Air University Review, January-February 1981

"Principles of Deterrence" Reconsidered

Chain reactions of creative thought are essential to sound strategies. The Fire Counter Fire and Commentary sections of Air University Review are well suited to assist that process, which comprises three phases: thesis, counter thesis, and synthesis.

My essay "Principles of Deterrence," which was published in the November-December 1979 issue of this journal, was a thesis of sorts. Comments regarding my essay in the July-August 1980 issue by three United States Air Force officers who are also Rand Research Fellows constituted counter theses or critiques. The synthesis phase awaits further rebuttals because I am not convinced that my basic premise requires modification.

The three reviewers read some things I never wrote into my treatise and sometimes misinterpreted my meanings. Therefore, I would like to offer a few clarifications.

Responses to Lieutenant Colonel Michael Seaton’s critique

The separation of interests and objectives (page 77, paragraph 1) is of more than semantic significance. Security interests are simply general concepts of a nation’s wants and needs. Objectives must be established to ensure their satisfaction. Preserving "our way of life," which falls into the first category, thus is not the "dominant national security objective of the United States," as noted by Colonel Seaton. Deterring strategic nuclear strikes on this country deserves that distinction, as confirmed by every President and Secretary of Defense since Harry Truman’s time. Failure to fulfill that aim would uncover every U.S. interest.

"Avoidance" and "deterrence" (Ibid.) are not synonymous. The former connotes steps to slip aside or shun. The latter dissuades opponents by psychological pressure of some sort. Consequently, strategic surrender could not accomplish deterrent tasks or cover critical U.S. interests, although Seaton indicates otherwise.

I deliberately deleted "objective" from my original list of deterrent principles (p. 77, paragraph 2) because deterrence in that case is the only germane goal.

Nothing in my discourse denies Clausewitz’s conclusion that no body of particular principles universally dictates strategic behavior (p. 78, paragraph 1). It specifically states the opposite.

Nuclear proliferation might make conflict "less likely out of fear of the consequences." (p. 78, paragraph 3) It surely would increase the likelihood of miscalculations, accidents, and irresponsible/irrational acts. I personally prefer a world with the fewest possible fingers on nuclear triggers.

Reward not only can be but frequently has been "a viable persuasive element in situations of calculated aggression," (p. 78, paragraph 5) despite Seaton’s doubts. President Magsaysay did not defeat the Huks with nuclear weapons or napalm. He undercut their power base in the populace with political, economic, and social reforms, to cite a single example.

Seaton calls for a range of military capabilities that should be "employable throughout the conflict spectrum." (p. 78, paragraph 6) Nothing in my list of deterrent properties indicates otherwise.

Intentions "not only to fight but to win" are tricky. (p. 79, paragraph 2) Tactical victories can lead to strategic defeat (as they did in Vietnam). Determination to win, however you choose to define that term, may strengthen deterrence in many cases, but not as a matter of principle.

Responses to Lieutenant Richard E. Porter’s critique

Many U.S. defense decision-makers, military as well as civilian, ignore Principles of War. (p. 80, paragraphs 3-4) Others never heard of them. That does not neutralize the potential usefulness of principles during the preparation of concepts and plans for defense or offensive combat. Principles of War and Principles of Deterrence, properly employed, should help formulate sound intellectual frameworks, rather than follow them.

Finesse is more likely to deter than is force in some instances, but I never implied that political or economic sanctions would cause the Soviets to pull out of Afghanistan. My discussion of deterrent properties suggests the opposite. (pp. 80-81) I am equally convinced that announced intentions to employ U.S. "recognized superiority" in strategic nuclear weapons would also fail to accomplish that purpose because the threat would lack credibility. The impoverished state of our tactical/mobility forces reduces the range of practical deterrent options even further.

Principles of War and Principles of Deterrence can be used as checklists to assist in assessing concepts, plans, policies, and operations. (p. 81, paragraph 4) The Principle of Publicity, for example, indicates that technological advances have no deterrent value whatever, if they remain under wraps. Seen in that context, key questions connected with Stealth aircraft are not whether data should be disclosed but at what stage of development and to what extent.

Responses to Lieutenant Colonel Phillip D. Gardner’s critique

The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is a poor example of irrational behavior or national insanity, Ambassador Grew’s statement notwithstanding. (p. 82, paragraph 3) It was a high-risk operation that fits better within the British Special Air Service’s (SAS) motto, "Who Dares Wins." It almost put us out of business in the Pacific. Successful steps to occupy Hawaii would have made U.S. resurgence most difficult.

"Strategy vanishes just at the moment when guidance is most needed" (p. 83, paragraph 2) only if the sole option is to execute some superspecialized plan, such as U.S. assured destruction concepts for general nuclear war. Defensive strategies traditionally supplant deterrence as soon as conflict (not necessarily armed combat) starts. That trend is traceable to the Stone Age.

I concur completely that Principles of Deterrence should not replace thought, (p. 84, paragraph 2) but they could remind strategists to consider specific subjects.

Contributor

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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