Air University Review, January-February 1981

Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution

The inherent flexibility of air power is its greatest asset . . .Control of available air power must be centralized and command must be exercised through the Air Force Commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully explained.¹

The characteristics and capabilities of air power—primarily speed, firepower, and mobility—enable air forces to use the principle of flexible employment. The principles of centralized control, decentralized execution, coordinated effort, common doctrine, and cooperation are unique to aerospace power. They are fundamental to the success of aerospace operations. ²

During the relatively short history of the United States Air Force as a separate service, the concept of centralized control and decentralized execution has been a fundamental axiom of Air Force doctrine. The loss of command, control, and communications (C³) in a theater of operations such as Europe in the 1980s would potentially render air power impotent. C³ systems are essential to the implementation of strategy, control of forces, and employment of weapons in modern warfare. These C³ systems support day-to-day operations, rapid assessment of indications and warning information for decision-makers in periods of increased tension and impending conflict, accurate situation monitoring and allocation of resources in crisis situations, and vigorous conduct of military operations in wartime.³

One of the most difficult problems that confront any commander who has committed his forces in accordance with a well-developed plan is to alter the operation in light of changing circumstances. Sun Tzu (circa 300 B.C.) recognized the inherent difficulties, both intellectual and physical, and repeatedly emphasized that the nature of war is ceaseless change.⁴ Thus we have historic evidence of early recognition of the need for near-real-time C³ systems to control the battle. Likewise, Carl von Clausewitz understood the need for real-time battle management when he wrote:

. . . [the strategist] will draft the plan of war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it. . . . Since most of these matters have to be based on assumptions that may not prove correct, while other, more detailed orders cannot be determined in advance at all, it follows that the strategist must go on campaign himself.⁵

Today, technology permits the modern strategist to go on campaign through the use of real-time C³ systems. The success of the current United States military premise—to fight outnumbered and win —is contingent upon the interoperability and synergistic attributes of our combat C³ systems. Inasmuch as an effective C³ system is advertised as a force multiplier, a disrupted or destroyed C³ system must be designated a force divisor. Accordingly, combat success or failure, especially in Europe, could be totally hinged on the effectiveness of command and control and its supporting communications networks.

Could communications be the Achilles’ heel of our NATO war-winning strategy and our ability to fight outnumbered and win? In his On War, Clausewitz defined a center of gravity as "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed."⁶ If one respects the Clausewitzian notion of centers of gravity, then one must concede the plausibility of a critical weak link. Could communications be our weak link? Are there weaknesses in the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) communication networks? The following paragraphs will suggest that the answer is yes. Too often, acquisition of adequate communication systems has been deferred in favor of funding for "shiny airplanes" and exotic weapon systems during the annual budget competition. This is somewhat understandable when one has to defend the lethal effectiveness of a telephone system. Yet, recently, the combat importance of communications has grown. There is hard evidence that the Soviets have targeted the NATO C³ area intensely.

For theater war, Soviet doctrine stresses joint operations: intense offensive strikes at war’s outbreak—conceivably conventional, conceivably nuclear, or conceivably a combination of both —to attack and take out key enemy military targets: airfields, air defenses, command and control centers, nuclear storage sites, etc.⁷ One aspect of Soviet doctrine that reveals the seriousness of their efforts is the emphasis they place on assuring the continued operation of their own command, control, and communications while attacking the enemy. Their doctrine of radio electronic combat ( REC) indicates a strong commitment to the coordinated use of electronic and lethal means to degrade the enemy’s ability to communicate. They have thus identified a crucial factor in the ability of modern, highly integrated forces such as ours to fight, arid they have focused on means to reduce the effectiveness of such forces.⁸

In practice, Soviet radio-electronic combat doctrine proposes to destroy a significant portion of our communications capability through direct attack and collateral damage; disrupt another major portion of our communications through electronic warfare means; the remaining portion of our communications networks is intended to fall into disarray through chaos and uncoordinated activity. Direct attack may take the form of sabotage on existing microwave radio relay sites, satellite earth terminals, and major switching centers. Radio equipment in the high frequency, very high frequency, ultrahigh frequency, tropospheric scatter, and microwave realms is particularly vulnerable to jamming, spooling, and exploitation. U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Dewey Bartlett have observed that a final implication for NATO of the new Soviet threat is the (resulting) inadequacy of the alliance’s current command, control, and communications capabilities, which one senior NATO commander recently declared to be "the fundamental deficiency with NATO today."⁹

The fragility of our communication networks cannot be totally credited to our adversaries. We are also to blame for many of the inherent vulnerabilities. In an article by SAC Commander General R. H. Ellis, USAF, it was stated that tactical communication equip- ment used by land, sea, and air forces of various NATO nations usually cannot directly communicate with corresponding equipment used by other nations because of differences in operating frequencies, modulation, data rate, or encryption method. This inability generates serious handicaps in the planning and conduct of combined operations.¹⁰ The situation will tend to worsen significantly as several NATO nations place greater dependence on automated command and control systems. The significant vulnerability evolves around the lack of extensive common-user communication networks and the lack of standards and in- teroperability protocols for existing dedicated digital communication systems. For commercial and national reasons, allied communication equipment has been designed to be less than totally interoperable. Design bureaus jealously guard command, service, and national prerogatives at the expense of interoperability. In good faith, each activity optimizes on national-based operational and commercial objectives that invariably are diametrically opposed to the design compromises necessary for multinational interoperability.

To compound the situation, the current NATO communication supporting networks are a conglomeration of much-outdated equipment, some of it dating to the 1930s. For example, the telephone exchange on Ramstein Air Base, Germany (providing telephone service for Headquarters Allied Air Force, Central Europe and Headquarters United States Air Force in Europe) was installed in 1939. Much of the communication circuit routing from Supreme Allied Commander, Europe/United States Commander in Chief, Europe down to major subordinate commands of national forces traverse single thread transmission networks and switching centers. Any single point failure in such a network will isolate higher-level commanders from vital information and will disconnect lower-level commanders from timely and coordinated direction. Today, in NATO, alternate routing, reconstitution assets, and adequate wartime backup equipment are severely limited. In 1976, major USAF communication reconstitution assets in the form of the 2d Combat Communications Group (then named the 2d Mobile Communications Group) were regarrisoned from Europe to the continental United States (CONUS) as a result of being administratively catalogued as "support forces" in the context of the Nunn Amendment. The value of prepositioning communication reconstitution assets in Europe has been analyzed and reanalyzed with positive conclusions since 1976. However, to date, no known positive action has been taken by USAF or other NATO activities that has resulted in pre-positioning significant amounts of critical wartime reconstitution assets in the NATO forward area.

One can attribute the foregoing to what is called the peacetime mentality of Washington-based planners and program/budget decision-makers. These high-level bureaucrats, both inside and outside the Department of Defense (DOD), are often unable to extrapolate from the "good times," which are defined as CONUS communications during periods of peace and tranquillity, to "bad times," which includes the chaos, fog, and friction of all-out coalition warfare in Europe. On occasion, severe communication problems do occur here in the "land of plenty," albeit with few if any lessons learned. For example, the Boston Globe reports:

Washington--When the nuclear accident at the Three Mile Island reactor occurred, Nuclear Regulatory Commission officials in Washington quickly discovered that they had a serious communications problem. Once the word of the accident got out, phone lines into the Harrisburg area were so overloaded that nuclear power officials had difficulty reaching their own aides on the scene to determine the extent of the accident and of the risks involved.¹¹

How much worse will the communication problem be in time of war? The fact is that there is ten times as much communications equipment available from Washington to Harrisburg as from Washington to our component commanders in Europe.

Why is it so difficult to see our obvious vulnerabilities? The answer is manyfold. Among the contributing factors are the following:

(1) that U.S. military and civilian communicators provide excellent CONUS communications under wide-ranging conditions with little or no fanfare. Americans are accustomed to a plethora of outstanding communications. They cannot conceive of the communication nightmare that exists in peacetime Europe today, much less in wartime Europe.

(2) CONUS and NATO exercises use large numbers of additional, specially engineered (engineered months in advance), commercially leased circuits to augment military communications during joint tactical exercises.

(3) Military communication engineers and survey teams work months in advance planning and siting detailed exercise communications. Because of this additional effort, exercise circuits rarely fail. Such a luxury would not be available in wartime.

(4) Additionally, high-level emphasis is placed on high-visibility areas to ensure that there are no failures in communications.

(5) Exercise communication systems are provided with on-site backup equipment and extensive redundancy in circuit routing and system design. This is typically uncharacteristic of real world, frontline communication networks. The theory is that tactical exercises are too expensive to permit disruptions due to communication outages.

(6) Many real world war planners have no idea of the magnitude of resources necessary to execute actual combat. Peacetime contingency plans that are executed often list in the Communications Annex—"Communications will be provided as required.’’ And communicators dutifully marshal their limited assets to put on a good show for the operators, thus hulling the operators into a feeling of false security.

(7) Other decision-makers are lulled by Korean War and Southeast Asian (SEA) experiences. Our communications in Korea and SEA were never targeted by the enemy-they gained too much intelligence value from exploiting our clear text messages. With the increased use of U.S. and NATO encryption capabilities. Soviet doctrine now places tactical communications on the high-priority target list.

(8) Washington decision-makers equates firepower, sea power, and air power and then set about in the name of economy to treat service communication needs as common, with identical operational requirements and characteristics. For example, the Air Force was forced to acquire overspecified TRI-TAC switches, which restrict mobility while increasing manpower and training requirements. As a result we may win the peace and lose the war.

The FY80 DOD Report appears to recognize the essentiality of C³ systems. It states:

The war-fighting capability of our armed forces and of our allies must not be compromised by ineffective or vulnerable C³I systems. Interoperability of U.S. and Allied systems is vital to timely and unambiguous assessment of the situation and to military operations in a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict.¹²

The report then supports several technically exotic C³ systems aimed at resolving certain deficiencies in the future, e.g., the TRI-TAC Program (initial operational capability or IOC— 1984, JTIDS (IOC— 1985), Combat Net Radio (IOC— 1986), Ground Mobile Forces Satellite Terminals (IOC— 1983), General Purpose Satellite Communications System (IOC— 1987), etc. However, the report fails to mention that those plans in the NATO Long Term Defense Program to make NATO C³ systems compatible with national tactical C³ systems is targeted for 1995.

At this point one has to ask what can be done in the near term when faced with the dilemma as described? The answer is plenty. My purpose is to show that Air Force principles of centralized control and decentralized execution are communication dependent and that U.S. and NATO communications are vulnerable to catastrophic failure. My objective is to get recognition for this potentially dangerous situation, especially the attention of Air Force operations personnel. Once recognized, the vital support needed from the ‘‘operators’’ will be facilitated. Additionally, there are several quick and low-cost actions that can be taken contingent upon "operator support.

The first low-cost action is that the Air Force should start to think with a realistic, war-winning mentality; recognize that war is feasible and the foregoing vulnerabilities are real. The operator must recognize the "first team" role of the Air Force communicator. Stop proliferation of communications systems that do not interoperate; appoint a single manager for all Air Force communications including combat communications. Make communication systems technically compatible—do not rely on buffers and unique interface devices. Cut through all Air Force command parochialisms and designate one senior officer to manage all communication and interfaces; then assign appropriate responsibilities and authority (including freedom of action) and hold the senior officer accountable. Make plans for the real contingency of going to general war next week, next month, next year. If current managers believed in such a possibility, many actions would be executed in a radically different manner and at a greatly accelerated pace. Operators need to identify their minimum essential information requirements at a minimum essential number of locations.

Second, plan seriously to be in a communications-out situation for long periods during a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation. Have plan "Bs’’ ready.

Third, work interoperability problems now with a new willingness to change U.S. standards and designs rather than always expecting our allies to do the compromising. Interoperability must be a mandatory operational requirement. The new authority vested in the single communication manager will greatly facilitate alternative trade-offs and international compromise.

Fourth, think NATO and coalition warfare. Stop thinking unilateral United States and that the U.S. solution is always, de facto, the correct solution.

Fifth, ensure that applicable NATO standards are developed in a timely manner; compromise, where necessary, in the interest of a stronger NATO. Where standards are established, build rapidly toward compliant equipment and systems.

Sixth, recognize and accept the risk of building less than optimum communication systems; in the past, "best" has been the enemy of "good," "adequate," and "effective."

Seventh, plan and justify the early return of communication reconstitution assets to Europe. Spain and Portugal would make ideal storage locations. Proliferate communication systems that interoperate and provide for many intersystem interface points; design survivability through extensive parallel independent networks with interoperability planned ahead. In this context, negotiate for expanded use of the German grundznetz system; harden other NATO and U.S. networks as required. Plan and design tactical interconnect points along all backbone communication routes in Europe, both military and commercial. Phase one of such an effort is to catalog and map the many allied systems that exist in isolation today.

Eighth, plan for and practice war damage, sabotage, electronic warfare, and disruption caused by failures to communication systems. Exercise the C³ systems with total imagination and no-holds-barred. Practice extensive reconstitution to the extent of marshaling reinforcements from CONUS.

Ninth, above all, evolve communication improvements. Radical changes in com- munication systems leave our NATO allies far behind and only hurts the U.S. Air Force in the long run. On 25 October 1979, David Israel, Worldwide Military Command and Control System/Systems Engineer, Defense Communications Agency, stated that there is a lack of consensus in the fundamental truths related to Command and Control.’’ Until these truths become self-evident, it is risky to propose radical changes to communication-systems. Radical changes only exacerbate communication interoperability and effectiveness in a combat environment. The bottom line: operators should be wary of promises related to wondrous communication capabilities in the wartime environment.

My premise has been that C³ systems are to serve the operator. I have solicited operator assistance to understand and support command and control and particularly its supporting communication so it could better serve the operator in time of conflict. It cannot be stated strongly enough that operator understanding and support of C³ systems are absolutely essential. Command and control decision-makers must be convinced to provide their support for war-winning communication improvement programs. Timely communication improvements with emphasis on survivability and interoperability are vital to the viability of tactical C³ in the NATO environment. With adequate communication we should have effective command and control of our forces. With effective C³ we should be able to efficiently employ the principles of centralized control and decentralized execution. Through proficient management of our forces and the inherent flexibility of U.S. and NATO air power, we will have the capability to fight outnumbered and win.

1. U.S. Army Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, 1943, p. 5-1.

2. USAF Draft Manual 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 5-2.

3. Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1980 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 234.

4. Sun Tzu the Art of War, edited and translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 52.

5. Carl von Clausewitz on War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 177.

6. Ibid., pp. 595-96.

7. Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, August 1978, p. 16.

8. Ibid.

9. Sam Nunn and Dewey F. Bartlett, NATO and the New Soviet Threat (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Jules Perel’s Publishing Company, April-May 1977), p. 8.

10. R. H. Ellis, "The Air Defense of the West — A View from NATO’s Central Region," Supplement to the Air Fore Policy Letter for Commanders, September 1977, p. 4.

11. Boston Globe, April 1, 1979.

12. Brown, p. 234.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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