Air University Review , September-October 1980

Yes, There Really is a Better Way
 to Win a War in Europe

IN AN earlier issue of Air University Review, Major Charles Specht reflected in very lucid terms on the indirect strategic approach. The essence of Major Specht's position is that firepower and attrition aimed at the destruction of the enemy military force are still the deciding factors in modern war. Implicit in this approach, in the event of a European war, is the primary importance of equipping one's forces with adequate technical means to destroy Warsaw Pact forces. In question is whether NATO must build forces to withstand an attack from the east and whether NATO can win a war against the vast Warsaw Pact forces. Some sources argue that NATO will not in the near-term, if ever, match Warsaw Pact forces and that it must exploit the enemy's soft spots to win. On the other side of the debate, Lieutenant General Raymond Furlong states: "We can no longer rely on raw strength and must now turn to brainpower."¹

To the extent that tactics must be designed to destroy the enemy's forces, Soviet tactical doctrine is consistent with Major Specht's philosophy. The eminent Soviet doctrinaire, M. V. Frunze, considers". . . the offensive, the ultimate goal of which is the total destruction of the enemy, to be the basic form of action of the Red Army." He states even more specifically that "the task of every operation and battle is destruction of the enemy and his technical means of warfare."² Soviet doctrine is most emphatic on the means of destroying the enemy: "The centuries old military history, including the history of the Soviet Armed Forces, is convincing evidence that in armed conflict of any scale . . . only the offensive leads to the attainment of victory over the enemy."³

Major Specht states further that the Federal Republic of Germany would not support a strategy of maneuvering defense in depth and quotes the German Minister of Defense to the effect that "the defence of the Federal Republic of Germany must be conducted as far forward as possible, that is to say immediately at the intra-German and Czechoslovak borders."⁴

Unfortunately, the Soviets have tailored their strategic philosophy around just such a doctrine. They envision a ferocious offensive battle involving huge masses of men and equipment along a broad front aimed at overwhelming a thin defensive line at a single point. Furthermore, they anticipate heavy casualties: "The employment of large quantities of combat equipment, the conduct of the offensive to a great depth and at high rates, and the strain of the battles will require a great expenditure of material, and the enemy's influence with nuclear and chemical weapons will lead to mass losses of troops and equipment."⁵ Can NATO seriously depend on attrition with conventional weapons to defeat forces designed to cope with, and win against, nuclear and chemical weapons?

Still another formidable tactical innovation by the Soviets is the concept of the second echelon, which is also a splendid tactic against a forward defense. The second echelon represents the second blow in a one-two punch from two waves of attackers; it is not a reserve force. It has a planned role throughout the attack, and it will receive its orders concurrently with the first echelon's orders. Soviet doctrine makes this point quite clear: "The distinction of the second echelon from the reserve is that it is created ahead of time with a precisely defined mission-to intensify the force of attack of troops of the first echelon . . . ."⁶ Thus, a forward defensive line will face an attack of overwhelming strength and fury at a single point, and the attack will expend huge amounts of men and material. As the attack slows before a determined defense, the second wave will hit with equal fury and will still have a reserve waiting behind it.

Reflection on these Soviet tactics and the forces at hand to counter these tactics in the short- and mid-term is an exceptionally sobering exercise. In all likelihood, NATO will not have adequate forces to sustain indepth defense, and it will certainly not have adequate forces to defend an unyielding line at the intra-German and Czechoslovak borders.

Major Specht quotes Clausewitz to support his contention. Although one can glean almost anything he seeks from Clausewitz, the following statement is especially relevant to this discussion.

We see then that there are many ways to one's object in war; that the complete subjugation of the enemy is not essential in every case; that the destruction of the enemy's military force, the conquest of the enemy's provinces, the mere occupation of them, the mere invasion of them . . . are all means by which, each of itself, may be used to force the enemy's will . . . .⁷

Thus, the destruction of the enemy is apparently not quite so paramount after all. The dominant theme in Clausewitz is subjugation of the enemy's will. Just as Major Specht emphasizes the indirect approach as only a means of accomplishing the objective, firepower/attrition is also only a means of subduing the will of the enemy.

Moreover, the strategy of the indirect approach espoused by Liddell Hart works against the will of the enemy. It seeks to add, rather than substitute, the dimension of psychological warfare to strategic thought. His basic premise is that maneuver is necessary to ". . . upset the enemy's dispositions . . . dislocate the distribution and organization of his forces . . . endanger his supplies, and menace the. . . route of retreat."⁸ Disruption of this magnitude could prove disastrous to the rigidly hierarchical Soviet chain of command and control that centralizes decision-making and minimizes flexibility and innovation at lower tactical levels. It would strike directly at the centralized Soviet system of tactical execution. Soviet doctrine is very strong on this point: "The principle of one-man command is a most important principle in the Armed Forces development."⁹ Liddell Hart's system of strategy aims directly at eroding the will of the enemy: "The purpose is to deprive the enemy of his freedom of action." The goal "is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that, if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by battle is sure to achieve this."¹⁰

NATO's immediate tactical objective will be to stop an assault by Warsaw Pact forces, and this will be extremely difficult. The strategic and most important part of the task will be to force the withdrawal of the invading forces. This is the basis for Germany's insistence on the forward defense and Major Specht's argument in favor of massive attrition. For the same reason, most military men, myself included, advocate major increases in military spending to close the quantitative gap between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

But, as General Furlong points out, even our best efforts cannot close the gap in less than five to ten years, if ever. Must we then assume defeat in the near-term? Are there not weaknesses to be exploited? By virtue of the enormous expenditure of munitions in modern warfare, supply lines assume an importance and vulnerability unmatched since the eighteenth century. If Rommel were alive, he could doubtless provide a fascinating monograph on the vulnerability and importance of POL supplies in modern warfare. Air interdiction is only part of the answer: nothing interdicts supplies like enemy troops astride one's line of supply, and interdiction of supplies to a heavily engaged unit for the short span of a day can be catastrophic. Second echelon forces in marching formations or in assembly areas can be exceptionally vulnerable. If forced to deploy against NATO units maneuvering on their flanks, these second echelon forces will not smash into the forward line while the defenders reel from the first blow. The momentum of the assault can be broken without engagement by the maneuvering force. The threat of engagement or interdiction of supply lines can force disruption of timetables, dilute the shock effect of the attack, and disorganize the enemy.

However, the exercise of these tactics in Western Europe will not force a withdrawal. A war of maneuver on the northern plain of West Germany may be adequate to stall the attack, but it will not force the Warsaw Pact to withdraw. Again, this reality leads Germany to insist on and Major Specht to support a forward defense that capitalizes on massive attrition of the invading forces. And they adhere to this strategic philosophy despite haunting memories of the Maginot Line.

Indeed, the war of maneuver is the answer to the problem, but the war must be fought in the East. For NATO to win, armies invading the West must be placed in an untenable position. The alliance must compel the Soviets to protect their lines of supply with forces earmarked for invasion. NATO must develop both the quantitative and qualitative military capability to fight a war of maneuver on the Elbe to force them to defend their rear areas with troops and armor. Since it cannot match the Soviets tank for tank for at least five to ten years, it must be able to outmaneuver, disorganize, disrupt, and outthink them. But NATO cannot win a war of maneuver limited to the soil of Western Europe; it can only minimize its losses. To win, NATO must fight the war on the plains between Magdeburg and Berlin, not between Hanover and Aachen.

1. See "Is There Really a Better Way to Win a War in Europe)" by Major Charles W. Specht, USAF, and "A Response" by Lieutenant General Raymond B. Furlong, USAF (Ret), Air University Review, November-December 1979, pp. 74-77 and 80-81, respectively.

2. V. Ye. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics (A Soviet View), Moscow: 1972 (Translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force), p. 41.

3. A. A. Sidorenko, The Offensive (A Soviet View), Moscow: 1970 (Translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force), p. 1. Italics added.

4. Specht, p. 77.

5. Sidorenko, p. 61.

6. Ibid., p. 97.

7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books. 1968). p. 129.

8. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, second revised edition (New York: Praeger, 1967), p. 339.

9. Marxism-Leninism on War and Army (A Soviet View), Moscow: 1972 (Translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force), p. 187.

10. Liddell Hart, pp. 341, 339.

Major Leslie J. Hamblin (USAF Academy; M.B.A., University of Utah) is a student of Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Before coming to Air University, he was a staff officer with Hq USAFE.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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