Air University Review , November-December 1980

A Response

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew

When one's job is to encourage creative thinking about strategy and doctrine, it becomes difficult to criticize innovative efforts in these areas. There is always the nagging fear that criticism will stifle further creativity. Most creative efforts, however, can be constructively critiqued. We hope that this dialectic process will bring us closer to the truth-closer to the most appropriate strategy and doctrine.

It seems to me that Lieutenant Colonel Fairweather's "new model for land warfare" can be challenged on two levels. The first is contextual; that is, the situation that spawned the "new model." The second level of challenge is conceptual; that is, problems within the "new model." Each challenge will be treated in turn.

The "new model" is, essentially, another in a seemingly endless series of "how to" or "how not to" fight a war in Europe articles that have appeared in the literature over the past few years. To Colonel Fairweather's credit, he has avoided the two most common themes of other authors: i.e., "bean counting" forces and debating the wisdom of forward defense. Colonel Fairweather has, however, repeated the fundamental error of his contemporaries, which can best be described as intellectual timidity. Nearly all authors can offer constructive criticism concerning "how to" fight in Europe, but seldom does anyone ask "should we" fight in Europe. Although Colonel Fairweather indicates that his "new model" is not constrained to a European scenario, it is difficult to imagine the "new model" at work in very different environments with very different adversaries. Thus the "should we" question remains appropriate.

To ask "should we" fight in Europe is to challenge the basic assumptions of our foreign and military policy. Unfortunately for those settled in their thinking, these assumptions are 30 years old and worthy of challenge. We must remember that the original purpose of a U.S. military commitment to NATO was to provide the security and stability that would promote European postwar recovery and return our Western Allies to a condition of self-reliance.

Obviously, the situation today is very different. The primary reason given for our continued commitment is that the huge industrial plant and large, highly trained population of Western Europe cannot be allowed to fall under Soviet domination. But are these not the very reasons that Europe should be militarily self-sufficient? Do we not have other national interests abroad that, at the very least, rival the importance of Western Europe? These questions cannot be adequately addressed here. The point is, however, that these questions must be faced. If it happens that our most vital interests lie outside Europe, we may need a total restructuring of our armed forces, not just a "new model" for land warfare.

The assumptions of the past must be continually challenged if they are to continue as the foundation of our defense policies. Strategy must be based on reality, not our memories of the past or our illusions of the present. Unfortunately, the basic assumptions are rarely challenged. It is, of course, entirely possible that even if we challenge these assumptions the defense of Western Europe may remain as the most vital U.S. national interest. In this light, it is appropriate to critique Colonel Fairweather's ideas on a conceptual basis.

Rather than a "new model," it looks as though Colonel Fairweather has taken his cue from Detroit and simply rearranged the chrome on last year's model. Still envisioned is a defense best characterized as employing the "direct" approach. Field Manual 100-51 calls for moving mobile forces directly into the path of the enemy thrust, to force a decision in a cataclysmic battle of firepower.* The implication is that the decision is forced at relatively close quarters. The "new model" projects the same type of decisive battle but with supporting firepower in the dominant role while mobile forces simply channel the enemy thrust into predetermined "killing grounds." The "new model" is the "old model" at arms length. Regardless of the model, one is reminded of the mutual slaughter at Verdun in 1916.²

*The term mobile forces is used carefully. To use the term maneuver forces for this type of operation is to bastardize the meaning of the term maneuver.

The outline of the "new model" presents many problems, some of which are forthrightly addressed by Colonel Fairweather. Others, unfortunately, are not addressed. For example, can RISTA (reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and target acquisition) be as effective as projected and required? If mobile (maneuver, if you insist) forces are greatly reduced, how can they channel the enemy attack to the support fire "killing grounds"? Is counterattack foreclosed because of the great reduction in mobile/maneuver forces? These, however, are problems in detail. The conceptual problem is much more vexing. Whether it is the "new model" or the "old model," the direct approach to defense has dubious prospects for success. Both models pit strength against strength. This is analogous to a boxer counting a haymaker punch by attempting to hit his opponent's fist with his own crushing blow. The best that can be expected from this sort of exchange is two broken hands. The smart boxer avoids the enemy haymaker and attacks the opponent's critical vulnerabilities, such as the head or belly. This is the essence of maneuver; this is the indirect approach, pitting strength against weakness.³

Colonel Fairweather does discuss the problem of expense in purchasing the vast array of equipment needed in the "new model." However, he all-too-easily solves this problem by reducing the expenditures for mobile/maneuver forces. This "rob Peter and pay Paul" solution ignores the fact that the "new model" still gives mobile/maneuver forces a significant role, and they still require significant strength and expenditures. When developing new ideas, one must recognize reality. We must not look at the panoply of available equipment through the eyes of a child clutching a credit card in a toy store. Observing reality is one of the basic principles of strategy.

The most troublesome conceptual problem, however, lies elsewhere, but it also concerns the principle of reality. We must recognize that strategy is a two-actor situation. We must always consider enemy actions and reactions realistically. Unfortunately, one gets the impression that Colonel Fairweather has underestimated the enemy. It is highly doubtful that Warsaw Pact forces will stage a variation of Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, mindlessly and continuously advancing into convenient "killing grounds" inviting their own destruction. One must assume that any attack will be accompanied by measures to disrupt our communications, confuse our intelligence, and limit our mobility. All of this will limit the "new model's" ability to concentrate and disperse, thus disrupting the required "pulses" of firepower. We face a wily foe, well schooled in military history and bent on profiting from history's "lessons." We must consider our opponents realistically.

Any new strategy must be developed within the proper context. This means that rather than enter the argument at the level of military or battlefield strategy, we must always look at the entire strategy process.⁴ We must challenge basic assumptions so that national objectives are pertinent and well understood. We must know what we have been tasked to do, in terms of grand strategy, to achieve those national objectives. Only then can we effectively develop military and battlefield strategy.

Yet, working through the strategy process is not sufficient. At the very least, we must be ruthless in observing reality. We must recognize the realities and limitations of economics and their impact upon materiel. Most important, however, we must recognize the realities of the enemy we face. The Soviets and their allies are not ten-feet tall, and they are not military geniuses. Neither are they physical and mental midgets.

I congratulate Colonel Fairweather on a significant contribution to a strategy dialogue that must continue. Although I have been critical, one must remember that everything written on the subject (including this short article) should be closely critiqued. Only if this dialectic process continues can we expect to cope effectively with a rapidly changing and increasingly dangerous world.

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew is Chief, Military Strategy Instruction, Military Employment Division, Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

1. Refer in particular to page 3-6 of FM 100-5.

2. Verdun may be the classic example of what happens when strength is pitted against strength in modern warfare. Perhaps the finest account of this battle is Alistair Horne's The Price of Glory (St. Martin's Press, 1962, and also available in a Penguin Books paperback edition).

3. As always, the best reference for the "indirect approach" is the originator of the phrase, Sir Basil Liddell Hart. See in particular his Strategy (Faber & Faber, 1967, also available in a Signet paperback); specifically, see chapter 20.

4. See "Strategy: Process and Principles" by Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew in Air University Review, May-June 1980. This article stresses the required linkage between the various levels of strategy, thus emphasizing the importance of the entire strategy process and the folly of separating military strategy from national objectives.

A Response

Major James M. Simpson

The major problem I encounter in commenting on Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Fairweather's proposal for revising doctrine in "A New Model for Land Warfare: The Firepower Dominance Concept" is that, fundamentally, it is not a new doctrine at all. The author says as much when he traces its antecedents to current second echelon interdiction concepts. The proposal is thus open to the criticisms raised in the numerous debates about current U. S. doctrine that have appeared in these pages and elsewhere, as well as more fundamental questions raised by the FIDO concept itself.

In general, the new approach reinforces rather than changes the established U. S. doctrinal approach to land warfare. It is clearly a firepower/attrition doctrine at the expense of mobility and maneuver. Its sole purpose is the destruction of the enemy's armed forces from a purely defensive posture. Despite Colonel Fairweather's reference to his indebtedness to guerrilla, blitzkrieg, and other mobile warfare concepts, he clearly remains well within the American tradition of the direct approach aimed ultimately at the physical destruction of the enemy.¹ In this context it should also be clear that his use of the term maneuver refers more to the mobility of forces rather than maneuver in the classic sense, which is designed to gain strategic or tactical advantage. Thus the reduction he calls for in maneuver forces seems to push the proposed doctrine even further toward a static firepower/attrition position than does the current approach.

In addition, the proposal does nothing to alter most current doctrinal assumptions, particularly in the European theater. Indeed, despite his claims to the contrary, the proposal seems tailored to the specific, purely defensive posture of that theater. The political-military objective is still to erect a defensive wall against the potential aggressor, which will result in his withdrawal with a minimum loss of allied territory either destroyed or given up in the process. The specific military objective is still to destroy the main mass of forces in the enemy's offensive thrust. The model assumes a head-on confrontation in the popularized mold of the Napoleonic "decisive battle" with little attendant strategic or tactical subtlety.

Beyond these general objections, however, it appears that Colonel Fairweather had placed too much one-sided faith in a number of current trends that he and others have postulated for the modern battlefield. Instead of devising a doctrine that will lead technology, he has allowed his analysis to be driven by technological factors almost exclusively.

Colonel Fairweather is not the first to note the increased lethality of the modern battlefield; however, by joining those who see the tank as obsolescent, he ignores the conclusion of two major proponents of combined arms, Israel and the Soviet Union. Both have concluded that, used properly, the tank is still an important element of both firepower and maneuver. The demise of the tank may not take as long as that of the armored cavalry in the Middle Ages, yet to forge a doctrine around the assumption that it has already occurred is to place too much credence in the first few days of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and not enough to its closing episodes. In this he shares overoptimism with proponents of current second echelon interdiction concepts.

Even more sanguine, however, is the faith the author places in the capability of technology to "potentially eliminate many of the 'mysteries' of war." (p. 80) I distrust this assumption for two reasons. First, if he has not overestimated the technological capability to acquire the required information, he has certainly assumed uncontested access to the visual, near-visual, and electromagnetic spectrums both to "see" the enemy and transmit the results in anything close to real time. Second, and perhaps even more important, is the assumption that by seeing the dispositions and movements of the enemy one can deduce his assumptions. Deception is as much an integral part of the tactics and strategy of warfare as it is on Saturday or Sunday football.

The author's conclusions as to the trend evident in our ability to centralize command, control, and communications (C³) fall into this same category. But here, by his own admission, "However the C³ system is established, its ability to remain fully operational throughout the battle is absolutely crucial to success." (p. 85) Thus, the point just alluded to can be reemphasized more forcefully. There seems to be a tacit assumption that the United States can retain a favorable technological edge in controlling the visual and electromagnetic spectrums to our unilateral advantage while denying a comparable capability to the enemy. This assumption appears to include both spectrums themselves as well as the associated ground equipment. In fact, experience shows that both spectrums are more neutrally available to the side which best mixes technology, quantity of existing equipment, and trained skill in application. This relationship has historically been one of relative advantage between sides which change over time. It is much more subject to a Boyd timing and tempo analysis than it is to computing an absolute advantage across-the-board and maintaining it. Simply postulating the importance of electronic warfare as a "whole new field of military endeavor" ignores this fact as well as the existing Soviet doctrine, force structure, and trained personnel engaged in Radio Electronic Combat (REC). Thus Colonel Fairweather's conclusion that "Presumably, the electronic warfare advantage falls to the side able to field technologically superior equipment" may emerge more as a hope than as a practical assumption. (p. 80)

Finally, the conclusion that these and other new technologies have promoted a desire to stabilize the battlefield seems to lean too heavily on the Egyptian reluctance to move out from under fixed defenses set up for the 1973 War and to pay too little attention to the offensive doctrine and associated force structure exhibited by the Soviets. If the increase in mobile defensive systems of all types assigned to Soviet divisions, all of which are mechanized, is not an indication that at least they do not accept such a technologically stabilized battlefield, then many analysts have missed the mark. To adopt the assumptions of the static defense in ascendancy over the offense, as seen in World War I, or of a maginot line philosophy in the face of an enemy, which is overtly dedicated to an offensive orientation that emphasizes both mass and maneuver, seems to be one of an excessive faith in technological solutions.

Compounding what seem to me weaknesses in the analysis of current trends is the tendency to which I alluded earlier, namely assuming that these benefits are one-sided. What convinces the author that if we can see the enemy, the enemy cannot at the same time see and target us? What persuades him that our firepower assets, C³ nodes, and so on are not equally vulnerable to attack and disruption as we assume the enemy's to be? What convinces him that we will dominate a technology merely by doctrinally deciding that it is important?

I must reemphasize that this proposal advocates a doctrine which is even more purely committed to an exclusively defensive posture than that which it replaces. Presumably, this is done on the assumption that force ratios and technological trends favor such an orientation; however, establishing a general set of doctrinal principles which largely ignores the offensive seems to introduce a dangerous rigidity. To express further the expectation that the force changes required by this approach will result in a cheaper defense is unsubstantiated. The assumption that many of these technological trends are already required by current doctrine and, therefore, the proposed approach only commits us to them more definitely is both specious logic and an unnecessary limiting of doctrinal thinking to that which is purely firepower/attrition.

Thus, the article proposes neither really new doctrine nor even a practical alternative to that which currently guides our efforts. It appears to rest on rather optimistic conclusions surrounding technological initiatives already under development as well as a total lack of reaction to these same realities on the part of Soviet doctrine and forces.

Major Simpson (M.P.S., Auburn University) is Director of Military Studies at the United States Air Force Academy.

l. See Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (New York: Macmillan, 1973), for a development of this thesis. In addition, a number of recent articles contrast the American direct approach to the indirect approach. See Colin S. Gray, "The Military Requirements of US Strategy," Military Review, September 1979; William S. Lind, "Military Doctrine, Force Structure, and the Defense Decision-Making Process," Air University Review, May-June 1979; and Edward N. Luttwak, "The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance," Air Force, August 1979.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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