Air University Review , September-October 1980
In our May-June 1980 issue we published several responses to an article written by Royal Air Force officer Group Captain Ian Madelin on close air support (CAS). We have heard from still another reader, Major Mike Beck, who adds his words to the dialogue. In this instance Major Beck also has a few words for Wing Commander Jeremy G. Saye, RAF, whose article, also on CAS, appeared in our January-February 1980 issue.
Over the past nine months, we have found these doctrinal discussions to be instructive. At our more exhilarated moments we sense the rising aura of the Air Corps Tactical School; in humbler moods we hope only that through such discussion we playa role in perfecting the doctrine that wins the next conflict.
The Editor
In recent issues of the Review, two Royal Air Force officers, Group Captain Ian Madelin and Wing Commander Jeremy G. Saye, have made some very poignant, if somewhat uncomfortable observations, about the nature and role of air power in support of ground forces. * If I interpret them correctly, their thesis can be summed up as follows:
*November-December 1979 and January-February 1980.
Simply stated, the authors appear to feel that CAS has become too hard to perform, and, therefore, the focus of TACAIR should be shifted; as Saye reports, rather than "destroy in the first echelons," we should "disrupt in the second echelons." As logical arguments go, theirs are quite compelling: clear, simple, and even entertaining. Surely, both authors deserve full credit for speaking out loud what many of us in the profession have been questioning quietly in dark bars and other places that flight suits are worn concerning the subject-title of Madelin's article "The Emperor's Close Air Support." However, just as surely, the authors need to be called to task for selling the CAS mission short and arguing a "faulty dilemma." In the interest of continuing the dialogue on the appropriate role of TACAIR in support of ground forces, I will focus on these disparities.
The validity of the conclusion reached by both authors concerning the value of BAI depends largely on the reader's accepting the facts about the nature of CAS as reported. Whereas most of the difficulties associated with the CAS mission are accurately reported, at least two major aspects of the air-land battle have been slightly misrepresented: The capabilities of the Army's organic firepower and the role of the forward air controller (FAC) in the CAS mission.
Madelin states that "the Army's own weapons are immediate, responsive, continuous, all-weather, day/night, and cheaper than aircraft. . . . we should in principle rely on the Army's integral weapons for the contact battle. . . ." This description of the characteristics of the army's organic firepower is accurate as far as descriptions go, but Madelin goes too far when he suggests that these characteristics amount to an inherent ability to handle the "contact battle" without some assist from air power. History indicates quite the opposite is true.
At the beginning of all major conflicts in which aircraft have been tactically employed (World War I, World War II, Korea, and Southeast Asia), ground commanders have either controlled or attempted to subjugate TACAIR to their control. History also records, however, that by the end of every major conflict since World War II, theater commanders have ultimately established command and control arrangements providing for centralized direction of the overall air effort and a system for apportionment of TACAIR between the traditional tactical missions, such as CAS, interdiction, and air superiority. It is interesting to note that the theater commanders in each of these major conflicts was a former ground commander, i.e., Generals Eisenhower, MacArthur, and Westmoreland.
There is no question, at least in the minds of recent great army ground commanders, that there are numerous ways to employ TACAIR productively. However, CAS, since its birth at the British Battle of Cambrai, November 1917, has been essential in determining the outcome of major land battles. I offer as examples the Battle of the Bulge (December 1944), the breakout from the Pusan perimeter (September 1950), and the Khe Sanh siege (March 1965). In spite of the fact that in the next war, the army may be more capable than ever before of bringing significant amounts of artillery, rockets, and missiles to bear on the enemy, there is every reason to believe, in my opinion, that CAS will continue to play an important part in determining the outcome of this war. For sure, the organic firepower of the army will not be able to resolve favorably the contact battle without some air support.
Concerning the issue of the role of the FAC in the CAS mission, it is apparent that both authors consider this element of the air-land battle important but impotent. Both Madelin and Saye question the utility of the FAC based on observations which include: first, if the FAC is airborne, he is vulnerable-subject to debilitating communication jamming and withering air defense systems. Second, if the FAC is on the ground, his visibility is so limited that it is increasingly the practice for the FAC to be airborne; therefore, the first observation applies. What they say is true, in part at least. Unfortunately, their articles omit some important facts about current developments in FAC operations in the armed forces of both NATO and the U.S. Tactical Air Command (TAC). These developments predict a very different future for the role of the FAG
FAC operations in Europe, particularly in the Central Region have undergone a tremendous change in the past three or four years. The European armed forces have traditionally had an indifferent attitude toward the value of CAS; consequently, the associated elements of this mission have suffered appropriately. Prior to the mid-seventies most of the Central Region countries were content to do most of their forward air controlling from the ground. Countries using ground FACs (GFACs) exclusively until the late seventies included Belgium, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Beginning with the publication of Supplement I to Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 27 A in 1976, forward air control in NATO began to change; this document contained NATO's first "how to" FAC directions.
In late 1977 and early 1978, changes in FAC operations in NATO continued. At this time, the Central Region allies, especially the United States, began to rethink the issue of the role of the FAC in CAS. The reasons for this increased interest in FAC operations in Europe came primarily from two exercises in 1978-Silent Target and FAC EX. During these exercises, the USAFE FACs, using current high-threat tactics, demonstrated to all concerned that a manyfold increase in TACAIR first-pass effectiveness could be obtained through FAC/fighter teamwork. As a result of these exercises and other factors, the Belgians started a national airborne FAC (AFAC) training course, the British began planning for a similar course, and the Netherlands began phasing to a total airborne FAC force. Additionally, in 1979, USAFE's OV-10 aircraft were recategorized from national command forces to NATO assigned. During this same time frame, several complementary events were occurring on the other side of the Atlantic to improve AF AC operations.
At the same time there was a rising interest in the AFAC role in Europe, TAC was making steps to improve FAC operations in several ways. In 1976 a FAC tactics office was created at the Fighter Weapons Center at Nellis AFB, Nevada, and in March 1978 TAC hosted the first worldwide FAC tactics conference. In the 1978-79 time frame, the FAC tactics were rewritten for Manual 3-1, the multicommand CAS volume--the Tactical Air Forces "how to fight" bible. In general during the last few years, TAC FACs have attempted to foster and nurture the evolution of AFAC procedures, keeping the concepts current, the tactics viable, and AFAC usefulness assured. (USAFE has been a partner throughout these changing times in the AFAC business and has recently published a book on AFAC operations, the USAFE "OV -10 Concept of Operations," dated 21 February 1980.)
Saye concludes his brief analysis of the role of the FAC in the CAS mission by stating that ". . . the FAC is unable to fulfill the roles necessary for the success of the CAS mission and that, by inference, the success of the mission itself is questionable." In my opinion, to paraphrase a famous American author, the reports of the demise of the role of the AFAC and the CAS mission are greatly exaggerated.
HAVING presented my observations on the factual accuracies in the articles of Madelin and Saye, I come finally to my greatest concern with what they have said. In spite of caveats by both authors, they have essentially given us an either/or choice between CAS or BAI. Saye states, ". . . it becomes a question of CAS or BAI." In logic training this statement is considered the "fallacy of the faulty dilemma." When faced with a faulty dilemma the uninitiated reader/listener is compelled to make a choice between two positions in spite of the fact that both options are unsatisfactory. Although there is no solution to a faulty dilemma, the solution to the problem of what to do with TACAIR in a high intensity conflict, in my opinion, lies in the hinterland between alternatives.
The key to determining the appropriate role of TACAIR in the land battle is to understand the concept of stress. Stress, in terms of the ground war, is a function of the combat ratio on the battlefield and the intensity of the battle. Combat ratio is a somewhat complex term. When we dissect the land battle, it can be seen that each side, over time, consists of forces that are in contact, increased by forces that arrive, decreased by forces that are attrited, and supported by a network of logistics and echeloned forces. Combat ratio is the sum of all these events. The intensity of the battle can be described as the ability of the ground forces to bring firepower to bear over time. Stress on the battlefield, then, is a function of forces (men, machines, and supplies) in a given time/space relationship. This perspective and these terms become more meaningful if we remove the artificial boundaries on the battlefield and describe the fight in terms of enemy and friendly forces.
Figure 1 depicts the NATO offensive air support missions as Wing Commander Saye has described them. Figure 2 simplifies the concept of battlefield conditions and portrays a division-size fight in terms of only enemy and friendly forces. On the right side of the line of contact, in Figure 2, there are two categories of forces, engaged and arriving. On the other side, the friendly side, only the engaged forces are portrayed. The battle condition in Figure 2 is basically that of the friendly forces in an active defense with the enemy on the offensive. On the defense the ground commander is most concerned with maintaining a combat ratio that prevents the attacker from creating overwhelming stress and breaking through the defense in a sector. This can only be done when the friendly force kill capacity or service rate matches or exceeds that of the opposing forces. In a slight oversimplification of the concept of stress, the air/land battle can be described in terms of service rate of engaged forces and arrival rate of new forces.
| Figure 1. NATO offensive air support missions related to
the battlefield
|
The value of TACAIR to the ground commander can be summarized by the term a force multiplier. CAS serves to reduce stress on the battlefield by boosting the service rate of the engaged forces. BAI, on the other hand, serves two separate purposes: BAI decreases the enemy's arrival rate through disruption and dispersal, and it enhances the overall friendly service rate through in-depth attrition. Both missions are essential. If the enemy's arrival rate exceeds the combined friendly air/land service rate at the line of contact, the defender will be driven back or overrun. Likewise, if the service rate at the line of contact does not match or exceed that of the enemy, the enemy's arrival rate will be of little consequence; a breakthrough will occur anyway.
Figure 2. Simplified diagram of division/division fight |
As doctrine, TACAIR can ill afford to concentrate on either CAS or BAI to the exclusion of the other. In a European-type scenario, there will be times when CAS or BAI will be flown exclusively; however, it is more likely that most of the time there will be a need for a delicate balance between the two missions.
In summary, the effective use of air power is now, as it has been in the past, dependent on the dynamics of the battlefield. In order for TACAIR to make an effective contribution to this joint battle, the flexibility and capability to perform both CAS and BAI must be preserved and perfected. Anything else is rubbish.
Other than these few comments, I find myself in complete accord with Madelin and Saye.
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
Contributor
Major Michael O. Beck,
USAF, is Chief of the ALO/FAC Training Section, Directorate of Command and Control, Hq Tactical Air Command.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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