Air University Review , November-December 1980

IF THERE are any near certainties in the complex world of energy and its potential impact on our society, this statement by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown is one of them:

...there is no more serious threat to the long-term security of the United States and to its allies than that which stems from the growing deficiency of secure and assured energy resources.¹

Current popular and scholarly articles often refer to the insidious nature of the energy problem and warn that the real danger lies in its becoming critical before the public even realizes it is serious.²

An illustrative analogy is that of a certain strain of bacteria with a doubling time of one minute. One bacterium is placed in a bottle at 11:00 A.M., and by noon the bottle is full. The essence of the illustration is in the last few minutes before noon. At 11:55 the bottle is 97 percent open space--little cause for even farsighted bacteria to worry about space exhaustion. At 11:58 the bottle is one-fourth full, and a massive effort is launched to acquire more living space. At 11:59, with the bottle half-full, three more bottles are located, and the bacteria supposedly breathe a collective sigh of relief since they have effectively quadrupled the original total space resource. At 12:00 noon the first bottle is full. At 12:01 the second is full. At 12:02 all four are full.³

The analogy is admittedly simplistic and the parallel to worldwide petroleum supply and demand obvious. Still, it contains a basic truth which Americans either have not yet recognized or, if they have recognized it, have yet to reach the point of demanding an accounting for the stewardship of their elected representatives.

Not that some hesitation is unwarranted. In this situation, as in many others, the relative inertia of the democratic process could conceivably prove a blessing since the passage of time often clarifies muddied issues. There are, however, indicators that time is running out. Long-term forecasting of energy supply/demand may not be particularly accurate, and intense popular pressure for immediate action could be less than productive when the options are obscured in a haze of technological, political, and economic uncertainties. However, the potentially unpleasant realities stemming from our laissez-faire approach to energy management would seem to demand immediate decisions and concurrent action.

Fortunately, the energy-related problems of the Department of Defense (DOD), and in particular the Air Force, are more clearly defined since the majority of our weapon systems are heavily dependent on liquid fuels for mobility operations. Assured access to these types of fuels is critical to our military effectiveness for at least the next twenty years and probably well beyond that. Defense energy issues, however, can be understood only in the context of the national energy situation.

The United States

The United States energy situation affects all elements of society with growing concern and frustration. The nation's appetite for petroleum developed during a period of relatively cheap energy, the real price of which actually declined 28 percent during the fifties and sixties.⁴ As replacement costs increased, public resistance to this reality, coupled with continuing government subsidies⁵ (in one form or another), kept prices artificially low.

Today, the predicament in which the United States finds itself can be traced directly to that earlier era of artificially lowcost energy. The legacy of cheap energy testifies daily in both the quantity of capital goods in this country and the energy inefficiencies of our automobiles, homes, and manufacturing processes when compared to other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).⁶ Figure 1 illustrates the character of U.S. productivity per unit of energy consumed. Note that other nations, Sweden and Switzerland, for example, maintain similar standards of living with per capita energy consumption less than half that of the U.S. The size and diversity of the U. S. do not fully explain such consumption. Energy inefficiencies are major contributors.

Increased demand, decreasing reserves of domestic petroleum, and the dramatically rising price of imported crude have prompted the Carter administration to announce three overriding energy objectives:⁷

Immediate objective: to reduce dependence on foreign oil and vulnerability to supply interruptions. Given the average citizen's reluctance to adapt voluntarily to current energy realities, the domestic political climate, technical limitations, and the absence of any extreme international threat, one need not be gifted to visualize the difficulties inherent in achieving this objective in the foreseeable, much less immediate future!

Medium-term objective: to keep United States imports sufficiently low to weather the period when world oil production approaches its capacity limitations. Forecasts for this event vary from 1983 to the next century. Politically induced reductions in Iranian and Saudi Arabian production, not an irrational notion in light of events in these nations in 1978-80, could see the supply and demand curves meet as early as 1981.⁸ The uncertainties here are understandable given the multiplicity of variables and the dramatic role anyone of them could play. Demand itself pivots on an increasingly interdependent world economy. Supply, especially from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), is subject to a host of political as well as economic equations.

Long-term objectives: to have renewable and essentially inexhaustible sources of energy for sustained economic growth.

The administration's objectives are set against an increasingly frustrating reality. Recent U.S. energy consumption has been about 38 + million barrels per day oil equivalent (mbdoe)⁹ with domestic primary energy production reaching approximately 29 + mbdoe.^l0 The majority of the daily energy shortfall of 9 mbdoe, a major source of U. S. economic and military concern, is made up by imported petroleum. (See Table I.)

Table I. U.S. net imports crude oil/products, 1977

Source: *Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries
CIA Handbook of Economic Statistics 1978, p. 88.

Opportunities for appreciably increasing domestic crude production do not appear promising. Twelve major oil firms provided data in response to a Congressional Research Service request for forecasts of domestic petroleum production to 1990. The best, average, and worse case forecasts for increased domestic production over 1977 production of 9.6 million barrels per day (mbd) are shown in Table II.

*Even the most optimistic long-term increase (37.5 percent) represents only 13.2 mbd
total production. Current U.S. consumption is already nearly 20 mbd.

Note: Projections assumed decontrol of domestic oil production.

Source: Derived from U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Energy: An Uncertain Future, No. 95-157 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 32.

Table II. Forecasts for increased domestic oil production
(percentage increase over 1977 total domestic production)

A comparison with demand projected during the same period reveals an even more serious shortfall between domestic supply and total requirements. A mean of 25 major studies produced between 1960 and 1975 and 15 studies developed from 1976 through 1978 shows the effect of current events, moods, and politics on long-range forecasts. (See Table III.)

Table III. Forecasts of U.S. energy demand

*One quad = 1 quadrillion (1 x 10¹⁵) Btu or approximately 173 million barrels of oil.

Source: Derived from U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Energy: An Uncertain Future, No. 95-157 (Washington: Government Printing Office,
December 1978), p. 18.

The point is that current forecasts, even though considerably lower than earlier estimates, predict a significant increase in demand for decreasing conventional energy reserves. (Granted these forecasts are all subject to uncertain variables and what Franssen, in his recent analysis, refers to as Zeitgeist or the "spirit of the time.")¹¹

Perhaps one encouraging aspect of the U. S. energy picture is that the energy-to-GNP ratio (illustrated in Figure 1) is being revised. In reality, the ratio (or multiplier) has varied considerably during the past quarter-century and has been favorably reduced during the 1970s.¹² In other words, continued real growth does not intrinsically require directly proportional increases in energy. However, reducing that ratio further will require higher efficiency in energy production, industrial processes, and methods of transportation.

Nearly half the current U.S. demand for energy is met by oil, and nearly half of that oil is imported. With present and predicted technology, domestic oil production, even under the most optimistic scenarios, will be little more than it is at present. Table IV, using an average derived from a cross section of major forecasts since 1975, reflects the impact of the 1973-74 embargo on the unrestrained optimism of earlier days; reduces bias to an acceptable minimum, it is hoped; and indicates the magnitude of the potential problem (i.e., increasing U.S. petroleum shortages and greater dependence on imports).

Table IV. U.S. oil supply projections 1980-90 (millions of barrels per day)

Source: Derived from U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources,
Energy: An Uncertain Future, No. 95-157 (Washington: Government Printing Office,|
1978), p. 21.

To place these figures in perspective, 9 million barrels per day (the lowest level of imports) is close to Saudi Arabia's total daily production, or double Iran's total daily exports before the Shah departed. Nine million barrels a day exceeds the Soviet Union's 1977 crude consumption and is more than 160 percent of Japan's crude consumption during the same period.¹³

Should the U.S. continue to function as a petroleum-based economy, either by default or conscious decision, what sources will be available to provide for demand beyond our domestic supplies?

Outside of OPEC, only Mexico has the potential for near-term (1980-85) excess capacity, and Mexico's oil prospects are another patchwork of uncertainties. Her proven reserves, oil and gas, have increased by a factor of seven in less than four years. Potential reserves may rival or even exceed those of Saudi Arabia. Official U.S. estimates of Mexico's productive capacity in the 1980s range from 4 to 10 million barrels per day, yet Mexican President Lopez Portillo has set a production target of only 2.25 mbd by the end of 1980 and is very sensitive to the inflationary potential of sharply increased production.¹⁴ The higher U.S. figures may represent available petroleum resources but are almost certainly neglecting more important factors, not the least of which is North America's cavalier treatment of its proud southern neighbor. The United States is a natural, but not the only, market for Mexican hydrocarbons. Mexico has the technological know-how, and capital input from other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development would be a rational investment. In the future Japan alone may be purchasing "about 20% of Mexico's total production."¹⁵

Acutely aware of the problems associated with a booming oil economy, Mexico's ultimate production seems to depend more on what she perceives as a reasonable balance between recession and overheated development, rather than U.S. (or others') requirements. Though not a member of OPEC, Mexico will not sell her oil below market price unless there is a collapse of world demand. In fact, it may be sold well above the OPEC price. The advantages of relative physical security and shorter lines of supply would seem to be incentives for the U. S. to pay a premium for Mexican crude. There is also the professed reluctance of Mexican authorities to flare gas in order to meet higher crude oil quotas. The U. S. is in a better position to take advantage of this gas, and it is far more economical to pipe across the border than to liquefy and export elsewhere. Again, the V.S. may be well advised to pay a premium for gas in order to encourage Mexican oil production.¹⁶

Mexican exports, while welcome, would satisfy only a small percentage of forecast U.S. petroleum requirements. Within OPEC, only Saudi Arabia seems to have reserve capacity to meet projected worldwide demand.¹⁷

The dotted line in Figure 2 represents an actual reduction in forecast capacity due to Iranian restrictions on crude production. (Iranian productive capacity was expected to begin declining in the early 1980s for geologic reasons, independent of political decisions.) The dotted line is also indicative of a Saudi political and technical decision to reduce production. The Saudi government reduced by 25 percent ARAMCO's plan to expand production to 16 mbd by 1983. Current target is 12 mbd by 1986, and the rationale, according to the Saudi authorities, is that the figure of 12 mbd in the mid-1980s will keep the world oil market in balance at constant or slowly rising real prices.¹⁸ IS A series of technical, financial, and political factors, explained in a recent staff report to the Senate Subcommittee on International Economic Policy,¹⁹ could keep Saudi production at the current range of 8-10 mbd for years.

For all practical purposes, the majority of the petroleum requirements of the U.S. that cannot be met by domestic production may be available, if at all, only from a few primary sources. And these producers view U.S. requirements as only one of an extended series of complex and uncertain factors in the political process.

At best, the world's finite and dwindling petroleum resources may be considered as swing fuels, simply buying time to seek economically acceptable alternatives. Eventually, as fossil fuels become unacceptably expensive for energy production, renewable energy sources will predominate. Fossil fuels will then be available only for unique functions and raw materials.

Alternatives

The United States is blessed with a series of potential alternatives to imported petroleum. These alternatives could provide both the liquid fuels, for which our systems are designed and to which we have accustomed ourselves, and for energy sources which could provide heat and electricity thereby freeing petroleum for petrochemical feedstocks and essential mobility fuels. Once again, though, a number of uncertainties--price and availability of petroleum and natural gas, water requirements, environmental impact, social dislocation, vested interests, and public and bureaucratic inertia--combine to recertify the old caveat: There is no free lunch.

Coal dominated U.S. energy production until World War II and today constitutes a majority of U. S. fossil fuel reserves. Commercial processes of varying efficiency now exist that convert coal to liquid or gaseous forms. Coal production compared to other fuels has been disproportionately slow in increasing, and these rises represent no real increase in the coal share of the energy market.²⁰ Increasing this share may be limited by various constraints: environmental, direct economic (demand, capital investment, transportation), and even technical; however, there are no reserve constraints. Known coal reserves are more than adequate for any likely degree of exploitation into the next century.²¹

A conscious political decision to substitute coal for oil in many sectors would seem to be a mandatory first step in the transition from oil. Federal incentives to support that decision would accelerate the process and continue an established precedent.²²

A brief glance at eastern versus western coal supplies will serve to highlight a few of the technical and economic considerations influencing coal production. Only one-third of U.S. coal reserves, mainly western, are accessible to surface mining. Stripping, a relatively economical procedure, poses environmental problems. Western coal typically contains less energy (Btu) per ton than eastern or Appalachian coal. It is, however, low in sulfur, an environmental plus. Water, always an issue in the semiarid Southwest, is necessary for both production and land reclamation following strip mining and could be the deciding factor.²³ Technology can probably be relied on to provide a solution to ease the water, transportation, and energy transfer problem.²⁴

U. S. proven resources of coal, 178,600 million metric tons,²⁵ have the thermal equivalent of nearly 800 billion barrels of oil--considerably more than current world reserves. This is more than enough to resolve our energy problem, but it took half a century to switch from coal to oil. Even the optimists do not give us until A.D. 2030 to change back to coal.

Of U.S. oil shale deposits (with an estimated 2000 billion barrels of trapped oil) some 6 percent, or 120 billion barrels, are considered commercially attractive.²⁶ This 6 percent is three times this country's current proven and probable petroleum reserves. Shale deposits around the world have been used for smallscale energy production (burning) for more than a century.²⁷

U.S. government and private efforts to extract oil from shale have run an intermittent course since 1948, with several major problems consistently blocking attempts at commercial feasibility. Waste management, the disposal of enormous quantities of spent shale with its associated alkaline and (possibly) carcinogenic materials, and water for processing and environmental restoration

lead the list of difficulties. Unfortunately, it is the water-scarce tri-border region of Utah, Wyoming, and Colorado that contains the richest and most promising shale oil reserves. Recent advances in modified in situ techniques of oil recovery hold promise for reducing problems in both waste management and water use. Surface waste disposal problems and materials handling are reduced by 85 percent, and the threat of leaching is appreciably reduced since surface waste materials are basic unprocessed shale.²⁸

One would anticipate a reduction in water supply/disposal problems since water-oil ratios of 1.5: 1 for conventional processing would be appreciably reduced by modified in situ production.²⁹ Threats to aquifers and surface water should also be reduced. Impressive as these improvements in shale oil production promise to be, large-scale commercial operations would still leave millions of tons of rubble to challenge the resourcefulness of the industry and en flame the environmentalists.

The prospect of rapidly rising costs for imported oil may make commercial extraction from shale feasible in the near future. However, since actual production costs for the OPEC exporters are a small fraction of the market price of oil, they are in a position to adjust crude costs to keep shale oil economically unattractive. From a national security point of view, the difference in shale and imported oil costs might have to be paid as the price for lowering dependence and switching to other energy sources.

Coal and shale oils offer the major alternatives to a petroleum economy during the transition period and into the indefinite future. U. S. tar sand deposits are small and not considered commercially exploitable, although Canadian deposits may eventually influence the U.S. economy. Energy sources, such as nuclear, and the less conventional solar resources (including hydro, wind, photovoltaics, bioconversion), and even geothermal are essential since they can replace petroleum in nonunique applications, e.g., heating and electrical power generation. Some are already available as supplementary mobility fuels. Gasohol, institutionalized in Brazil and now appearing in the United States, is an excellent example of bioconversion adapted for use in internal combustion engines.

Nuclear power production has grown steadily during the past three decades, though it has not lived up to its advanced billing. Mid-'60s estimates for U.S. nuclear power capacity in 1980 average 150 gigawatts (Gwe), the energy equivalent of more than 4 million barrels of oil per day. Actual production in 1977 was 46.2 Gwe, or about 12 percent of U.S. electrical generation. As with other energy supply/demand forecasts, estimates produced since 1974 show more modest increases in future demand. (See Table V.)

Table V. U.S. nuclear electric capacity (Gwe)

Franssen's comprehensive study of world and U.S. energy projections lists some principal reasons for the lower estimates since 1975:

-Lower estimates of load requirements,
-Escalation of capital costs,
-Speed at which additional units can be licensed,
-Opposition by interest groups? especially environmentalists, and
-Opposition by state governments to plant siting and waste management.³⁰

The 1980 forecast of 65.5 Gwe should be very close to actual capacity since these facilities are on-line or will be completed soon. (The Three Mile Island accident and the shutdown of five East Coast plants in early 1979 are not reflected in any of these figures.)

Emotion-charged public debates may be expected to continue on the issue of nuclear power. Improved safety procedures and systems will be a positive result balanced by increased costs to institute and maintain them. Increasing cost and scarcity of nuclear fuels are also major economic factors in the equation. Efforts to control fuel costs by reprocessing spent fuel and via breeder reactors are currently stalled by unresolved technical and political questions. Nuclear power will probably continue to grow since alternate forms of energy production, at least in the foreseeable future, also pose serious environmental and cost problems of their own.

Furthermore, countries less blessed with alternatives to petroleum and natural gas may view dependence on nuclear power as their only hope. The U.S. might find that international pressures to maintain an active nuclear program could have a major input on domestic programs. Our economic and military ties force us to be sensitive to allies' energy problems and see them as influencing our security. Within our capacity we must see them as our own. Added to this are the pressures of a nonproliferation policy that virtually assures our role, willingly or otherwise, as a major nuclear functionary.

Fusion power may seem such a shining hope simply because of its distance from present or known realities. Steady progress has been made on high-energy inputs to initiate the fusion process and on containment of the reaction, yet commercial demonstrations are not likely in the short- to medium-term. Its promise as a clean, nonpolluting, and virtually infinite source of power will, it is hoped, be fulfilled. At best, its real potential will probably not be realized until the twentyfirst century.

About 14 percent of the U.S. electrical energy demand is met by hydropower, mainly from the Pacific Northwest. Lack of suitable sites and environmental issues, not the least of which are aesthetic, will more than likely minimize large-scale hydro (and geothermal) expansion. Hydro increases in the near term will come mainly from increased generator efficiency and capacity at present sites. Current hydro input, about 1.5 mbdoe, is not projected to increase more than 30 percent by the year 2000. The concept of dispersed, small-scale energy technologies (so-called low-head hydro turbines), reminiscent of New England's mill wheels, is an approach that seems to be gaining popularity. These systems, however, would contribute little to the national energy position by the year 2000, yet could potentially become an efficient supplement to irreplaceable fuels in many locations.

Solar sources are extremely promising in the long term. The solar source may be harnessed directly for thermal processes (heating/cooling) or indirectly for production of electricity (wind, photovoltaics). The processes could be small and dispersed or even centralized in large space platforms, with energy channeled to earth via microwaves or lasers. Devices in several categories, for example thermal transfer and photovoltaic electrical generation, are already edging toward broader commercial acceptance. There are still unresolved technical/cost problems to overcome prior to large-scale introduction.

Here, again, uncertainties plague projections. A figure of 1.5-3.0 mbdoe by the mid-late 1980s³¹ seems realistic, and that includes hydroelectric generation. Mainline (oil, gas, coal, nuclear) energy producers' fuel costs are highly unstable, thereby making estimates of competitive solar technology that much less predictable. Photovoltaic costs per watt are decreasing though other basic costs for labor and materials are increasing, further compounding the problems of true cost estimation. Also, backup and energy storage systems will be required for most solar schemes, thereby further obscuring true or comparative costs.

As the solar constituency in this country develops political visibility, further subsidies, direct (such as now written into our tax laws) and indirect (for example, space technology), will more than likely increase. The promise of efficient, renewable energy resources certainly warrants continuation of the established precedent that has provided over $200 billion in federal incentives for energy production, as shown in Table VI.³² There is little doubt that solar energy application is an idea whose time has come.

Table VI. Estimated cost incentives to
stimulate energy production, 1918-77

The implications of conservation, though not technically an alternative energy source, are self-evident. This is especially true given the quantities and efficiency of energy use in the United States today. Roughly half of the energy generated in the United States provides no useful work, and in fact increases thermal pollution. The most flagrantly inefficient consumer of energy resources was, and still is, the transportation sector. Approximately 75 percent of the petroleum devoted to transportation provides no useful work, and 27 percent of all U.S. energy is consumed by transportation. Half of this, about five million barrels per day, is consumed by automobiles. Opportunities for conservation in other sectors are not so dramatic, but these are definitely valid opportunities for stretching overall resources.³³

Conservation, in effect, provides increased energy supplies and, like other sources, is not without problems of its own. In addition to requirements for capital investments, government must walk a narrow line between reducing demand by increased efficiencies and simply depressing economic activities. Consumption is reduced by both, but many undesirable effects accrue to the latter.

Continued government incentives, such as the current tax relief for investment in insulation, encourage conservation with less impact on economic activity. European practices and technology, such as cogeneration, offer further opportunities to reduce the energy-to-output ratio of our industries. Potentially traumatic changes in traditional life-styles and expectations hold many unanswered questions for the political fabric of our society. An important element in our ability to control these stresses shifts from domestic to foreign political figures as our dependence on imported oil increases.

Energy and the Military

It is this diminishing control over the most basic ingredient in the U. S. economy that could conceivably result in extensive demands on the military element of our national power. Yet here, again, is another dilemma. The armed forces, especially the Air Force and Navy, are more reliant on petroleum derivatives than almost any element of our society and therefore highly vulnerable to shortfalls. Ironically, that element of our national power which may be called on to ensure energy security for the U.S. or its allies could be severely constrained by a lack of energy, specifically mobility fuels--virtually all derived from petroleum.

I suggest it is not only the abrupt cutoff of OPEC crude that poses the greatest threat to the military element but also the steady increase in price and potentially misdirected efforts at economy. Those in the military are quite familiar with the emphasis on "doing more with less." This emphasis on improved management has introduced changes and in many instances clearly forced efficiencies where few existed before. However, under peacetime conditions, as price and shortage pressures increase, there is the temptation to reduce flying hours and steaming days beyond an as yet undetermined point where combat capability is curtailed. Reductions affect not only the combat skills of the operational crews but the supply and maintenance systems that support them. Without flexibility in these vital systems, combat effectiveness is drastically reduced. These pressures can be expected to increase. "Simulation" and "more efficient use of currently allocated resources," both excellent approaches to the problem, must be carefully and realistically applied and evaluated lest dedicated (and anxious to succeed) decision-makers (at any level) accept degraded combat capabilities. Most commanders are familiar with the pressures implied by this situation.

In an abrupt, cutoff scenario, there is little doubt that petroleum would be allocated from domestic sources to meet the military's needs. It is under a less traumatic scenario, such as we face today with the fuel price/availability squeeze, that the services are most susceptible to petroleum anemia. The military, dependent on petroleum-type mobility fuels through the rest of this century, faces possibly debilitating pressures. They are dependent on the policy action of civilian agencies to provide alternative fuels, and there has already been criticism of the lack of national defense consideration in planning and policymaking.³⁴

The impact of DOD energy requirements may seem deceptively small since peacetime demands draw only 2-3 percent of the nation's energy. A more realistic appraisal would consider defense-related industries consuming an equal amount and DOD demands tripling under emergency conditions, with some 90 percent of the military's demands specifically for petroleum-based mobility fuels. The Department of Defense is already the largest single energy consumer in the United States.³⁵

A shutoff of overseas sources would make critical demands on our allocation and distribution systems. Nearly one quarter of DOD's petroleum supplies (almost 39 million barrels per year) is purchased overseas, and half of this is jet fuel.³⁶ An emergency means not only deriving fuels from domestic sources but transporting them to overseas locations. Under a minimum-import emergency condition, Air Force aviation fuel requirements alone could require access to nearly 22 percent of all U. S. domestic crude production.³⁷

The impact of 1979's crude shortages and unexpected price increases on the international market will undoubtedly put pressure on domestic allocations. Every cent-a-gallon increase in aviation fuel adds $36 million to the U.S. Air Force fuel budget--the approximate flyaway cost of five F -16 fighters. It is not difficult to understand the pressures that can be anticipated to cut beyond "fat" and into the operational readiness of our armed forces.

A report prepared for the House Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization illustrated the potentially decisive role petroleum plays in our defense posture, as seen in Table VII. A conclusion of that report commented: ". . . augmented domestic oil production, limited as it may be by geologic realities, and supplementary mobility fuels from alternative sources, are now critical in terms of national defense. "³⁸

Table VII. Percentiles of the energy budget by war categoreis

Source: Ohio State University Energy and National Security Project, National Security, Mobility
Fuels, and the Defense Production Act, March 9, 1979, p. 22

In late 1978 a recommendation within the Department of Defense called for development of a comprehensive Defense Mobility Fuels Action Plan. It emphasized the following:³⁹

-DOD/DOE cooperation to meet defense mobility fuel requirements through commercial development of synthetic fuel.

-Technical and operational plans required for a post-1985 transition to synthetic fuels. This includes ensuring that DOD's systems are capable of using both synthetic and conventional fuels.⁴⁰

-Developing the industrial base to implement capability to use synthetic fuels.

The Army, Navy, and Air Force are currently developing a capability to use synthetic fuels in their respective systems.⁴¹

It is the Department of Energy that must face the major issue, and that is developing programs and incentive proposals to ensure that commercial quantities of synthetic fuels are available to DOD (and other) customers. The United States cannot afford to allow the lack of a single, clearly superior alternative to continually delay efforts to ensure secure supplies of mobility fuels for defense. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology, in supporting a careful assessment of available options, warned that ". . . in our pursuit of careful studies and objective assessments we must not, by virtue of our failure to take decisive actions, foreclose on our ability to protect our national security."⁴²

FROM the foregoing, one could conclude that there are no shortages of potential energy resources. There does seem to be a shortage of certainties or political decisions on which paths to follow to reduce our present vulnerability to external economic or political decisions inimical to our interests . . . and a shortage of time in which to do it. The lead time required to implement our decisions has already reached the point where U. S. energy vulnerability will continue increasing for years before the process can be reversed. The lack of one, or even a few, clearly superior alternatives seems to have hamstrung our ability to act decisively on one of the most serious problems of our time. The uncertain-

ties within the question and the multiplicity of partially effective answers have frustrated decision-makers and the populace and eluded America's traditional penchant for identifying a problem, channeling resources toward its resolution, and solving it in a short period of time. To a degree, this ambiguity and resultant frustration may explain why the public and the bureaucracy have avoided the issue to the point where now it may well become "critical before we know it is serious." There seems to be no comfort for the American technological "quick-fix" approach in problems of this nature.

In summary, it appears that relief will come only through a broad series of technical and political advances that include incentives, conservation, and multiple alternate energy sources. The question is, when will decisions be made that will reverse the trend, and what stresses, domestic and international, will this nation be subjected to in the interim?

There is no shortage of energy "bottles" that will offer relief from our present, increasingly precarious position. There is, however, an acute shortage of willingness, or ability, to make decisions on one of the most critical issues of our time. There is one certainty--delaying that decision brings us that much closer to high noon.

Notes

1. U.S., Congress, House, The National Energy Plan Options under Assumptions of National Security Threat, Hearings before the Ad Hoc Committee on Energy, U.S House of Representatives, 95th Congress, 1st session, on the National Energy Act of 4 May 1977, 95th Congress, 1st session, April 1978, p 28.

2. Carroll L Wilson, Energy Global Prospects 1985-2000 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977), p. 16 Wilson is Project Director, Workshop on Alternative Energy Strategies.

3. Albert A. Bartlett, "Forgotten Fundamentals of the Energy Crisis," American Journal of Physics, September 1978, pp. 877-78.

4. Executive Office of the President, Energy Policy and Planning, The National Energy Plan, April 1977 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. vii.

5. For example, cost incentives to stimulate oil production in the United States have been estimated at over $1 billion. Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, An Analysis of Federal Incentives to Stimulate Energy Production, Executive Summary, December 1978, p. 7.

6. Executive Office of the President, The National Energy Plan, April 1977, p. 3.

7. Ibid., p. ix.

8. Howard Bucknell Ill, Robert Bailey, Norman Rask, National Security, Mobility Fuels, and the Defense Production Act, Report for the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization of the House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, Congress of the United States, 9 March 1979, p. 8.

9. Exxon Company, Energy Outlook 1978-1990 (Houston: Public Affairs Department, May 1978), p. 4.

10. CIA Report, Handbook of Economic Statistics 1978, ER 78-10365, October 1978.

11. Simply stated, the effect of the zeitgeist is for forecasters to project future energy requirements higher when the analysis takes place during a boom and vice versa. Dr. Herman T. Franssen has written a report analyzing the major national and international forecasts of energy supply and demand. U.S., Congress, Senate, Energy: An Uncertain Future, prepared at the request of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, Publication No. 95-157 (Washington: Government Printing Office, December 1978), pp. 5-6.

12. Ibid., pp. 17,18.

13. CIA Report, International Energy Statistical Review, ER I CSR 79003, 7 March 1979.

14. "Mexico's Reluctant Oil Boom," Business Week, January 15, 1979, p. 64.

15. "New Japanese-Mexican Oil Deal Almost Certain," Energy Daily, January 16, 1979, p. 3.

16. John Dillin, "Natural Gas: U.S.-Mexican Impasse," Christian Science Monitor, January 10, 1979, p. I.

17. CIA Report, The International Energy Situation: Outlook to 1985, ER 77-10240 U, April 1977, pp. 2, 18.

18. Ted H. Moran, "OPEC and the World Oil Market," Resources for the Future, January-March 1979, p. 7.

19. U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Future of Saudi Arabian Oil Production, Staff Report to the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy, 96th Congress, 1st session, April 1979.

20. Executive Office of the President, The National Energy Plan, April 1977, p. 63.

21. Edward D. Griffith and Alan W. Clarke, "World Coal Production," Scientific American, January 1979, p. 40.

22. The coal industry has received approximately 4.5 percent of the total federal energy incentive package, some $9.71 billion. This compared with the oil industry's $101.3 billion, or 47 percent of the incentive package. Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories, An Analysis of Federal Incentives to Stimulate Energy Production, Executive Summary, December 1978, p. 7.

23. Griffith and Clarke, p. 43.

24. A consortium of "powerful financiers and former government officials" has proposed converting low-sulfur western coal into methanol (alcohol) and using this as the medium for a coal slurry. See "A Coal Slurry Idea May Save Water," Business Week, January 15, 1979, p. 39.

25. CIA Report, Handbook of Economic Statistics 1978, p. 84.

26. Wilson, p. 220.

27. Oil shale was mined in Scotland from 1860 to the mid-1900s; Estonia mines 25 million tons a year, half of which is burned at the mine to produce electricity. William D. Metz, "Oil Shale: A Huge Resource of Low-Grade Fuel," in "Energy: Use, Conservation and Supply," Science compendium, Philip H. Abelson, ed. (1974), p. 70.

28. Bucknell et al., p. A-6.

29. Wilson, p, 220.

30. Franssen, p. 35.

31. Ibid.

32. See Battelle Laboratories, An Analysis of Federal Incentives to Stimulate Energy Production, p. 7.

33. U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration, Energy Flow Patterns for 1975, R B. Kidman, RJ. Barrett, D. R Koenig, Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories (Washington: Government Printing Office, June 1977), p. 72.

34. William D. Wiard, Energy Section, Systems Acquisition Strategy Study, Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland: Hq Air Force Systems Command, October 1977.

35. Ruth M. Davis, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Advanced Technology, Defense Mobility Fuels, Statement before the Subcommittee on Economic Stabilization, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 96th Congress, 1st session, March 13, 1979.

36. U.S., Congress, House, The National Energy Plan: Options under Assumptions of National Security Threat, A report for use by the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Congress, 2d session, April 1978, p. 43.

37. In 1977,U.S.primarycrudeproductionwas8.18mbd (CIA lnternational Energy Statistical Review, March 1979); USAF aviation fuel consumption during the same period, 238,356 bbl/day (USAF Summary, March 1979); USAF consumption x 3 (wartime conditions) equals 715,068 bbl/day. Since approximately 40 percent of each barrel of crude yields aviation fuel, 715,068+.40 = 1,787,670 barrels per day, or 21.9 percent of the total 8.18 mbd. Adding the Navy's aviation fuel requirements brings this to 30 percent. Of course, the remaining products, 60 percent of each barrel, would be available for other purposes. Reduced domestic production in the future would mean a proportional increase in the percentage of crude required.

38. Bucknell et al., p. 23.

39. Davis, pp. 6, 7.

40. To date, coal-based synthetic fuels require efforts to improve low-hydrogen characteristics. Problems include smoke, combuster liner temperatures, infrared signature, and poor thermal stability. (William L. Stanley, "Future Sources of Military Jet Fuels," Rand Corporation P-6099, May 1978, p. 6.) Shale synthetic fuel meets most current standards, but has been high in particulate matter and gum and shows poor storage and thermal stability characteristics. (Gebman et al., "The Potential Role of Technological Modifications and Alternative Fuels in Alleviating Air Force Energy Problems," Rand Corporation R-1829-PR, December 1976, p. 51.) These problems can be overcome with current technology and further development.

41. See the Army, Navy, and Air Force Energy Plans for a detailed outline of service plans/programs on all aspects of energy management. Army Energy Plan (24 February 1978) prepared by Unified Industries, Inc., Alexandria, Virginia. Navy Energy Plan (OPNAV Document No. 41P4, 27 July 1978) and Air Force Energy Plan July 1978), both prepared by Tetra Tech., Inc., Arlington, Virginia.

42. Davis, p. 9. Emphasis added.

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph A. Breen (M.A., State University of New York) is an international politico-military affairs officer with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has served as a fighter pilot, high-altitude reconnaissance pilot, advisor to the Vietnamese air Force, commander of a kC-135 squadron, as an attaché with the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, and he was a research associate at the Mershon Center for National Security Policy Studies at Ohio State University. Colonel Breen is a graduate of Armed Forces Staff College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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