Air University Review , September-October 1980

Southeast Asia Today:
Cultural Continuity and Political Instability

THE probability of proxy wars increases as the United States adjusts to strategic parity under the pending SALT II agreement. Although there may be a nuclear stalemate with the Soviets, we must not assume that the Chinese or Soviet Communists will forego other strategies to expand their influence through force and violence. The developing nations are especially aware of the potential danger. The July 1978 Foreign Ministers for Non-Aligned Nations meeting in Belgrade expressed grave concern about the growing phenomenon of proxy war. The nuclear balance of terror rules out military confrontations in the Northern Hemisphere, so it is reasoned that conflicts will be initiated or prolonged by Communist proxies in the Third World.¹

The U. S. S. R is systematically advancing Soviet power beyond the Warsaw Pact area. The Chinese Communist leadership is acutely sensitive to this latest challenge, particularly when the scenario is played out adjacent to borders where Peking believes she should have the predominant voice. Indochina War III is demonstrating that the Chinese will use military means through a proxy, or directly if pushed too far, to achieve what they regard as national security objectives. We cannot assume, however, that Peking will continue limiting coercive tactics to Communist opponents on her border, particularly if the People's Republic of China (PRC) succeeds against so determined an opponent as Vietnam.

In a proxy war the armed forces of the proxy state serve the interests of both principal and proxy. Sustained military activity and intervention would not be possible without the support of the patron. As a principal or patron power, the Soviet Union attempts to make the proxy dependent to a point where, in essential matters, Moscow can enforce its will.

Countries involved in regional conflicts are drawing the attention of Communist strategists in order to increase the number of allied states and restrict the influence that rivals may have in the Third World. During this decade, regional hostilities in the Third World may often be transformed into proxy conflicts and thus become the arena in which great power rivalries are allowed violent expression. Indochina War III is striking because it involves a confrontation between the two Communist giants: the People's Republic of China (proxy: Democratic Kampuchea or Cambodia) and the Soviet Union (proxy: Vietnam).

The Cambodian-Vietnam Conflict

Indochina War III formally began when Vietnamese forces crossed the border into Cambodia in December 1977. Although this war had its own local causes, its origins and continuation at current scale place it in the proxy war category. Each of the Communist superpowers seeks advantages through military actions of its respective proxy.

territorial integrity and ethnic hostility

Phase 1 of Indochina War III lasted between 1974 and the initial limited Vietnamese invasion in December 1977. Dominating this first phase were disputes over boundary lines and the question of survival for a Cambodian nation that historically has had portions of its territory absorbed by both Thailand and Vietnam. Today approximately one million Khmer Krom (Cambodians in Lower Cambodia) live in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam, an area controlled by the Cambodians 150 years ago. The Cambodian core was saved by the French protectorate established between 1864 and 1867. Vietnamese territorial advances were halted by the French, and two provinces seized earlier by Thailand were returned to the French colony in 1907. Ethnic hostility toward the Vietnamese grew, however, because of the Vietnamese minority in Cambodia, many of whom were brought to Cambodia by the French. During this century the Vietnamese have constituted approximately 9 percent of Cambodia's population. The Khmers have resented the Vietnamese, who were used by the French in supervisory positions over "less energetic" Cambodians.

A legacy of distrust affects contacts with both Thailand and Vietnam, though much more so with Vietnam because of the mutual ethnic dislike between the Khmers and Vietnamese. During the Vietnamese expansion westward through the Mekong Delta in the nineteenth century, the Vietnamese referred to the smaller, darker Cambodians as tho or barbarians. The Cambodian Communists or Khmer Rouge have used ethnic hostility in an even more pronounced fashion. Shortly before the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime, the Foreign Ministry of Democratic Kampuchea published a 112-page Livre Nair (Black Book) in which it chronicled a long list of Vietnamese crimes and boasted that since the Angkor epoch the Khmer people have referred to the Vietnamese as youn or savage.²

Despite suspicions of Vietnamese Communist motives, former Head of State Prince Norodom Sihanouk concluded border agreements in 1967 with the North Vietnamese government as well as the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. These agreements recognized the poorly marked boundary drawn up by the French in 1939 (the Brevie line) which has few official border crossings and does not follow topographical features. After the 1975 Communist seizures of power in Cambodia and Vietnam, border disagreements were quickly magnified in the minds of the new Cambodian leadership as issues of state survival. The Vietnamese in turn played on Cambodian fears to increase the level of conflict and distrust.

Also present were serious military security problems. Highway 1, linking Ho Chi Minh City with Phnom Penh, traverses the Parrot's Beak (Svay Rieng province), a piece of Cambodian territory which juts deeply between Tay Ninh and Kien Tuong provinces to within 40 miles of the former Vietnamese capital. The Parrot's Beak is a dagger pointed at Vietnam's second major city. Similarly, the December 1977 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodian territory along Highway 1 brought the invaders to within 35 miles of Phnom Penh. Enemy incursions endanger the political/military vitals of each country.

Cambodian/Vietcong clashes began in 1974, a year before the 1975 Communist victories. Cambodian Communists sought to evict Vietnamese residents and Vietcong troops from Cambodian delta territory. Military clashes over disputed offshore islands occurred in 1975, and the Vietnamese continued their efforts to "adjust and clarify" the Brevie line. Border skirmishes increased during April and May 1977, and by September of that year the Vietnamese launched retaliatory incursions. These Vietnamese actions, according to the Cambodian Communist chief of state, included foreign nationals (Russian and Cuban) who advised military companies and tank squadrons.³

Angka Loeu, the "Organization on High," the cruel oligarchy which ruled Cambodia under Pol Pot until January 1979, was the administrative arm of the Cambodian People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) founded in 1951. This was the same year the Lao Dong party was established in Vietnam. The Pol Pot Communists, however, date the PRP's origin as 1960 in order to minimize their relationship with the Vietnamese Communist party.⁴ When the 1954 Geneva Agreement ended the first Indochina war, the Cambodian Communists received the worst deal. They were instructed to dissolve their organization, and their cadres were to go to North Vietnam. Most of the original Khmer Communists crossed into Vietnam for 16 years of training and indoctrination. A second generation of local Khmer Communist recruits began organizing in the late 1950s and were vigorously opposed by the Sihanouk government. Tough and resourceful, this second generation of Communist leaders, many educated in France, were the rulers of Democratic Kampuchea under Prime Minister Pol Pot. The top four Democratic Kampuchea leaders (Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, Khieu Samphan, and Son Sen) were educated in Paris and took part in radical student politics in the 1950s.⁵

Khmer Rouge suspicions of Vietnamese comrades grew when Hanoi pursued a policy of conciliation with Sihanouk in the 1960s. Hanoi's aim was to protect the Ho Chi Minh Trail and station thousands of Vietcong in Cambodia's provinces. Sihanouk's ouster from power in March 1970 changed Hanoi's policy. A major Vietnamese assistance program was begun to undermine the Lon Nol government and to reduce pressure on the Hanoi-controlled portions of Cambodia. The assistance package included 2000 to 3000 Hanoi-trained Cambodians, who returned to assist their local Khmer Rouge comrades. The resulting intrigues, which included Hanoi, the second generation Khmer Rouge, and the returned exiles, remain obscure. The post-1960 Khmer Rouge leaders believed that the returning cadre were instructed to gain control of the Khmer Rouge movement. The repatriated comrades failed, but the plots, counterplots, executions, and assassinations of fellow Communists continued through 1978.⁶ All of the Hanoi-supported coup attempts by Cambodian Communist factions were detected and mercilessly crushed. Comradely distrust and hatred could hardly be greater than that between the deposed Pol Pot regime and Hanoi.

Phase 1, the undeclared war of hit-and-run clashes conducted by both the Vietnamese and Cambodians since 1974, erupted into phase 2, open conflict, in December 1977. On 30 December the Cambodian Foreign Ministry cited the ferocious and barbarous aggression launched by Vietnam against Cambodia and severed diplomatic ties with Hanoi. Within a month there were 60,000 Vietnamese soldiers occupying the Parrot's Beak. Cambodia's 25,000-man Eastern Army had suffered severe casualties. By the end of January the invasion halted, with Vietnamese troops holding a corridor up to 18 miles deep in the Cambodian border areas and deeper still in the Parrot's Beak. Cambodian raids continued throughout 1978, and a Vietnam army spokesman claimed in March that Cambodian troops occupied portions of Vietnamese territory in 13 border regions. East European sources explained that Khmer presence was tolerated as evidence of Cambodian aggression.⁷

Resistance by the Khmer Rouge army of 90,000 was unexpected. Vietnamese strategy in phase 2 intended to: (1) halt Khmer Rouge border incursions; (2) cripple the Cambodian army to the point of collapse; and (3) bring about a palace coup in Phnom Penh which would install a pro-Vietnamese government. Hanoi failed to achieve any of these objectives. The hostilities continued until June, when additional Vietnamese troops and air power began attacking Cambodian targets. Simultaneously, refugees, captured Khmer Rouge soldiers, and some Khmer Krom were enlisted into a Vietnam-based resistance force which grew to 30,000 by late 1978. Nevertheless, the Pol Pot regime continued in power. The Soviet/Vietnamese strategy failed in its objectives.

Phase 3 began in late November 1978, the start of the dry season, with the official creation of a Hanoi-sponsored Kampuchea United Front for National Salvation. The massive Vietnamese invasion was launched on Christmas Day. Phase 3 ended when Democratic Kampuchea formally came to an end on 7 January 1979 with the seizure of Phnom Penh and the establishment of the Hanoi/Moscow-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea. A high-level Chinese team had visited Phnom Penh the previous November. It had recommended that the Pol Pot government not defend its capital in the event of a Vietnamese invasion. This would publicize the aggressive designs of Hanoi and Moscow and ultimately defeat the Vietnamese by bogging them down in a costly no-win guerrilla war. Thus a nearly successful proxy conquest might be stalemated by a classic people's war as the two Communist superpowers attempt to expand their influence in the region.

Peking believes that the struggle in the Third World against the U.S.S.R requires an all-out Chinese effort to reduce or eliminate Russian influence wherever possible. Just before the formal outbreak of Indochina War III, Peking was expanding its influence in Southeast Asia, and Moscow was losing influence. Asiaweek, published in Hong Kong, reported that by late 1977 there were clear signs pointing to the "increased isolation of the Soviet Union and the emergence of China as the leading force for peaceful progress in the region."⁸ As the Soviet Union seeks to increase its position on a worldwide basis, one of its major goals is to limit Chinese influence. The tilt in Southeast Asia was toward Peking, not Moscow, and this led to a more aggressive Soviet policy.

The parties involved in Indochina War III regularly declare that this is a proxy war. Peking accuses Vietnam of pursuing "regional hegemonies," serving as the "Cuba of the East" and the "junior partner" in a Soviet plot to dominate Southeast Asia.⁹ Hanoi also stresses the proxy character of the war. Nhan Dan, the Vietnamese party newspaper, analyzed the November 1979 visit of Wang Tung Hsing, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Communist Central Committee: "By sending the fifth ranking personage of hegemonism to Phnom Penh on such a hasty visit, the Peking ruling circles have shown their desperation as well as those under their protection. The PRC who nurses a great power hegemonistic dream is worried about the expansionist enterprise." The visit meant "an increase in Chinese aid to remedy the lackey's situation. "¹⁰ The Moscow-based Far Eastern Affairs recently reviewed PRC ambitions in Southeast Asia. The article warned of "Peking's great power designs of aggrandizement," and the pivotal role of Vietnam in thwarting these ambitions. Vietnam is described as the "main obstacle" to PRC "hegemony in this area."¹¹

Without the support of their principals, neither Democratic Kampuchea nor Vietnam could have taken the actions they have since 1975. Soviet/Vietnamese accusations that Cambodia "systematically violated" Vietnamese territory since May 1975 are correct.¹² Khmer Rouge motives discussed previously were reinforced by the advice and support of Peking. Traditionally, China has opposed the emergence of strong neighbors on its borders, particularly those unresponsive to China's strategic needs. This policy required opposition to a united and strong Communist Vietnam on China's southern border. From April to May 1975 onward, Peking assisted Khmer Rouge raids into Vietnam. A principal objective of these raids was to support southern dissidents. The ultimate goals were to: (1) counter Russian influence in Hanoi; (2) keep Vietnam only loosely federated; and (3) make Vietnam a weaker and more pliable neighbor. The Cambodian incursions were the principal means of delivering supplies to both disaffected National Liberation Front/Vietcong and anti-Communist guerrillas. This was not an excessively costly venture until the outbreak of the Sino-Vietnamese war on 17 February 1979. Chinese aid between 1975 and 1978 totaled about $100 million.

A major premise of this article is that the Vietnamese military activities depend on Russian advice and support. A Vietnamese victory would fit neatly into Soviet global strategy. A Vietnamese-controlled Indochina federation would intimidate other Southeast Asian nations, especially Thailand. It would assist in expanding Soviet influence. And, most immediately, it would restrain the growth of Chinese influence in the region.

Domination of Laos was the first step in the creation of a Moscow/Hanoi-controlled Indochina federation. Laos has a 25-year friendship treaty with Vietnam and is host to 50,000 Vietnamese troops. It is under the virtual control of Moscow and Hanoi. In addition to the large Vietnamese presence, there is a total of 1200 to 1500 Russian advisers in Laos. Peking charges that Vietnam and the U. S. S. R are turning Laos into an Asian Czechoslovakia.¹³ The main obstacle to an Indochina federation between 1975 and January 1979 was Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea. This last obstacle to a Moscow-oriented Indochina federation has now been removed.

An ambitious and expansionist Vietnam needs a big power ally to limit Chinese reprisals and provide needed economic assistance. One such example is the Vietnamese/Soviet friendship treaty signed in November 1978.¹⁴ Vietnamese successes are Soviet successes, even if they stem initially from the surge of Vietnam's historic objectives rather than a need to follow the Kremlin's instructions. The quid pro quo for the Soviets will, though, be determined during the coming months. An accommodating Vietnam must be the inevitable basis of the relationship.

It is unusual in a proxy war for one of the sponsoring powers to go to war directly with the other sponsor's proxy. This happened in Indochina in the 1979 Chinese invasion of Vietnam. The reasons are threefold: (1) the People's Republic of China and Vietnam have a common border; (2) the mistreatment of the 1.5 million Chinese minority in Vietnam; and (3) the military overthrow of the Pol Pot regime by Vietnam.

On 24 March 1978 a series of directives from Hanoi launched collectivization of South Vietnam. This led to the complete breakdown of relations between Hanoi and Peking. The first edict ordered the abolition of all "bourgeois trade," traditionally dominated by the Chinese. Many Chinese were ordered to the New Economic Zones (NEZ). These areas were being opened up to develop distant mountain and border areas where living conditions are primitive and in order to transform urban residents into subsistence farmers. Hanoi's new economic policies had strong racial overtones because the Chinese minority was the group most affected. Relations between China and Vietnam reached a 30-year low as a result of: (1) Chinese attempts to flee Vietnam; (2) the inability of Hanoi and Peking to agree on which and how the panic-stricken Chinese might leave; and (3) border clashes between Chinese and Vietnamese security and military personnel beginning in June 1978. By midsummer more than 160,000 refugees had fled to south China, at a reported resettlement cost to Peking of $870 per refugee. ¹⁵ China cut off its 30-year assistance program to Vietnam in July. Peking's total assistance to the Vietnamese Communists over the years had exceeded $10 billion. Its recent annual assistance averaged $300 million.¹⁶ This was a substantial loss for a Vietnam faced with continuing economic deterioration.

Was this split between Vietnam and the People's Republic of China deliberately provoked? Probably so, although the reasons are not entirely clear. One consequence was that Moscow and Hanoi moved closer together. The English language reporter covering the Cambodia/China/Vietnam/Soviet Union quadrangle most comprehensively in Nayan Chanda. He concluded in March 1978 that Hanoi officials did not foresee an open rift with China and maintained a "safety margin" in dealing with their colossal northern neighbor.¹⁷ Within days of Chanda's article, the events described led to an abrupt break in Sino-Vietnamese relations. The Soviet Union gained, but so did the PRC if one assumes that a Vietnam with resources stretched too far rather than a strong Vietnam benefits Peking.

From Hanoi's point of view, the Peking-sponsored Cambodian military incursions into Vietnam grew progressively more severe and disruptive in 1977. As part of Hanoi's collectivization and pacification of the south, more than eighty New Economic Zones involving nearly 1.3 million people were set up, several near the Cambodian border. The security of a substantial part of South Vietnam and many NEZs was threatened by Cambodian probes. Vietnam had either to endure the disruptive raids supported by China or hope that chewing up the Eastern Cambodian Army would cause an internal coup and provide the basis for permanent Vietnamese influence in Phnom Penh.

The Vietnamese initiatives of invading Cambodia and the doctrinaire economic reforms which put severe pressure on many of the 1.5 million Viet-Chinese must be considered alongside certain other facts. Disputes with China and Cambodia came at a bad time. Hanoi apparently had hoped to devote most of the Vietnamese national energies to unifying the country and rebuilding an economy devastated by 30 years of war and three years of Communist mismanagement. Agriculture was given top priority in the five-year economic plan launched in 1976. A serious setback occurred in the fall of 1978 when the Mekong Delta experienced the worst floods in 40 years. The economy was further jeopardized by growing border confrontations in 1977. These forced Hanoi to shift ten divisions from civil action to military duty. Democratic Kampuchea, with fewer than 7,000,000 people and an army of 90,000, exhorted by China, succeeded in disrupting the internal structure of Vietnam, a country with a population of 50,000,000 and the best war machine in Southeast Asia. Not only was the emergence of a Vietnam-controlled Indochina federation postponed but the very viability of Vietnam was threatened. With Soviet urging and support, decisive steps were possible, even if they led to a direct confrontation with the PRC.¹⁸

Today Vietnam's military forces are mobilized and stretched so far that economic development is difficult to achieve. Its expansionist plans will be reduced without increased support from the U.S.S.R In addition to the Cambodian problem, there is instability in the client state of Laos. Thirty percent of the lowlands where the Lao reside is in the hands of insurgents. Nearly all counterinsurgency operations are conducted by the Vietnamese. Finally, there was the need to deal with the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979. Hanoi could cope with any one of these problems and perhaps two simultaneously but would be hard put to handle all three without substantially more Soviet assistance.

China remains committed to a primitive political leadership which destroyed its own towns, abolished its currency, murdered more than 15 percent of its own population, and, despite a small army, subjected its political system to a continuous round of bloody purges. Peking supported Cambodia as a buffer to Vietnamese expansion and as a pipeline for support to insurgents in Vietnam. The People's Liberation Army's invasion of Vietnam, which began on 17 February and by mid-March resulted in the withdrawal of most Chinese forces, was inconclusive. The PRC felt compelled to take action or lose face both as a result of the fall of Pol Pot and because of the heavy-handed treatment of the "overseas" Chinese in Vietnam. One paradox in big power international politics is that minimal prestige or the loss of prestige may force a country to rely on force more extensively. It is this relationship between prestige and the use of force that led to the Chinese invasion. The binding of Cambodia into a Hanoi-controlled federation close to the PRC border without any response would have confirmed the PRC as a paper tiger. Future attempts to oppose Soviet influence would receive little support or respect from other countries. Moreover, given the constant internal political intrigues in Peking, no faction wants to be responsible for "who lost Cambodia."

Instability and Limited Victories

Proxy confrontations and Communist superpower involvement will continue in Indochina for some time. One unpleasant lesson is that maneuverings for expanded influence by the two Communist titans may catch the non-Communist world unaware and unprepared to respond. A fall 1977 survey of 65 political, diplomatic, and military leaders in Southeast Asian countries is pertinent here. Nearly all of those interviewed regarded open aggression by Hanoi as "most improbable." They saw little external military threat to their national security in the next five years and concluded that "the Soviet presence would not easily be linked to any credible danger scenarios."¹⁹ Within two months Vietnam had invaded Cambodia. Today a major worry of Southeast Asian leaders is whether their national security is threatened either by a spillover from Indochina War III or by efforts of Peking and Moscow to extend their regional influence.

We must assume that the Indochina situation will remain unstable during phase 4, which began with the flight of the Pol Pot government from Phnom Penh in January 1979. In its efforts to maintain its modern army and subdue Cambodia, Hanoi is encountering difficult logistical problems. Less than a month after the fall of Phnom Penh, Radio Democratic Kampuchea announced a two-day conference attended by 183 of the Khmer Rouge from nine battlefronts. The conference was to coordinate Pol Pot's China-backed guerrilla war, and it was stated that Pol Pot and the Chairman of the State Presidium, Khieu Samphan, were personally directing the struggle in Cambodia.²⁰ There are now reports of villages recaptured and of assassinations of the new government's local officials. The reemergence of the Khmer Rouge policy of executing all opponents discourages most individuals from cooperating with the new regime. One intelligence analyst offered the following summary: "In the west it's like the last years of the Lon Nol government. In the east, the Vietnamese have somewhat more control-it's like South Vietnam."²¹ The recent Vietnamese offensive against the Khmer Rouge was only partly successful. Many Khmer Rouge insurgents, with Thai assistance, escaped to regroup and provide the core for an extended insurgency.²² Both sides have garnered some successes in phase 4 of Indochina War III. This can only encourage further efforts to gain a decisive advantage.

The February Chinese invasion and continuing border incidents compelled Vietnam to reassign some forces to the northern border in the hope that this will slow the consolidation of an Indochina federation. Within a week of the Chinese invasion, a Hong Kong pro-Communist newspaper reported that Vietnamese troops in western Cambodia were pulling back and several regiments of troops were being transferred from Laos to northwest of Hanoi. It was alleged that a power vacuum was being created in Laos and authorities were urging the people to be vigilant and "prepare to annihilate enemies who cause trouble."²³ Chinese officials hope their actions will reduce the pressures on Chinese-supported insurgents in Laos and Cambodia. Moreover, almost simultaneously with the March announcement by Peking that it was withdrawing its forces, Vietnam announced general mobilization and placed its economy on a war footing. The future suggests continuing border pressures by Chinese Communist forces against both Laos and Vietnam and aid to antigovernment insurgents in Laos. Vietnam must maintain sizable numbers of troops in the northern areas of Vietnam and Laos to contain Chinese-supported insurgents in Laos and in case the PRC forces decide to cross the border in force again.²⁴ The Chinese activities further weaken Vietnamese economic development programs and are intended to restrain its regional ambitions.²⁵

Peking is using Indochina War III to illustrate the danger of Soviet strategy to all concerned. It warned the Western world that Chinese initiatives were required to contain Soviet global ambitions now being set into motion on the Asian rimland:

Europe has been the focus of Soviet-U.S. rivalry. But, the two sides are essentially at a stalemate, so the Soviet Union started a large flanking movement to encircle Western Europe with the main object of seizing sources of strategic materials vital to the West and controlling the major sea routes linking Western Europe and the United States and those linking the two with Africa and Asia.²⁶

The PRC hoped to demonstrate to the West-especially the United States-that firm counteraction, such as the invasion of Vietnam, can be taken without incurring a direct Soviet reprisal.

Finally, Vietnam serves as a warning to non-Communist Third World nations of Soviet manipulation. The U.S.S.R, argues Peking, wants to embroil developing countries in aggressive, expansionist policies, thereby encouraging military actions that will weaken their economies and allow increased Soviet influence and control.

On the other hand, the Vietnamese have also gained from Indochina War III. The most obvious benefit is that the war has brought Cambodia into the Vietnamese sphere of influence, at least temporarily. Indochina War III also bears witness to the aggressive acts of the Chinese. Vietnam demonstrated that by a limited fallback policy and reliance on militia and border guards it can mount an effective defense against the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The PRC's resort to force has caused sharp disagreements within Peking's leadership, suggesting that even close to its borders there are major internal limitations on Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, the continuing credibility of the Vietnamese military is demonstrated once again. It is a stark reminder to Southeast Asia that Hanoi has numerous options to increase its leverage in the region.

Hanoi's dependence on and cooperation with Moscow have increased as a result of the PLA invasion of Vietnam. In this type of situation, the U.S.S.R has traditionally insisted on port rights which could lead to the establishment of a Soviet naval facility at Cam Ranh Bay. A first signal of Soviet naval success was the right of Soviet warships to call at will and establish supply depots in Vietnam. One indicator of future developments occurred when the Soviet vice foreign minister recently rejected Japanese objections and stated that the U.S.S.R is using military facilities in Vietnam to "carry out its obligations set under the Russo-Vietnamese Friendship and Alliance Treaty."²⁷

An expanding Soviet military presence in Vietnam will alter the military balance in the Pacific Basin. It will provide a basis for future Soviet/Vietnamese actions to increase their regional influence. The Vietnam connection increases the attractiveness of proxy war as an option to expand Soviet world reach, despite the absence of total victory in Cambodia. The Vietnamese will not assume a policy of nonalignment suggested by Tito and others over the past two decades. Vietnam is much more likely to follow the Cuban model and serve as a vehicle for Communist expansion with all this implies.

PROXY war and the use of military force, as in the case of Indochina War III, can be a potent strategy if the costs are not too high for the patron and the potential benefits are great. Ambitious big powers that wish to expand their influence can treat the entire world as their universe to pick and choose selectively where they will initiate or support a proxy war. The non-Communist world, in its avowed commitment to human rights, stability, and slow, nonviolent change, finds itself at an awkward disadvantage. Great powers such as the U. S. S. R and the PRC, which view competition within a global framework and possess a willingness and capacity to wage low-cost proxy wars, may frequently conclude that this is an appropriate strategy. Their objectives can be advanced through encouraging numerous regional power rivalries, where at least some ambitious smaller powers will seek out a big-power sponsor. In a world of permeable states, the most recent and successful Communist strategy is proxy war.

1. For a summary of Third World concerns, see the New York Times, July 31, 1978. Interestingly, this year's nonaligned meeting was held in Cuba, a principal Soviet proxy.

2. Black Paper: Facts and Evidence of the Acts of Aggression and Annexation against Kampuchea, Department of Press and Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea, September 1978. English translation published by G.K.R.A.M., New York.

3. FBIS Daily Reports: Asia and the Pacific, January 3, 1978.

4. Dennis Duncanson, "'Limited Sovereignty' in Indochina," The World Today, July 1978, p. 263. For a summary of Pol Pot's version of the PRP's creation, see p. 265.

5. For more background see Brian Eads, "Cambodian Hierarchy Linked by Blood. Marriage, and Shared Schooldays," Bangkok Post, November 10, 1977.

6. One of the more readable summaries of Vietnamese/Khmer Rouge party conflict is William Shawcross, "The Third Indochina War," New York Review of Books, April 6, 1978, especially pages 16-18.

7. Far Eastern Economic Review, March 31, 1978, p. 13.

8. Ibid., December 30, 1977, p. 14.

9. Peking Review, July 21,1978, p. 8.

10. Asian Almanac, February 17, 1979, pp. 9275-76.

11. M. Kapasov, "Peking Seeks Hegemony in Southeast Asia," Far Eastern Affairs, vol. 4 (1979), pp. 29-42.

12. E.g., ibid., p. 234.

13. Ta Kung Pao (A pro-Communist newspaper published in Hong Kong), April 28, 1979. The Vietnamese Foreign Minister reportedly acknowledged that there are 50,000 Vietnamese troops stationed in Laos. Ibid., May 1, 1979.

14. The published text of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is available in Moscow News, supplement to issue no. 45 (2825), November 5, 1978, pp. 15-16.

15. Asiaweek, July 7, 1978, p. 20.

16. Peking Review, July 28, 1978, p. 17.

17. Far Eastern Economic Review, March 17, 1978, p. 10.

18. The Soviet Union is currently providing more than $500 million in aid annually to Vietnam. Chung Kuo Shin Pao (Taipei), March 5, 1979.

19. Franklin B. Weinstein, "The Meaning of National Security in Southeast Asia," The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November 1978, pp. 20-28.

20. Japan Times, February 5, 1979.

21. International Herald Times, March 5, 1979.

22. Discussions the author had with one intelligence official indicate that Thailand has allowed the Chinese to send supplies to the insurgents overland.

23. Ta Kung Pao, February 23, 1979.

24. Christian Science Monitor, September 20, 1979. The Bangkok Post reported that between August and September 1979 China recruited more than 1000 Lao refugees to go to China for guerrilla training.

25. Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping stated in a secret speech that a principal reason that the PRC invaded Vietnam was to assist the Khmer Rouge. After Phnom Penh fell in January 1979, two additional Vietnamese divisions were transferred to Cambodia to destroy Pol Pot's army, most of whom fled or were bypassed by the Vietnamese invaders and their allies. See "Teng Hsiao-Ping Talks about the Sino-Vietnamese War," The Seventies, No. III, April 1979, p. 25. The Seventies is a pro-Communist monthly published in Hong Kong.

26. Peking Review, January 19, 1979, p. 13.

27. Japan Times, May 15, 1979.

Thomas J. Bellows (B.A., Augustana College; M.A., University of Florida; M.A., Ph.D., Yale University) is Professor of Political Science, University of Arkansas. He spent the spring semester in the Republic of China, Japan, and South Korea conducting research on the security situation in Pacific Asia. Dr. Bellows is author of The People’s Action Party of Singapore, co-author of People and Politics, and has published in Asian Survey.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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