Air University Review, January-February 1980

Soviet Power On
The Threshold of the Eighties

IF any consensus can be derived from Western analytical perspectives on the contemporary Soviet scene, it is that the 1980s probably will not differ measurably from the 1970s with respect to the U.S.S.R.'s major domestic and foreign policy thrusts. Current Soviet writings, and particularly high-level party and state policy pronouncements, further reinforce this admittedly cautious but not complacent trend projection. Barring unforeseen events that might alter current Soviet internal programs and international policies, this predictable trend reflects neither extreme optimism nor abject pessimism for the probable course of Soviet affairs. Even with probable leadership changes, the absence of prominent reform elements in the Communist Party elite hardly optimizes prospects for significant systemic alterations in the post-Brezhnev context.

In the event then, it may be worthwhile for the West to evaluate the Soviet system intensively in order to reach a broader understanding of the system itself and attain a better indication of its traditional domestic bases and current external projections of national power. One work that provides significant current reference data on just about every aspect of Soviet domestic and international affairs is USSR Facts and Figures Annual (UFFA), under the editorial direction of Professor John L. Scherer.* As the first volume of a continuing series. UFFA presents the latest possible data on Party and Soviet state affairs, armed forces organization, and the vital economic sector, as well as a number of other significant aspects of the Soviet system.

*John L. Scherer, editor, USSR Facts and Figures Annual (UFFA), vol. I (Miami: Academic International Press, 1977, $31.50), 320 pages.

Although the publisher's deadline evidently affected the editorial effort, in that 1976 data are the latest reflected in the work, UFFA presents a wide array of recent source material and has significant value as a current reference work. For those who seek data on the major internal sources of Soviet power, UFFA is especially useful in pointing out the readily apparent Soviet emphasis on intensive and interlocking organizational structures throughout the entire party-state apparatus. UFFA coverage of these organizational and administrative areas also makes it quite obvious that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), while still a distinct minority party after sixty years in power, far exceeds the quantitative weight of its membership (about 6 percent of nearly 260 million people) in maintaining control of the Soviet state. Briefly put, this initial edition stands on its own merits as a solid research effort that is both timely and comprehensive in its coverage of Soviet affairs. As the Soviet system enters its seventh decade, one hopes that future editions will maintain this excellent precedent as a reference guide to both its internal sources and external projections of power.

In another approach to Soviet power, Colonel M. P. Skirdo provides a firsthand assessment of the socioeconomic elements of Soviet national strength in his characterization of the continued CPSU monopoly of power within the huge Soviet state.* A recent addition to the U.S. Air Force translation series, this 1970 work, gives an inside glimpse into CPSU dominance of the military and other key socioeconomic areas that remain vital to the continued maintenance of a powerful Soviet national security posture. Lest someone assert that Skirdo's work is of predétente vintage and, hence, out of step with more recent Soviet perspectives, travelers to the U.S.S.R. report that it remains on prominent display in Soviet military bookshops after some ten years in print.

*Colonel M. P. Skirado, The People, The Army, The Commander, USAF "Soviet Military Thought" series, No. 14 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, price not given), 166 pages.

Primarily concerned with military matters and the essential role of the Soviet population in supporting the defense effort, both past and present, it seems fairly obvious that the author might have added "the Party" to the book's title. Colonel Skirdo, who prepared this work while a senior faculty expert on Marxism-Leninism at the Soviet Armed Forces General Staff Academy, declares without hesitation: "The strength and invincibility of the Soviet people and their army are attributable to the wise and battle-seasoned Communist Party," (p. 165 ) Ideological propaganda-- yes; an accurate portrayal of who controls the Soviet system--without a doubt! Nor does he shy away from identifying the U.S.S.R.’s glavnyy vrag ("main enemy") which requires the peaceloving Soviet state to maintain its huge offensive-oriented military establishment:

The principal organizer and inspirer of imperialist aggression is the U.S. American imperialism constitutes the principal threat to peace in the entire world. It is preparing to commit the most terrible crime against mankind, i.e., a thermonuclear world war. (Italics in original, p. 7)

While it is worth noting that ten years have passed and the U.S. has not revealed any such inclination to initiate a nuclear holocaust involving the Soviet-Union, one should also observe that the détente-era "relaxation of tensions" also has not resulted in any less vehement ideological characterizations of the United States in Soviet writings. Most current publications, and particularly those emanating from the Soviet military press, tend to reinforce Skirdo's officially endorsed assertions of 1970. Also suggestive of this thematic consistency, Colonel-Doctor Skirdo has since departed from the General Staff Academy and now is a research professor at Moscow University's G. V. Plekhanov Institute of the Economy. (The Plekhanov Institute, a prominent Soviet "think tank," is often consulted by the Soviet decision-making elite regarding such national security matters as SALT, MBFR, and Soviet-American economic relations.)

If Skirdo furnishes an all-too-familiar inside view of the CPSU's direction and control of the total Soviet effort to achieve superiority over its ideological enemies, Professor Roy Godson's insightful monograph on Soviet efforts to gain influence within the international labor movement furnishes another dimension to its current projections of power abroad.* While the CPSU has long since reduced Soviet labor unions into useful mechanisms for full control over its workers, it also has maintained an active interest in gaining control of non -Communist labor organizations elsewhere as an important means of altering the global sootnosheniye sil ("correlation of forces") in its favor. Godson observes that despite heavy setbacks during the immediate, postwar years, the Soviets have continued their efforts with both renewed vigor and considerable sophistication over the past decade. He also points out that this huge Soviet campaign, particularly in the Third World, has included a consistently substantial expenditure of human and financial resources which, in spite of recent exposés, makes earlier U.S. and Western counter-efforts appear rather puny by comparison.

*Roy Godson, The Kremlin and Labor: A Study in National Security Policy (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, 1977, $ 3.25 paper), 79 pages.

His treatment of CPSU direction of this effort through the Soviet-controlled international labor front organization, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and its regional counterparts, deserves careful consideration for its assessment of current activities by this oft-overlooked, quasi-official instrument of Soviet external policy. For the 1980s, Godson believes that Soviet efforts to gain influence among international labor will continue as an "indirect approach " mechanism in complete coordination with more overt projections of its global politico-military power. As a possible countermeasure, he strongly recommends that the West develop a concerted strategic program to deny any further attempts to capture this vital human resource.

Last, but certainly very meaningful for this new decade, is the critical issue of Soviet-American détente. Amidst a steady stream of topical works that have appeared since the signing of the initial SALT accords in May 1972, one book that merits attention for its coverage and perspectives is Richard Barnet's The Giants.* Quite similar in approach to his previous studies that exposed the inner workings of multinational corporations and international arms merchants, Barnet's historical development of sixty years of Soviet-American relations bears with it a certain bias toward the superpowers' political elites. From his rather revisionistic viewpoint, these rival elites appear to have somehow fumbled and blundered their respective ways over the past six decades into the common realization that they do share a number of vital interests, particularly the avoidance of a devastating nuclear war, in spite of their widely divergent ideological belief systems and gross misperceptions about one another. Not that Barnet errs in his basic facts or historical coverage; but he does tend to carry his arguments to rather tenuous extremes. It is as if the author expects his readers to don sackcloth and ashes in expiation for Ambassador William C. Bullitt's deep mistrust of the Stalinist regime back in the 1930s or Cardinal Spellman's well-founded animosity toward communism two decades later. Nor will military readers find much comfort in that he seems to equate "military" with "militarism," and the Doctor Strangelove image of General Jack D. Ripper looms large in his reflections on the influence of the U.S. Armed Forces leadership on the détente process. Likewise, an evident downplay of the avowed Soviet detachment of "ideological struggle" from détente seems to equate periodic shifts in Soviet tactics with overall strategic aims as he traces the first five years of the post-1972 U.S.-Soviet relationship. While it may be true that official U.S. policies and perceptions have tended to shift in one direction or the other in near1y every decade since 1917, it is much more correct that the Soviet leadership has never renounced its longstanding ideological intent to achieve final victory over the "imperialistic" West. Moreover, immediate circumstances more critical to Western survival than traditional misperceptions brought the two superpowers into confrontations over Berlin in 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis the following year. While sharing the author's optimism for the future durability of détente, it is also difficult to concur with the objectivity of his analytical perspectives. For that reason, this work does not represent the final word on this most crucial issue of our times.

*Richard J. Barnet, The Giants: Russia and America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1977, $7.95), 190 pages.

While it may be prudent to forecast that the domestic roots and external projections of Soviet power in the 1980s will not vary widely from their current scope and thrusts, this outlook is hardly complacent. If anything, the substantial expansion of Soviet military and economic power during the post-1960 "Revolution in Military Affairs" offers lesson enough for the coming decade. The additional Soviet inclination to project this power and influence in many areas abroad, especially in the Third World, and its apparently nonnegotiable insistence on continued ideological struggle with the "imperialist bloc" leave an obvious implication that the West will face a multifaceted, highly sophisticated Soviet challenge in the years ahead. Understanding the full essence of that challenge in its current context may well represent a meaningful first step in formulating an effective Western response for the future.

Annandale, Virginia

Major Joseph E. Thach, Jr., USAF (Military Intelligence), (Ph.D., Georgetown University) serves on the staff of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. With a doctorate in Russian history, he is an elected member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He was a Soviet area analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency. Dr. Thach is a graduate of Air War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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