficult not to conclude that the Marines may have maintained relatively higher quality small unit officers throughout the entire conflict than did the Army. Historically, and to state fairly, the Marine Corps has been smaller than the Army and takes on more of the quality of a brotherhood than the bureaucratic associations that tend to develop in the large, complex bureaucratic structures characteristic of the Army. Moreover, many Marine officers were not career officers. Instead, I feel that they were for the most part highly motivated young men who joined the Marine Corps for one or two tours of duty and then left service. The result was that the Marine officers who commanded small combat units were often imbued with the notion that the Corps was something special; they were convinced of the value of Marine traditions and practice in leading their men into battle by superb NCO cadres. The dictum, popular in the early seventies, that one could manage men on the battlefield or that officers were merely middle-tier managers never took deep root in the Marine officer corps during Vietnam and from all indications it still has not.

As a consequence the quality of Marine officers must have remained very high at the crucial point in the fighting structure, namely at the company and platoon level, precisely where most of the fighting was done. Further, the overall expansion of the Marine Corps to meet the requirements of the war was considerably less than the Army’s. The pressure on the Marine officer corps for rotation through Vietnam was less. As a result, the Marine Corps seldom, if ever, found it necessary to lower quality standards for their officers in order to recruit evergrowing numbers to meet manpower requirements. By contrast, in order to meet sometimes inflated strength levels, the Army found it necessary to continually reduce the qualifications allowable for officer positions. As the war dragged on, the Army witnessed what appeared to be a continual lowering of standards by necessity and a proliferation of officer candidate schools to the point that they produced a breed of officers whose quality was held by many to be considerably lower than in the early days of the war.¹⁵ Thus, perhaps one of the crucial aspects of the ability of the Marines to maintain cohesive units in the face of individual tendencies toward disintegration was closely tied to the maintenance of a highly disciplined, strongly motivated officer corps of good quality.

officer strength levels

Another element closely related to the ability of Marine Corps units to remain cohesive was the small size of the officer corps itself. An examination of highly cohesive armies in history, and even today as the Israeli case exemplifies, reveals them to have officer corps whose strength was relatively low as a percentage of total strength.¹⁶ For example, the Wehrmacht of World War II never exceeded 4 percent of total strength for its officers, the French during Indochina never exceeded 5 percent, and the Israeli Army today does not exceed 6 percent of total officer strength. All of these cohesive armies fought well and possibly did so at least to a large extent because their officer corps were small and apparently tightly disciplined. If Marine officer strength levels are examined in this light, it is clear that Marine officer strengths were proportionately far lower than strength levels in the Army. Discounting the officers of the Marine air wing who did not see ground combat (our data similarly discount Army warrant officers, most of whom were helicopter pilots, for the same reason), Marine officer strength during Vietnam accounted for about 6.4 percent of total corps strength.¹⁷ The ratio of officers to enlisted men was one officer per 14.1 soldiers or a rate that compares very favorably with the German Army in World War II, the French Army in Indochina, and the Israeli Army today. By comparison, Army officer strength in 1968 was one officer for every eight soldiers or almost double the proportional strength of the Marines. By 1972 Army officer strength had risen to one officer to 5.7 enlisted men or to almost 15 percent of total troop strength.¹⁸ In contrast with the Army, the Marines tended to maintain lower officer strength, a condition usually historically associated with highly effective and cohesive battle units. The Marines perceived that a small officer corps was effective in leading combat units and persisted in this policy throughout the entire Vietnam War while the Army, slowly becoming more managerially oriented, expanded its officer corps considerably and at a high rate.

stability of leadership

One of the more obvious elements associated with effective combat units throughout history is the degree of stability of unit leaders. Highly cohesive armies tend to consist of units that trained together, deployed as units, and remained together for long periods of time. The same is true of the leadership elements attendant to these units. Cohesive units tend to have officers and noncommissioned officers who have been stabilized in their positions for long periods of time. In the early days of the Vietnam War, Marine units followed their historical practice, deploying and replacing whole units and sending the officers who had trained the men into combat with them.

During Vietnam, U.S. military units, especially Army units, were subjected to an exceedingly high rate of personnel turnover so that the bonds of cohesion among members of a unit were often seriously weakened. Because each soldier had a different time at which his tour of service would end, constant in-and-out rotation was the rule. As a consequence, no one was ever in place long enough to establish strong bonds with his fellow soldiers. Cohesive units were quickly replaced by associations of strangers. With regard to Marine units, the Corps abandoned its traditional policy of unit rotation (transplacement) in 1965 and adopted the individual rotation system of the Army.¹⁹ Consequently, personnel turbulence within Marine units was almost as high as in Army units. During the peak year of Marine incountry strength, this turbulence fluctuated between 85,000 and 120,000 soldiers—a year of a total strength level of 317,000.²⁰

Despite high levels of personnel turbulence, the ability of Marine units to fight effectively seemed basically unaffected. The reason seems simple. Unlike Army policy, which was to rotate officers into command positions for only six months and then redeploy them to staff positions, the Marines required officers to spend their full tour of duty with their troops.* Except for battle death, wounds, or special circumstances, Marine officers spent their entire time incountry with their troops. Army combat officers spent only six months in combat while their troops spent a full twelve. While Army officers apparently rotated rapidly through a series of assignments, Marine officers remained in place in support of the traditional practice of officer stability.

*Army practice was to rotate at the company level and above at the six-month point primarily to expand wartime experience.

With Army officers assigned to combat posit ions for only six months at a time while their troops remained exposed for the full tour of duty, the troops came to perceive that their leaders were not bearing their fair share of the risk. The fact that many Army officers served multiple tours and were highly experienced and competent did not change this. It was the perception that counted.

In Marine units exactly the opposite was true. The only way an officer would leave a unit ahead of his men was by being killed or wounded. There is perhaps no element of leadership that cements men together more than the perception that their officers are hearing their fair share of risk and death. In Army units the troops quickly discerned that with their officers having to serve only half as long as they did under the enemy’s guns the officers were riot bearing their share of the burden. In Marine units the opposite perception was obtained as Marine policy stabilized leadership elements with their troops for the entire period of in-country service.

the burden of death

Because Marine officers stayed with their troops longer, their presence in turn was more visible on the battlefield. Probably as a consequence, they received more battle wounds proportionately than did Army officers and, more important, suffered a far greater burden of death than did Army officers. Although Army officer strength during Vietnam constituted some 15 percent of the total force, Army officers absorbed only 7

percent of the battle deaths. By contrast, Marine officers constituted only 6.4 percent of total strength and suffered 6.1 percent of battle deaths.²¹ It was quite clear to Marines that their officers not only shared the hardships and risks of a full thirteen-month tour but that their officers actually accepted an equal risk of death.

When Marine performance in Vietnam is examined from the perspective of unit cohesion, it appears that the Marines were able to maintain higher levels of cohesion by applying basic lessons learned from their own history. They correctly linked unit cohesion to a corps of highly motivated, good quality officers, who constituted a small percentage of total strength, stabilized their positions for at least as long as their troops were in-country, and set an example of courageous leadership by suffering their share of wounded and dead. All four of these conditions have historically been associated with highly cohesive military forces.

Moreover, Marine units appeared able to overcome many of the pathologies affecting individual soldiers precisely because of the quality of officer leadership. The Marine officer stood as a bulwark by his own example, by risk of his own life, by his own motivation, and thus keeping the forces of individual disintegration from overwhelming unit cohesion. The unwillingness of the Corps to abandon such traditional gladiatorial practices in the face of creeping managerialism must be counted as one of the greater successes of the Marine Corps in Vietnam.

effective disciplinary system

The excellence of Marine officer leadership has been characterized by yet another traditional practice of the Corps, the maintenance of good order and discipline and their rigid enforcement by every legal means available, When disciplinary rates for Marine and Army units are compared, they clearly show that the Marines maintained a more rapid and efficient disciplinary system for containing and dealing with disciplinary problems. Between 1965 and 1972, only half of the Army deserters were returned to military control. By contrast the Marine disciplinary system returned more than three-fourths of deserters to its control. In cases that were tried for desertion by courts-martial, the Army conviction rate was only 63 percent whereas for the Marines was 80 percent.²²

Perhaps most telling of all is the fact that during the Vietnam War the Army actually decreased the number of prosecutors available to deal with offenses against good order and discipline.²³ The Marines on the other hand increased the number of legal officers dealing with disciplinary problems which may have been relevant to Marine success. It was common knowledge among the troops that punishment in the Corps would be swift and sure. The Marines seem to have maintained yet another institutional support for unit cohesion by linking good officer leadership to a rapid and efficient prosecutorial system for containing and dealing with disciplinary problems. I find that significant in comparing leadership and entrepreneurial modes of operation.

Marine units during the Vietnam War suffered from problems of desertion, AWOL, and drug use at rates commensurate with Army units. However, the performance of these units as units makes it clear that the Marines were able to prevent individual pathologies from coming together in such strength as to affect unit cohesion or performance. How they did this, I think, is a credit to professionalism and traditional modes of leadership. The Marines were able to deal effectively with their disciplinary problems, by having small numbers of highly visible officers, by ensuring that the remained with their troops for a full tour of duty, and by allowing Marine officers to assume their full share of the burden of death. All these are traditional mechanisms of military leadership, and they were evident among Marine units in Vietnam.

None of this is to suggest that the Marines did not have their difficulties during that war, nor is it fair to imply any lack of dedication or competence among Army officers. It is only to suggest that although Marine units were pulled by forces toward disintegration—as all armies have been from time immemorial—the Marines, unlike the Army, were able to prevent these forces from damaging unit cohesion and discipline. More important, they were able to accomplish this, I believe, through the judicious application of traditional leadership methods. By contrast, the Army had gradually abandoned many of its traditional leadership modes and disciplinary habits in conformity with the new bureaucratic order, which placed premiums on the ability to handle managerial skills. When that happened, the effectiveness of Army units dropped considerably while indicators of unit disintegration rose alarmingly.

In the end, the traditional formulas of military leadership and discipline worked well for the Marines, and they were able to maintain effective units in the face of potential debilitating problems. The Army, on the other hand, tried to implement a modern formula of managerialism and managerial technique, tried to "manage the conflict," manage their resources, and finally tried to turn its officers into middle-tier managers." To this analyst, the lesson is clear: The traditional formula worked; the modern one failed. In this sense those who would introduce managerial techniques into the military ought to be aware of the effect that such techniques may have on the quality of combat leadership and unit discipline. Only when it has been determined that leadership and unit cohesion will not be adversely affected by managerial reforms should we feel safe to adopt them in a combat army. That would appear to be the basic lesson of a comparison of Army and Marine Corps units in Vietnam.

1. This is the major thesis of Richard A. Gabriel and Paul Savage’s Crisis in Command: Mismanagement in the Army (New York: Hill & Wang, 1978).

2. America’s Volunteers: A Report on the All-Volunteer Armed Forces, Office of the Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, December 31, 1978, p. 206.

3. Ibid.

4. Section on Military Absentees, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&RA) MPP, April 18, 1972.

5. Letter to Congressman Robin Beard, originally responding to author’s request for information through that office. The letter is dated 31 August 1979 and signed by Edward Hidalgo, Assistant Secretary the Navy, Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, p. 5.

6. Presentation by Lt. Gen. W. K. Jones, USMC (Ret), Commanding General, FMFPAC, at the General Officers Symposium in 1972, pp. 23-25.

7. Gabriel and Savage, p. 49.

8. Letter to Beard, p. 4.

9. See Division Command Information Report of April 10, 1971, of the First Marine Division.

10. Gabriel and Savage, Table 2.

11. Letter to Beard, p. 2.

12. Gabriel and Savage, p. 45.

13. One of the major arguments in Crisis in Command is that the number of Army casualties taken over a ten-year period compared to similar types of warfare in recent history marks the Vietnam War as a low-intensity conflict in which battle stress, as traditionally witnessed in the West, was relatively low and of short duration.

14. Letter to Beard, p. 6.

15. Interestingly, the perceived decline of officer standards was used as a defense by lawyers representing Lieutenant William L. Galley, Jr., during his court-martial for the so-called My Lai massacre. They argued that Calley would never have been allowed to become an officer by postwar standards.

16. For this argument presented more completely in the historical context, see Crisis in Command, pp. 69-70.

17. Letter to Beard, p. 10.

18. Gabriel and Savage, p. 62.

19. The Marines in Vietnam: 1954-1973 (Washington: History and Museums Division, U.S. Marine Corps, 1974), p. 41.

20. Letter to Beard, p. 9.

21. Ibid, p. 8.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

Major Richard A. Gabriel, USAR, Professor of Politics at St. Anselm’s College, Manchester, New Hampshire, is assigned to the Directorate of Foreign Intelligence in the Pentagon, is the New England Director of Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, a Fellow of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, and Guest Scholar at Brookings Institution. Gabriel is coauthor of Crisis in Command and Mangers and Gladiators: Directions of Change in the Army and author of several articles and books on military subjects, his latest being The New Red Legions: An Attitudinal Portrait of the Soviet Soldier. He recently completed To Serve with Honor: A Treatise on Military Ethics and the Way of the Soldier, the first major treatise on military ethics written by an American.