Air University Review, May-June
1980
In our November-December 1979 issue, Group Captain Ian Madelin, RAF, argued that there are inherent limitations in the theory and practice of close air support (CAS), which make it a poor choice for the application of tactical air power in support of the land battle.
His analysis of close air support--defined as "air attacks, requested by the ground commander, against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which need the detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces"* --pointed out a number of problems:
*A paraphrase of definitions in TACM 2-1, ATP 33, and AAFCE Manual 802.
--CAS is essentially reactive in nature, making assignment of target priorities in line with the true priorities of the battle difficult.
--There will be inevitable delay between initiation of the CAS request and the arrival of aircraft in the target area.
--Targets in the battlefield area are generally small, hard, probably camouflaged, and quite likely to be moving. As a result, they will be difficult to see from the attacking aircraft, a difficulty further aggravated by the need to fly low and fast to avoid enemy ground-based air defenses. Low air/ground weapon accuracy against single, hard, point targets will further reduce effectiveness.
--The usual solution to these problems, the use of a forward air controller (FAC), requires a cumbersome and probably unreliable communications network which will be vulnerable to jamming.
--The ground commander requesting CAS must terminate his organic supporting fires, at least for a time, to enable CAS aircraft to get safely in and out.
--CAS places friendly air assets in jeopardy to friendly ground-based antiair systems.
--All of these effects are likely to be cumulative.
By contrast, committing our air assets against other battlefield targets in the enemy's rear is not reactive in nature. Rather it permits proper assignment of target priorities:
--concentrates air assets on the targets against which they are most effective;
--simplifies target identification--everything is fair game beyond an easily established geographic limit;
--minimizes the effectiveness of the enemy's antiair defensive effort; and, finally,
--permits friendly aircraft to cross the front lines at places of our own choosing, thus allowing friendly groundbased antiair defenses a free hand to deal with enemy aircraft in the battle zone.
Group Captain Madelin's analysis was framed in terms of the cautionary children's tale, "The Emperor's New Clothes," by Hans Christian Andersen, in which the emperor is promised fine, new garments and pays handsomely for them. The deceitful tailors, unable to deliver the desired garments, convinced the unfortunate emperor that he is wearing the new clothes when in reality he is nude. None in the crowd admits that he cannot see the fine garments that, of course, do not exist. Only one little child cries out: "Why he has nothing at all on!"
The Editor
I found Group Captain Madelin’s analysis of close air support (CAS) well reasoned and internally consistent. The close air support/interdiction debate will probably go on forever as each proponent defines and redefines his assumptions and objectives. My thoughts on the subject can best be introduced by: Why must there be an a priori answer to the question of close air support versus interdiction? I think that Group Captain Madelin’s article suffers the intellectual fallacy of the false alternative.
Let us start by presuming that "there is a war on." (p. 83) Let us continue and say that the war is a NATO-Warsaw Pact war in Central Europe. Is it too unreasonable to presume also that NATO may experience an enemy breakthrough? (p. 86) The author recognizes that there will be exceptions to the general rule that battlefield interdiction is preferable to CAS. (p. 86) If there is a breakthrough, I feel confident that both major ground and air commanders will be interested in doing everything they can to contain and, hopefully, defeat the breakthrough force. I expect that even Group Captain Madelin would agree that CAS is appropriate. Perhaps not, but I certainly believe it would be appropriate and demanded by the major ground commanders.
Thus, if there is only one breakthrough, I suppose the Group Captain's thesis is still intact because we still have CAS as an exception to the rule. But suppose there is more than one breakthrough? With the NATO-Warsaw Pact force balance that we all know only too well, how many breakthroughs are likely to occur? None, one, several, or many?
Suppose that close air support is provided to a local unit that has hitherto conducted a successful defense, but now the Soviet second echelon forces are closing on that unit. It seems to me that both air and ground commanders are going to be overwhelmed with targets and demands for attack resources. The real problem in the real war will be the real-time allocation and apportionment of resources to where the highest priority demand is. Some of those demands will be for CAS. We had better be able to respond to it and do it well.
AND, finally, a different thought. The pessimistic scenario that Group Captain Madelin develops is probably appropriate for the first day of such a war. The enemy will have all his fighters, warfare capability, and antiaircraft defenses, etc. But what about the second, third, or thirty-third day of the war?
I find it interesting that almost all debates about strategy and tactics presume the war will be fought in extenso the same way as on the first day. My guess is that one's view of the viability of CAS will be different on the tenth day of the war as compared to the first day.
Major General John E. Ralph
(USMA; M.P.A., Princeton University) is Commandant. Industrial College of the Armed Forces."[The subject of close air support] can evoke more emotion (from soldiers and airmen alike) than most other subjects. . . .Your article is very well done and should be read by people in a number of air forces (and armies). . . ."
Rear Admiral Edward F. Welch, Jr.,
USN, is President of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.Should we tell the emperor that his magnificent clothes exist only in his own eyes, that the close air support (CAS) which he relies on will probably not be there when he wants it, that the aircraft will be of only marginal value if they do arrive? I suspect we should. But Group Captain Ian Madelin, RAF, has confused the issue with a flawed scenario and has been driven precisely to the wrong conclusions and recommendations.
the scenario
The battle scenario pits two fighter aircraft against a single moving, camouflaged enemy tank on a sophisticated battlefield bristling with electronic warfare and air defense weapon systems. The enemy has adopted a tactic of not massing his forces for an attack if he is in contact. Our side possesses such an inept air defense system that it destroys more friendly aircraft than enemy. Our ground commanders request close air support simply because it is "available," understand neither the characteristics of their supporting arms nor the principles of weapons employment, and are unable to prioritize the targets in their own sectors. Our fighter pilots arrive on the scene after a ninety-minute delay, during which time the sector commander has ceased all supporting arms fire. They then attempt to destroy the tank with the worst possible aircraft weapons--rockets. Waiting to be destroyed just beyond the battlefield is a vast array of uncamouflaged, lightly defended, and immobile targets--railheads, ammunition storage sites, headquarters, roads, bridges, etc. The author concludes that it is better to use air power to attack the rear area targets than the battlefield targets.
He concedes that there are a few situations that he views as atypical in which aircraft might properly be employed in a CAS role, namely in support of "particular ground units lacking their own combat support firepower" and in the case of an "enemy breakthrough in a weakly defended front." To support our disagreement with him, some background is needed.
Offensive combat principles.
A commander planning offensive operations chooses the time and place of the attack. To ensure success he employs his forces so that he will have a greatly superior force compared to the defender (a ratio of from 3 to 1 to 6 to 1 is commonly sought). To do this, at some time he must concentrate (mass) his forces for the attack. Thus, by design, every offensive action consists of a situation in which the attacker possesses the strong force and the defender, the weak, at the point of the attack. We must assume from the scenario's large number of headquarters and support facilities and from the density of his air defense weapons, that the enemy is capable of mounting more than a one-tank assault. Thus, our fighters' targets in the scenario should be a battalion or regiment of tanks, not just one. When the enemy is conducting division-sized mechanized or armed attacks, our pilots' identification and location problems are greatly simplified. A commander who does not mass his forces for an attack is employing tactics unknown to our enemies (or to our friends).Defensive combat principles
. A commander planning a defensive operation must distribute his forces so that the attacker cannot achieve a sufficient force superiority to succeed in an attack. Unless the defender possesses an overwhelming superiority of troops and weapons, he cannot employ the forces he has along a very long front in static defense and expect to deter or defeat an attacker. His defensive strategy, then, must consist of mobile defensive units moved to counter any enemy concentration plus a means of concentrating his own firepower at the point of the attack. That is, weapons located at positions other than the point of attack must be brought to bear on the threatened areas. Given an adequate command and control system, all weapons in range can be directed to targets along the attack axis. Highly mobile weapons may be moved into range. The weapon with the most range and the highest degree of mobility is the aircraft. Hence it is relied on as a supporting arm in almost every conceivable situation in which the enemy elects to attack.In the typical case, the defender will require immediate reinforcement in terms of both additional combat forces and fire support. Group Captain Madelin's question "If the FAC is in a position to fire smoke or a laser at a target and hit it, why does he . . . [not destroy it with his own weapons]?" misses the point. His advice to "in principle, rely on the Army's integral weapons for the contact battle" belabors the obvious. In fact, these integral weapons will normally be inadequate to the task if the enemy behaves rationally and in accordance with his own doctrine, i.e., if he attains massive force superiority at selected points before commencing the offensive.
As long as the West continues to field high technology, low manpower intensive forces, as politically and demographically it must, it will be necessary to provide fire support from every conceivable source, including aircraft. Seen in this regard, it is our battalions rather than our aircraft that must be regarded as the "precious" asset. In relative terms, we are stronger in aircraft than we are in tanks, artillery, and infantry.
Weapon selection. The author has ignored his own advice in weapons selection and chosen an unsuitable weapon with which to attack the tank in his scenario. He makes much of the low kill probability of the aircraft rocket and lauds the ability of modern antitank weapons used by ground forces. A fairer evaluation might be to compare the rocket to 105-mm artillery. To give the ground commander the latest in missile technology and restrict the aircraft to World War II type weapons makes a very poor case against close air support.
In discussing capabilities and limitations of various fire support systems, three of the aircraft's most significant advantages are ignored--the ability to attack moving targets, the ability to attack targets the ground commander cannot see, * and the ability to deliver large tonnages of munitions. These factors are compelling reasons for CAS.
A forward air controller does not have to control every CAS mission; and, when he does, it is not necessary that he see the target. Consider the case of using aircraft against retreating forces or against counterattacking forces after a breakthrough.
Fire support coordination
. Two years ago, the U.S. Army and Air Force agreed to procedures that permit artillery fire to continue while waiting for the arrival of aircraft. Indeed, artillery is considered essential for the suppression of air defense weapons immediately prior to the air attack. Artillery fires are checked for only three minutes and then only those directed at the same target that the aircraft is attacking. The ninety-minute delay waiting for aircraft in the scenario is believable, but to stop all fire support during this time is unrealistic and contrary to U.S. doctrine.My own experience with ground combat commanders has left me with a very high opinion of their ability to coordinate Supporting arms fires. They have invariably been expert at weapons selection and usually knew more about aircraft capabilities and limitations than the aviators sent to advise them in this matter. They certainly employed their own supporting arms before calling for air, did a fair job of "prioritizing the targets in their own sector," and to my knowledge never called for air support just because it was available.
the efficiency fallacy
By choosing an insignificant target and attacking it with the wrong aircraft weapon, and by attributing unrealistic tactics to the enemy and incompetence to the friendly commander, the author concludes that when CAS is requested "we have to accept that the chance of a successful outcome is slim, the loss rate could be high, the resources we have invested considerable, and the exchange rate exorbitant." Under those conditions, indeed we do. But if the war situation requires aircraft delivered fire support in the battle area for success, then we must develop procedures, tactics, and forces to provide it. This may require a better air defense control system, better trained ground commanders, or new CAS command and control procedures. To demonstrate that it is easier or more efficient to do something else with available aircraft is to ignore the problem.
The efficiency fallacy which underlies the author's assertion quoted above has bedeviled combined operations throughout the history of warfare. Proponents of each new weapon system, be it the horse-mounted warrior, artillery, tanks, or aircraft, quickly develop rules and standards that govern the way in which the new weapon system is used. Thus, we aviators tend to measure our success in terms of efficient operation. We attempt to quantity the measure of our success by maximizing the havoc wreaked on the enemy (number of roads cut, bridge spans dropped, tanks killed, secondary explosions observed, etc.) and by minimizing our losses. In our calculations, the targets destroyed are not valued in terms of either time (of destruction) or position (in relation to the battle). Unfortunately, we have been unable to find an adversary who will agree to surrender when we achieve superior exchange ratios. If CAS is required to win, then arguments that interdiction is a more efficient utilization of aircraft are irrelevant. Efficient utilization of a weapon system is not a legitimate ultimate combat goal.
This is not to deny the utility of air attacks on rear area targets. They are often as Group Captain Madelin argues, of greater value than close air support. Allocation of air assets to these two tasks is the job of the commander (not the air support operations center/ASOC) who must make the allocation decision on a daily basis. A commander confronted with the author's scenario certainly should direct his air component commander to go after the rear area targets. It is my contention, however, that the Madelin scenario represents the atypical case.
command and control
If the requirement for CAS developed earlier is valid, then Group Captain Madelin's indictment of the CAS command and control system as an "incredibly cumbersome set of procedures" that generate ninety-minute delays is a subject of great concern, both to those who may need CAS and those who will have to provide it. Here his criticism is exactly on target. The unresponsiveness of our command and control system is reason enough to tell the emperor that he has no clothes. Fortunately, these procedures are not part of the order of the universe and are based on no inherent physical characteristic of the CAS weapon system.
Defensive orientation
. The orientation of both the providers and the users of our CAS system is predominantly defensive: "Air will pull you through when everything else fails." We have, perhaps subconsciously, supported this defensive orientation by devising a command and control system that fits it perfectly. It responds fairly well to a call for help; it is nearly incapable of providing flexible, phase-line by phase-line, objective by objective air support of offensive operations.Note how the Madelin article assumes the defensive: ". . . our own troops, being in the defense, will have the benefit of better concealment. . . ." And, close air support would be appropriate in the case of ". . . an enemy breakthrough in a weakly defended front. . . ." (p. 86) As late as 1968, U.S. Marines in Vietnam used a CAS request precedence system based entirely on the degree to which the requesting unit was being clobbered: Emergency precedence--unit being overrun, priority--unit will be overrun if CAS does not come, and routine--all other requests. The only way to request CAS for offensive operations was "routine," which meant the mission would probably not be scheduled. Routine interdiction missions were seen as more productive.
As useful as CAS may be to save a unit, it is also essential that a method of integrating air power into the ground commander's scheme of maneuver be developed. The same force superiority requirements for successful offensive operations apply to us as to potential adversaries. One method of concentrating force for offensive operations is through air power. For numerically inferior forces, as ours are likely to be, close air support may be the only way to achieve the force superiority required to conduct offensive operations. Offensive CAS has been neglected in the past largely because of the reluctance of air commanders to commit aircraft to a specific unit's operation in advance. Group Captain Madelin expresses this situation accurately from the ground commander's viewpoint: He ". . . cannot count on his request being granted." Because the ground commander typically cannot get a specific commitment from air, he cannot plan his scheme of maneuver around air strikes as he can around other supporting arms fire. He can count on, perhaps, a preattack bombardment. But he must restrict his air planning to incidental targets which, if not engaged, will not dramatically affect the outcome of his offensive. Often his scheme of maneuver will be quite different from what he would choose if air support could reasonably be expected.
Assigning aircraft in direct support of a unit in advance of an operation would provide reasonable assurance not only that aircraft will be available, but that the aircrews will be aware of the tactical situation, that the aircraft will be loaded with proper weapons, and that the offensive schedule of operations can be modified without "losing" the aircraft to other missions when the ASOC diverts them in the name of efficiency. (Of course, direct support aircraft, like artillery, can be reassigned by higher authority, but the decision to do so is a tactical one, driven by the battle situation, rather than an administrative one, designed to make the most efficient use of the aircraft.)
Examination of the literature available shows a noticeable lack of concern for CAS in offensive operations except for some significant work in connection with amphibious assaults and some old material on armored offensives. The use of CAS in the pursuit-by-fire phase of an offensive is rarely considered. Its potential here is very great as artillery has inherent limitations against moving targets, especially when they are beyond the forward observer's view.
Delays and jamming
. In the last decade, the introduction of vertical and/or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) attack aircraft (attack helicopters, Harriers, and A-l Os) has made it possible to eliminate many of the delays and even more of the command and control difficulties that are so vividly described in the Madelin scenario. With the aircraft physically located at operational field headquarters, the great difficulty in getting the tactical air request through to the aircraft operator in the face of enemy electronic warfare is partially overcome. If the aircraft are assigned in direct support, requesting air support is no more difficult than requesting artillery support. Requests can be transmitted by wire or even by runner, if they do not originate in the field headquarters itself. Likewise, the requirement for the extensive FAC briefing in the air disappears when the pilots are totally abreast of the tactical situation and receive their mission brief prior to takeoff.Direct support tasking is still a suspect notion in aviation circles, and elimination of the old request channels back through the air component headquarters is strongly resisted. As a result, even with aircraft sited forward in training exercises, we still see the tactical air request wending its tortuous way a hundred miles to the rear and then back to the aircraft site. Pilots take off and streak about at three or four hundred knots for twenty minutes of processing through the air command and control bean count system so that they may, at last, strike targets that are ten miles from the takeoff point. Major procedural and doctrinal changes may be necessary to ensure successful close air support on the modern battlefield. Forward basing, direct support tasking, and streamlining of the command and control procedures are all alternatives that must be considered before we give up on close air support as "too hard." Group Captain Madelin correctly maintains that the emperor is wearing invisible clothes. He proposes that we inform him of his nudity and convince him henceforth to remain naked because his clothes are needed elsewhere. The alternative of providing him with suitable clothing must be vigorously pursued.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Savage, Jr.,
USMC (M.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute) is a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.In a hearing before a special subcommittee on close air support of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, in 1971, Marine Corps Colonel George W. Smith summarized the essence of close air support (CAS). He said that close air support was only one of several capabilities to support the ground scheme of maneuver and that the ground commander's mission is "everything."l Implicit in his statement is the notion that the ground commander should choose the most efficient supporting arm available to him. If he is threatened by an enemy tank and can use a tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) or Dragon antitank weapon, he should use that instead of close air support. To do otherwise would be in violation of the principle of economy of force. This has been the main, underlying premise of close air support since its inception by the U.S. Marine Corps in the jungles of Nicaragua in 1928.
We are losing sight of the fundamental purpose of CAS if we think it can, or should, replace any or all other supporting arms. Group Captain Ian Madelin, Royal Air Force, has posed a series of arguments, which I consider less than objective, for the abolition of CAS. Let's reevaluate what he said in light of the purpose of CAS as another means of combat support.
Although never specified in so many words, Group Captain Madelin's discussion was limited to CAS in the Western European (NATO) environment. In that limited context his argument has some validity; however, on a universal scope it is not accurate, nor does it consider technological advances that have enabled the CAS concept to adapt to changing circumstances.
In his scenario, Group Captain Madelin attacks CAS because of slow response, poor command and control, forward air control requirements, enemy electronic warfare, enemy defenses, and target identification. In his hypothetical situation, all these factors do apply, but before we examine each limiting factor in detail, let us look at the overall situation.
There are, in order, three levels of threat facing allied military forces: strategic nuclear, theater nuclear/conventional, and limited war. While our defense spending has generally reflected this priority, the probability of actual conflict has proved to be the reverse. International interdependence on energy and nonenergy minerals has increased the probability of limited conflict in the Third World. It is the potential for fast-moving conflict in this arena that will challenge the Free World in the 1980s and possibly beyond evidence the Iranian crisis. This threat will require a mobile rapid response force that is light enough to be transported to the conflict area but heavy enough to win once it is there. The U.S. Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) with its organic aviation is an excellent example of the type of force required.
The MAGTF can be custom-tailored to the task and provided with the necessary mix of aircraft to provide that heavy combat power in the early stages of an amphibious operation or during other limited operations until additional means of combat support could be moved to the area. In short, since no one can predict where, when, or what type of conflict we will be involved in, they cannot predict exactly what tactics or weapons will be needed to win. We must, therefore, retain those historic American traits of flexibility and innovativeness.
Group Captain Madelin has concluded that close air support was, "certainly not worth the money, and hardly suits the purpose for which [the emperor] is buying it."2 His rationale was that close air support: (1) is not responsive to the needs of the ground force because of the cumbersome command and control system, (2) places too much demand on the forward air controller (FAC) and his communication capability, (3) places excessive demands on the pilot because of problems with target identification, and (4) requires assets that could be more efficiently used in an interdiction role. If his argument is universally applicable and not simply limited to the complex NATO environment, then we should agree with his conclusion. Conversely, if we can demonstrate that close air support is a viable concept in most, if not all, environments, then we should strive to improve our ability to use it.
The first failing that Group Captain Madelin addressed was response time due to the awkward command and control structure. In the NATO arena, this criticism is valid. It is not a new complaint, and a great deal of energy is being expended by all services, both American and allied, to find a better way. Among the alternative approaches being evaluated are the forward basing of V/STOL aircraft, more use of preplanned CAS, both scheduled and on call, and data link methods of transmitting air requests; but the most effective method has been increased training in the existing procedures. An example is the USMC combined arms exercises at Marine Corps Base, Twentynine Palms, California. These exercises enable small unit commanders, forward air controllers, ground controllers, and aircrews to exercise command and control procedures under realistic combat conditions, often with live ordnance. These maneuvers develop familiarity with the system of command and control and provide an excellent opportunity to refine or modify procedures to meet the needs of more sophisticated combat environments.3
The notion of the forward air controller presented in "The Emperor" seems to be a combination ground FAC, airborne FAC, and fast FAG All have the same task of terminal control, but they use distinct tactics which depend on the situation, mission, terrain, weather, etc. Since the ground FAC is the best known and--I would argue--most flexible, let's discuss his role in detail. In the Marine Corps, he is typically assigned to a frontline rifle company and is the air planner/adviser for that small unit commander. He initiates all air support requests, whether preplanned or immediate. In an immediate request the FAC is in direct contact with the direct air support center (DASC), which can assign a forward-based V/STOL aircraft to the mission, scramble a ground alert, or divert an aircraft already airborne on a lower priority mission. Once given the mission by the DASC, the aircraft reports to the FAC for terminal control.
This system gives the needed flexibility to meet the rapid response requirement of the ground unit. If air is not available, the FAC will know right away and will advise the commander who will have to take alternative action. Remember, the commander called for air because it was the most appropriate supporting arm or because no other supporting arm was available. If air is not available, he may have to change his scheme of maneuver.
The use of radio communication between the FAC and DASC or aircraft immediately raises the question of enemy electronic warfare, specifically communications jamming: Given that the enemy has the capability to jam all voice communications frequencies is a problem but not an insurmountable one. The FAC has a choice of three VHF radio nets to submit the request, and this redundancy reduces vulnerability to jamming. Once the request is received, the DASC can provide the bulk of the required information to the aircraft well behind the forward edge of the battle area (or in the case of forward based V/STOL via land line or VHF radio net). This reduces vulnerability to jamming further and leaves minimal data for the FAC to pass to the aircraft. Currently, FAC-to-aircraft communication is a limiting factor since selective jamming can stop critical communication; however, new technology such as the improved RABFAC (radar beacon) can provide data to the aircraft on a frequency band presently immune from battlefield jamming techniques. The development of a battlefield, secure data link technology could eliminate this concern altogether.
To digress for a moment, Group Captain Madelin omitted a major criticism of CAS-ineffectiveness at night and in marginal weather conditions. Recent improvements in the AN/PPN 18 RABFAC beacon for A-6E and F-111 operations have increased the range of this equipment significantly, and new procedures are being evaluated for all-weather CAS operations under radio silence.4 Furthermore, the plan to modify the A-7 aircraft for RABF AC bombing will greatly expand this capability.
The problem of target identification illustrated in "The Emperor" is a real one, widely recognized within the "attack community." In addition to the RABFAC, which provides pinpoint bombing data for A-6 and F-111 aircraft, other devices are in various stages of development. They include laser target designators, the laser spot-tracking bombsight, laser-guided munitions, etc. These are not Buck Rogers ideas but represent existing technology and will greatly enhance the chances for a first-run hit. Additionally, the A-6E, F-111, and A-7, with their sophisticated navigation equipment, gained a good reputation for successful CAS during those nine "atypical" years of combat in Vietnam.
There are many points in "The Emperor" that most attack aviators will readily agree with. There is most definitely a need to develop and practice new CAS tactics for the NATO environment (this author doesn't know of a NATO-committed unit that is not concerned). But just because our clothes--or the emperor's--need a patch or two, should we throw them away and suffer needless exposure? Close air support is a concept. It is a method of extending the range of supporting arms for ground troops; it can provide support for rapidly moving operations such as amphibious landings when no other means is available. The need for close air support still exists. It is a difficult mission that requires coordination, but with training it can be efficiently and effectively accomplished. The record of Marine Corps close air support in combat during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam will attest to its effectiveness.
Granted, there are numerous problems with CAS. There are, in fact, numerous problems in modern warfare. What do we do to counter sophisticated enemy air defenses? How should we best employ our air defenses? Where do we invest our scarce resources? These are typical of the problems that have plagued leaders for centuries.
Group Captain Madelin is right. We sometimes operate under delusions, but the viability of close air support is not one of them. Our ground commanders are going to need all the support we can provide, and close air support is one more means of applying combat power where and when needed. If a ground commander calls an air strike on a tank when he could have killed the tank with a TOW, then he is not a very resourceful commander. The solution is continuous, realistic, live-fire combined forces training.
The key to future success in NATO or in conflict is cooperation, cooperation among services and among allies. We must develop common procedures and routinely train together so that as a cohesive force each service can apply its individual expertise as required by the mission. Our common goal of deterrence through preparedness and peace through combat readiness must be the linchpin of our unity.
Group Captain Madelin's challenge of the close air support concept is not without merit. We must constantly reevaluate our readiness, our tactics, and our equipment. Playing the "what if?" game is almost always worthwhile. We should welcome criticism since it will help us avoid complacency and eventually increase preparedness.
Notes
1. U.S., Congress, Senate, Armed Forces Committee, Close Air Support Hearing, 92d Cong., 1971, p. 303.
2. Ibid. p. 86.
3. The U.S. Marine Corps Air Command and Control System is different from the Army-Air Force or NATO systems. The Marine Corps system is self-contained and designed for rapid deployment. It is a flexible system and can interface with the existing NATO NAGE by means of the MANTA buffer system. Additionally, the Marine Corps Air Command and Control System can interface with other U.S. service systems. In fact, the mutual support feature enhances overall capability.
4. Additional information is available from Headquarters Marine Corps (Code AWP).
Major Patrick J. Finneran, Jr.,
USMC (B.A., University of Notre Dame) is a student at Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.Group Captain Madelin has, in my opinion, dismissed close air support (CAS) without its due. His lucid and well-reasoned explication of the merits of interdiction and tactical strikes represents, I believe, the current British and NATO thinking on the subject. It presupposes, however, that the next battles will be fought in Central Europe or, if not, then in another high-threat area where Soviet-style forces will oppose our own. Despite the Soviets' provocations, the unprecedented scale of their "peacetime" forces, their recent incursion into Afghanistan, their penetration of the Third World, and the whole range of other issues involved in countering them, war in Europe is not likely. We certainly recognize that the defense concerns of the United Kingdom lie primarily in Europe. So do ours, but the United States is a global power, whereas the United Kingdom in large measure has ceased to be so, a development that I find regrettable. Since the U.S. must concern itself with more than the threat in Central Europe, we can hardly afford to virtually discard so valuable a tool as CAS. Even the Israelis in 1973 were only compelled to suspend it.
I recognize the Group Captain's caveat to the need for CAS, but I also believe it to be very much understated. The "atypical" situations, which he mentions as ones in which CAS has played a central role, are more indicative of the likely combat situations in which the U.S. will be involved than is Central Europe. I do not mean to belittle the concentration of forces there. Without them the U.S.S.R would certainly move to fill the power vacuum, and the political blackmail which the West could expect to pay would be enormous. The stakes there, though, are high for both sides. If we maintain our vigilance, modernize our weaponry, and display the requisite national will and unity, the situation will remain but a tense stalemate.
The same is not true of the Third World, as recent events demonstrate. We can and must expect that any opponent which we might face there will be equipped with the modern air defense weapons, probably of Soviet design, but the degree of such outfitting is another issue. Insurgency and national liberation movements being limited in resources, the probability of a low-to-medium threat environment is a much more likely prospect.
Without going into the issues of vital raw materials and the role of ideology in Soviet behavior, I suggest that for various reasons our confrontations with Ivan will take place elsewhere than on the North German Plain. Group Captain Madelin's statements regarding weapons suitability and particular targets have great validity, as long as one has the weapons to which he refers and the environment permits one to employ them. Precision-guided antitank munitions and other tanks are very effective weapons against Soviet armor, but tanks and Dragons are of little use in marshland or in the mountains. In another case, just ask the friendly, local infantry unit commander how willing he is to call in artillery within 100 meters of his own position. Neither of these situations need deter a qualified attack pilot. The primary problem in CAS, alluded to in the article, is that of unambiguously marking the target, a fact to which many exercises attest. The marking need not be done by an airborne F AC: white phosphorus rounds from any ground weapon do very nicely. Using burst transmissions, a ground FAC can provide a reliable correction, even in the expectable jamming conditions. Further, we cannot afford to leave our infantry units without access to heavy weaponry when they need it. If he were an infantry unit commander cut off from resupply, without attached armor and on the fringe of artillery support, would he take consolation from the knowledge that the aircraft which could be paving the way back to his lines were out looking for truck convoys 100 kilometers away? Does not the principle of economy of force to which Group Captain Madelin implicitly refers apply to ground units as well? Air units alone will not win a campaign.
I must state that the danger to us in the cockpit may be great in delivering CAS, and the antiair threat that we face may be awesome, but neither of these is the measure by which the need for CAS should be judged. Interdiction may be a far more cost-effective technique than CAS in a high-threat environment, but I would not write off the need for CAS, nor would I minimize its role. When CAS is required, nothing else may suffice. This is particularly true in the U.S. Marine Corps which, by comparison with the armies of NATO, is one of those units permanently "lacking their own combat support firepower." We in the attack community fill that role.
Major Lawrence G. Kelley
(AB., Princeton University) is an A-4 pilot in the United States Marine Corps assigned to the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.Some people have, predictably, read into my article a case to discontinue air support for the contact battle, or in their words: "to abolish close air support." Quite the contrary, I am arguing for more support of the land battle, not less. To some extent the misunderstanding rests, not in what General Ralph calls "a false alternative," but in another pitfall of logic called "the confused use of terms." Even the manual of Tactical Air Operations reminds us that: "Interdiction. . . and battlefield interdiction. . . are closely related to . . . and may be inseparable from. . . close air support." With that kind of interrelationship it is hard to discuss one aspect of the subject without conveying implications for the others.
Perhaps we need some new def1nitions. For the present though, we must make do with the old ones, so I remind the reader that the article was specifically concerned with direct close air support (CAS) in the traditional sense, as defined in the TACM 2-1 and elsewhere.
Let us now briefly consider some of the points which have been raised.
In questioning our traditional ideas about close air support, it was not my purpose to suggest that such support could be dispensed with. I repeat, we need to give more air support to the land battle, not less. And we could do this, even within the level of our present resources, by employing these resources in different ways. Our ideas about CAS have barely advanced since the days when aircraft were seen as merely an extension of artillery. Today's ground attack aircraft is very much more than this. To take but one example, the introduction of modern navigation/attack systems has almost revolutionized the potential of ground attack aircraft. We can now do things which were once infeasible. Yet this development seems to have passed virtually unnoticed and is still unexploited in our tactics. Our ideas about the nature of close air support are due for a thorough overhaul.
Group Captain Ian Madelin
is Royal Air Force Adviser to the Commander. Air University (ATC). Maxwell Air Force Base. Alabama.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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