Air University Review , November-December 1980

teetring on the brink

IT IS difficult to remember when I first heard the phrase "Do more with less." I am sure it did not make much of an impression on me then. Little did I know that years later it would develop into a major factor in the preservation of our national security and profoundly affect the ability of the Air Force to carry out its mission.

I remember one time the slogan was used. I was an F-111 D weapon system officer at Cannon AFB, New Mexico, and it was during an aircrew meeting. The squadron commander was telling us how the 1973 oil embargo had affected us and that flying time was going to be cut back. The flyers did not like that idea, and the commander, sensing our dissatisfaction and lack of understanding of the problem, said, "Guys, we all have to realize that the days of abundant resources and unlimited money are gone. From now on, we as a nation must tighten our belts, trim away the excess fat. And one of the first places to do the belt tightening is in the federal bureaucracy and the Department of Defense in particular. We can no longer have everything we want." And then he said it, "We have to do more with less."

I vividly recall another occasion a few years later, in 1977. I was stationed at RAF Upper Heyford in the United Kingdom, still flying F-111 s. It had not been a particularly hard winter in England, but there were spells of cold, bitter weather, the kind that combine rain, wind, and fog into bone-chilling days and even worse nights. In an effort to conserve energy, the base was doing everything it could to reduce heating and lighting expenses. But it was all for naught because, at the end of the year, the money just was not there to pay the bills. Accordingly, the heat was turned off in my squadron over the Christmas holidays. A few days after Christmas, the squadron reopened, and several of us were there at 0700 trying to flight plan the day's mission. The building was cold, and holding a pencil to fill out my line-up card was difficult. The commander, sensing our obvious annoyance, tried to keep us going, "This is no picnic guys, but we just have to make do. We'll try to get the heat on as soon as we can. I can't make any promises, but I'll see the boss and maybe we can get some relief." And then he said it, "I know this isn't easy to accept, but we have to be prepared to do more and more with less and less."

A third, more recent occasion was during my tour on the Air Staff at the Pentagon. I worked in a directorate that, through several Air Staff reorganizations, had lost almost 50 percent of its authorized slots and was only 90 percent manned in the slots it still had. The workload, according to some of the officers who had been in the directorate for almost four years, had just about tripled. Morale was suffering. The head of the directorate had an officers' call. He touched on several points but invariably came back to the overworked and undermanned theme that was foremost on the minds of his subordinates. The directorate head was a forthright man who "told it like it was." His comments were:

Everything is getting tougher. We are taking on more work and doing it with less people and resources. But you were all hand-picked for this assignment. I know each of you personally. You are all good men and women. If you weren't, you wouldn't be here. I know you can do the job. But we must all realize something that is now a fact of life. We must do "more with less." I hope you take that as a challenge and try even harder to get the job done.

In each instance, the commander used a different tactic to try and overcome the problem. One was educating me, one sympathized with me, and one challenged me. But, in the end, they all had the same problem to deal with: how to do more with less.

These instances are not, of themselves, important. What is important is that they are part of a larger problem, a syndrome if you will, based on a do-more-with-less philosophy. And this syndrome just might be leading our nation in a direction that is neither healthy, beneficial, nor secure. It seems that "do more with less" has become a panacea for all our problems, a way out of all the troubles of big government, inflation, and social unrest. But the questions must be asked: What if this nation reaches a point where it cannot do more with less? What will happen then?

Those questions must be addressed if we are to continue a strong, secure nation because the do-more-with-less syndrome is a vicious circle that, as presently used, cannot be broken. The syndrome revolves around the idea that a production unit (be it a fighter wing, an Army battalion, the Air Force, or DOD) can produce "more" (which is defined in a variety of ways--better trained troops, greater unit capability, more sorties, etc.) by using "less" (which is also defined in a variety of ways--energy, money, personnel, etc.). Over a given period of time (for example, a fiscal year), the theory is put to the test. Resources are reduced, and production goals are increased. If the unit reaches the new, higher goals and only uses the reduced amount of resources, then for the subsequent time frame, the goals are increased again and the resources are cut still more. The circle is closed. The unit again tries to "do more with less." Thus, the process seems to focus on the idea that if a production unit meets its goals with fewer resources, the possibility exists that the unit can increase production even more by using even fewer resources. And as long as the unit meets the established goals, the "less" becomes even less and the "more" becomes more.

Some measurement is needed to gauge the success of this syndrome. Statistics usually provide the answer because apparently anything that can be quantified will be quantified. We see this manifested on the resources side as personnel used, dollars spent, and energy consumed, to name just a few. On the production side, it translates into measurement of performance factors: training accomplished, combat readiness of a unit, effective sorties flown, and much more.

These are the rules of the game, and every manager in any production unit faced with having to operate under the do-more-with-less theory knows these rules.

BUT now the problems begin. There comes a point, a point different in every production unit, when the available resources can no longer sustain the increase in productivity. Something must give. It definitely cannot be the productivity itself because the productivity is what is reflected in the statistics, and the statistics are what managers are primarily concerned with under the do-more-with-less rules. And in a military organization, these statistics translate into pressure; pressure that unless you, as a manager, get the job done with what you have, someone else will replace you and do the job more to the boss's liking. Additional resources are not available because the less part of the syndrome dictates continued resource reduction. There are only two alternatives available:

1. Continue high productivity with fewer resources but let the quality of the product suffer.

2. Force greater performance out of the only resource that the manager has some control over, people. (After all, a barrel of oil is a barrel of oil, a dollar is a dollar, but a person has various levels of performance.)

Each is a logical, but potentially deadly, alternative.

These alternatives are available because of two serious flaws in the do-more-with-less syndrome. One is quantification. While productivity levels and resource savings can be measured in absolute terms, the quality of a product is not easily quantifiable. (How "combat ready" is combat ready?) It cannot be listed as a statistic. Likewise, while actual numbers of personnel can be measured, the performance of these people or the conditions under which they work (which influence their attitudes, morale, etc.) are much less easy to determine. The second flaw is, for lack of a better word, manipulation, which occurs as a direct result of quantification. Many of the factors in the productivity and resource areas are known to all, i.e., dollars allocated, gallons of fuel consumed, numbers of personnel assigned. It is hard for either the manager or his boss to dispute these figures. In this instance, manipulation is almost impossible without resorting to an outright breach of integrity and lying. But where the quality of a product or the working conditions and attitudes of personnel are concerned, manipulation is much more possible. This is because the lack of quantification in these two areas allows for a much greater use of subjective judgment. It is the manager's word against someone else's, someone who is armed with no statistical evidence at all, that the product is a quality one. It is the manager's word that he is taking care of the people making the product. Furthermore, in a military organization, this manipulation, if used incorrectly, can be tied to the obedience of the subordinates to the manager using the military chain of command to enforce such obedience.

Both instances are, of course, serious breaches of integrity. But, if a manager makes a conscious decision, because of pressure or other forces acting on him, to sacrifice his integrity, it is easier to do so in the areas of product quality and personnel management (because of the effects of quantification and manipulation) than in any other area that can be supported (or refuted) by "hard" statistical evidence.

It would thus seem that the entire do-more-with-less syndrome hinges on integrity. If a manager's integrity cannot be compromised, then he will readily admit that, at some point where fewer resources can no longer support increased productivity, the product's quality or the unit's personnel are suffering. In short, the manager will say that the limit of "do more with less" has been reached. He can go no further without making a sacrifice that forebodes trouble for quality or personnel. However, if integrity is compromised, the do-more-with-less syndrome will flourish, and the product quality and personnel will suffer.

But what if the quality of the product or the attitudes of the people who produce it do suffer? Is that necessarily bad? In industry, maybe not. If a product's quality is bad, the product fails. The lawn mower breaks. The roof leaks. The appliance burns out. The car breaks down. All are repairable or replaceable, and only the product's reputation suffers. Likewise, if people are mistreated, they leave the production unit. The unit must then make changes to attract people, or it faces bankruptcy. Even in the extreme latter case, the outcome will probably not affect the future of our nation.

This is not true when the "product" is our national defense and the "personnel" involved are our armed forces. This is a unique situation where the people are part of the product, a very important part. And, even more unsettling, the quality of a part of the "product"--our war-fighting capability--is tested only when we must, indeed, fight a war. That is certainly no time to find that the quality is bad or that personnel cannot perform as expected. Once lost, our freedom will be hard to regain.

Of course, there are those who maintain that the product's quality is good, as evidenced by the lack of war. This argument is faulty for two reasons. One, advocates of this point of view equate the product to deterrence when, in actuality, deterrence is only one part of the product. While deterrence has, to date, been successful, that is not a valid base from which to argue that the other part of the product, our war-fighting capability, should be allowed to deteriorate. For if deterrence does fail and the deterrence part of the product proves to be bad, we must have that war-fighting capability to fall back on. Second, one must seriously question whether deterrence, even if viewed as the total product, is, in effect, working. The already heated arguments over the SALT II Treaty and the Soviets' massive military buildup that erodes our deterrent's survivability must be taken into account. It is not a question of whether deterrence has been successful but whether deterrence will be successful in the future. That is where the judgment on the product's quality must be made, and that judgment does not seem to be a favorable one at present.

Thus, the point is made. As it regards our national defense and armed forces, the product must be a quality one; the personnel must be the best. No compromise in quality or personnel can be tolerated. To do so would be disastrous.

BUT has the do-more-with-less syndrome's trade-off point been reached? Has integrity been compromised to make the productivity look good at the expense of quality and personnel? Have we, as a nation, been blind in looking for that point, the point of maximum returns for minimum resources? Are we teetering on the brink of disaster?

Proponents of the do-more-with-less syndrome would say no. They proudly point to lower resource usage and higher productivity to prove their case. But, when asked about the quality of the product or the well-being of the personnel, the proponents can only point to statements by the managers themselves, statements that usually reflect that everything is all right. After all, what manager is going to say his product or his people are in trouble? What manager wants to lose his job? But, taken one step further, when asked about a possible compromise of integrity in the managerial ranks, the do-more-with-less proponents point to the track record. Have there been any breaches of integrity? Have there been any documented (or demonstrated) acts where integrity was shown to have been lax? Have any of the products proved to be faulty? After all, deterrence has been working ever since its inception after World War II. Have any of the people making the product ever complained? Until now, the answers seem to have been no to most, if not all, of these questions.

Until now. Recent pronouncements seem to indicate a possible change. Maybe cracks are appearing in the previously impenetrable dike that shored up the proponents of the do-more-with-less syndrome's case.

• First, integrity and quality of the product. On 13 March 1979 Air Force Chief of Staff General Lew Allen, Jr., published a letter to all Air Force personnel. In the letter, he discussed a series of allegations made by an entire aircrew training class. Some of the allegations were found to be true, others not. But General Allen found the issue disturbing enough to bring it to everyone's attention. One section of the allegations list stated:

. . . it was alleged that serious integrity problems were evident:

--Certifying flying training requirements as accomplished when they were not.

--Changing take-off times to put them in the "on time" window when, in fact, they were late.

--Failure to document aircraft discrepancies for fear of reprisal.

--Reporting sorties as effective and productive when they were not.

--Commanders "accommodating" to a system that constantly calls on them to do more and more with less and less.¹

That is a breach of integrity. That is downright lying to "make the numbers look good." That hits home!

•  Second, the people. General Allen made the following comments concerning officer retention in an address to Arizona newsmen:

We have compounded the problem ourselves with sometimes poorly focused management efforts and pressure to compensate for force reductions and to support increased readiness by working longer hours. We've pushed our people hard. To some extent, we may have lost the vital balance between concern about the task and concern about the individual. We are now paying closer attention to this balance--and making improvements...²

A problem unique to the Air Force? Not according to General Bernard W. Rogers, former Army Chief of Staff, in an address to business executives in Philadelphia:

I am concerned about the cost of national defense. Allocating more resources...will considerably improve it; failing to apply them can gravely jeopardize it.³

• Third, the statistics. These are the symbolic figures that the do-more-with-less proponents point to when bolstering their case. Here are a few statistics not often cited:⁴

By any measure, by any standard, everything listed here shows a definite "less" in resources. There is no area in which increases are observed.

But what about the "more"? How do you show that? Not as easily, but it is possible. Talk to any squadron commander whose unit is only 80 percent manned but handling his full wartime mission. Talk to any maintenance officer or noncommissioned officer whose duty days are getting longer and longer. Talk to any staff officer whose piles of paperwork and bureaucratic red tape continue to mount. Look at the inspector general's tasking orders, where flying wings must now strain to fly the predetermined number of sorties on a "sortie surge" and also must better previous scores in other areas of evaluation. And finally, ask the do-more-with-less proponents themselves. They, of course, will show you all the information you need to document the "more." But maybe they will not do so in the context of this discussion.

• And the biggest crack of all in the dike is the stark realization that our nation has restored the mandatory registration of 18year olds and might be forced to reinstate the draft. In this case, the "more"--the combat capability of the Army in particular and the armed forces in general--cannot be obtained with "less"--reduced manpower through voluntary military service. As General Rogers prophetically commented a year ago:

As a minimum, in my opinion, the Selective Service System must be reenergized and the registration of 18-year-olds commenced again.⁵

IN THE final analysis, what is happening seems to be almost criminal. Not because there are strong advocates of the do-more-with-less syndrome. Doing more with less is not inherently bad, as waste and repetition should be eliminated. Not because integrity is at stake and has been compromised. There are effective ways to correct such problems. Not because personnel are being treated unfairly. That, too, can be corrected, as General Allen has pointed out. It is criminal because what all this leads to is a grand disillusionment of the American people and the senior decision-makers of this nation. As a whole, the military establishment (and, who knows, maybe other governmental agencies) is projecting a capability that possibly does not exist in wartime. We are doing so much more with so much less that the pressure to continue the syndrome's cycle is intolerable. We are making the numbers look good to satisfy the bosses while overrating the true ability of our military. We are compromising our quality and our people. We are tampering with the security of our nation.

The solution? No more accommodation, more truth. Break the cycle if indeed the "more" versus "less" indicates or dictates that the limit has been reached. However, we must not intentionally break the cycle just to escape the do-more-with-less philosophy. That would only further compromise our collective integrity and make us no better off than we are now. If more can be done with less, then let's do it. If it cannot be accomplished, then we must first admit that fact to ourselves and then tell our superiors about it. Be honest.

If it should come to another armed conflict and we, as defenders of our nation, cannot perform as expected, we have only ourselves to blame. We cannot fight and win a war with statistics. Adequate national security is based on a demonstrated military capability that costs money and men. We can, and should, trim these areas when possible to realize resource savings while increasing capabilities. But we have trimmed enough and, under present constraints, expanded our capabilities to the limit. To "do any more with any less" now, invites disaster.

1. Allen to ALMAJCOM-SOA/CC, 13 March 1979, Subject: Integrity. Emphasis added by author.

2. "Chief Faults Air Force," Air Force, March 1979, p. 120.

3. Ed Duggan, "Rogers: Our Deterrent Must Be Credible," Pentagon News, April 26, 1979, p. 1.

4. Data for this section was taken from US Air Force (AF/ACMC), Pocket USAF Summary, 1979 (Washington: US Air Force, 1979).

5. Duggan, p. 1.

Captain Kenneth C. Stoehrmann (USAFA; M.A., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufis University) is an instructor, political Science Department, USAF Academy. He serve as an executive officer during a one-year Air Staff training tour at Hq USAF. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the Undergraduate Navigator Training School, Squadron officer School, and the USAF Academy. Captain Stoehrmann is a previous award-winning contributor to the Review.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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