Air University Review , July-August 1980

Commentary

"Principles of Deterrence"

In the November-December 1979 issue, John M. Collins, Senior Specialist in National Defense at the Library of Congress and author of Grand Strategy and American and Soviet Military Trends, argued for a cogent and careful development of Principles of Deterrence. The exercise suggested by Collins in reviewing his list of principles was a device to cultivate dialogue without setting concrete postulates. The following are critical responses prompted by the Collins device.

The Editor

Comment by
Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. Seaton, USAF

IF deterrence of nuclear War were the dominant national security objective of the United States, as John M, Collins asserted in the opening of his "Principles of Deterrence," then the avoidance of nuclear war for the United States could simply be a matter of surrender when a belligerent state such as the U,S.S.R credibly threatened nuclear attack. Instead, the dominant national security objective of the United States is preservation of our way of life and freedom of choice of life-styles among other free people of the world.

We must not confuse national security objectives with policies and strategies designed to achieve those objectives, lest pursuit of the policy become the objective. Although it is not yet clear that we can or should codify a body of knowledge called Principles of Deterrence, any such potential codification must have the objective as its first principle. The preventive aim of a national security strategy is not always self-evident, as suggested by Collins in his Principle of Change.

It may be that Collins is attempting to create principles of deterrence out of erudite principles of War which, by their depth and diversity, defy codification. Bernard Brodie points out in his War and Politics that:

Although Clausewitz himself frequently speaks loosely of certain "principles" to be observed and followed--he could hardly do otherwise than seek to establish certain generalizations at least in his analytical works--he specifically rejected the notion that there could be any well-defined body of particular rules or principles that universally dictated one form of behavior rather than another. . ., Clausewitz would have been appalled at (attempts to encapsulate centuries of experience and volumes of reflection into a few tersely worded and usually numbered principles of war] and not surprised at some of the terrible blunders that have been made in the name of those "principles."¹

Brodie, Collins, and the views of the Six-Man Group notwithstanding, I do feel a free exchange of views on national security strategy in general and military strategy in particular to be a worthwhile endeavor.

Conflict Cause

Overconcern or, in Collins's words, "constant cognizance of war-causing conditions" may in fact lead political and military leaders away from the manipulable causes of war and particularly the manipulable causes of conflict at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. Herman Kahn's concern, for example, about the "deterrer becoming too strong" thereby inviting preventive or preemptive war seems an improbable proposition in the modern era.² A preemptive nuclear strike, showing preference for a "fearful end rather than endless fear," hardly seems an operative construct in an era of mutual assured destruction and rational leadership. Perhaps Hans Morgenthau was but half-right about the necessity for a balance of power due to the absence of a final arbiter with enforcement power. Nuclear proliferation may be evidence that modern states view possession of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of security. Might we have been wrong about nuclear proliferation? Might proliferation make conflict--any conflict--less likely out of fear of the consequences?

Deterrent Properties

With regard to Collins's properties of deterrence, we would do well to remember that theories do not persuade, dissuade, coerce, or compel. Whether individual or governmental, the calculations of risks, gains, and losses determine the persuasiveness of ideas. Deterrence is a theory, "a theory of the skillful nonuse of military forces."³ Thomas Schelling in 1963 and Brodie ten years later, among a dozen others, questioned whether the military services were in fact intellectually prepared to exploit the threat of force.

Since I take exception to a number of Collins's properties of deterrence, brief descriptions of some of these differences may be useful. First, I do not believe that reward is a viable persuasive element in situations of calculated aggression. In such situations, operative persuasive elements range from fatal punishment (assured destruction) as a deterrent against strategic nuclear attack to denial of goal attainability in the case of conventional aggression. In the absence of hard knowledge about enemy intentions, reward for not doing something is a hit-or-miss proposition. The "appropriate" level of punishment in the event of nuclear aggression might arguably be tied to intentions as well, but I would argue against such linkage. Rewards, therefore, both large and small, should only be used to persuade a priori, it seems to me.

Second, among the Primary Deterrent Properties, I suggest persuasive capabilities which must include military power employable throughout the conflict spectrum. A range of capabilities is required for effective deterrence. Both the muscle and supporting options, strategies, and concepts are required for effective deterrence. We have always been long on military muscle but short on innovative and effective options, strategies, and concepts for deployment/employment of that muscle, which was perceived by U.S. political leaders as relevant to the various crises at hand. Colonel Robert Reed argued in 1975 that, "military strategy (needed to] be brought into a much closer relationship with policies and strategies for use of all other elements of national power."⁴ A rapid deployment force is one such concept; many others are needed. For example, we need a near real-time options development system (to supplement the joint operations planning system within the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the unified and specified commands) capable of tailoring military options in crises to National Command Authorities specifications. Such a capability would provide a giant stride toward Colonel Reed's objective. Another concept might be to put terminally guided conventional warheads on selected intercontinental ballistic boosters. Yet another might be the exploitation of mechanisms for nonlethal interference with enemy military command, control, or diplomatic communications.

Third, a deterrent property missing from Collins's Figure 3, under "intentions," is the intention not only to fight but to win. Conventional, nonmilitary, academie wisdom has rejected the notion of winning, and one has to ponder just how far this idea has receded even from the military consciousness. In deterrence, as in war, there is no substitute for victory, and declaring that one's intentions lie in victory will enhance deterrence!

Finally, I would add actions causing détente failure as "Deeds to be deterred." Only in this regime do rewards or the promise of rewards seem viable persuasive constructs. An adaptation of Schelling's compellence may provide an operative framework for the idea that rewards, as positive motivators of behavior, can be continuously applied until the other side acts to break off the reasons or incentives for reward.

But what of the longer term? If former President Lyndon Johnson had taken determined and long-duration action against the Soviets for their invasion of Czechoslovakia 12 years ago, are deterrent principles suddenly now apparent that were not foreseen a decade ago? I don't think so. I think Collins is correct in asserting that none of the principle norms are immutable, for vital national interests are not black and white but various--often indistinguishable--shades of gray. It is the job of the executive branch to illuminate the gradations for the purpose of designing actions to preserve, protect, and defend the vital national interests of the United States. Such illumination is fundamental and must precede policy, strategy, and tactics designed to achieve the objectives. President Carter, in his State of the Union address, illuminated the fact that Afghanistan was peripheral but the Persian Gulf vital to U.S. interests. It should surprise no one, therefore, that Soviet troops will remain In Afghanistan.

On reflection, I have talked little here about principles of deterrence per se but, rather, have focused on deterrent properties and theory. Perhaps this means that the dialogue is the most important thing Collins has sparked. Clausewitz would surely agree.

Strategy is a bit like research and development (R&D), but doesn't R&D begin with a requirement?

Santa Monica, California

1. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973), p. 446. (Emphasis added.) Also treated in Brodie, Strategy In the Missile Age (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 21-33. To further quote Brodie is illuminating--up to a point:

In short, the catalog of principles [of war] must be recognized for what it is, which is a device intended to circumvent the need for months and years of study of and rumination on a very difficult subject, presented mostly in the form of military and political history and the "lessons" that may be justly derived therefrom. (p. 448)

One begins to wonder, however, about the wisdom of quoting Brodie, for, in the next sentence, he states:

However, it has to be added that in the training of the modern officer such study and rumination are not allowed for, either at the staff college level or the war college. It takes too much time, and it also takes analytical and reflective qualities of mind that are not commonly found either among student officers or among their instructors.

Dr. Brodie surely cannot have so summarily dismissed the possibility that many officers undertake analytical and reflective thinking on their own initiative as a vital part of their professional development. To wit, the "Fire-Counterfire" column of this publication.

2. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 157.

3. Thomas G. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 9.

4. Colonel Robert H. Reed, USAF, "On Deterrence: A Broadened Perspective," Air University Review, May-June 1975, p. 5.

Lieutenant Colonel Michael B. Seaton is a United States Air Force Rand Research Fellow.

Comment by
Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Porter, USAF

WHILE wholeheartedly supporting John Collins's search for a "systematic way to shape schemes for nuclear deterrence," I have strong reservations. It is a decision-maker's individual intellectual framework not a set of principles that permits the formulation of consistent and appropriate actions.

This assertion puts me in the uncomfortable position of discussing the article which I feel Collins should have written rather than the one he wrote. For this, however, I would hold Collins partly to blame. He proceeded to recommend Principles of Deterrence without first establishing their prospective suitability and utility.

Borrowing the Principles of War concept and applying it to deterrence may well have merit, but the reader deserves at least some evidence that such principles have proved useful to those who have planned and executed military strategy. While both the author and editor assume that such is the case, it is not self-evident to me.

In my own reading of military history, I have found little evidence that the Principles of War were ever more than prescriptive slogans, more useful to those who critique action than to those who must take it. When such principles have shown promise, it is because they followed an intellectual framework rather than preceded it.

The Soviets recognize Principles of War in this fashion-as part of a defined strategy and intellectual framework. Accordingly, their principles are assigned priorities and integrated into their overall strategic objectives, for the use of planners and decision-makers.

If the formulation of an intellectual framework must be the first task, how then do we proceed? Do we explore the unknown ground by wandering through it, or do we stand at a single point and sweep the horizon? The literature is filled with possible approaches.

Although Collins's intent was to suggest Principles of Deterrence not methods for theory, his article suggested two basic approaches to the problem. In the first, we arbitrarily define which elements belong in theory and then seek the relationships that tie them together. In the second, we focus first on the relationships themselves and use this as a basis for determining which elements should be included and which should not.

Collins's approach to deterrence is open-ended and reflects the first approach. He defines deterrence as "a strategy for peace" and includes in it every type of confrontation--"political, economic, technological, social, paramilitary, and military. . . ." I believe that such an encompassing approach makes it extremely difficult to tie things together. I suggest that Collins's open-ended approach to deterrence may well raise more issues--with or without an acceptable body of principles--than it resolves.

Of the two approaches, the second appears to offer the most promise. We begin with a clearly defined premise and carefully focus on the relationships that tie various elements together, by carefully tracking each idea back to the original premise and testing it before it can become a part of the whole. While the beginning is narrowly defined, the eventual coverage may be extensive. To demonstrate how the two approaches can lead to very different conclusions, we can arbitrarily select a specific premise and compare its interpretation of a major historical event to that suggested by Collins's approach. It is obvious, for example, that since the Soviets enjoy an overriding superiority in conventional military forces, the United States seeks to counter as a deterrent with its recognized superiority in nuclear weapons. Deterrence theory subsequently progresses from this premise--the United States' seeking political leverage from its strategic advantage counters the Soviets' conventional advantage.

Without developing this construct any further, the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan offers an interesting comparison. If one applies Collins's "strategy for peace" approach, deterrence is still at work in the form of economic and political sanctions promised by the United States and her allies. Such sanctions are nonmilitary forms of punishment designed to dissuade the Soviets from any similar actions in the future. The narrow approach postulated above, however, suggests that deterrence is not necessarily at work. The proposed sanctions do not qualify as deterrence measures. They are not actions that correlate to the use of strategic power to counter conventional power. The Soviet takeover in this case demonstrates a failure of deterrence. After all, the original premise held that U.S. strategic superiority would counter Soviet conventional superiority.

The validity of either interpretation is academic and not central to this discussion. What is important is that both views produce not only very different judgments as to what happened but also end up asking very different questions. Collins's approach asks: How do we make deterrence work better? The other approach asks: Where do we go from here?

If these disparate approaches share common ground, it is in recognition of the fact that power relationships have shifted in the world. If rattling nuclear sabers proved somewhat useful in the past, there is little indication that this will be so in the future. The use of military force to support political goals is becoming increasingly more complex.

Although I do not share Collins's confidence that Principles of Deterrence, in the context of a capital checklist, offers concrete assistance to the decision-maker, I support his assertion that deterrence theory urgently requires a new look--or better yet, a complete reassessment.

While I have strayed far from a narrow critique of Collins's principles, I did so in the interest of expanding the debate. His article, in fact, was the major stimulus for the ideas presented here. In this sense, I am indebted to him. Our differences, however, are fundamental. Until convinced otherwise, I shall hold fast to the conviction that principles are not to be discovered in the world but in the intellectual interpretation of it.

Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Porter is a United States Air Force Rand Research Fellow.

Comment by
Lieutenant Colonel Phillip D. Gardner, USAF

IS IT feasible to formulate a practical checklist of principles predicated on deterrence theories that could be consulted by U.S. strategists? John M. Collins presents an interesting list of precepts, but he does not offer a means for determining its value as a practical guide to action. How can the principles be substantiated? One possible method is to verity the underlying theories and then show by logic tests that the principles are consistent with them. This approach invariably yields an edifying result: failure. It fails because no one has yet validated the theories. This is an interesting deficiency and worth exploring for what it reveals about the character and limitations of deterrence theories and principles.

It will be useful to begin the exploration by reviewing writings on principles of deterrence and tying them to a body of theory. The literature on principles consists of the articles by Collins and Colonel (now Brigadier General) Robert H. Reed, USAF.^l Both authors discuss major deterrence concepts and categories of conflict, refer to principles of war, and offer lists of principles of deterrence. (See Figure 1.)

It is evident that they view their lists as predicated on theories that surfaced during the 1955-65 avalanche of innovative strategic thought by analysts such as Bernard Brodie, Herman Kahn, Thomas Schelling, Glenn Snyder, and Albert Wohlstetter.² The primary objectives of these theorists were to evaluate the impact of nuclear weapons on international relations and to develop methodologies for analyzing the manipulation of threat as an instrument to forestall aggression.

This body of theory forms a coherent intellectual framework, which aligns and clarifies relationships among major concepts about the use and role of power in international politics. The theory is elegant in its structural simplicity yet sophisticated enough to accommodate powerful analytical models, games, psychological analyses, and econometric logic. However, the theory has two significant limitations: extrinsic, events the theory explicitly excludes and intrinsic to the logical construct of the theory.

Figure 1. Principles of deterrence

The extrinsic--what the theory knows it doesn't know. Accidents, miscalculations, and irrational acts are considered outside the explanatory bounds of the theory. This creates two categories of problems: (1) validity, is the event intentional and therefore explained by the theory? and (2) definition, what constitutes a miscalculation, and what is irrational? Problems in the first category revolve around the question of deciding whether the event is actual or a ploy to gain an advantage. (Was the accidental missile launch really an accident?) Problems in the second category arise from information inequalities and interpretive differences. Even if adversaries could share perfect information and thus reduce the potential for miscalculations, cultural differences in logic structures can still cause them to arrive at different conclusions. As U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew commented when assessing the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor, "National sanity would dictate against such an event, but Japanese sanity cannot be measured by our own standards of logic."³

In short, the universe of events outside the theory's explanatory boundaries is large and significant. Apparently deterrence theory and rules of English spelling are distinctive in having more exceptions than applications.

The intrinsic--what the theory thinks it explains. Deterrence theory explains rational actor gain-loss calculations on the manipulation of threat, but it explores the subject within a very narrow construct. The theory's applicability is constrained by its heavy deductive content. Since initial premises and fundamental assumptions cannot be verified by deductive logic within the confines of the theory, one cannot know or prove why deterrence succeeds. This does not mean that the theory is invalid; it simply says that, in its present state, much of it is unverifiable. This is a partial explanation of why, as Collins observes, the deterrent theory has lain fallow since the publication of seminal studies.

What is the rest of the explanation? In large part, the theory never satisfactorily resolved the question that inspired the 1955-65 studies, finding a meaningful way to relate nuclear weapons to political objectives.

What is the purpose
of nuclear weapons?

One major postulate of nuclear deterrence theory is that there can be no meaningful outcome of a nuclear war:

Because of the destruction wrought by nuclear weapons, war can no longer be considered, as in the famous dictum of Clausewitz, to be the continuation of policy by other means. Nuclear weapons have made nuclear war absurd.⁴

The formula that nuclear war cannot have a victor has two major effects on the body of deterrence theory: (1) it divorces deterrence from warfighting; and (2) it elevates deterrence from a strategy (means) to an objective (end). The first effect is evident in Collins's definition that "Deterrence is a strategy for peace, not war." If this is true, the strategy vanishes just at the moment when guidance is most needed. Obviously, deterrence can and should play an intrawar role in the form of escalation control. There is a need for a body of concepts to describe that role and further to specify the transfer of deterrence value down the hierarchy of conflict from one level to the next. Reed recognizes this need to transfer from passive to active deterrence in a discussion of the relationship of traditional principles of deterrence to principles of war. The second effect, elevating deterrence to an objective, erects a conceptual shield between the task of deterrence and the purpose of deterrence. There is need for a theoretical construct that bridges the gap between deterrence and defense and does so in a fashion that correlates the short-term military balance with the more fundamental political and economic consideration of relations among nations. *

*For an innovative and significant work that addresses these needs and advances a comprehensive rationale to relate nuclear weapons and U.S. national objectives, see Carl H. Builder, A Conceptual Framework for a National Strategy on Nuclear Weapon, (Rand Corporation R.2598-AF, forthcoming,)

One final requirement for the necessary new concepts: they should be verifiable. And there is a growing body of work that attempts to do this.

In a recent review of trends in deterrence theories, Robert Jervis identifies three waves of U.S. theorists.⁵ The first wave' appeared immediately after World War II and served as basis for the 1955-65 second wave. Deterrence writings of the third wave are primarily empirical studies. The major contributors to date are Alexander George, Patrick Morgan, and Richard Smoke.6 The primary tool of the third-wave theorist is the case study, although other methods of analysis are also being used. Since the third wave is in part a riptide from the second, nearly as much emphasis is placed on delineating the limitations of deterrence concepts as on specifying their use. The third wave is discovering some interesting attributes of deterrence practices and has the potential to develop into a meaningful, coherent body of studies. Empirical verification is a tedious process, so it is unlikely that findings will be published at the rate that concepts were generated by the second-wave analysts.

IN THE meantime, what are the principles of deterrence, and how are they to be used? The principles that Reed and Collins agree on are prescriptive rather than descriptive, which arouses a suspicion that they are more deeply rooted in experience than in predictive theory. This condition accords with the approach used by Clausewitz, who based his general theory of war on experience and the study of history. In this regard, Clausewitz's view of the role of principles and theory is instructive.

Clausewitz held that theory serves to guide one's attention to relevant history. Theory illuminates reality and increases understanding but will not suffice as a guide to specific future actions.

If principles and rules develop from the observation that theory institutes, if the truth crystallizes into these forms, then theory will not oppose this natural law of the mind. It will rather, if the arch ends in such a keystone, bring it out more prominently, but it does so only to satisfy the philosophical law of thought. . . . For even these principles and rules serve more to determine in the reflective mind the general outlines of its accustomed movements than as signposts pointing the way to execution.⁷

In some instances individual principles apply but not in others. To select the appropriate action for a specific situation, one must accurately perceive reality and understand the entire intellectual construct from which the relevant principles were derived. Clausewitz calls this ability genius, and Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles labels it an "intuitive grasp of the whole."⁸ A strategist who has attained this level of intuitive understanding does not operate from a checklist of principles; and one who has not attained this level will not gain much from a checklist, for the list itself does not answer the question of which principles and when to apply. A strategist who relies on precepts to guide action risks allowing theory to dominate reality and distort perceptions of events. This is why Clausewitz warns that theory can be used to educate the mind but should not accompany the military commander "to the battlefield."⁹

SUCCESS in any human activity embodies certain principles. Reed and Collins offer several principles of deterrence distilled from the authors' experience, observation, and contemplation. Principles predicated on present deterrence theory are questionable, for it has yet to be shown that fundamental elements of the theory can be empirically verified. And even principles that are found to be valid should be used as aids to study and understanding rather than as practical checklists for action.

1. Robert H. Reed, "On Deterrence: A Broadened Perspective," Air University Review, May-June 1975, pp. 2-17. At that time Reed was a member of the USAF Six Man Group of colonels (Reed, Stuart W. Bowen, Robert W. Kennedy, William H. L. Mullins, John L. Piotrowski, and Leonard J. Siegert) who collaborated at Air University on studies for the Air Force Chief of Staff.

2. Major works by these analysts during the mid-1950s to mid-1960s include the following: Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton University Press, 1959); Kahn, On Thermonuclear War (Princeton University Press, 1960), Thinking A bout the Unthinkable (Horizon Press, 1962), and On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios (Praeger, 1965); Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard University Press, 1960), with Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), and Arms and Influence (Yale University Press, 1966); Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton University Press, 1961); and Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs, January 1959, pp. 211-34.

3. Quoted in Roberta Wohlstetter's Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 354.

4. Y. Harkabi, Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace (Jerusalem: Israel Program for Scientific Translations, 1966), p. 4.

5. Robert Jervis, "Deterrence Theory Revisited," World Politics, January 1979, pp. 289-324.

6. Major third-wave works include Alexander George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Columbia University Press, 1974); Patrick Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Sage, 1977); and Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Harvard University Press, 1977). For some interesting approaches to the task of testing deterrence theories, read Raoul Naroll, Vern L. Bullough, and Frada Naroll, Military Deterrence in History: A Pilot Cross-Historical Survey (State University of New York Press, 1974); Bruce Russett, "The Calculus of Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 1963, pp. 97-109; and Clinton F. Fink, "More Calculations about Deterrence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1965, pp. 54-65. See also Colin S. Gray, "Across the Nuclear Divide--Strategic Studies. Past and Present," International Security, Summer 1977, pp. 24-46.

7. Clausewitz, War, Politics, and Power, translated and edited by Edward M. Collins, Colonel, USAF (Regnery, 1962), p. 158. The same passage in a different translation is found in Clausewitz, On War, translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 141.

8. Eccles, "Strategy--The Theory and Application," Naval War College Review, May-June 1979, p. 19. 9. Howard and Paret, On War, p. 141.

Lieutenant Colonel Phillip D. Gardner is a United States Air Force Rand Research Fellow.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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