Air University Review, January-February 1981

Saving the World

disarmament, peace, and negotiation

As long as weapons exist, so does the danger of their use. This is the basis for the arguments of two very different schools of thought. Many of those who urge policies of disarmament rely on that fact to demonstrate the folly of increasing or even maintaining both national and global strategic profiles. By eliminating weapons, one simultaneously eliminates the risk of their use and, concomitantly, the risk of war.

Those who urge expansion of the nation’s strategic profile agree thoroughly that the existence of weapons poses a clear threat to peace, yet reach an entirely different conclusion. They argue that, precisely because a danger exists, one must be prepared to meet and meet it in kind. Unlike adherents of the first school of thought, however, partisans of weapon proliferation virtually never speak global terms, contending instead that their own nation must expand its weaponry in order to reestablish the balance of power in the world.

Implicit in the thinking of the first group is the hope that man is willing and able to curb his aggressiveness, negotiating a policy of peaceful global coexistence—or, at least, a policy of strictly nonmilitary global competition. Underlying the rationale of the second group is the belief that human nature precludes trusting one’s enemies: if they have weapons, they will use them; and even if they ostensibly agree to a disarmament policy, they will cheat, waiting until one’s own trusting homeland has lowered its defense posture and then either attacking it or threatening it into submission. In other words, the first group looks at mankind and hopes for the best; the second group looks at man and plans for the worst.

Is it impossible to synthesize these two positions? Is it unrealistic to hope for the best while planning for the worst? Most nations would undoubtedly aver that such is precisely their policy. They strive to find peaceful, diplomatic means for settling international differences but reserve the right to employ force if it proves necessary for them to do so. Unfortunately, one finds no real consensus definition of the phrase "if necessary." Like beauty, necessity is usually in the eye of the beholder. However, some recent literature takes preliminary steps in the direction of defining the word necessary; and, more important, in the direction of resolving the tension existing between those looking forward to the best and those girding themselves for the worst.

Most of man’s thinking and behavior rests on past experience, and this observation holds true for collective national behavior as well as for individual behavior. Disarmament & Nuclear Tests l96-63* and Disarmament & Nuclear Tests, 1964-69** provide excellent background material dealing with the basis of current global expectations of continued weapons proliferation. The two volumes in question put forward no thesis; instead, they present news stories outlining objectively the successive ups and downs of nuclear negotiation. They provide anyone interested in peace with the background needed to understand why one cannot be either completely optimistic or completely pessimistic about man’s capacity for handling awesome weapons intelligently.

*Lester A. Sobel, editor, Disarmament & Nuclear Tests, 1960-63 (New York: Facts on File, 1964, $3.45 paper), 120 pages.
** Vojtech Mastny, editor, Disarmament & Nuclear Tests, 1964-69 (New York: Facts on File, 1970, $4.45 paper), 254 pages.

In similar fashion, Negotiating Security: An Arms Control Reader provides historical perspectives with regard to negotiating both nuclear and nonnuclear arms control.* Unlike the first two volumes, the articles in Negotiating Security make no pretense of being objective. Each selection argues a particular point of view; but so diverse is the range of opinion included that, as in the case of an objective historical overview, the reader is left to formulate-his own conclusions. Overall, therefore, the volume is an objective, balanced presentation.

*William H. Kincade and Jeffrey D. Porro, editors, Negotiating Security: An Arms Control Reader (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1979, $11.00), 321 pages.

The Peacekeeper's Handbook* published by the International Peace Academy, serves as an exercise in practical peacekeeping negotiation. It differs from the first three works in setting forth and supporting a definite thesis: namely, that the role of third-party peacekeepers is to be prepared for essentially anything, from suave diplomatic negotiations to surprise attack to worldwide criticism, and that peacekeepers must (1) hold firm to their resolve to preserve the peace but (2) retain complete flexibility with respect to the methodology for enforcing peace.

*Peacekeeper's Handbook (New York: International Peace Academy, 1978, no price given), 14 pages.

In Is America Becoming Number 2? Current Trends in the U.S. -Soviet Military Balance,* the Committee on the Present Danger presents a balanced review of pertinent data, arriving at a firm conclusion: the Soviet Union has outstripped the United States in terms of military preparedness and possibly also in terms of willingness to use its military capacity. Accordingly, the existing world order is highly unstable—a danger not only to the U.S. but also to all other nations. Rapid, vigorous steps to reverse the trend toward a low American military posture must be taken quickly and uncompromisingly.

*Is America Becoming Number 2? Current Trends in the U.S.-Soviet Military Balance (Washington: Committee on the Present Danger, 1978, no price given), 46 pages.

The Reader on Nuclear Nonproliferation,* a compendium prepared for the Senate Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, is another well-balanced presentation of differing opinions concerning the control of nuclear devices, both weapons- and energy related. Although its historical overview of such thinking stretches from the dawn of the nuclear age, circa 1946, to the present day, the bulk of the volume concentrates on current thinking, emphasizing the period from 1976 on. The book reflects growing concern about nuclear proliferation among thinkers of all sorts without a genuine consensus about how to cope with the situation—nonproliferation, or more rigid safeguards, or decentralization of nuclear authority being some of the alternatives discussed. Once again, the reader must make up his own mind.

*Reader on Nuclear Nonproliferation (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978, no price given), 504 pages.

In Warning and Response: A Study of Surprise Attack in the 20th Century and an Analysis of Its Lessons for the Future,* Julian Critchley makes no such demand on the reader. He gladly expounds his own conclusions, most of them revolving around his premise that it is not enough to have even the most accurate intelligence concerning the enemy; one must also be able to interpret properly the data gathered. According to Critchley, the principal difficulty in interpreting such data involves what psychologists call "projection"— imputing one’s own beliefs and motives to others. Virtually every concrete example of surprise attack reviewed by Critchley involves the problem of a nation misunderstanding the intentions, and often the capabilities, of an enemy—or of not identifying a certain state correctly as an enemy.

*Julian Critchley, Warning and Response: A Study of Surprise Attack in the 20th Century and an Analysis of Its Lessons for the Future (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1978, $14.00), 123 pages.

Disarmament and Peace

Few authorities believe that disarmament in the near future would really further the cause of peace. The International Peace Academy defines peace as "a condition that exists in the relations between groups, classes or states when there is an absence of violence (direct or indirect) or the threat of violence."^l On the face of it, this definition contradicts the statement preceding it. After all, disarmament would seem to be a definite step toward eliminating both violence and the threat of violence from the face of the earth. However, there is simply no reason to believe that unilateral disarmament by any major power—including even the Soviet Union— would serve the cause of world peace in the near future.

The principle of the balance of power is too familiar to bear repetition here, Useful, however, is a reminder of the view of man underlying that principle: man is selfish, untrustworthy, and aggressive. Man is potentially capable of being controlled by appeals to his higher faculties, his reason, his compassion—but man can definitely be controlled only by threats to his personal security. Furthermore, if man fails to be controlled, he will attempt to dominate other men. History, alas, confirms that these underlying principles are all too accurate, and the advent of weapons of unprecedented destructive power has not changed man’s nature.

History also shows that the foregoing observations are universal in their applicability; they describe American man as accurately as they do Soviet man or Chinese man. The Soviet Union’s efforts to achieve world domination² certainly represent the most immediate threat to world peace today; but there is little reason to believe that any state, regardless of the professed nobility of its intentions, could resist the temptation to dominate the world if only it had the opportunity to do so. For one thing, the lofty principle of a united globe has long existed as one of man’s ultimate goals; but history demonstrates that most states have achieved unification not so much as the result of noble purposes but as a result either of having to deal with a powerful, common enemy or of being conquered and unified by a tyrant. Moreover, economic imperatives indicate that a world unified by a nation with a fully developed industrial capacity would be a distinct advantage to that nation’s further economic growth.

These and similar considerations at least suggest that were the Soviet Union to disarm unilaterally the United States might well be unable to resist the temptation to unify the world. In other words, even under the disarmament circumstances most favorable from the American standpoint—a divested Soviet Union and a strong U.S—disarmament poses a very real potential threat to world peace.

Tangentially, I believe that American multinational corporations have acquired far too great an influence on the nation’s foreign policy—an influence that seems to be increasing and which inevitably affects U.S. military policy both directly and indirectly. Our society certainly depends on a strong and free marketplace, but it is not for businessmen to influence what should be military decisions—they have neither the training nor the requisite global view for such a function.

The argument against unilateral disarmament does not apply in the case of genuinely universal disarmament. With no significant weapons at its disposal, no nation could dominate another militarily. However, man is neither so trusting nor so naïve an animal as to permit universal disarmament in the foreseeable future. It is extraordinarily difficult if not altogether impossible to disarm confidently, especially where there is a history of mutual suspicion between states. Although intelligence-gathering techniques continue to increase in sophistication, no authority believes that a nation dedicated to the purpose could not successfully conceal a sufficiently extensive strategic capacity to enable it to conquer a fully disarmed enemy. Consequently, it seems unreasonable to assume that any nation would really comply with a total disarmament policy—because that nation would not expect other nations to comply with it.

Experience colors expectations, and expectations influence behavior if not actually dictating it. This principle runs through all disciplines involving human behavior, from religion and economics to politics and military science. As Julian Critchley points out, "The capabilities of an enemy can be measured—not so his intentions. . . . For it is a natural tendency to project one’s own sets of values upon others. Despite an awareness that the enemy is different, it is very hard to stop expecting him to act in the same way as oneself."³ That is why an understanding of Soviet and Chinese psychology is so imperative for the pursuit of effective foreign and military policy. Psychologists call an analogous principle that of "field theory," meaning that a therapist must be able to enter into a patient’s perception of the world and of his place in it before he can help the patient.

It is at this point that the writings about disarmament and those concerning negotiation reach a parting of the ways. By truly understanding the basis of behavior, whether of a society or of an individual, one can help alter the behavior and the attitudes shaping it. Although Richard Falk does not in any way disagree with Critchley’s stand that one must study history in order to understand the motives and expectations of one’s enemies, Falk does argue against assuming that history necessarily repeats itself:

My argument is premised upon another more positive image of an historical and cultural evolution that proceeds according to spiral forms, going back but at a higher level, in a different setting, acting as a rediscovery that builds upon the insufficiencies of what preceded and might otherwise emerge. In this view, the future is neither a projection of the past nor a series of repetitions, but is rather a sequence of ascending spirals that exhibit an interplay of recurrence and innovation.⁴

If history repeats itself inexorably, there is no apparent purpose to peace negotiations or to disarmament efforts, because these efforts have failed in the past; at least, they have fallen enormously short of their goal of lasting world peace. However, if man can learn from his history, he need not remain a slave to it; he can create a new and better future. Insofar as furthering the cause of world peace is concerned, the purpose of negotiations is to help create that new and better future.

Negotiation and
World Peace

Negotiation has been defined as: discussions between parties to a conflict directed toward the arrangement of a settlement;⁵ but I prefer another definition of it, one based on a thorough review of the literature concerning negotiation made by Max Ways. He defined negotiation as "a process in which two or more parties, who have both common interests and conflicting interests, put forth and discuss explicit proposals concerning specific terms of a possible agreement."⁶ The second definition is superior because it points out that negotiation is impossible if the parties involved have no common interests whatever. Further, the definition demands that negotiation be specific—it must contain concrete policy proposals maximizing the common interests of the parties involved while minimizing or eliminating their conflicts.

"Everybody" wants world peace, of course, for to prepare for war drains a state both economically and psychologically. Yet, almost no one agrees on how to achieve the goal. Therefore, negotiations having as their stated intentions the goals of world peace or disarmament or both are worse than useless if they do not include specific policy proposals right from the start. They are worse than useless because they must inevitably fail, and their failure will cause men to believe that all such efforts are futile, Again, expectations generate behavior; if peace and negotiation are futile, then war and aggression are the only alternatives.

I contend that the history of disarmament negotiations has thus far been inconclusive⁷ because no real negotiations have taken place. Effective, concrete policy proposals cannot be made unless and until all parties to the negotiations understand each other. The Soviets have proved particularly intransigent on this score: (1) they refuse to renounce their plans for world domination; and (2) they perceive efforts at negotiation as signs of Western weakness,⁸ further intensifying their belief that they can ultimately dominate the entire world militarily. Until the Soviets come to understand that a willingness to negotiate does not bespeak weakness— rather, it often reflects both great and mature strength—there seems no hope of attaining world peace through diplomatic negotiations.

In the long run, disarmament is vital to the cause of world peace. Without substantial weapons, there could be no threat of military action. However, disarmament would not eliminate the threat of economic violence, something for which the industrialized West is far better equipped than are the Chinese or even the Soviets. It follows that one can hardly expect the U.S.S.R to surrender willingly the one area where it has achieved parity or possibly supremacy—the military domain. In the short run, then, disarmament does not serve the cause of world peace. The Soviets will never agree to it in any meaningful way; therefore, there are none of the necessary points that East and West must have in common. Hence, there is simply no basis for negotiations.

I suggest that meaningful negotiations looking toward world peace can take place only if and when the Soviets realize that the U.S. and its allies will meet force with force, making weapons escalation futile. At present, the Soviets have recourse other than to negotiations. The U.S. must reverse its drift toward a form of unilateral disarmament so as to give the Soviets reason to negotiate. Both sides will then be able to work toward mutual understanding. Both sides will then be able seriously to try settling their differences by means of negotiations. Then and only then will disarmament seriously be considered by either side.

Notes

1. Peacekeeper’s Handbook, p. I/6.

2. Is America Becoming Number 2? Current Trends in the U.S. –Soviet Military Balance, p. 44.

3. Critchley, p. 117.

4. Richard Falk, "Nuclear Weapons Proliferation as a World Order Problem," in Reader on Nonproliferation, pp. 143-44.

5. Peacekeeper’s Handbook, p. I/6.

6. Max Ways, "The Virtues, Dangers, and Limits of Negotiation, Fortune, January 15, 1979, p. 87.

7. Disarmament & Nuclear Tests, 1964-69, p. 1.

8. Robert L. Arnett, "Soviet Views on Nuclear War," in Negotiating Security: An Arms Control Reader, pp. 115-20.

Captain Steven E. Cady (B.A., Texas Lutheran College; M.S., University of Southern California) is Executive Officer, Deputy Director for Force Development and Strategic Plans, Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff. He served as an electronic warfare officer and wing executive officer at Loring Air Force Base, Maine. He was Loring’s 1976 "Officer of the Year" and a 1978 "Outstanding Young Man of America." Captain Cady has published articles in the Review and other military journals.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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