Air University Review, March-April 1980
Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang W. E. Samuel
| Who asks whether the enemy were defeated by strategy or valor? |
|
Virgil |
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has undoubtedly been one of this country's most successful regional military and political alliances. Therefore, it is all the more astounding that after thirty years of organizational viability, responsible observers on both sides of the Atlantic strongly suggest that the alliance has such critical military deficiencies that its ability to deter war, not to mention fighting one, is at best marginal. Bluntly stated, NA TO is viewed by many thoughtful observers as being too weak militarily to counter effectively the potential threat facing it.1 Major General John Singlaub, U.S. Army, retired, in an unintentional but appropriate summary of such criticism stated, ". . . in the event of a major conflict in Western Europe, NATO's forces could fight no more than a holding action."2
Such an assessment is all the more amazing in view of the vigorous and significant defense upgrade efforts by most members of the alliance in recent years to improve their military forces and conventional warfighting capabilities. To cite only a few major examples, Holland, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway are replacing their aging combat aircraft with much more capable F-16 fighters; Germany, Denmark, and Canada, among others, proudly point to new Leopard main battle tanks (MBTs), described by many experts as the best tank in the world. Holland and Germany are equipping with the new, mobile, and highly accurate radar-guided Gepard short-range, twin-barrel antiaircraft Flackpanzer, and U.S. Air Forces in Europe are introducing the highly touted F-15 air superiority fighter and A-10 close air support aircraft in sizable numbers. Improvement efforts of this scope are evident in all of the services of alliance members in the Central Region, the critical region in NATO past and present. With such highly visible defense improvement efforts, it seems almost paradoxical to speak of a major military weakness in NATO. What, then, are we really talking about when we speak of military strength or the lack of it? Do we mean that even more and still better tanks and aircraft are needed? Do we need more and better trained men? Or are we in fact talking about whether we are or are not employing what we already have in the most rational manner in today's strategic and tactical nuclear environment?
I believe there is a strong possibility that with a return to some time-honored and proven principles of military leadership and force management, a change in perspective of NATO's ability to defend itself is possible without spending ourselves into an either / or situation; that is, either guns or butter, not both.3 A much publicized and often quoted 1977 Senate report reviewed NATO and how its forces related to the Soviet threat. Its findings and recommendations were in terms of the current strategy of flexible response. However, in a brief introductory sentence, the report got to the heart of NATO's ailment by stating that perhaps even NATO's strategy itself is questionable.4 My purpose is to pursue this suggestion and propose an approach to Central European and, therefore, U.S. conventional defense efforts that may make the alliance more viable in the future and better able to fulfill its mission of deterring overt war; but, if necessary, to deny an aggressor any gains should war occur. My intent also is to promote thoughtful debate on a vital subject as opposed to offering definitive and pat prescriptions for NATO's real or imaginary ailments.
Military comparisons between Warsaw Pact (WP) and NATO conventional combat forces normally are expressed in terms of such simple quantitative indices as numbers of MBTs, armored fighting vehicles (AFVs), tactical aircraft (TACAIR), surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems, and whatever else lends itself to reduction to a chart or graph. For instance, a cursory review of only a few such indicators of supposed military strength or weakness gives a disheartening impression that NATO combat capability is not only inferior to that of the Warsaw Pact but apparently dangerously so in some respects.5 Such a simplistic, although often used, quantitative analysis of the relative strengths of two opposing camps has some obvious value. One major flaw of mere force comparison analysis, however, is its failure to reflect qualitative and organizational differences, nor does it make allowances for such perishable but important factors as training, morale, or leadership, to mention only a few. That weapons alone do not make armies was amply demonstrated in very recent times by the Iranian armed forces. Therefore, the conclusions to be drawn from side-by-side comparisons of equipment and forces are necessarily limited and, in good conscience, should always be so identified. In fact, given the weight of other than simple quantitative factors, the apparent inequities posed by the quantifiable numbers are significantly less than revealed by casual observation.
Numerical inferiority is not of itself an indicator of inferior combat capability. The fundamental axiom underlying such a rationale is the often-held belief and cliché that the side with the larger battalions wins. While frequently a valid statement in attrition-type warfare where the size of the force may be far more important than its imaginative employment, a historical review rather convincingly suggests that skilled generalship can many times compensate for unfavorable imbalances in the size and technical capabilities of forces. Although the Persian 17 army of Xerxes, more than 200,000 men accompanied by a fleet of 1500 agile warships, enabled him to occupy Athens in 480 B.C., it was not enough to save him from defeat by a vastly outmanned but not outgeneraled Hellenic alliance. In 1940, German Field Marshal Karl von Rundstedt's 2574 tanks, outnumbered by 3609 allied tanks of generally superior quality, made military history by their brilliant dash to the Channel.6 The "invincible" forts of the Maginot Line, with their large garrisons prepared for headon, attrition warfare, sat inactive and unable to enter into or influence the conflict. Who would have seriously questioned the value of that magnificent fortification prior to the debacle; but the lesson, although often quoted, is less often understood. Certainly it is little heeded today at a time, in some respects, not so different from 1939. It can be argued that a new Maginot Line has again evolved in Central Europe, while not as visible and formidable as its predecessor, just as vulnerable. That new line is the current NATO strategy of flexible response with its doctrine of forward defense. This doctrine may pose a greater threat to NATO than any real or perceived Warsaw Pact numerical inequities in weapons or men because it does not recognize that combat power is not a function of mere numbers but a combination of tangible and intangible factors.
From the point of view of the traditional attritionist, NATO forces represent, if one ma y be permitted an analogy, a glass of water half empty--never able to defeat the enemy's forces in a massive head-on clash of arms. It should not be argued that the NA TO glass of water is half full--the view of the optimist with rose-tinted glasses--but rather it is suggested that the water in the glass is adequate when viewed in a different glass. The difference is not only one of perception but is one fundamental to the continued future effectiveness of America's key alliance.
Underlying the current NATO combat doctrine of forward force deployment is a strategy whose very name is a misnomer, flexible response. The official name is MC 14/3. It does not mean, as one might expect, flexibility of conventional force employment, but rather it describes an escalatory force scenario from the employment of conventional weaponry to that of tactical nuclear weapons with the explicit possibility of the ultimate nuclear exchange.7 The strategy is indeed flexible when compared to its predecessor MC 14/2, the strategy of massive retaliation,8 but like its predecessor it also has by now outlived its usefulness and no longer reflects the strategic or theater nuclear situation. Additionally, MC 14/3 incorporates a doctrine of forward force deployment that may have been appropriate for the late 1960s and early 1970s, when U.S. theater nuclear forces were only poorly matched by Soviet assets. Today, such a concept flies in the face of reality and almost guarantees the destruction of NATO's conventional forces while NATO no longer possesses the leverage once enjoyed through a near monopoly of tactical theater nuclear weapons.9
The doctrine of forward defense no longer supports a strategy but rather has become the strategy for NATO. Under it, conflict is expected to be joined on a broad front from Lubeck to Passau, with NATO forces engaging the attacker immediately over the entire front. The purpose of such an exercise is to start what some defense analysts call "the business of attrition" as soon as possible,10 conveniently forgetting that in that area the Soviets hold all the trumps and that attrition is indeed a two-edged sword cutting friend and foe alike. Critical to the success of NATO and its thinly stretched lines under MC 14/3 is the early determination of where precisely the major Soviet thrust (or schwerpunkt,* as the Germans so aptly describe it) occurs so that forces can be concentrated and employed in the right place and in a timely manner before they are fully engaged by the enemy. However, the crucial elements of space, time, and resources, underlying any strategy, in the current NATO situation have their potential significantly degraded through forward force deployment and have been made, in a manner of speaking, to work for the aggressor rather than against him.11 This situation is tacitly acknowledged by NATO strategists, few of whom expect conventional defensive measures to be successful against a Warsaw Pact attack. The tactical nuclear weapon is perceived as the ready fall-back position for all conventional force deficiencies. Beyond that lies little of comfort to friend or foe alike.
Although the day has long passed when the United States and its allies had superior nuclear forces and could field land, sea, or air forces numerically superior to those of the potential enemy, NATO's strategy has continued to maintain a curious mixture of nuclear bravado and what one author calls a style based on the methods of attrition at a time when the prerequisites for successfully waging either type of warfare, nuclear or conventional attrition, no longer exist.12 Then why the insistence for a strategy that offers little or no advantage to the-defense? Unfortunately, the answer is not all that logical but lies within those essential elements of space, time, and resources.
*Literally, it means "thrust point," In context, schwerpunkt usually designates both the axis and direction of the main offensive effort.
Although today is not 1940, the similarities are all too striking in terms of space management and force dispositions. In 1940 the Allied armies were actually much better positioned to wage forward defensive warfare than NATO's are today. The problem of the Allied forces then, however, is the same as the one faced by NATO commanders today--to identify positively and in a timely manner the main thrusts of the enemy's forces. There is no convincing indication that the current strategy has solved that critical problem; rather, forward defense helps to compound it.
Forward defense as now envisioned in NATO would result in the rapid engagement of screening forces as well as the main body before the enemy's intentions are known and before he has irrevocably committed himself to a course of action. To disengage after such knowledge is gained, while troops are still locked in combat, is indeed a skillful and daring maneuver--one so demanding that only few generals have ever attempted (much less completed) it successfully. The essence of the NATO problem is not warning of attack or to determine that it is in progress, but rather it is to ascertain the attack's strong points, its schwerpunkt, before the ability to react effectively is no longer there.
Unfortunately, it is not a simple matter of finding a guilty party. There are no scape-goats. The current state of affairs evolved over time from 1945, when the United States had and for many years thereafter maintained an effective monopoly on employable means of mass destruction--in this case, nuclear weapons. But in a day when strategic systems of the two major powers face each other in awe-inspiring impotence and when tactical nuclear weapons are now equally available to either side, NATO has lost its last trump card. The tactical nuclear weapon no longer represents a viable alternative to buttress insufficient conventional forces. Its utility in the face of equal or superior Soviet capabilities is markedly degraded. Through their determined buildup of theater nuclear and conventional forces, the Soviets are now equipped to wage war under all conditions (conventional, theater nuclear, strategic nuclear, and chemical). They have finally achieved the option to attack with or without the support of tactical nuclear weapons, in fact, leaving the choice to NATO and thereby effectively having neutralized the tactical nuclear leg of the NATO triad.15
The Soviet evolution in strategic and tactical force capabilities, nuclear and conventional alike, is the reason for the impotence of the current NATO strategy. The reason NA TO continues to cling to the dated strategy of flexible response and its accompanying doctrine of forward defense is not dictated by such mundane factors as space, time, or resources but by a West German political choice for forward defense. The depth of German feelings on the subject can be judged from a response to proposed alternative approaches during a 1978 roundtable held in Washington, D. G., jointly sponsored by the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. A summary report of the roundtable states:
German participants were emphatic on the unstinted imperative of a NATO forward defense posture. They characterized forward defense as the original quid pro quo for the Federal Republic's entry into the Alliance. If NATO were to abandon this concept in its posture or doctrine, they warned, the Federal Republic would have to reassess its political options, including the alternative of broad accommodation with the East.16
It is indeed strange for the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to insist on being the primary future battleground between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in a scenario potentially rivaling the destruction experienced by many of its cities in World War II, only on a much wider scale. Granted, the situation is practically unavoidable because of the country's location, but how one goes about defending that location is a matter of choice and not fate. Under the current scenario, intense combat would take place east of the Rhine with the certain expectation of high levels of destruction. The swift application of tactical nuclear weapons to save failing conventional defenses would only make the situation worse. So why insist on a strategy that so patently represents one of the worst of all choices? The time has surely arrived for both the FRG and its alliance partners to address difficult political questions, to provide the climate and the opportunity to look at viable strategy alternatives that provide both deterrence and warfighting capability at affordable cost and which do not necessarily involve the planned devastation of the FRG and a prompt nuclear showdown between the two military superpowers. To cling to a concept which requires that war in the Central Region must immediately invoke massive United States nuclear involvement and thereby hope that the potential foe is deterred appears to be a concept needing serious reexamination.
What, then, is a viable defense alternative for NATO? Whatever it is, it should consider some fundamental alliance conditions and elements. First and foremost among these is the acknowledgment of the mutual U.S.-Soviet nuclear impasse on a strategic and tactical plane with an apparent continuing tilt in the Soviet's favor--if not real, then perceived. "Rethinking the Unthinkable," as one author calls an apparent recently renewed acceptance by American strategists of fighting nuclear war, should be questioned as a solution to alliance defense problems.17 The accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant has probably served to introduce a degree of reality into nuclear discussions in the civil sector and may serve the same purpose in other areas, too. If nuclear weapons are to playa continuing and significantly meaningful role at the tactical level, then questions of escalation, conflict control, and war termination are in need of thorough examination and deserve some very precise answers.
NATO will not do itself a favor when buttressing its defense with a capability that is in a near-checkmate situation and whose employment solicits an unpredictable response.
Second, a recognition that in our free societies it is probably impossible if not counterproductive to attempt to instill or to maintain a near-wartime psychology for any extended period even to support essential military programs. The majority of citizens of NATO countries are surely quite aware of the need for adequate defensive measures.
Many, however, question the constant cry for more defense expenditures; and after contributing more, being told that the money has all been spent, was not enough to start with, and what has been bought with it cannot do the job adequately. The demands in each country on a limited amount of uncommitted disposable income are numerous, and defense is only one of them. Although security is a fundamental need that must indeed be satisfied, it is still only one among many. Therefore, the solution may lie in using that which is available better, and, if necessary, changing strategies, doctrines, and concepts of military force employment -none of which are sacrosanct, to get the job done. The incentive to do so may lie in the continuing Soviet increase in theater nuclear as well as conventional combat power and in the unlikelihood of any really significant and sustained growth in future allied defense budgets. A consoling thought should be that historically ample defense budgets have seldom been accompanied by a corresponding flowering of strategic thought.
Third, the alliance must address and define its warfighting goals over and above deterrence and the rapid employment of tactical nuclear weapons once deterrence has failed. Once conflict is joined, for whatever rational or irrational reason, what is the overall objective, and what are the immediate and intermediate goals of the alliance? Failure of deterrence is considered so remote by many that it contributes to the acceptance of poorly-thought-through warfighting concepts. As one author views the problem, "underlying most of the causes of deficiency in NATO is a fundamental lack of seriousness about the likelihood of war."18 Subscription to the emotionally satisfying but impractical concept of total victory would make compromise impossible and war termination on other than a total war basis doubtful. However, if the aim of the alliance is to terminate a situation in a manner favorable to itself, that is, stopping the attacker effectively and putting him on the defensive accompanied by as little damage to home territory as possible, then it is quite possible that a reasonable force structure and disposition can evolve, satisfactory to NA TO both in peace and war.
Finally, length of war should be a decidedly secondary consideration for NATO planners. Almost all wars, deliberate or accidental, were to be short wars. For instance, World War I was expected by both sides to be violent but short, "a war lasting three, or at the most, four months. . . a violent, but short storm" stated Bethmann-Hollweg in August of 1914.19
Length of war is generally indeterminate and governed not by logic and reason but by factors often beyond the control of the combatants. Bernard Brodie states that "the waging of modern war on any scale approximating total national commitment necessitates so huge and unwavering an effort that the first casualty is not so much 'truth' as simple reason."20 The NATO goal then should be to reason before not after the unthinkable happens; not to gird itself for a war of short or excessively long duration but rather for one in which supplies and expendables last sufficiently long until there is reasonable expectation of resource replenishment. Neither the Soviets nor the allies have the capability to stock sufficiently in peace so as to take care of all contingencies in war. Essentially, time is NATO's ally, after thirty days that is; at which time the inherent industrial strength of the West should come to bear. Not even in the nuclear age has this factor of sustainability lost its relevance, especially if the nuclear option was not exercised as expected. But what about the first thirty days?
The solution suggested is nothing new, certainly not revolutionary. It is a recommendation to substitute the indirect form of warfare for the direct approach; the substitution of such principles of war as maneuver, flexibility, surprise, and simplicity for concepts of mass, attrition, complexity, and inflexibility now inherent in our current strategy. In an address to the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr in November 1978 and again in a recent article in Parameters, Lieutenant General Raymond Furlong, USAF, then commander of Air University, described the indirect concept of war fighting that has as its principal goal the mind of the enemy commander rather than the bodies of his troops.21 What General Furlong is talking about is the return to a style of warfare which at one time was the American way of fighting--that is, adapting to the situation, building on your own strengths, and exploiting the weaknesses offered by the enemy.
American history is replete with examples where smaller, adaptable, ingeniously led maneuver forces triumphed over the many who did not heed the changes in their environment. Braddock paid dearly during the French and Indian War when he tried to apply Continental wargaming to the American wilderness. At Lexington and Concord the revolutionaries changed their tactics sufficiently to teach the Redcoats a lesson and Washington turned the embers of a dying revolution into a bright flame with his imaginative leadership at Trenton and Princeton. Names such as "Stonewall" Jackson, Lee, Grant, Sherman, Scott, MacArthur, and Patton ring with imagination and tell of success often against difficult odds; they speak of movement, surprise, discipline, skill, and matching forces to the situation.
During the U.S. Civil War, warfighting concepts started to change, almost imperceptibly at first but nevertheless decisively, away from maneuver to the application of mass and attrition warfare, which was in fact adaptive for the North and won the war at less overall cost than would the repeated battles of the 1861-63 variety. An agricultural South won many brilliant victories in those early years but lost the war when it tried to beat the North at its own game without possessing the necessary prerequisites. Such bravery as that exhibited by Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg, although inspiring, was exactly the kind of attrition the South could stand the least.
By the end of World War I, concepts of mass and attrition war should have been laid to rest on the fields of Flanders and at the forts of Verdun. But not so. Only the defeated Germans looked for and found alternatives,22 not because of the tremendous losses they and their opponents had suffered but because of the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. They found their alternatives again, not in new weapons or their massive application but in concepts of maneuver and surprise, taking advantage of the mobility and firepower provided by the tank and aircraft. However, the innovators of the blitzkrieg soon forgot the reasons for their own spectacular successes of 1940 and 1941 and tried to beat the Soviet giant on his own terms. The massive Soviet tank armies, which swept across eastern Germany in 1945, gave ample testimony to who was best at mass and attrition.
U.S. World War II strategy in Europe also followed the principle of mass but with the principle of attrition used only where it would lead to substantial weakening of the enemy. U.S. strategy substituted materiel for human lives and overpowered the adversary with the products of an efficient and ample industrial base. However, strict adherence to rigid employment concepts based on mass is essentially foreign to the American character, which has never taken well to excessive regimentation. Principles of mass employn1ent and the direct approach were adhered to during this period only with difficulty. Foremost among the opponents of such concepts was Patton, whose tactics of swift and decisive penetration were reminiscent of those of Jackson during the Civil War and proved more often a bane to Eisenhower than an asset. Patton introduced tactical uncertainty into a situation that strategically possessed little of it, but his approach also had the potential for early war termination.
Today, however, the situation is drastically different. Mass is measured' in terms of in-being forces not future deliveries, at least during the first thirty days of conflict, and under such conditions the Soviets possess a decided initial advantage. Thus, it seems incongruous to match the potential adversary in areas he is best at and where the vastness of the Atlantic Ocean presents NATO with a significant logistical handicap. The solution to the problem lies not in the total relocation or restructuring of current forces, in new equipment and technology, and ever more detailed command and control; although all of them are important, it lies in using what is available more effectively by building on available strength and the enemy's weakness, as so many successful American military leaders have done in the past.
Specifically, one should accept the idea that the Soviets, if they choose to attack, would achieve a significant degree of surprise in time, place, and method--if such is not the case, all the better. Therefore, the major NATO defensive effort would initially be reactive but not necessarily purely defensive. Adequate delegation of authority would allow commanders to seize ephemeral opportunities and exploit the situation. This may be especially applicable in the employment of air power.
A Soviet breakthrough should not only be expected but in areas encouraged, facilitated, and channeled. Make them commit themselves rather than the NATO forces; spread out their flanks and by so doing create the nightmare of every armored force commander from Rommel to Patton. Avoid the head-on battle until the time for decision has arrived. The enemy wants to force the decision as soon as possible, as it is in his interest to do so. Why should one facilitate matters for him? As suggested by another observer of current strategy, our foremost responsibility is to avoid defeat, then gain the initiative, increase our strength relative to the opponent at one's place and time of choice using whatever means are appropriate and available: technology, mass, maneuver, etc.23 Rundstedt and Guderian did not destroy the Allied armies in the West in 1940; they disorganized them and interfered with the ability of their commanders to make relevant, executable decisions. They controlled the dimension of time24 through maneuver and speed. The campaign was relatively bloodless and accompanied by little destruction to nonmilitary assets, but it destroyed an army's ability to function.
Should NATO not strive for such a model rather than a forward defense, reminiscent of the bloody and senseless practices of World War I? A policy of flexibility rather than rigidity does not constitute abandonment of the German ally but reflects realistic warfighting concepts including a believable deterrent posture. The fate of the powerful German VI Army at Stalingrad in 1942 should be a sobering lesson to all who advocate the rigid defense ofterritory.25
A posture based on maneuver warfare and truly flexible in response not only shows the adversary that one is ready to fight if necessary but fight in a manner so unpredictable that success of aggression may be too uncertain to consider it as a viable alternative for one's ambitions. Additionally, maneuver offers a posture with the option for a country such as Germany to survive a conflict not totally devastated. The option to resort to means of mass destruction is always there; however, one should not be too ready to resort to it too early. Not only does insistence on early application of tactical nuclear weapons appear implausible as a defensive strategy but it may weaken de" terrence because of its lack of relevance to current military and political realities.
Obvious advantages to a truly flexible and responsive approach with a decreased emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons are that NATO reserves and capabilities in general, which are now expended at the "knife's edge," are given the opportunity to be brought to bear more effectively. For; example, the fact that most Belgian and Dutch forces are not now in place in their forward positions is a plus rather than a minus. No one really knows how they would get there anyway if they had to, across roads choked with refugees all going in the opposite direction. Under a maneuver strategy these forces can form the nucleus of a powerful northern strike force which hopefully could strike the enemy in a coherent and decisive manner. Under a maneuver concept, the U.S. Seventh Army no longer finds itself in the wrong place but rather in the preferred position--on the enemy flank. Not only does the Seventh tie down substantial enemy forces across from it but it poses such a threat to the flanks of enemy operations north of it that it threatens their very success. The German road arid rail net, which runs essentially north and south, not east and west, in no small measure facilitates a concept of maneuver aimed at the enemy's flanks rather than static defense predicated on successive westward retrenchment. A truly flexible allied strategy based on maneuver warfare, not on holding territory per se, should be able to strain the highly centralized Soviet command and control to the very breaking point. The Soviets are often given credit for blitzkrieg concepts and capabilities when in fact they are neither organized nor equipped to wage such a war; a concept that presupposes decentralization of the decision-making process and delegation of authority to relatively low levels of command. Mobility and detail of plan are not blitzkrieg hallmarks, but rather maneuverability and flexibility of command and its execution.26 Allied maneuver strategy would introduce that vital degree of uncertainty of success which is precisely what is needed for any strategy that has deterrence as its primary objective.27
I remind the reader that Israel, which has little space to speak of and whose command structure must operate within the smallest limits of warning time, has never elected the option of forward defense. A small experiment with such an approach was the establishment of a forward defensive line along the Suez Canal, It proved to be an unwise decision and in 1973 provided neither warning nor defense. Finally, heavy Soviet commitments in the northern or southern NA TO regions are of little relevance to Soviet success in the Central Region. Such Soviet force commitment could only degrade their position rather than improve it and result in a division of their forces which would make them too weak to achieve any kind of desirable outcome in the vital and critical central sector. The northern and southern regions are important but not crucial to the outcome of war. That dubious distinction, unfortunately, is reserved, as it has been in times past, for the Central Region. For example, in a still definitive study of German operations in the Northern Theater a respected researcher and historian concluded that:
In warfare there are occasional blind alleys, and for Germany in World War II the Northern Theater was one of those. . .Norway, which a reinforced corps had conquered, took an army plus vast expenditures of materiel to defend. . . the causes of Germany's failure in World War II are not to be found in the specifics of strategy or tactics. . .but in the fallacy of attempting to satisfy boundless ambitions with limited means.28
Although Soviet resources are vast, they are not limitless; Soviets have no options to fritter away what they have in secondary theaters of operation. It is, of course, their choice to do so but ours to respond according to priorities.
ONCE the decision has been made to use available NATO resources in a true manner of flexible response or maneuver warfare, then they look much more formidable to the task and a higher degree of force adequacy is achieved. In fact, the forces available give the option of covering the border lightly and forming powerful air and ground strike forces, which can not only hinder but destroy an enemy's best laid attack plans. Air power, a vital component of NA TO striking power, no longer need be viewed as expendable flying artillery to stop hordes of tanks that have overrun an inadequate forward defense. Instead, it can go out and seek its targets ahead and behind the main battles, in the enemy's flanks or wherever he is weak and vulnerable.
Without fuel and ammunition, large mechanized forces soon become liabilities and hostages rather than combat assets. TACAIR can contribute to and bring about that situation by concentrating on those vital Warsaw Pact Support elements which carry those combat sustaining consumables. Like the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka in days gone by, TACAIR must contribute to chaos and confusion, to disorganization and fear. It may be that bringing about those conditions is more important than a large tally of tank kills. No longer need TACAIR be the vanguard of Pickett's futile charge by expending itself against the strongest armored formations the enemy can field, but it can lead a charge into the rear and flanks of the enemy, where he is the weakest; into the mind of the enemy commander, depriving him of not only command but of that essential control over his fighting elements. Therein may lie its greatest contribution to the overall defense effort.
Maneuver warfare provides army commanders the option to employ their resources most advantageously within existing space and time constraints. Forces which once were too weak to hold on to every square foot of NATO territory are now transformed into powerful strike elements with the potential of turning a well-planned Warsaw Pact attack into a chaotic collapse. The ability to roll with the punches and to counter-punch and attack as the opportunity presents itself is not only fundamental to the sport of boxing but to survival on the field of battle. I would suggest that in war one should not be too eager to seek head-on combat like a knight going on a crusade seeking the infidels, but rather look toward ending a conflict--a goal which is achieved by depriving the enemy commander of either his forces or his ability to control them. It appears the wiser of the two Courses is to deprive him of the ability to control, and that is the lesson of the German campaign of 1940.
Forward defense as now practiced is a strategy incompatible with true flexibility of response. NATO forces will never be sufficient to indulge in the extravagance of attrition warfare. However, if the forces available are used prudently, then enough space, time, and resources are available to do a creditable job; and it does not require that one commit joint suicide along with the aggressor by too hastily applying the nuclear option.
However, if we continue to tell ourselves, Our people, soldiers, and airmen, that we are second rate, that we cannot do the job, and that the only answer is more men and weapons, maybe after a while people and soldiers alike will believe. Then, in fact, we will have a second-rate armed force regardless of Leopards, Eagles, and Tornadoes. The answer lies in our hearts and minds, not in the swords we carry. Defense without relevant strategy is an impossible task.
Washington, D. C.
Notes
1. An example of this position is the report of Senators Sam Nunn and Dewey F. Bartlett, NATO and the New Soviet Threat (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 24 January 1977).
2. Major General John K. Singlaub, "Military Strength Has Declined to Put U.S. at a Disadvantage in Europe and the Far East," Atlanta Journal and Constitution, May 6, 1978, p. Cl.
3. For an excellent discussion on the principles of war, their origin and efficacy, lee John M. Collins, Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices, 1973, pp. 22-28.
4. "The viability of current NATO force posture in Europe and perhaps even NATO's strategy of flexible response and forward defense is questionable," Nunn and Bartlett, p. 1.
5. The Military Balance 1978-1979 (London, England: International Institute, for Strategic Studies, 1978), pp. 108-13. For footnotes accompanying listed data see source document. Also see The Military Balance 1979-1980, pp. 108-13.
6. R. E. Dupuy and T. N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, revised (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 1057.
7. Allied combat doctrine is reflected in allied tactical publications (ATPs). Nearly 30 ATPs have to date been agreed on and published. ATP 35, Land Force Tactical Doctrine, April 1977, pp. 5.1 to 5-3, for example, explains tactical nuclear operations as well as the strategy of flexible response, MC 14/3. Essentially it states that if deterrence fails, NATO requires a full spectrum of conventional and nuclear capabilities to be able to defeat the enemy at the level he chooses to fight or escalate the conflict to a level which will either induce an aggressor to cease his attack and withdraw or generate a general nuclear response.
8. MC 14/2, massive retaliation, was intended as a strategy to meet any Soviet attack against NATO with a massive nuclear counterblow. It was a credible strategy at a time when the United States enjoyed a decided advantage in nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles over the U.S.S.R. and when its will to employ them, if necessary, was not questioned.
9. The reported or anticipated future deployment of the SS-20, SS-21, SS-22, and SS.23 short-to-intermediate-range missiles as well as that of the nuclear-capable Backfire swing-wing bomber suggests that Soviet ability to match NATO TNW employment has been achieved or is well on its way. See "NATO Warned of Soviet Upset in Nuclear Balance," Philadelphia Inquirer, May 16,1979, p. 11; also "Soviet Weapon Scares Europe," San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle, May 6, 1979, p. 4B; "Soviet Buildup Worries NATO," International Herald Tribune, May 16, 1979, p. 1.
10. Colin S. Gray, Defending NATO-Europe, a report prepared for the Director, Defense Nuclear Agency, Washington, D.C., November 1977, p. 15.
11. For a discussion of forward defense and its essentiality to a successful NATO defense posture, see Colin S. Gray, pp. 8-19. Mr. Gray offers eight reasons why he thinks forward defense is a must.
12. Edward N. Luttwak, "The American Style of Warfare and the Military Balance," Survival, March/April 1979, p. 57.
13. The Belgian defense line was anchored on powerful Fort Eben Emael, guarding the Albert Canal. It was captured in a daring airborne assault on the first day of the German invasion.
14. Michael I. Handel, Perception, Deception and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1976). Dr. Handel states, "there is little chance, despite the availability of adequate information, ultra-sophisticated technologies, and all human effort invested, to prevent or forestall an impending surprise attack. Very few surprise attacks on the strategic level have ever failed." Also, see Dr. Barton Whaley, "Deception and Surprise, The Lessons from History," a briefing to the Joint Staff, as reprinted in Readings in Military Employment, vol, III, part II, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Air Command and Staff College, February 1973, pp, 14551J
15. The NATO triad consists of conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces. This is contrasted to the U.S. strategic nuclear triad of land and sea-based ICBMs and long-range bombers.
16. NATO and Its Future: A German-American Roundtable, Cosponsored by the Konrad Adenauer-Stiftung and the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Washington, D,C., 14-16 November 1977, p. 10.
17. Leon V. Sigal, "Rethinking the Unthinkable," Foreign Policy, Spring 1979, pp. 35-51.
18. Colin S. Gray, "NATO Strategy and the Neutron Bomb," Policy Review, Winter 1979, p. 7. Mr. Gray addresses, among other things, the apparent inability of politicians to think beyond peacetime deterrence. Also see Charles M. Kupperman, "The Soviet World View," Policy Review, Winter 1979, p. 45, who comments on the lack of seriousness of Western planners.
19. Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the first World War (London: Chatto and Windus, 1967), p. 92.
20. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, 1973, as reprinted in U.S. Army War College Selected Readings, vol. I, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 1977, p. 64.
21. Lieutenant General Raymond B. Furlong, "Strategymaking for the 1980's," Parameters, March 1979, pp. 9-16.
22. Mitchell, Fuller, Douhet, de Gaulle, and others looked for alternatives to static attrition warfare. None of them, however, were successful in the interwar period of having their ideas accepted and implemented in the military services of their respective countries. The Germans borrowed many ideas from these men and integrated or adapted them to their new form of maneuver warfare--blitzkrieg.
23. Furlong, pp. 12-13.
24. "New Strategic Concept," National Review, October 27, 1978.
25. The Soviet counterattack in November 1942 swiftly broke through Rumanian and Italian forces that flanked the German VI Army fighting for Stalingrad, The powerful Russian pincers quickly surrounded the Germans and successfully fought off inadequate German relief efforts. The subsequent demise of the VI Army was less due to the initial debacle and the severity of the Russian winter than to Hitler's direct order to its commander, General Paulus, to hold in place and recapture lost ground. The German commander stoically awaited Hitler's authorization to break out of the encirclement, which never came.
26. For a discussion of Soviet combat doctrine and practice, see V. Ye. Savkin, The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics, Moscow, 1972, and A. A. Sidorenko, The Offensive, Moscow, 1970, published and translated in the United States under the auspices of the USAF.
27. Conversely, a major objection by Western planners to such an approach is precisely its high degree of uncertainty induced by the many variables which can affect the outcome.
28. Earl F, Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1959), p. 315.
Contributor
Lieutenant Colonel Wolfgang W. E. Samuel
(B.S., University of Colorado; M.B.A., Arizona State University) is International Politics Military Affairs Officer assigned to DCS Operations, Plans, and Readiness, Hq USAF. He is a master navigator with over 2800 flying hours. From 1969 to 1973, he was stationed at Hq USAFE as a command air operations staff officer and flight safety officer. He was Air Force Research Associate at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Colonel Samuel is a Distinguished Graduate of Squadron Officer School.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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