Air University Review, March-April 1980

Spain and NATO

problems and prospects

The Moors, on their arrival in Spain, thought the country to be an island, and named it the Hidden Land. The poet Auden described Spain as a land crudely soldered onto Europe. Yet, whatever elements of "separateness" may exist in Spanish society and temperament, for historical, cultural and political reasons, the country is so situated that the nation cannot escape its strategic importance to Western Europe and the world at large.¹

John Fullerton

The question of Spain’s entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance has been a subject of active controversy for over thirty years. So much verbiage has been expatiated on the subject throughout this period that by now it must surely have been addressed from every possible angle, and one more bottle of ink spilled would not only add to what is already a decided surfeit. However, the issue is important and time-sensitive, and it deserves our continued attention and unremitting efforts to bring it to a speedy and enlightened resolution. As a minimum, recent changes in the military balance in Europe argue for at least one more effort, however futile, to bring the question into clearer focus.

NATO’s Perspective

The forces aligned against incorporating Spain into the NATO alliance quite clearly lie within Spain herself and' within the NATO membership. Viewing the issue first from NATO's perspective, there are a number of factors that balk achievement of the consensus required for Spain's admittance. Nonetheless, there appears to be a majority opinion not only that many compelling factors support this course of action but that the advantages, in fact, far outweigh the disadvantages. We will begin by addressing these positive factors.

benefits to NATO

The first and most obvious factor that makes Spain's acceptance advantageous to the alliance is the considerable military contribution she could make. So much has been written on this subject since 1949 that it does not need to be dwelt on at length. However, a complete picture of the key factors involved demands a brief review of this one aspect, which many feel to be the compelling argument overshadowing all others.

First, in terms of numbers, compared to the twelve current NATO members that contribute forces to the alliance.* Spain would rank sixth in gross national product (GNP) ($123.6 billion), defense expenditures ($2.36 billion), and tanks (860) and fifth in numbers of troops (315,500) and combat aircraft (214).² While these combat assets, if added to NATO, would not significantly tip the balance, they would represent a short-term enhancement at a time when the increasing disparity in combat power has become a matter of grave concern in Brussels. More important, the long-term potential promises even greater returns. Spain's universal military training program could field a total available force of one and a half million men,³ and the Spanish soldier who would man that force has proved throughout history to be a tough and courageous fighter.⁴ While the recession bred of the 1973 oil crisis hit Spain harder than it did most of the other Western nations, her economy remains strong, with promise of even greater improvement with her pending assimilation into the European Economic Community (EEC).⁵ Spain, therefore, has the capacity to improve both the quality and quantity of the fighting equipment that would support this force.

*Iceland, France, and Greece do not now contribute forces to NATO.

However, Spain's potential contribution to the military balance far transcends mere numbers of men, tanks, and airplanes. It is her strategic location that offers the greatest advantage to any potential ally. So strong, in fact, is her geographic position that Spain has come to be commonly referred to as a "European redoubt," a relatively invulnerable sanctuary, wherein forces for use on the Central Front could be marshaled, from which air and sea attacks on the Warsaw Pact could be staged or launched, and in which a defeated NATO force could regroup for counterattack.

In addition to her military and geographic strengths, Spain also brings with her a unique political force of considerable importance to the goals and aspirations of the NATO alliance. In the vituperation against the "fascist" regime of General Francisco Franco and the general European distaste for and mistrust of his dictatorial form of government, the fact that Spain has a solid history of anticommunism, particularly anti-Soviet communism, is often overlooked. To begin with, it is important to remember that anticommunism was the main cornerstone of fascism, a fact that became obscured during the days when we joined arms with Stalin to defeat the forces of consummate evil personified by Hitler and Mussolini. It is significant in this regard also that the only active support Franco provided the Axis during the war was the dispatch of the Blue Division to fight on the Eastern Front against the Russians. Of more immediate concern, however, is .the fact that under Franco, militant anticommunism continued unabated in the postwar Spanish government.

More important than the official anticommunism of the Nationalist government, however, has been the history of anti-Soviet communism that pervades Spanish politics across the entire political spectrum, all the way out to the far left. Going back before the Civil War of 19361939, when the communists were garnering considerable political strength in the tangled web of Spanish politics of that era, there was a strong anti-Comintern bias to the coalition of the left. Just to the left of center, the major element, the socialists were strongly anticommunist until the pressures of the Civil War drove them into the arms of their former rivals. To the far left, the anarchists were militantly anticommunist. And within the Communist Party itself, anti-Comintern forces long dominated those elements that favored the Russian brand of communism. This bias was again ameliorated by the necessities of war, although even in the worst of times during the struggle of 19361939, a strong anti-Comintern element known as the POUM (Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista) gained many advocates within the Republican ranks.

In the early years of the war, the Soviet influence grew, as Russia provided much needed material assistance and as the Russian-backed elements demonstrated the only truly cohesive political force in the still fragmented Republican ranks. However, from this position of strong advantage, the Russians and their surrogates overplayed their hand by a cold-blooded suppression of the other leftist elements in the coalition. Anarchists, POUMistas, and even some who simply showed anti-Comintern leanings found themselves jailed and often executed alongside Franco supporters who had fallen into the hands of the Republican forces. Seeds of mistrust and even hatred were thus sewn in the leftist ranks that later were to bloom in the rich soil ofabjectdefeat.⁶

Spain, therefore, has a political track record of anti-monolithic communism which outshines that of the other European democracies.

NATO concerns

The benefits that would thus accrue to NATO from Spain's entry into the alliance would appear to be compelling. She is a strong ideological enemy to the Soviets, a capable military partner with significant geographic advantages, and now a candidate for economic partnership in the Common Market. Yet her admittance to the military coalition of Western states has been barred for over thirty years; and, while there is reason for new hope, she remains uninvited and, from all appearances in some quarters, unwanted. The reasons for this antipathy are numerous, confusing, and in a constant state of flux. A strong argument can be made, however, that none are irreversible if handled with political finesse.

The first and overriding factor that has kept Spain waiting at NATO's door has been her dictatorial, rightwing government, held under the tight control of Generalissimo Francisco Franco until his death in 1975.⁷ The negative reactions his government spawned in the other capitals of Europe have been at various stages as paradoxical and hypocritical as they have been lasting.

In the early years following World War II, these reactions were clearly bred of Franco's relationships with the German-Italian axis. However, this concern was somewhat exaggerated in light of the very lukewarm support that Franco had provided the Nazi forces, and it certainly became paradoxical at best when both Germany and Italy were themselves admitted to NATO in the mid-1950s.

What kept the forces in opposition active at that later point was a lingering mistrust of Franco's antisocialism. Being anticommunist, it seemed, was acceptable; however, Franco fell so far to the right that he came afoul of the socialist parties that were in the ascendancy in countries such as England, Denmark, and Norway.⁸

This political problem was aggravated by the residue of emotional involvement with the Civil War's Republican cause. And it was many of the young idealists who had fought in or supported the International Brigades of the '30s who were now in power in the European socialist parties of the '50s. It thus devolved that while Portugal, under the dictatorship of Salazar (who had actively supported Franco during the Civil War), Germany, the historic enemy of all of Western Europe, and her erstwhile ally Italy were admitted into the alliance, Spain remained unwelcome.

There was, and remains in this animosity, an element of hypocrisy that has always been untoward and which may prove most troublesome before the history of NATO has run its course. This hypocrisy has its roots in the fact of strong bilateral U.S.-Spanish agreements dating back to 1953 and renegotiated as recently as 1976. Simply stated, these arrangements have permitted NATO to have it both ways. The various members have been able to sit behind the protection of the U.S. Spanish agreements while piously berating the lack of democracy in Spain herself a dangerous game to play with the most docile and forbearing of people, a potentially fatal one with a people as proud and volatile as the Spanish.

It is pertinent to question here the role of the United States in this one-sided face-off. On the surface we appear to have filled the role of good friend to both protagonists. However, it is in playing this part that we have allowed the game to continue; and in this regard, we share a large portion of the blame for its outcome. In simplest terms ours has been a policy of expediency; and, as with most such policies, it is likely to prove most shortsighted. The 1959 negotiations over Spain's application for admission to NATO provide a clear example of our failure to meet the problem head-on. By then, as one reporter observed, "there was little dispute . . . that from the standpoint of military strategy, strategic integration, and sound common sense, Spain should be a fully participating member of the Western Alliance."⁹ Recognizing this, all countries except Denmark and Norway appeared prepared to accept the proposition.¹⁰ Faced with this tough challenge, the U.S. took the easy way out and failed to support her loyal and committed ally. Pleading the vital importance of maintaining the unity of the alliance, we failed to aggressively pursue a political solution, electing rather to join the rest of the nations in hiding behind the bilateral agreements which assured Spain's support without offering a NATO quid pro quo.¹¹ This lack of political gumption has proved particularly ironic in light of the subsequent withdrawal of France, one of the earlier bulwarks of the alliance.

This brings us to the last major NATO 'concern about the admittance of Spain, one about which practically no mention is made today, at least in the context of Spain's admission to NATO. That is the concern of the countries to the north of the Pyrenees that the incorporation of Spain as a full and participating partner would somehow undermine the forward defense strategy, a fear, if you will, of a "redoubt mentality." The Spanish conquistador Cortes once burned his own ships to remove them as a safe haven of escape in order to make his reluctant soldiers press on toward the conquest of Mexico. Without acknowledging it openly, the current NATO membership may find themselves looking on Spain today as Cortes did his ships in 1519. So pervading and tangible is concern for the forward defense strategy that it cannot help being a factor in the thinking of every European north of the Pyrenees when the term "Spanish redoubt" is mentioned. And herein is added yet another irony to the already complicated equation: the military strength that Spain offers the alliance becomes, on the political front, a liability.

In any discussion of the pros and cons of Spanish membership, there inevitably surface several other concerns, such as Spain's economic problems, the inadequacy of training and armaments for her armed forces (with the corollary concern over the potential costs to Spain and her NATO allies to make up these shortcomings),¹² and finally the concern, voiced generally by the political left, that her admittance will upset the status quo in the East-West balance, inspiring a further strengthening of the Warsaw Pact.¹³ While these issues cannot be ignored, they constitute more political straw-men than substantive concerns. The effort of those who would support Spain's incorporation into NATO should therefore be to avoid being sidetracked by arguments such as these and to focus on the major issues of Spain's political posture, her unrequited NATO commitment and concern for the "redoubt mentality."

Spain's Perspective

Those then are the issues that divide NATO on this vital question. Until 1975, or even as late as 1977, any consideration of the question could have stopped here; for Spain under Franco, and for a short time following his death, was unequivocally committed to the NATO cause and unabashedly eager to join. However, NATO has played sanctimonious politics for about two years too long and now finds herself with a potentially reticent candidate for membership. As Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez indicated in late 1977, "Membership in NATO is now a question for the Cortes (Spanish Parliament), or even a question for a national referendum."¹⁴ Whoever would henceforth seek to accomplish this union must therefore address himself to selling the idea to both NATO and the Spanish people, and with every passing day the selling job in Spain is becoming more and more problematical. We are therefore confronted with yet another irony, for as NATO appears to come closer to accepting the proposition, Spain has begun to drift away from it.

Spanish concerns

The issues and forces that tend to discourage Spain from taking this path, however, have not just recently risen. Some in fact go as far back as the seventeenth or even the sixteenth century, when Spain's decline from a position of preeminence in Europe began, presaged then and re-enforced through the next two centuries by a series of disastrous alliances. Spain entered the twentieth century understandably wary of coalition in any form, a policy that she has adhered to faithfully and an attitude that still has strong roots to this day. It might be said, in fact, that Franco's efforts to join NATO were a unique aberration which may well have come and gone, unique not only for Spain in general but specifically for Franco. It seems little appreciated, but the fact is that Franco's avoidance of stronger ties to the Axis in World War II was nothing short of a masterpiece of statesmanship. Given the great debt that Franco owed both Germany and Italy for their military and economic support, without which he could never have won the Civil War, and given the early and dramatic victories of the Nazis, the pressure to throw his lot in with Hitler and Mussolini must have been intense. But NATO appreciated neither his earlier resistance to the strong temptation to join the Axis nor his subsequent break with longstanding tradition and policy in seeking to join the Western alliance. They reacted to both by making Franco and his nation the pariah of the continent.

This brings us to the second factor at work opposing the alliance, and that is Spanish pride. No nation, no matter how patient, can be shunned for 30 years, committing herself all the while, with little or no reciprocation, without becoming more than somewhat reticent to subsequent overtures. And the Spaniards, far from being a forbearing lot, are a proud and volatile people, whose patience can be tried only at high risk. There is little doubt, in fact, that at least one plateau has already been passed. Spain is, henceforth, quite unlikely to petition formally for membership; it will now be incumbent on NATO to solicit her partnership.

There are a number of other factors at work against this proposal, both, internal to Spain and within the realm of her foreign relations. The first and most obvious internal factor is the clearly enunciated anti-NATO policy of the Spanish Workers Socialist Party (PSOE), the second largest and most powerful political element within Spain.¹⁵ While the PSOE currently holds only approximately 34 percent of the seats in the Cortes, it is a force with which the largest party, the UCD (Union del Centro Democratico), must always contend, in that the latter holds far from a majority of the public's support. While the UCD made some minor gains in the last elections, it achieved its near majority with the support of only 35 percent of the popular vote.¹⁶ If Suarez wishes to have a relatively free rein to attack the country's most serious problems, particularly those in the economic area, he must avoid raising other controversial issues which could threaten to bring his government down.¹⁷ In this regard, it is significant that he has avoided making NATO membership an issue.¹⁸ It is of interest to note also, however, that Felipe Gonzalez, the head of the PSOE, in a post-election interview, promised that "his party would try not to force elections within the next four years 'because we believe the country deserves this period of stability."¹⁹

While this would appear to give Suarez a little breathing space, there is in the carefully worded promise, the clear implication that Gonzalez reserves the option of challenging any issue of significant import to the PSOE-and a tacit warning to Suarez not to raise any such issues. However, in view of Suarez's near majority in the Cortes and the fact that moderate socialists do not support the non-NATO policy, a vote in the Cortes would appear to have a good chance for success. In that the UCD popular vote percentage (35 percent) was much lower than the 48 percent share of the Cortes seats won by the party, a referendum might prove a less certain route to go and a greater political gamble for Suarez. On the other hand, the Spanish voters have overwhelmingly approved every proposition advanced by the government since 1967. So given the UCD's present momentum, this approach, Atoo, should prove successful if the necessary political spade work is properly accomplished; and it would clearly constitute a more visible and binding commitment by the whole Spanish nation. While it would involve a slightly greater political gamble, it would promise commensurately greater rewards.

While Prime Minister Suarez has essentially decoupled himself from open advocacy, members of his party are working behind the scenes to accomplish the union. Further, specific steps are being taken at least to neutralize the opposition of the PSOE, if not achieve its tacit support. On the national, level, the UCD is using the PSOE's anti-NATO position to undermine that party's unity, seeking, through a low-profile campaign, to alienate more moderate members who see their party's position as being Soviet-sponsored.²⁰ Meanwhile, the UCD is also working for support on the international scene. For example, at a North Atlantic Assembly held in Portugal in December 1978, a Spanish senator, a member of the UCD, was in attendance with the expressed purpose of soliciting "support for Spain's membership in NATO." He further indicated his intent to seek assistance from the pro-NATO Portuguese Socialists in an effort "to influence the Spanish Socialists to change their minds and support membership."²¹

However, it will probably take more than that and may well involve a Cortes vote, or the national referendum alluded to by Suarez. For there are other political factors operating against the proposal, two key ones of which revolve around the military, namely the internal orientation of the army and the probable costs of modernization, which would portend a possible tax increase--never a popular political issue.

The internal army problem is one of the decidedly negative legacies of the Franco regime. It was bred of the problem, endemic to dictatorships, that military-police force is invariably required, in perception if not in fact, to maintain the power in the hands of the dictator. While he had two strong paramilitary police forces, the Guardia Civil and the Policia Armada, charged with the mission of internal security, Franco still tended to look toward the army itself, the force which had brought him to power, to ensure the stability of his regime. The army in turn therefore tended toward a more internal orientation, more toward its mission of "the defense of institutional order" than that of maintaining national security.²² This problem was aggravated by the loss in 1975 of the mission of providing security within the borders of Western Sahara (formerly Spanish Sahara). The army, already, in the view of many, too involved in the internal affairs of continental Spain, now found itself without any substantial external counterbalance.

Beyond the internal army question is the more important and politically significant question of the cost of modernization.²³ The Spanish armed forces are poorly equipped in terms of both quality and quantity. As mentioned earlier, this creates a problem for NATO, but more to the point, it presents a problem for the Spanish people. While both parties will have to help defray the necessary costs of modernization, the element most directly concerned will be the Spanish taxpayer; and opponents of the alliance within Spain are certain to play heavily on the tax issue when the question comes up for consideration either in the Cortes or by referendum. And given NATO's current problems, they are also likely to raise the question of what additional security they will be buying for these added expenditures. In addition to internal pressures, there are a number of external factors that will operate to dissuade Spain from joining NATO. The first and most obvious is pressure from the Soviet Union, which is becoming much bolder and more direct in its efforts to lure Spain from the NATO camp, using both the carrot and the stick. The carrot is what Newsweek has referred to as "Russia's Spanish Gambit," comprising promises of tempting business deals, to include attractive credit terms and lucrative markets.²⁴ This Russian effort was clearly doomed from the start, however, in that it was so obvious that the U.S.S.R. could not compete economically with the European Community that even the Spanish Communist Party supported the EEC move.²⁵ That leaves the stick; and the tacit threat to Spanish sovereignty lies behind any Moscow move.²⁶

The last force that could incline Spain toward remaining outside of NATO is the potential inducement to join a nascent southern Europe pact. There is not much literature on the subject; however, vague allusions to such an alliance are beginning to appear in various writings.²⁷ It may well be just a gleam in the eye of the yet-aborning coalition of Eurocommunist nations. However, this is an interesting possibility that bears careful watching, in that the potential members, namely Italy, France, Spain, and Portugal, all lie on or adjacent to NATO's southern tier. Such a development would obviously have far-reaching and complex implications for NATO.

As with the question of NATO's position on the issue at hand, there are pros, as opposed to the above-listed cons, which suggest that joining the NATO alliance would be in the best interests of Spain herself. With one exception, they generally fall into two broad topic areas: security and economic-political leverage.

The third broad area involves the status of the Spanish armed forces themselves, and herein lies another interesting paradox. The air force and navy are progressing slowly but resolutely toward both modernization and closer ties with NATO; and each of these services is realizing real benefits from both programs that improve their potential contribution to Spain's defense. Furthermore, the officers of the junior services are for the most part receptive to NATO membership, for they see in this step the promise of yet better equipment and better training, as well as a clear, unqualified mission on which to focus their efforts--three big pluses for Spain as well as for NATO.²⁸

The paradox is that the army, which suffers an even greater need for more modern equipment and a substantive mission, is balking at the prospect of the NATO connection. The problem, as discussed earlier, derives from her internal orientation and is aggravated by the lack of a real mission since the loss of Spanish Sahara. At its core, however, is the pride of the senior Spanish officers who are reticent to surrender the positions of prestige and power they hold within the nation's infrastructure. While, on the surface, this poses one of the major roadblocks to Spanish acquiescence to union with NATO, it in fact holds the key to what would be a major benefit for the Spanish government and people, who would clearly like to return the business of justice and order to the courts and police agencies. Membership in NATO, and the army's subsequent shifting of its focus of attention to the international arena, could therefore very much serve in the interests of Spain's continuing efforts to reestablish a viable, internally secure democracy.

Spain's armed forces themselves would also realize considerable benefits by joining NATO through the achievement of much needed improvement, at what could well be minimal expenditure by both Spain and NATO. This economic factor, as mentioned earlier, is a problem which cannot be ignored. However, it can be persuasively argued that the problem has been exaggerated, that Spain already spends a greater percentage of her GNP on defense than most current NATO members, that what is needed are the benefits of joining NATO in the Long Term Defense Plan in order to ensure maximum return on the money she does invest. Concurrently, her pending admittance to EEC should give her added economic leverage that would enable her to meet the 3 percent real growth program to which NATO membership would commit her, without significant tax increases or the threat of further inflation. Conversely, it is also of interest to consider the potential costs of neutrality. While it would require a comprehensive analysis to prove one way or the other, it can be conjectured that it would cost Spain considerably more to support independently the military force that would be required to maintain a credible neutrality.

The second major benefit for Spain would be the enhanced political leverage that membership in NATO would bring. To regain her rightful place in the councils of Europe, Spain must join NATO as a full partner, and down deep she aspires to that rightful place and knows that she must join NATO to achieve it. Her estrangement from the high politics of Europe has been an unnatural state of affairs which is long overdue for change.²⁹

But by far the most important benefit an alliance with NATO would bring Spain is enhanced security. It can be argued, and is by the Soviets, that, rather than improving Spain's position, such a move would put her in harm's way. However, the political and military imperatives are such that she will find herself there whether she joins NATO or not, and her best chance for survival is to achieve the mutual security offered by the alliance.

Barring a failure to renew the V.S. bilateral treaty when it comes due in 1981, Spain has made herself a de facto enemy of the Warsaw Pact by permitting V.S. use of her ports and air bases; thus her status as a member of NATO could not aggravate an already consummate enmity. But even without the V.S. bilateral commitment, any Spanish effort to remain neutral would prove inevitably futile. Her strategic position simply makes her an irresistible target for either side in any future continental conflict. She must choose to go one way or the other; and the choice for her should be clear.

As' the then minister of Foreign Affairs observed in January 1976, Spain intended to join the EEC, and she was well aware that NATO was "the military infrastructive of the community."³⁰ She has now petitioned to join that community, and in doing so, as indicated earlier, she made a conscious choice between the Common Market and economic affiliation with the V.S.S.R. Assuming that the EEC acts favorably on the recommendation of its commission, Spain will clearly assume a vested interest in protecting the community and its interdependent economic structure. It could be argued that she might follow the independent path chosen by France; however, Spain does not own and has no prospects of owning her own force de frappe. So this, too, seems an inappropriate course for her to pursue.

All of which leads back with inexorable logic to the proposition that membership in NATO is indeed in Spain's best interests from the all-important security standpoint. Spain needs NATO to secure her economic and political future, and NA TO has come to sorely need Spain's support in order to be in a credible position to provide that security.

New Factors

The Spanish question has lingered on now for over thirty years, and most of the basic issues of concern then remain those of concern today. There have, however, been some rather fundamental changes in the complexion of these issues, the great bulk of which should shift the balance well in favor of Spanish admission to the NATO alliance and some of which in fact urge the expeditious resolution of the issue.

The first change has been the unprecedented and to-date effectively unanswered increase in both the quality and quantity of Warsaw Pact forces. This improvement program has tipped the combat power ratio perilously far toward the Warsaw Pact side, to the extent that it is now estimated that the Pact possesses the 3:1 advantage required for a reasonable chance of success in an attack against a well-organized, cohesive defense, much less against the less-than optimally postured NATO forces. In a more specific sense, with regard to Spain, the improved range of the fighter and fighter-bomber aircraft of the Pact has brought all but a few of the current NATO and French airfields within range of the Pact attacking forces. Thus the availability of Spanish bases for staging, recovery, and other vital air operations has taken on added meaning for the continental allies as well as for the United States.

The next most significant change in the military balance lies in the loss of the coordinated support of France and Greece, together with the V.S. alienation of Turkey and the subsequent deterioration of her forces. These losses are compounded by Italy's growing economic crisis, the increasing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean, the loss of Malta, and the socialistic leanings of Libya and Algeria, which propel them closer to the Communist bloc. Taken together, these changes have made the unfavorable shift in balance on NATO's southern flank even more dramatic and potentially disastrous than that of the Central Front.

These new factors, all on the negative side of the ledger, urge speedy and substantive adjustments on the part of NATO. The alliance has put a great deal of effort into the development of a long-term solution; however, for the immediate future, the only available option that promises rapid, tangible results would be the acceptance of Spain into the Western military community.

Fortunately, there have also been a number of favorable changes, all of them involving Spain's economic and political status. The most significant, of course, has been the emergence in Spain of a government that has made remarkable strides toward the achievement of truly representative government. There are still a few who feel that not enough progress has been made in this sensitive area, but the number of critics dwindles with each passing day and each new step forward.

Conversely, Spain's new-found political freedom also argues for expeditious denouement from a negative standpoint. For this brief moment in history may find those in Spain who are in favor of joining NATO at the zenith of their power or, more important, those opposed at their nadir. Spain's economic and political problems are the kind that provide fertile ground in which the seeds of socialism and comunism quickly germinate.³¹ In addition, the last time Spain had a go at democracy, in the early 1930s, her politics proved most volatile, with parties at both ends of the spectrum on occasion supporting their erstwhile opponents and the seat of power swinging from one side of center to the other in relatively rapid and dramatic fashion. Some things are different today, but a great many of the basic conflicts and controversies remain essentially unchanged from what they were almost fifty years ago. The decision to go at the problem in anything approaching a leisurely pace might therefore prove a bad gamble; The Socialist promise to support stability for four years combined with the current split in its ranks on the NATO issue also argues for striking now.

The final change of potential significance, and happily a positive one, was the favorable report by the EEC commission concerning Spain's admission to the Common Market, The final move by the EEC, which now seems assured, should do more than any other single event to persuade all parties concerned of the desirability, if not necessity, of accomplishing a corresponding military coalition, in order to ensure the security of the joint economic interests of both parties.

THE answers to the questions "when" and "how" are, simply, "soonest" and "through an aggressive, enlightened and well-organized U.S. political-diplomatic effort," starting with initiatives to accelerate Spain's acceptance into the Common Market. Time is of the essence, however; as the inertia bred of years of inactivity weighs heavy on NATO, Spain becomes more independent and reticent, and U.S. prestige and leverage continue in decline. It is therefore urgent that we act now; and there is an added inducement to undertake this action, within which lies the final irony of the Spanish. NATO equation--one that finally promises a favorable result for the U.S. For should we be able to accomplish this aim, not only would we take a significant step toward restoring a semblance of balance to the Warsaw Pact/NATO power ratio but we could also in the process reverse all of the forces working against the achievement of this goal; that is, NATO inertia, at least in this one realm, would have been reversed; centralist political elements in Spain would be given a boost in their competition with the Socialists-Eurocommunists; and, finally and perhaps most important, U.S. prestige and credibility in the international arena would experience a sorely needed boost. But it will not come easily-it will take a delicate diplomatic touch, enlightened political planning, and plain hard work. Spain and NA TO both wait to see whether we have the necessary measure of each -and I suspect that they both hope that we do, that they are even pulling for us-which just may prove the most important thing we have going for us.

It is also certain that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact watch with equal interest; that they will be working hard to balk our efforts; and that, if we are to pull it off, they will make us work for it, even if our allies do not. The effort, however, will be well worth the price, because success would bring us greater credibility in the eyes of these, our potential enemies; and credibility in that realm is a negotiable instrument--directly convertible into deterrence.

Air War College

Notes

1. John Fullerton, "Spain, for the First Time in Centuries, Is at a Decisive Strategic Crossroad," Defense and Foreign Affairs Digest, 3/1978, p. 4.

2. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1978-1979 (Dorking, Great Britain: Adlard & Son Ltd., Bartholomew Press, 1978), p, 30,

3. Squadron Leader D, C. Martin, "Spain and NATO," The Hawk, Winter 1978-1979, p. 4. Admiral Horacio Rivero, "Spain: Free World Asset," Strategic Review, Spring 1976, p, 69.

5. "1978-Economic Review of Spain," Quarterly Economic Review of Spain 1 (1st Quarter 1979): 6.

6. Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). The material in this paragraph summarizes a large section of this definitive work on the Spanish Civil War.

7. General T. R. Milton, "NATO Membership for Spain?" Air Force Magazine, February 1977, p. 40.

8. Robert Pell, "NATO and Spain," America, 20 June 1959, p. 449.

9. Ibid., p. 450.

10. "Current Comment: Spain Is West . . . and NATO?" America, 14 May 1960, p. 234.

11. Pell, p. 450.

12. Captain R. A. Komorowski, "Spain and the Defense of NATO," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1976, p. 196.

13. Fullerton, p. 39.

14. John F. Coverdale, "Spain from Dictatorship to Democracy," International Affairs, October 1977, p. 629.

15. Fullerton, p. 30.

16. "Spain--Government Wins Elections," Facts on File, 16 March .1979, p. 191.

17. "Worldgram," U.S. News & World Report, 12 March 1979, p. 40.

18. Fullerton, p. 30.

19. "Spain--Government Wins Elections," p. 191.

20. Fullerton, p. 30.

21. "Spain in NATO?" Atlantic Community News, December 1978, p. l.

22. Stanley Meisler, "Spain's New Democracy," Foreign Affairs, October 1977, p. 200. 23. Miguel Acoca, "Spain's Lagging Democracy," Washington Post, 27 November 1977, p. C-3.

24. Fullerton, p. 39.

25. "1978--Economic Review of Spain," p. 6.

26. Rivero, p. 6.

27. Fullerton, p. 39.

28. Ibid., p. 30.

29. Pell, p. 449.

30. Antonio Sanchez-Gijon, "Spain and the Atlantic Alliance," Royal Air Forces Quarterly, Spring 1977, p. 65.

31. David B. Richardson, "Spain's Free Election--Now a Move to 'Join Europe"? U.S. News World Report, 27 June 1977, p. 30.

Colonel F. R. Stevens. Jr., USA, (B.S., USMA; M.A., Columbia University) is in the United States Million. NATO. He has served in U.S. Army artillery units in the Far East. Europe, and continental United States and held a number of high-level staff positions, primarily in the operations field. He commanded a Nike air defense missile battalion in Florida and completed a tour of duty in the Strategic Operations Division of the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Colonel Stevens is a graduate of Air War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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