Air University Review, January-February 1980

They Also Served

A VISIT to the bookstore or even to a local drugstore or discount house will show that much is being written about World War II. Authors and publishers churn out endless floods of paper, pages of which seem to drip with blood and gore . These books, stressing the dramatic and heroic, run up an astronomical body count, nearing the 40 million actually killed in the conflict. Apparently, such an approach is profitable, for the buying public consumes the material almost as rapidly as it is produced. Unfortunately though, the important but much less bloody and dramatic home front has been neglected .

There have been studies on the home front, but none have caught the attention or imagination of the public. There are Richard Polenberg's excellent general study of the U.S. home front and Richard Lingeman's more journalistic social history. Probably a better example is John Blum's V Was for Victory, reviewed in an earlier issue of Air University Review.¹ For those interested in the broader aspects of World War II, three recently published books on the home front should also be considered.

ALAN MILWARD's War, Economy and Society: 1939-1945* is the most important and the best of the three. To his previous studies of the economies of Germany, France, and Norway during World War II,² Milward offers this scholarly economic survey of the Second World War. The author makes extensive use of foreign language sources and of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) in putting the economic aspects of World War II into 365 pages of text. For those readers who may want more detail on a particular subject, footnotes and a 19-page bibliography are useful.

*Alan S. Milward, War, Economy and Society: 1939-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977, $12.95), 365 pages, bibliography.

Milward tells how Germany got a sizable jump on the Western Allies during the period 1933-38 when the U .S. and Britain each spent only about 43 percent as much as the Germans did on arms. (p. 25) Germany's strategy of warfare of loot and profit was based on armament in width, that is, sufficient armament for immediate superiority without gearing up the economy for total war. The blitzkrieg strategy was successful until the continued resistance of Britain and Russia turned the war into a conflict dependent on mass armies and mass production. Germany's short war strategy failed in the protracted conflict that followed, for the Allies had the advantages of greater resources and having begun total mobilization sooner than the Axis. As early as 1941, Allied production was equivalent to Axis production, and, by 1944, the Allies were outproducing the Axis three to one, with the U.S. producing 40 percent of the world's armaments. (pp. 57, 67) The American contribution to production was unmatched. The U.S. supplied not only her own troops but extended massive assistance to her Allies as well. One example is the American production of almost 300,000 aircraft, only slightly below the combined wartime production (305,000) of Germany, Britain, and Japan; Russia produced about 137,000 aircraft. (p. 74) If adjustments are made for size and complexity of the aircraft produced, the U.S. edge would be even greater. The official Army Air Forces history estimates that in 1944 the combined airframe weight produced by Britain, Germany, Japan, and Russia was less than two-thirds that of the U .S. production.³

Milward can be provocative. For example, he asserts that: "there is no convincing evidence that the overall speed of technological advance was greater in wartime." (p. 180) Here is one place where further explanation and footnotes would have been welcomed. Another, better developed idea, although certainly worthy of even greater attention, concerns the contrast between the Allies' success with aviation and their relative failure with armor. Milward states that the strong American commercial aviation base helps explain the former while a number of factors account for the latter. He includes the initial Allied decision to field highly mobile but lightly armored tanks, long lead times, and tactical doctrine. Another factor he mentions is that both the U.S. and Britain emphasized air and sea forces over ground forces. (pp. 40, 182-83, 295).

Milward discusses control of the wartime economies, the economies of the occupied countries, and such topics as technology, labor, finances, and agriculture. He also touches on such diverse subjects as the economic impact of the war on the economies of the smaller countries and on women, as well as the Bengal famine that left 1,500,000 people dead.

Unlike many another author, Milward shows an understanding of the strategic air war, which, in light of his fine study on the German economy, is to be expected. Strategic bombing is discussed in a 34-page chapter which, within the limits of the book and relative to the discussion of other topics, adequately covers the subject. He writes that air warfare fell short of Allied expectations because the bomber was not as potent as expected, the bombing campaign lacked the required continuity, the Axis powers were able to adapt to both their opponents' tactics and their own weaknesses, and be-cause the economic systems were more complex than anyone had anticipated. Nothing new or startling here, reflecting Milward's reliance on the USSBS studies. (pp. 298-99)

Milward's effort is to be applauded as a badly needed and well-done scholarly survey, covering the important aspects of a significant and neglected subject. In light of the scope of the topic and the space available, Milward has done a fine job.

But there are other ways to approach the home front story. Americans Remember the Home Front* is just that--quite a different kind of book, approaching the subject through the recollections of 200 Americans on the home front. Author Roy Hoopes writes that "maybe, with a little poetic license, a hundred people can speak for a hundred million." (p. xiv) Perhaps.

*Roy Hoopes, Americans Remember the Home Front: An Oral Narrative (New York: Hawthorn, 1977, $12.95), 395 pages.

Certainly some doubt the utility of oral history. Others will criticize Hoopes's sample as unrepresentative; indeed, it does seem to consist mainly of successful, middle-class, college-educated folk. Another weakness is the decided lack of editing, which results in overlong segments, apparently randomly arranged, and, at times, seemingly endless trivia.

For those undaunted by these real and potential problems, there are redeeming qualities. The interviews occasionally sparkle with the excitement, the prowar feeling, and the patriotism of Americans engaged in a war they believed in. The reader senses and is almost overwhelmed with the feeling of the American people being brought together for and by the common endeavor, a refreshing contrast with more recent experience.

Other impressions abound, some of which are of current interest. Coverage of the progress and difficulties of blacks and women, two groups that prospered during the war, is good. The other is that the most serious difficulty encountered on the home front was not food rationing, blackouts, air raid drills, or the like, but gasoline rationing.

The final three chapters are very good, much better than the bulk of the book. One entitled "The Ultimate Cost of Victory, " deals with the reaction of civilians toward the death and capture of their loved ones. It is truly marvelous and worthy of being read by all.

So, Americans Remember the Home Front is what its title proclaims. Because it is very personal, it will probably be of greater popular interest than either of the other books reviewed here.

A third approach to the home front is that of a detailed study of a limited topic. Michael Sherry does just this in his Preparing for the Next War, the contents of which are better described by the subtitle, America Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45.* Sherry's object is to give an overall view of the U.S. military's wartime planning, concentrating on the Army.⁴

* Michael S. Sherry, Preparing for the Next War: America Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-45 (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1977, $12.50), 238 pages.

The book is not only based on extensive research and documentation but, in addition, is also well written. The heart of the book is the discussion of universal military training. Sherry insists that a "determined, well-organized, and articulate opposition, " bad timing, and the fortunes of war defeated the measure. (pp. 74-75) While this probably explains specific events in the 1940s, Sherry does not consider the American antimilitary tradition and the more important and deeper question: Can America ever adopt universal military training?⁵

Airmen should be alerted that they may be put off by this book. First, Sherry uses rather pejorative language in referring to aviators; employing such adjectives as "ambitious" and "brash" and such phrases as "strategic air power infected the air staff" and the "melodramatic AAF effort." (pp. 19, 96, 109, 227) Second and more serious is the author's failure to appreciate air warfare, especially strategic bombing in World War II. A comparison of Milward's treatment with Sherry's makes that point. Sherry, like so many others, is guilty of citing and quoting USSBS but not reading it very deeply. He does not mention the impact of Allied air superiority or the oil campaign on the course of the war. Pertinent to Sherry's work regarding the AAF position on postwar policy are the concluding three pages of USSBS's Overall Report, especially the next to last paragraph:

Speed, range, and striking power for the air weapons of the future, as indicated by the signposts of the war in Europe must--specifically--be reckoned with in any plans for increased security and strength. The combination of the atomic bomb with remote control projectiles of ocean-spanning range stands as a possibility which is awesome and frightful to contemplate.⁶

Another issue not fully developed is that of the Soviet threat, Sherry never makes clear whether the Soviets were a threat in 1945 or not. Had this point been clarified, the author's conclusions might be more soundly based.

Sherry concludes that the postwar growth of America's military resulted from economic and power factors as well as military planning, which he labels "an ideology of preparedness." He claims this mentality emerged before the end of the war and before the U.S.-Soviet rivalry. But in view of the oscillating fortunes of the U.S. military in the years since 1945, this argument is difficult to support.

Sherry is clearly on target on occasion, such as when he writes that "policymakers developed a misguided faith in American technology, especially air power and nuclear weapons, to deter or check future aggressions." (p. 237) That he is often far afield, though, is probably no more evident than in the book's concluding lines:

Determined never again to be caught off guard by a Hitler, they [America's soldiers and scientists] set out to patrol the world in the interests of peace. They seemed unaware that they might provoke other nations as much as pacify them. In 1945, the alternative to preparedness and global peacekeeping appeared to the policymakers to invite national suicide. The course they ultimately followed became for the world, including the United States, substantially as dangerous. (p. 238)

All in all, Sherry’s survey is an important work on a little studied subject. While it will not have much popular appeal and may be criticized by some, students of military policy in the post- World War II period will have to come to grips with it.

These books indicate how little study has been done on the home front and that there are important and neglected aspects of the subject that need to be explored. But, with the exception of the oral history approach, these same studies show no possibility of rivaling the popularity of battle history. The overwhelming fact is that the number and impact of combat histories push studies of noncombat activities into relative unimportance. A more realistic approach, that is a balanced view of how the war was fought and won, would give the home front more prominence. Such a view is shared by neither the public nor the publishers; but the student of World War II who does not give the home front the greater attention it deserves, unnecessarily limits the value of his work.

Radford, Virginia

Notes

1. Richard Polenberg, War and Society: The United States 1941-1945 (Philadelphia, 1972); Richard Lingeman, Don’t You Know There’s a War On? (New York: 1970); John M. Blum, V Was for Victory: Politics and American Culture during World War II (New York, 1976), reviewed by Captain Robert C. Ehrhart in Air University Review, July-August 1978, p. 92. Also see Keith L. Nelson, editor, The Impact of War on American Life: The Twentieth-Century Experience (New York, 1971), an anthology with a valuable bibliography.
2. The German Economy at War (London, 1956); The New Order and The French Economy (London, 1970); The Fascist Economy in Norway (Oxford, 1972).
3. Frank Craven and James Cate, editors, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. VI: Men and Planes (Chicago, 1955), pp. 350-51.
4. See Perry M. Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945 (Baltimore, 1970); Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943-1946 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1966); and William M. Wix, "The Army’s Plans for Its Postwar Role, 1943-1945," Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1976.
5. The author uses Robert Ward’s 1957 University of North Carolina Ph.D. dissertation, "The Movement for Universal Military Training in the United States, 1942-1952." A more recent study is Frank D. Cunningham, "The Army and Universal Military Training, 1942-1948," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1976.
6. United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Over-all Report (European War) (Washington: GPO, 1945), p. 109.

Kenneth P. Werrell (USAF; Ph.D., Duke University) has taught recent American and military history at Radford University since 1970, with the exception of one year at Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has published numerous articles in historical and military journals and has just completed a book-length manuscript on the Eighth Air Force in World War II. Currently, he is working on an annotated bibliography of that organization for publication by the Eighth Air Force Historical Society. He is a previous contributor to the Review.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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