Air University Review, January-February 1981

The Modernization of Soviet Frontal Aviation

What does it mean?

A close relationship exists between the Factors that influence the size and those that determine the composition of nation's armed forces. Simply put, a nation develops a strategy to overcome an impediment to its national objectives or restrain a perceived threat to its security. In turn, the strategy results in decisions that include the men, money, and materiel necessary to carry it out.

Obviously, weapon systems and the level of war-fighting capability go hand in hand. What is not always so obvious, except to experience military analysts, is that the way a nation fights is largely determined by the weapons it possesses. This observation is pertinent today because the Soviet Union and the United States are competing extensively within a wide range of weapon systems. The Soviets seem to have made real progress in attaining a force structure that reflects their stated strategy.

The purpose of this article is to examine one aspect of recent Soviet weapons activity, the modernization of their Frontal Aviation (FA) force structure.*

*The Soviet Air Force consists of three separate components: Frontal Aviation, Long Range Aviation, and Military-Transport Aviation. Its primary mission of Frontal Aviation is to provide tactical air support to ground forces, secondary mission to provide support for strategic air defense. (Soviet Aerospace Handbook, pp. 37, 38)

the Frontal Aviation threat

The current Soviet Frontal Aviation posture did not emerge overnight. Rather, Soviet tactical air power is the result of an intensive and methodical building program. Frontal Aviation has remained the largest command in the Soviet Air Force since the later days of World War II. Nonetheless, its numerical strength has fluctuated greatly, depending on emphasis placed on other commands at various times. In the early 1950s, FA possessed about 12,000 aircraft; in recent years, between 4000 and 5000.¹ This force is currently deployed as 16 tactical air armies, four in eastern Europe and one in each of the 12 military districts of the Soviet Union.² Air armies usually consist of from three to four air divisions, the basic operational unit. Each air division has three regiments composed of several fighter squadrons and an air logistic support unit comprising a transport squadron and a communications flight.³

While the numbers of aircraft have decreased, FA combat effectiveness has not. According to the FY 1980 U.S. Military Posture: "Most of Soviet Frontal Aviation fighters and fighter-bomber forces have been fielded since 1970. These aircraft have a greater radius of action, and improved avionics and support systems, ordnance, reconnaissance sensors and electronic countermeasures capability." ⁴

In the 1970s the offensive capabilities of Soviet Frontal Aviation steadily improved, due to the introduction of modern multirole fighters and fighter—bombers such as the Fencer, Fitter C, and Flogger. According to Soviet Aerospace Handbook, ‘‘Frontal Aviation has more than 4,500 combat aircraft, some 150 transport aircraft and 2,900 helicopters in its inventory."⁵

The qualitative improvements in the latest Soviet fighters may he far more important than the numerical advantage they enjoy over NATO forces. The technological inferiority of earlier generation Soviet fighters has largely been overcome. For example, automatic navigation and attack systems, laser range finders and target seekers, electronic countermeasures (ECM), and other advances in technology are incorporated in the Su-19 Fencer, MiG-23/27 Flogger, and the Su-17 Fitter.⁶

There has also been a significant shift in orientation toward Frontal Aviation over the last ten years, characterized by an accelerating trend from a preponderance of air defense interceptors to multimission capable fighters with greatly increased combat ranges and payloads. In essence, then, the FA forces have shifted to a role of offensive combat.

In addition to modern fighters, FA possesses about 3000 helicopters. The most important is the Mi-24 Hind which can be used as a gunship or for transporting combat equipped troops. The Hind has a large-caliber machine gun, Swatter antitank missiles, general purpose bombs, and 57-mm rocket pods to Fill both close air support and anti-armor attack roles.⁷

Soviet doctrine on
tactical air power employment

After two decades of emphasis on air defense, FA priorities have returned to the role they played in World War II. This was highlighted in 1972 by Chief Marshal of Aviation P.S. Kutakhov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Air Force. Describing the Soviet World War II "theory of air operations," Kutakhov emphasized the role of the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command in planning and controlling air operations. In addition, he pointed out that frontal air armies were employed in "air operations to destroy (or weaken) enemy air groupings, the destruction and disruption of the work of enemy lines of communications and in escorting long-range bombers to destroy military industrial installations in the enemy’s deep rear."⁸

Another author claims that the use of FA in Soviet theater warfare doctrine is actually "a reversion to the doctrine of the offensive use of air-power developed in the mid-1930s."⁹ This shift of emphasis from air defense to ground attack has resulted in "the primary objective of FA aircraft in Europe is to reduce the sortie rate of US/NATO aircraft."¹⁰ This goes a long way toward explaining the shift in performance characteristics of first-generation Soviet jets such as the MiG-15/17/19 and third-generation fighters, e.g., MiG-21/23/27, and Su- 17/19.

According to other Western analysts,

the primary role of Soviet Frontal Aviation will be the non-nuclear destruction of targets located behind enemy lines, with a secondary emphasis on the isolation of the NATO front-line forces. At the onset of battle, Soviet fighter aircraft . . . would be assigned missions to penetrate NATO airspace, along with fighter bombers, . . . in order to insure aerial superiority over the entire battle area, thereby providing the conditions necessary for interdiction missions against military and industrial targets in Western Europe, especially airfields and logistic structures, supply lines and command posts. ¹¹

With the modernization program that has been under way since 1970, the FA third-generation tactical fighters are now capable of carrying out the above mission objectives.

words and deeds

A clear trend can be shown to exist between Soviet doctrinal statements and their quest to modernize their Frontal Aviation forces. Whereas in the recent past the Soviets could not adequately support their strategy, they have now arrived at a point where their tactical weapon systems are probably capable of fighting in the manner and method long described in theoretical writings.

The Soviets have undertaken a steady and continuous modernization of their Frontal Aviation forces in which aircraft design changes are more evolutionary than revolutionary. The "fly before buy" concept, where aircraft are developed and extensively tested before being put into production, is prevalent in the USSR. In fact, modernization and enhancement of proven aircraft constitute the norm.¹² The best example is the MiG-21 Fishbed which has been modified so much that models J/K/L/N compose the largest component of their tactical air forces (although the MiG-23 Flogger B/D is fast becoming the backbone of the FA fighter force structure).

It is hard to overstate the impact of real improvement in capability that this Soviet modernization of Frontal Aviation will have on NATO. Although some analysts have hastened to point out the vulnerabilities and problems faced by the Soviet Air Force (such as inferior avionics and pilot training and low flying time), it must he realized that these deficiencies can be corrected in a relatively short time. Once the Soviets have acquired technologically advanced equipment and weapon systems, it would be naïve to expect that they will not learn to employ them effectively. Historically, improvements in weapons have preceded the development of appropriate tactics and optimal employment methods.

projected developments

The course that Frontal Aviation will take in the future is certainly not clear, but there are indications in which direction the Soviets’ fourth-generation aircraft design will proceed. An authoritative aviation journal recently identified three new fighters as:

1. Model J, designed for close air support and containing a 23- or 30-mm antitank gun system;

2. Model K, a variable-geometry wing aircraft equipped with look-down, shoot-down radar; and

3. Model L, a fighter that employs a medium-range, radar-guided missile.¹³

Two of the three new fighters would probably be introduced into Frontal Aviation forces.

In addition, the Soviets continue to modify and improve the performance of the existing fighters in Frontal Aviation units. New technology being developed includes terrain-avoidance radar, Doppler navigation equipment, Gatling-type guns mounted in pods, side-looking airborne radar, electro-optical surveillance television, laser-guided weapons, and new air-to-surface munitions.¹⁴

the problem

One thing is certain. Our ground forces in NATO can expect to be under heavy and repeated enemy air attack from the opening shots of a European war. Soviet Frontal Aviation now has the capability to subject NATO forces to the first aerial bombardment that Western armies have endured since World War II. This could be extremely significant if our forces are not physically and psychologically prepared.

The reader should be reminded that our recent combat operations (Korea and Vietnam) were fought under special circumstances for air combat. These conditions will probably not apply in a European war. Thus we must expect new orders of attrition for air-to-ground forces there. Soviet numerical advantages will give them a distinct edge in such a heavy casualty combat environment. Sanctuaries and tacit limits in the rules of engagement are unlikely to prevail. The recent Mideast wars will probably be better models for European combat than American military experiences in Korea and Vietnam.

Unfortunately, our armies have become used to operating with friendly air superiority.

In fact, many U S. Army officers, based on their Vietnam experiences, view tactical air power as an extension of their organic artillery support. One U.S. Army general officer observed:

Quantifying the Army’s need for tactical air support is simple: In a place like Europe, we need tons of it at the outset of hostilities, and the need will not let up until the numerical superiority of the opposing force is significantly reduced. ¹⁵

The U.S. Air Force has been accused of relying too much on the principle of flexibility in air power employment. To the contrary, reliance on this characteristic has repeatedly proved sound; we usually get into trouble when we deviate from it. In a high-intensity conflict, the air commander must retain the flexibility to adjust his forces during the "fog of war."

My purpose here is not to advocate a radical alteration of our current force structure. However, I believe it may be possible, at relatively small expense, to use what we presently have and are programmed to get much more effectively. Even without any aircraft modifications, I believe we must ensure that operationally we are getting the most out of our weapon systems, i.e., operating them in an optimum manner against any threat posed by Soviet tactical aviation and ground forces. An example of tactics that maximized the potential of a weapon is the World War II German blitzkrieg against French forces that actually possessed tanks that were superior to those of the Germans in terms of armor thickness, firepower, and handling characteristics, and which possessed equivalent speed as well.¹⁸

Although they are only discreetly discussed within the Air Force, there are several major options that could enhance our flexibility. Why not use our complex and costly fighters in a multirole if they inherently possess this growth potential in mission capability? For example, the F-l3 is a tremendous air superiority fighter and at present is assigned only this single mission. However, it could have a significant ground attack capability. Why not buy the bomb racks and air-to-surface munitions and train the pilots for the multimission capability the F-l5s inherently possess? ¹⁹

Although now limited to the ground-attack mission, the A-l0 could be employed against Soviet helicopters and enemy fighters that transit its areas of operations.²⁰ After all, Hans Ulrich Rudel, the great German tank killer with 519 confirmed kills, and other Stuka pilots on the Eastern Front shot down many Russian aircraft.²¹ We will need the maximum number of effective sorties immediately, and this could include A-10s shooting down enemy aircraft, especially Hind helicopters. It would take only a small amount of training (perhaps two to four sorties per year) to provide A-10 pilots some degree of proficiency in the fundamentals of aerial gunnery. It will be too late to get the required training after a conflict breaks out.

Other questions that may require changes in Air Force thinking and policy need to be revived and debated. We still lack a true beyond-visual-range (BVR) air combat capability.²² Why not equip our fighters with some type of video instrumentation in the cockpit that would allow them to fire on hostile aircraft with medium-range, air-to-air (A/A) missiles? It does not make sense to carry A/A missiles with a 30-mile range and normally use them only within a 3-mile distance of our aircraft. Other necessary steps are to ensure aerial rules of engagement that allow BV R missile firings and the required training to produce pilot proficiency. In addition, the F-16 would be greatly enhanced if it were modified to carry radar-guided missiles. This capability has already been demonstrated.²³

NATO planners should prepare effective plans to counterattack any Soviet invasion, rather than rely on defending against a blitzkrieg-style attack. This planning would require extending their sights beyond the present Western European boundaries. This new threat of an immediate counterattack to the Soviets’ territorial buffer acquired since World War II could serve as a deterrent to aggressive actions on the part of the Russians and their Warsaw Pact allies. History, unfortunately, does not record the outcome of unused options and alternatives. Therefore, it is extremely important for planners to develop options that actually affect the outcome of a war.

Another area that needs further review is the best use of our air power in a high-intensity European conflict. NATO needs a concept of operations that allows relatively weaker forces to defeat numerically stronger opponents. To fulfill this requirement, Colonel John Boyd, USAF (Ret), has developed a concept of strategy and tactics that is appealing.

The concept has as its dominant objective the ability to present the enemy with challenges and to do so more rapidly than the enemy can receive information, process it, and act on it . . . the important advantage was the ability to switch from tactic to tactic, constantly presenting the opponent with a new situation and doing so more rapidly than he could respond.

…this concept seeks to disorient the enemy by presenting incomplete and inaccurate data; to disrupt operations to generate confusion, disorder, panic, and chaos; and, through these actions, to shatter cohesion and cause paralysis and collapse.²⁴

Because of its inherent characteristics, air power is well suited to perform this disruption and destruction strategy. For example, a prime target of NATO air forces should be the rigid Soviet command, control, and communications (C³) system. Because initiative is only exercised at the Soviet division level, or higher, it is important to attack their C³ structure. A combination of terminally guided weapons ("smart bombs") delivered by fighters and saturation attacks by B-52 bombers could achieve the desired objective.

Our aerial firepower should be carefully directed. As a strategy, it will not generally be cost effective to attack enemy tanks or aircraft on a one-to-one basis, i.e., trying to destroy an armored vehicle in one pass or aerial dogfighting. A much better strategy would be to use our bombers and fighters in attacks on selected enemy airfields, massed armor in reserve and artillery formations, command, control, and communications sites, etc. Potentially, this could be a greater aid to our ground forces than the traditional close air support they expect.

The U.S. role as a world power demands that the Air Force maintain a balanced and flexible capability to accomplish whatever mission is necessary, i.e., counter-air (offensive and defensive), close air support, and/or interdiction. Assessing a mission in isolation from the overall military strategy has been a problem in the past. The first major step in being successful against Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces is the selection of an air power strategy to achieve theater objectives as simply and directly as possible. Once this is done, we can determine how each tactical mission will contribute to the overall objective. From this determination we can fix the priority, allocation of effort, and sequencing of each mission into a logical and simple battle plan. Since the tactical missions are interdependent, the battle plan must be designed to ensure that the missions—counterair, interdiction, and the close air support—reinforce each other to achieve the objective as quickly and efficiently as possible.

Success in warfare demands an appreciation for the value and limits of offensive and defensive air actions. Defensive air action can provide security for friendly forces and help to slow or stabilize the enemy ground offensive. It cannot capitalize on the element of surprise because it is reactive in nature and concedes the initiative to the enemy. A defensive posture gives up the opportunity to concentrate forces at the decisive time and place. An order to be completely successful, it requires the detection, identification, interception, and destruction/neutralization of every major threat before an enemy attack is completed. By comparison, offensive air action offers many advantages that the defense cannot. By going on the offense, the opportunity to achieve surprise is enhanced. Another plus is the ability to concentrate forces at the decisive time and place. As the situation dictates, we have the flexibility to change plans while conducting offensive air attacks, thus affording us the initiative of attacking when and where desired. Most important, we have an opportunity to achieve victory on our terms.

General William Momyer, in his Air Power in Three Wars, stresses the importance of lessons learned and then apparently forgotten in subsequent conflict. He analyzes the overall concepts of air power employment, strategy and tactics, and priority of missions with the stated objective that "our airmen won’t pay the price in combat again for what some of us have already purchased."²⁵

THE extensive modernization of the Soviet Frontal Aviation forces could decide the survival and success of its ground forces against NATO’s armed forces in a future conflict. The Soviets once emphasized interceptor aircraft with a short range and small payload, but their tactical doctrine now stresses interdiction deep into enemy territory and close air support for their ground forces. The Soviets have developed large numbers of modern aircraft with improved performance in range, weapon, payload, avionics, and electronic countermeasure equipment. They have arrived at a position where their force structure seems capable of carrying out their strategy and tactics in a high-intensity warfare situation. The superiority of U.S. and NATO air forces has eroded because of qualitative improvements in the technology of Soviet aircraft. These Soviet high-technology systems, coupled with the long-standing numerical superiority of FA forces, have greatly increased the threat to NATO ground and air forces.

This growing Frontal Aviation threat requires that we thoroughly examine our strategy, tactics, forces, training, and overall readiness. Historically, there have been many opinions and much controversy over the best use of air power. There are ways to improve our tactical air power employment in order to defeat the Soviet FA threat. I advocate a degree of change and not a radical break in our current force capability, planning, apportionment, etc. Now that the threat perception of Soviet FA modernization is becoming obvious, we must scrutinize our strategy and force structure for changes necessary to counter this threat.

1. Alexander Boyd, The Soviet Air Force since 1918 (New York: Stein and Day, 1977), p. 218.

2. "The Military Balance 1979/80," Air Force, December 1979, p. 70.

3. William Schneider Jr., "Trends in Soviet Frontal Aviation," Air Force, March 1979, p. 80.

4. The United States Military Posture for FY 1980 (Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff publication, Government Printing Office, 1979).

5. M. O. Norby, Soviet Aerospace Handbook (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 39.

6. John W. R. Taylor, "Jane’s Aerospace Review 1977/1978," Air Force, January 1978, p. 19.

7. Carl E. Daschke, "The Threat: The HIND Myths and Facts, US. Army Aviation Digest, December 1979, p. 43. This article also includes an interesting section that postulates an air-to-air mission for the Hind against our antitank aircraft.

8. P. S. Kutakhov, "The Conduct of Air Operations, Selected Soviet Military Writings 1970-1975 (Washington: Government Printing Office, l977,p. 240.

9. Schneider, p. 80.

10. Ibid.

11. Jacquelyn K. Davis and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Soviet Theater Strategy: Implications for NATO (Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1978), pp. 19-20.

12. Boyd. pp. 227-28.

13. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Soviets to Field 3 New Fighters in Aviation Modernization Drive, Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 26, 1979, p. 14.

14. Ibid.

15. Charles E. Canedy, "Tac Air: An Army View," Air Focre, February 1978, p. 56.

16. Adolf Galland, The First and the Last (New York: Ballantine, 1973), pp. 33-34.

17. Edward N. Luttwak, "The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance," Survival, March/April 1979, p. 57.

18. William J. Perry, Overview Statement on the Department of Defense FY 1980 Procurement Program before the Subcommittee on General Procurement, Committee on Armed Services of the United States Senate, 6 Apr 1979, p. 5.

19. Bonner Day, "The Pros and Cons of a Multimission Fighter Force," Air Force, April 1979, pp. 60-63. This author has written an excellent critique of the factors involved in force structure tradeoffs.

20. Retsae H. Miller, "Air Superiority at the Treetops," Military Review, March 1979, pp. 2-9. Although this may be the opening shot in a new Army-Air Force fight over roles and missions, it demonstrates that the Army is considering helicopters to counter the Soviet attack helicopter and airmobile force threat.

21. Hans U1rich Rudel, Stuka Pilot (New York: Bantam Books, 1979), pp. 130, 202-3.

22. A few Air Force F-4s do have TISEO (telescopic imaging sight electro-optical) and some Navy aircraft such as the F-14 are equipped with TVSU (televideo sight unit). However, our air superiority fighters, e.g., F-15 and F-16, do not possess any BVR optical equipment.

23. Raytheon advertisement, "Sparrow AIM-7F. . . because this is no place for second best C Air Force, November 1978, pp. 22-23. The F-16 is currently equipped with a 20-mm cannon and heat-seeking missiles. If it were adapted to carry radar missiles, the increase in F-16 combat capability would be significant.

24. Raymond B. Furlong, "Strategymaking for the 1980’s," Parameters, March 1979, p. 14.

25. William W. Momyer, Airpower in Three Wars (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. v.

Contributor

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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