Air University Review , November-December 1980

A New Model For Land Warfare

THE modern battlefield promises levels of intensity and destruction never before approached by man. Technology has provided the warrior with sophisticated weaponry that far outstrips anything known in World War II. Weapons capabilities have advanced so fast, in fact, that armies have had great difficulties in updating tactical doctrine at the same pace, and the military man finds himself driven by technology rather than making technology the useful servant of doctrine. In order to regain our mastery over technology, I posit the thesis that firepower should be the dominant variable in the firepower-maneuver equation.

Though my views seem heretical in light of current doctrine, they are presented in all seriousness and do not depart significantly from a body of thought that reaches far back into history. For the most part, these views are derived from a careful study of guerrilla warfare, blitzkrieg tactics, air power doctrine, and concepts for mobile warfare in a fluid environment. The essence of the views is a vivid image of firepower-intensive engagements on a four-dimensional battlefield, where time is the fourth dimension and success depends on the destruction of mass with precisely timed pulses of violence.

The Traditional
Firepower/Maneuver Model

All great armies of the world rest their land combat power on the tank. . . .tank strength is the foundation of NATO defense.²

Napoleon's military success, according to many historians, was due to his brilliant management of firepower and maneuver. Through the works of Jomini, Clausewitz, and a succession of military thinkers, Napoleon's basic model for land warfare has survived and, in a refined form, provides the basis for U. S. Army doctrine today.

This traditional model, while emphasizing the integration of maneuver and firepower, places maneuver forces in the dominant role and supporting firepower in a subordinate role. It rests on the principle that one must physically seize or hold terrain-oriented objectives by concentrating superior maneuver forces at points of decision in order to destroy the enemy. As a corollary to the principle, supporting firepower augments the combat power of maneuver forces and, in concert with the plan of maneuver, supports the attainment of maneuver force objectives.³

The advent of tactical air power changed this traditional land warfare model very little because aerial weapon systems were viewed by U.S. Army doctrine writers as just another form of flexible firepower with which to support ground forces. Although current doctrine now refers to land warfare as the "joint air-land battle," and combat power is considered to be an amalgam of firepower and maneuver, the dominant-subordinate relationship between maneuver forces and supporting firepower remains essentially the same. Changes to doctrine have centered mostly on procedures and methods for managing fire support, accomplishing joint interfaces, and applying new technology.⁴ For some, these changes suffice, but there are at least a few military thinkers who believe that more than superficial changes are needed.

The Need for New Doctrine

The greater amounts and types of firepower available on the battlefield have created extraordinary problems of fire support coordination. They have also brought into question the entire relationship between firepower and maneuver.⁵

There is a growing awareness that traditional doctrine may no longer meet the demands of warfare. Further evidence comes in the form of new trends and developments.

• First, technology has led to conventional weapons that can be fired at standoff ranges and do so with greatly enhanced accuracy and lethality. These weapons threaten to make even the mainstay of battle, the tank, obsolete.
• Second, technology has provided sophisticated means for penetrative and standoff reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA). These RISTA means can potentially eliminate many of the "mysteries" of war, especially the ones relating to enemy dispositions and intentions, and can provide real-time target data.
• Third, command, control, and communications (C³) systems utilizing electronic and computer technology provide vastly improved capabilities for battlefield management. While allowing a high degree of efficiency through centralization, these C³ systems do incur the drawback of themselves becoming primary targets.
• This leads to the fourth trend, the creation of a whole new field of military endeavor, electronic warfare. The objective of electronic warfare, stated succinctly, is to deny the enemy the use of his C³, RISTA, and fire control means while protecting one's own means. Presumably, the electronic warfare advantage falls to the side able to field technologically superior equipment.
• Fifth, technology has also resulted in some other effects on warfare. For example, in opposition to the general rule that battles with movement (Waterloo) are decisive and battles without movement (World War I trench warfare) are indecisive, technology promotes a desire to stabilize the battlefield.
• The air defense umbrellas and antitank shields of today are most effective when left in place, and armies are reluctant to move away from them. Further, as demonstrated in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, technology is increasing the intensity, tempo, and attrition of war. Fast-paced, violent firepower duels promise to exhaust the opponents and deplete their resources making victory hang reconstitute.⁶
• Sixth, there is no guarantee that land warfare will remain conventional. In all probability, tactical (and perhaps strategic) nuclear weapons will be used at some stage. If that happens, then the act of concentrating forces to achieve favorable combat power ratios may incur the penalty of presenting suitable nuclear targets to the enemy. A force that is unprepared to shift immediately from conventional to nuclear battle will be at a severe disadvantage. The necessary preparations go beyond just equipment and training and must include the development of a flexible doctrine.⁷
• Finally, Western nations are finding it increasingly more difficult to receive public support for maintaining large standing military forces. The monetary cost of providing the required equipment and its support is high, but even more at issue are the costs and other impacts of sustaining high levels of military manpower. As a result, Western military forces have been unable to keep pace with the quantitative and qualitative military improvements that continue to be made by the Warsaw Pact. The outgrowth of this has been the adoption of a "fighting outnumbered, while winning" concept,⁸ which has little chance for success. Logic dictates that when you pit a small capable force against a large capable one and both follow the same basic doctrinal game rules, the smaller force is unlikely to win.

These trends and developments point to the need for new land warfare doctrine. Whatever form it takes, it must maximize the advantages of new technology while minimizing the disadvantages. It must be affordable and supportable by Western nations. Further, it must result in a credible deterrent while also providing the capability to defeat the Warsaw Pact or other enemies in the event of aggression. Ideally, it would make the Warsaw Pact's land warfare doctrine inoperative, thus placing the economic stress of massive military reinvestment on the Warsaw Pact nations. Finally, it must be a flexible doctrine that incorporates the tenets of both conventional and nuclear warfare.

The Second Echelon
Interdiction Concept

To say that no one is working the doctrine problem would be highly inaccurate. The truth is that a large-scale joint second echelon interdiction study is in progress under the direction of TAC/TRADOC's Air Land Force Application Agency. The purpose of the study is to determine how best to integrate and apply both USAF and Army firepower means against the follow-on echelons of the Warsaw Pact ground forces. Conceptually, while NATO ground maneuver forces are defending against the attacking first echelon, joint supporting firepower means would be directed at the second echelon to attrit and delay it. The objectives to be achieved against the second echelon are straightforward. First, the second echelon would be delayed so that it would not arrive to reinforce until after the defending forces had defeated the first echelon. Second, since the defending forces would suffer attrition while fighting the first echelon, the second echelon would have to be attrited to the point where the defenders would retain an adequate defending combat power ratio. Also, it would be desirable to channel second echelon elements by firepower so that they would arrive in the close combat zone at places other than those of their choosing.⁹

To meet these objectives, NATO ground and air firepower means would be targeted in depth against the second echelon. One concept envisions early location of second echelon forces through deep reconnaissance.¹⁰ Subsequently, a program of firepower attacks would be executed to strip away supporting elements, to impede and channel movement, and to cause cumulative attrition of overall combat capabilities. This same concept also visualizes large-scale firepower attacks to degrade the enemy's artillery and rocket forces located 5 to 20 kilometers behind the line of contact. These fire assets not only support the first echelon; they must also provide fire support for the second echelon when it reinforces, thus making them high-return targets.

Critical to the success of the foregoing concept is the flawless integration of joint ground and air firepower operations against the second echelon and in support of the overall air and land battles. Such integration will call for the establishment of a highly sophisticated C³ system that can operate under all conditions of combat. This aspect is the principal area of concern in the ongoing study efforts.¹¹

Significantly, the second echelon interdiction concept reflects a shift in military thinking. No longer must firepower be a total slave to the maneuver force battle at the line of contact. It is an important step leading toward the concept I propose and has had more than a passing influence on my own thoughts.

A New Air-Land
Battle Model

If the second echelon can be made ineffective by the application of massed firepower, can the entire air-land battle be fought in the same manner? After extensive research and much reflection, I have become convinced that the answer is yes, if one is willing to accept new doctrinal approaches to warfare. One of these approaches is a conceptual airland battle model, which I have named the firepower dominance (FIDO) concept. It is really only the bare framework of a model at this point, but it will serve as a means for me to convey my ideas.

The FIDO concept places firepower (that firepower which is not integral to ground maneuver forces) in the position of dominance on the battlefield. It does this in accordance with the following principles.

Firepower dominance. Firepower dominates over maneuver as the primary consideration for battle planning and execution. The firepower objective is to destroy and defeat enemy land and air forces. Maneuver forces are subordinate to firepower forces and will be utilized as a form of augmentation. Specifically, maneuver forces will cause the enemy to deploy, help channel the enemy into killing zones, destroy isolated enemy elements that escape firepower destruction, provide rear area security, secure assigned terrain, and be prepared to exploit the results of firepower.

Dispersal. Firepower and maneuver assets will be dispersed on the battlefield to avoid mass destruction by the enemy. This dispersal will be both in depth and width and accomplished at every level practical. The purpose of dispersal is to attain survival through the dilution of mass.

Concentration and deconcentration. Firepower will be systematically and rapidly concentrated on the enemy to destroy, delay, and disrupt his forces. From dispersed locations, firepower assets will place coordinated, integrated, and massed fires against enemy targets. These targets will be attacked in priority order, based on the tactical situation. Normally, first priority targets will include those enemy offensive firepower and maneuver forces that pose the greatest immediate threat. Friendly maneuver forces will concentrate only to execute assigned missions and then will deconcentrate.

RISTA saturation. Reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and target acquisition means will saturate the battlefield in depth and width to provide for accurate, timely, and continuous targeting and damage assessment. This is vital to ensure effective firepower management. RISTA means will be fully applied (within political constraints) on a continuous basis during peacetime to provide accurate targeting at the outbreak of hostilities. The purpose of this prehostility effort is to ensure that the first echelon be targeted and destroyed by firepower before it can penetrate in depth.

Centralized command and control. Command and control of the air-land battle will be highly centralized and will flow through a joint command and control structure that will reach to the lowest levels practical. This structure will also be responsible for the integration of all forms of firepower and for the integration of maneuver force operations into the plan of firepower. A joint centralized command, control, and communications (C³) system will provide the means for command, control, and integration.

Flexible weapons employment. Firepower forces will be fully equipped, manned, and trained to achieve firepower dominance. The objective is assured defeat of the enemy. These weapons and their support will be predeployed or rapidly deployable to distant battlefields and will possess the capability to reposition tactically. They will have sufficient range to provide for the rapid concentration of firepower while operating from dispersed positions or bases and will possess the lethality and accuracy to destroy the targets that they are to attack. The weapons, in aggregate, will provide a range of conventional, nuclear, and chemical options, and all planning for employment of the weapons will facilitate the shift from one option to the other. Although not firepower per se, offensive electronic warfare means will be treated as weapons and integrated into battle plans as such.

These principles provide the foundation for the FIDO concept. It is not intended that this concept be constrained to the Central European battlefield, since, one of its objectives is to enhance the worldwide projection of military power. However, it is useful to describe the concept in terms of a major NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation so that the reader can relate it to a relatively familiar scenario. Force structure changes will be addressed first so that the reader can better understand the subsequent discussion covering the flow of battle.

To achieve full firepower dominance, extensive changes to force structure would be required. First, firepower, RISTA, C³, and other related resources would be greatly increased in quantitative and qualitative terms. Concomitantly, quantitative requirements for maneuver forces would be considerably lower on any given battlefield. Since this last statement strikes the soldier where it hurts most, I will discuss this area before describing firepower changes.

Maneuver force requirements on the FIDO battlefield would consist of a fairly heavy covering force forward deployed along the entire battlefront and highly mobile main forces deployed in depth at strategic locations. The primary purpose of the covering force would be to cause the Warsaw Pact first echelon to deploy and help channel it into firepower killing zones. The division-sized mobile main forces would maintain dispersed (but combat ready) postures at their base locations, prepared to execute missions that include reinforcement of the covering force, destruction of isolated enemy elements that eluded firepower annihilation, and consolidation of terrain cleared by firepower. Both the covering and main forces would be organized and equipped to provide the mobility necessary for rapid concentration and deconcentration. Integral firepower would be designed to kill armored vehicles at maximum standoff ranges during highly mobile engagements. Attack helicopters could provide augmentation to integral firepower while other helicopters might be employed to maintain the flow of logistics, deploy mines, and emplace antitank guided missile teams. Since maneuver forces would not be the primary means for stopping and destroying the enemy, it is expected that the number required on the battlefield by current doctrine could be cur at least in half. However, the remaining maneuver forces would have to be of top quality.

Firepower forces, in contrast to maneuver forces, would grow in size and quality to meet the demands of firepower dominance. The doctrinal concepts that would serve as a guide for firepower employment and force structure requirements are similar to those used for building and employing tactical air forces.¹³ The primary functional missions would be maneuver force destruction, offensive and defensive counterfirepower, and interdictory firepower. The apportionment of firepower for each functional mission would depend on the objectives to be achieved and the overall situation. To provide this apportionment flexibility, a full range of multirole air and land firepower systems must be made available to commanders. These systems must be suitable for strategic deployment so that military firepower can be projected to new battlefields or can provide rapid reinforcement in Europe. To the maximum extent possible, the systems must be night, obscured-conditions, and adverse-weather capable and able to deliver concentrated firepower while operating from dispersed positions or bases. Besides tactical aircraft, which will be needed in great numbers, it is visualized that firepower systems could include surface-to-surface missiles, long-range single/multiple rockets, air defense guns/missiles, attack-capable ground-launched cruise missiles, and extended range artillery. Greatly enhanced capabilities for electronic warfare would be integrated with firepower means. Ground-based firepower systems and all ground/air support elements should be fully mobile. Precision and area munitions capable of defeating hard and soft targets would be required. These munitions should provide for a full range of conventional, nuclear, and chemical options. Although some suitable weapons and munitions are available, it is quickly recognized that extensive research, development, test, and evaluation/production efforts would have to take place to field the quantity and quality needed for assured fire-power dominance.

Similar efforts would be necessary to develop the required reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities. It is visualized that the systems providing these capabilities would also operate from dispersed positions or bases and provide real-time targeting/assessment information around-the-clock, in any obscurant and weather conditions. Force structure emphasis should be placed on providing large numbers of standoff and penetration systems that are reliable and relatively survivable but sufficiently inexpensive to allow continuous saturation of the battlefield. The systems and their support elements should be able to operate on a mobile positioning/basing concept.

To tie the functional elements of a FIDO-based force structure together and provide the survivable links necessary for flexible centralized command and control, an extensive effort must take place to develop a very sophisticated C³ system. Not only must the C³ system elements be dispersed, protected, and shielded from damage by enemy firepower, the system must be able to continue operations in chemical, nuclear, and electronic warfare environments. Ideally, advances in fiber optics, microcomputerization, space communications, and other related technologies would be applied to develop a redundant multiple route/media network with multiple user access points spread throughout the battlefield. The command and control nodes, which would also provide firepower integration, could then be mobile and plug into the system at any access point. However the C³ system is established, its ability to remain fully operational throughout the battle is absolutely crucial to success.

Logistical forces would have to be highly flexible and, similar to the combat forces, would have to concentrate and deconcentrate logistical support rapidly from dispersed locations. To facilitate this, war materials and logistical manpower should be organized in packages that are strategically positioned to meet the expected flow of battle. Reserve war materials should be located so that they could be used in response to deviations from the predicted battle flow. Everything considered, logistics support may be simpler than under current doctrine due to the centralization of command and control and the reduction of maneuver forces.

Undoubtedly, numerous other force structure changes would have to take place to make the concept work.

The Flow of Battle

Discussion of the firepower dominance concept as employed during the flow of battle will be kept on the abstract level since it is primarily intended to summarize the application of the firepower dominance theory. The NATO-Warsaw Pact scenario will be used for the sake of convenience.

Warning of a Warsaw Pact attack would come from both strategic national intelligence and battlefield RISTA resources. Since, under the FIDO concept, the NATO RISTA resources would already be continuously oriented against the Warsaw Pact forces, assessment and targeting would already be in progress. At the first act of aggression and with subsequent political approval to defend against the enemy, extensive preplanned cross-boundary RISTA operations would start. The FIDO concept would most likely be no secret to Warsaw Pact military planners, and measures would undoubtedly be taken to destroy NATO RISTA capabilities. Deception measures could also be expected and might include attempts to conceal force concentrations or to avoid force concentrations until the last possible point in time.

Nevertheless, if the RIST A effort is properly executed, it should lead to a reasonably clear picture of the Warsaw Pact first echelon maneuver formations across the entire front. As the leading elements move beyond the political boundary, the NATO covering forces would engage them to force their battle deployment, channel them into firepower killing zones, and develop refined targeting information. The mobile main forces would be deployed in depth, ready to concentrate when and where needed.

Enemy first echelon targets would promptly be attacked with intense air and ground maneuver force destruction firepower. Concurrently, firepower means supporting the first echelon would also be heavily hit. The objectives would be to destroy first echelon maneuver forces before they could penetrate or be reinforced, strip away their fire support means, and cause the maximum possible initial psychological impact.

Defensive counterfirepower assets, consisting of an extensive network of ground-based air defense systems and a relatively small number of interceptor aircraft, would meet the expected waves of Soviet Frontal Aviation aircraft. The dispersal of NATO forces would compound the targeting problem for the enemy and, it is hoped, reduce the effectiveness of those aircraft that are able to penetrate.

Offensive counterfirepower operations would be put into effect immediately at the start of battle to reduce Warsaw Pact air power and long-range land-based firepower to an ineffective level. Tactical aircraft and surface-to-surface missile attacks would be made against airfields, aircraft support facilities, C³ nodes, missile sites, and nuclear weapon systems. Offensive counterfirepower initial objectives would be to establish air superiority, suppress or destroy long-range ground-based firepower capabilities, and destroy nuclear-capable weapon systems.

Although some firepower would be placed against second echelon maneuver forces and interdiction targets in the initial stages, the bulk of NATO firepower would be devoted to air defense, first echelon maneuver force destruction, and offensive counterfirepower operations. The weight of effort in these areas would continue until it is determined that the primary objectives have been met. At that time, the priority would shift by stages to provide for the systematic destruction of second echelon forces, interdiction targets, and Warsaw Pact reserves.

Throughout the battle, NATO battle managers would follow the principles of firepower dominance, dispersal, rapid concentration/deconcentration, RISTA saturation, centralized C³, and flexible weapons employment. They would use timed pulses of firepower to meet the enemy at his points of strength and, early in the battle, take away his advantages of surprise and offensive initiative. Stripped of his offensive firepower and without sufficient maneuver forces to continue the attack, he would have no recourse but to retreat from the battlefield.

Analysis

Any concept has particular strengths and weaknesses, and the FIDO concept is no exception. Because the concept has been presented in the abstract, the analysis must take place at the same level: a simple presentation of major disadvantages and advantages.

Several disadvantages can readily be identified. First, adoption of the concept would appear to be very costly because it would require a high density of technology-intensive firepower, RISTA, and C³ systems. It is hoped that a large portion of this cost would be offset by the reduction of maneuver-forces, decreased overseas stationing requirements, and allied cost sharing. Second, the concept is dependent on a centralized C³ network that may be fragile and susceptible to degradation. This is a legitimate concern. However, even with the current concept of warfare, such a system is needed. At least with the new concept, a great emphasis will be placed on making it work. Finally, if the FIDO concept were to fail in battle, then insufficient ground maneuver forces would be available to hold the enemy. To answer this, several points can be made. First, it is not clear that the maneuver forces currently in place could resist a superior Warsaw Pact onslaught even if reinforced. If they failed to do so, not only would the battle be lost but so would a major portion of our Army. On the other hand, the bulk of the FIDO firepower forces (especially the aircraft) would have the mobility to withdraw strategically.

The advantages of the FIDO concept are numerous, but I will limit my discussion to just a few. First, by adopting the concept, the United States would be able to put new meaning into the flexible response strategy. As befits a maritime nation, military power could be projected worldwide in the form of relatively mobile firepower systems that are not dependent on large, manpower-intensive ground maneuver forces. This reduction of maneuver forces and their deployment requirements could reduce the existing strategic mobility problem, balance-of-payment problems, and the need for large standing manpower requirements during peacetime. Second, the FIDO concept facilitates a fully integrated preparedness and capability to fight chemical and nuclear warfare. Third, it provides the capability to quickly resolve the outcome of a battle and do it before the battle moves deep into friendly territory. Fourth, the concept forces a joint approach toward battle and firmly establishes doctrinal interfaces among the various services. Finally, the concept is readily adaptable to the acceptance of new technology and presents an opportunity for the United States to regain unquestioned superiority in this area.

I am sure that the reader can find other advantages and disadvantages, or may disagree with some that I have presented. I can also see where some may have great difficulty in accepting a concept that implies that the tank is obsolete, among other things. Obviously, an in-depth analysis would be necessary to identify specific weaknesses and strengths of the concept and to prove that it would really work.

WHETHER one agrees or disagrees with the FIDO concept, it presents a clear alternative to the traditional model for land warfare. It recognizes that firepower is the dominant force which leads to the destruction of the enemy on the battlefield and is a logical extension of trends and developments that are available for all to see.

Until the concept is thoroughly analyzed to determine if it is viable, it can be considered no more than one man's opinion of how modern war should be fought. I hope that this article may spur others to test that opinion and see if it bears fruit.

1. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, editors, Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 228.

2. Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Washington: Department of the Army, 1 July 1976), p. 2-2.

3. Major Robert A. Doughty, "The Evolution of US Army Tactical Doctrine, 1946-76," Leavenworth Papers, No.1 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, August 1979).

4. Air-Land Battle Primer, Hq USAFTAC/USATRADOC Pamphlet (ALFA Agency), June 1978.

5. Ibid., p. 49.

6. Maj. Gen. Israel Tal, "Israel's Defense Doctrine: Background and Dynamics," Military Review, March 1978, pp. 22-37.

7. Major John S. Doerfel, "An Operational Concept for the Integrated Air-Land Battle" (Paper delivered at the 1980 Air University Airpower Symposium, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 5 March 1980), p. 22.

8. FM 100-5, p. 1-1.

9. Telephone conversation with Director, ALFA, Langley AFB, Virginia, April 1980.

10. See Doerfel.

11. Telephone conversation with Director, ALFA, Langley AFB, Virginia, April 1980. 12. Lt. Col. Kent M. Monroe et aI., "Employment of the Manned Strategic Bomber in Non-nuclear War: A Perspective," Air War College Research Paper, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1978.

13. TACM 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, 15 April 1978.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert S. Fairweather, Jr., USA (USMA; M.S., University of Southern California) is TRADOC System Manager for Scout helicopters with the U.S. Army Aviation Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama. Colonel Fairweather, an Army aviator and field artilleryman, has published articles in Army, Army Aviation Digest, and other publications and is author of the helicopter chapter in Modern Airmanship. He is a graduate of the Air War College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor