Air University Review, September-October 1979

Few issues are as vital as the current discussion over American defense policy. Many military spokesmen and defense scholars charge that America's military might is eroding. Detente appears a one-way street. They contend that the Soviets use detente merely as guise to deter U.S. military development, while the Russians continue full-scale military commitment. The critics allege that American policy in recent years has been disastrous: SALT I emasculated U.S. strategic supremacy; the B-1 and other weapon decisions limited military options; and current manpower policies such as the all-volunteer military are expensive failures. Military unionization lurks on the horizon, and even one of the future cornerstones of our strategic defense, the cruise missile, is a subject of negotiation.

Current trends portend serious dangers. The current administration, as did its predecessors, denies that the situation is as catastrophic as the critics suggest.

Doubtless, the Soviet Union aspires to military superiority. The Soviets' military ascendancy in recent years is undeniable. Unquestionably they have employed detente as a successful tactic. Yet their desire for détente is more than charade. The essential question, however, is whether the United States has slipped dangerously behind the Soviets militarily, or have we maintained what Kissinger referred to as "essential equivalence" and Carter calls "rough equivalence"?

The debate is too often political and polemic rather than nonpartisan and analytical. It rages in the political arena, in the popular press, and in an ever increasing list of pseudoscholarly books. Fortunately, it exists on a higher plane as well. Groups such as the United States Strategic Institute and the National Strategic Information Center are leading scholarly voices of protest.¹ They are matched by an equally impressive array of government defense analysts and academic and think-tank scholars. Several important books on the topic of detente and deterrence have appeared in the last few years. Three of the books reviewed here speak to this issue on a scholarly plane. The other study addresses the antecedents of the present condition: the growth of a national security deterrence mentality during the origins of the Cold War.

A host of books on the origins of the Cold War emerged in the late sixties and early seventies. Their ideological tone and their quality varied greatly. Most were written before the opening of State and Defense Department documents for the crucial postwar years. Even the best of these studies must be read in this light. The so-called "revisionists" dominated the field. Their perspectives and conclusions varied, but all challenged the basic assumptions held by the "traditionalists" or "orthodox" explanations of the Cold War. Primarily, they questioned the axiom that the Soviets bore the major, if not the total, guilt for the emergence of postwar hostilities. They contended that an aggressive American policy was far more than reaction to Soviet expansion. Different authors assigned various levels of responsibility and blame to the United States. The more extreme found the U.S. guilty of capitalist imperialism and thus totally at fault for the Cold War.

The revisionists raised new questions, electrified the issues, and inspired a second wave of scholarship in response to their allegations. Cold War traditionalists such as Herbert Feis, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Hans Morgenthau, and George F. Kennan offered new works accepting some revisionist points but primarily taking them to task.² By the early seventies so many different positions existed in the historiographical debate that the old categories of traditional and revisionist were no longer adequate. Revisionists ran a wide gamut from mildly liberal to Marxist radical. Some early revisionist works that had caused significant stirs, such as Gar Alperovitz's Atomic Diplomacy, had been proved shoddy even by fellow revisionists.³ A second wave of revisionist scholarship appeared more substantial: less dramatic, more scholarly, and better researched. Gabriel Kolko established himself as the leading radical exponent, and Thomas Patterson ranked as one of the soundest scholars of the less radical revisionists.⁴

Meanwhile, an exceptional postrevisionist study emerged, John Lewis Gaddis's The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947.⁵ The book received rave reviews, won several prestigious awards, and inspired new terms such as "neotraditionalist" or "neorevisionist" (depending on the persuasion of the critic). The book, which attempted to analyze the full diversity of factors responsible for the Cold War and to explain rather than to assess blame, quickly became the classic in the field. Several Ph.D. dissertations and books in the Gaddis model followed.

Few research areas are as potentially prolific as the Cold War decade. Government archives are now open for years into the early fifties. The amount of material available is overwhelming. Dozens more major studies of the origins of the Cold War and the Cold War decade should appear in the next few years. No work can hope to be definitive; the topic is too dynamic, too vast. The best that the scholar can aspire to is that for a brief moment his book may have its day in court, its contributions fairly assessed.

Daniel Yergin stands at this point.* First written as a Ph. D. dissertation at Cambridge University in 1974, his book Shattered Peace received significant publicity when published in 1977. It has been called, with some justification, the best study of the origins of the Cold War to emerge since Gaddis's book. Unquestionably, it is a balanced, perceptive, and insightful work. Definitely in the Gaddis model, the study attempts to move beyond the questions of responsibility and guilt to investigate the complex interplay of international politics that resulted in the Cold War. As the author states, "This is not a book for those who want a simple story, a morality play, a confirmation of prejudices, or a rationalization for or against present-day policies."

*Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, $15.00), 526 pages.

Yergin's major purpose is to explain the development of the Cold War mentality that he calls the national security state. He focuses on the interplay between policy-makers, their perceptions, and the basis for the hard decisions rendered. He asks: "Was not some form of détente--some explicit ground rules--possible earlier, much earlier? Why did diplomacy fail and confrontation become a way of life?" He can examine only the Western side of the story. No nation is so open and forthright with its diplomatic material as is the United States. Soviet materials remain totally closed.

The author's concentration on top policymakers reminds one of Lloyd Gardner's Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949.⁶ Yergin's book, though, is a much better researched, fairer, and more balanced account. Still, he too may overplay the role of key individuals and not give enough attention to less tangible factors such as bureaucratic inertia and national sentiment.

Yergin contends that two competing assumptions, two world views, two perspectives on how to interpret and react to the Soviet Union, vied for supremacy after World War II. Re coins the terms the "Riga" and "Yalta" axioms as shorthand for the two approaches. The Riga axioms, named after the interwar American observation post in the capital of Latvia, where the infant American Soviet Service developed, represented a hostile attitude toward cooperation with the Soviets. Later, hardliners such as George F. Kennan, Joseph C. Grew, Loy Henderson, and Charles E. Bohlen interned in Riga. To Yergin the term stands for the realpolitik, hardline, anticommunist approach that triumphed in the Truman administration.

The Yalta axioms, reflecting the spirit of the Crimean conference in early 1945, represented the Wilsonian or liberal internationalist tradition dominant in America for most of the first half of the century. This position, best exemplified by Franklin D. Roosevelt and later Henry A. Wallace, viewed Russia as a traditional Great Power, a difficult nation but one with which the U.S. could deal if patience and understanding were employed.

Yergin states that neither alternative had a monopoly on truth. In the end, however, the Riga axioms prevailed and provided the base for the national security state. The Yalta axioms, the basis of detente, lay dormant. The author feels that the possibilities for diplomacy and accommodation were not played to the fullest. Policy-makers exaggerated the "range and degree of the Soviet challenge" and the "immediate military threat" to the United States. They operated on the premise that it was safer to act on the worst possible assumption. Accordingly, the United States armed itself, assumed unilateral defense of the Free World, and rejected any compromise with Soviet objectives. Compromise was defined as appeasement, a doctrine proved bankrupt by the war.

As he judges, Yergin admits that the historian has the advantage of hindsight in his assessment, and he does not bear the responsibilities of the moment that weigh so heavily on participants. Still the historian has the obligation to search out the truth and judge as the facts dictate; but he must be fair, honest, and compassionate toward beleaguered participants. Above all, the historian must not attempt to force the record to conform to preconceived notions nor to support his current political desires. Yergin admirably meets these standards.

I have some problems accepting Yergin's model entirely. It seems too pat, too simplistic. But this is a good book, an interesting study that makes a significant contribution. It will not replace Gaddis, but it is a fine companion piece.

The other three books deal with the current problems of policy-makers. Professor Patrick M. Morgan of Washington State University critiques current deterrence theory and assesses the proper role of deterrence in present national security.* The book is a theoretical study. Morgan begins with the classic Deterrence in American Foreign Policy. Theory and Practice by Alexander George and Richard Smoke as he strives to develop an adequate definition of deterrence.⁷ He then discusses the mechanics and dynamics in practice. Finally, he turns to the proper role in foreign policy. The author believes that too much emphasis has been placed on strategic nuclear deterrence. He explains that despite its seeming logic it can easily fail and nuclear war result. Confidence in it is misplaced: "The key contribution of a theory of deterrence should be to point out how it works, and thus how tenuous it can be, to encourage steps to reduce the damage if it fails, and ultimately to encourage efforts to move away from reliance on deterrence."

*Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1977, $6.00), 216 pages.

Morgan concludes that nuclear deterrence has become less and less sensible. Yet deterrence theory has not kept up with the present reality. It proposes what the author considers oversimplified crises decision-making models, which may intensify the possibilities of tragedy by erroneously convincing participants that they are in control of the situation. Finally, it rationalizes excessive nuclear capacity, "justifying overkill capacities that expand the possible costs of war without thereby enlarging the national security." Morgan is particularly interested in bringing proliferating nuclear armament under more stringent control. He asserts that the great powers have excessive stocks of unnecessary strategic weapons, which invite higher levels of destruction should deterrence fail. As he claims: "There really is 'overkill' and it really is senseless."

As an alternative, Morgan advocates greater emphasis on conventional military capabilities. While these forces have minimal deterrence value against the Soviet Union, they playa major role in support of allies and in situations where nuclear deterrence is not functional. These weapons have been and can be employed in confrontation situations. Unfortunately, Vietnam contributed to an adverse climate for limited war and conventional capacity. The frustrations and mistakes of Vietnam intensified reliance on nuclear deterrence.

Morgan's book raises some interesting points. It poses several dilemmas and important questions, but it provides little practical guidance. The author knows the literature in the field; he argues impressively. But like many theoretical propositions, it sounds better on paper than in practice. His case is premised on certain assumptions that other defense experts would challenge. For one, he misunderstands overkill, as the next study will demonstrate. The book has certain scholarly interest, but it merits less serious practical consideration.

Edward N. Luttwak, Associate Director of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, an Associate of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies, and one of the nation's leading students of strategic power, offers the converse to Morgan's argument.* The thrust of Luttwak's excellent study is the efficacy and necessity of nuclear strategic deterrence. He declares that despite its dangers the balance of terror works. However, he fears that deterrence is endangered as American strategic power is falling behind the Soviets. While he stresses the complexity involved in assessing comparative strategic power, he postulates conclusions on the current balance.

*Edward N. Luttwak, Strategic Power: Malta", Capabilities and Political Unity (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1976, $3.00), 70 pages.

First Luttwak details why a "minimum deterrence force" is inadequate. Such a limited force could deter the Soviet Union from a direct "out of the blue" attack on the U.S. by promising retaliatory destruction of Soviet cities and the prevention of any Soviet counterforce effort. But this kind of situation is not likely to occur. Both adversaries realize that mutual destruction would be the end result. A more likely scenario would involve attacks on American allies or against U.S. forward base systems. With a minimum deterrence force, the U.S. would have to employ forces slated for the ultimate defense of the homeland (the Armageddon capacity so to speak) to respond to this situation. Minimum capacity does not allow flexibility of response. Obviously, more force than just that to protect the homeland is necessary; the question is how much excess.

Luttwak explains that a nation must have forces capable of responding to every possible challenge by hostile nations without encroaching on the forces designated in the last resort to annihilate the enemy homeland. The amount of force necessary IS relative to the potential of the enemy. Overkill could exist only when one nation's power is excessive after preparing for every logical eventuality. The United States does not enjoy such security; thus the popular overkill metaphor is naive, a myth perpetrated by those innocent of power realities. Finally, Luttwak notes that nuclear strategic power plays a role in international politics beyond its use only in warfare. Power gives a nation options in many realms.

The bulk of the book details the comparative strategic weapons balance of the United States and the Soviet Union. Although he employs pages of charts and tables, Luttwak explains that mere numbers themselves mean little. The Soviets' obvious numerical advantage codified in the SALT I agreements is not conclusive evidence that they have strategic superiority. Comparisons based on anyone criterion are misleading. Far too much of the debate on the strategic balance revolves around such simplistics. One cannot assess the balance without addressing variables such as throw-weight, vulnerability, flexibility, number of independent warheads, and reliability of systems. Despite Soviet buildup and numerical advantages, American technological superiority has maintained parity. Luttwak points out that this is a precarious kind of security. The Soviets are fast closing the gap and have surpassed the U.S. in several critical areas. He questions whether the United States can continue to stake security on technological superiority over the Soviets. Undoubtedly were he writing today, he would be even more dubious.

The author also notes that the Soviets have proved more effective negotiators than the Americans. The Russians employ their numerical advantages as bargaining chips. While they accept any U.S. concessions, they concede little themselves without quid pro quo. They have been most effective in extracting tradeoffs for any action taken. They tend to maintain outdated missiles in their arsenal until they can garner concessions from the U.S. to deactivate them. The U.S. approaches weapon systems from a military and economic standpoint; cost effectiveness is important. The Soviets are more interested in the international political role their weapons play, what they can gain in negotiation, than in the impact military spending has on the domestic economy.

Luttwak concludes with a brief discussion of the U.S. strategic bomber force. He is a strong exponent of the strategic bomber and the B-1. He argues that few weapon systems have the capability and flexibility of the B-1. Finally, he injects a plea for greater emphasis on civil defense, a major Soviet concern but a low American priority.

Although slightly dated, as are all studies in this area the minute that they come off the press, this is an outstanding book, a succinct, clear, scholarly treatment of a complex and vital subject. It should be widely read.

Finally, we turn from strategic to tactical nuclear weapons. In January 1976 the National Strategy Information Center, an organization committed to serious study of national security issues, met in private conference to consider the role of tactical nuclear weapons in the defense of Western Europe. The resulting book contains an introduction by eminent military historian and analyst Bernard Brodie, an article by Samuel T. Cohen and William R. Van Cleave, and a summary of the conference discussion.*

*Toward a New Defense for NATO: The Case of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1976, $2.00), 61 pages.

Brodie begins with a brief history of the changing doctrines of tactical nuclear weapons. Since the Korean War, strategists have wavered back and forth and still today have not worked out an accepted doctrine. Military commanders appear to be ambivalent. Brodie cautions that the Soviets are prepared for tactical nuclear warfare and would probably employ it in any strike into Western Europe. Yet NATO remains wedded to a conventional response to conventional warfare.

Cohen and Van Cleave develop these points further. They emphasize that NATO has neither coherent doctrine nor strategy for tactical nuclear weapons. Neither is NATO postured to withstand nuclear attack. Revamping to defend against such a possibility requires fundamental changes in force posture and structure as well as logistics practices. It is dangerous to believe that the same forces organized, equipped, and trained to fight a nonnuclear war can shift automatically to a nuclear posture if the necessity arises.

The remainder of the book consists of questions posed by National Strategy Information Center president and conference chairman Frank Barnett and a series of unattributed responses. The consensus definitely supports NATO's employment of tactical nuclear weapons.

This is a difficult book to evaluate. The topic is important, and the study makes a contribution; but it barely scratches the surface of the issue. More important, its concern may be a bit passé as NATO is moving toward a more tactical nuclear capacity.

The Carter administration and those following will continue to grapple with these vexing issues. An intense national security debate will continue to rage in Congress, among civilian and military experts, and in the larger public arena. Detente and deterrence are controversial and difficult problems. Correct answers and effective policy are essential, but the problems are much easier to define than to solve. We will continue to exist in a world of ambiguity and uncertainty. One truth rings clear--as General Hoyt S. Vandenberg expressed it, "...the only war a nation can really win is the one that never starts." That is what deterrence and detente are all about.

1. For the thinking of the United States Strategic Institute, see any issue of their journal, Strategic Review. The National Strategic Information Center publishes extensively: agenda papers, strategy papers, and other book length offerings. The best expression of their thought on current defense issues is Francis P. Hoeber, David B. Kassing, and William Schneider, Jr., Arms, Men and Military Budgets: Issues for Fiscal Year 1979 (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1978).

2. See Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: the Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Norton, 1970); Lloyd C. Gardner, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and Hans J. Morgenthau, Origins of the Cold War (Waltham, Massachusetts: Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970); and George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967).

3. Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Vintage, 1965).

4. See Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945 (New York: Random House, 1968); Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972); and Thomas G. Patterson, Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).

5. John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

6. Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970).

7. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

Joe P. Dunn (Ph.D., University of Missouri) is Assistant Professor of History and Politics and head of the International Affairs major at Converse College, Spartanburg, South Carolina. Previously, he spent three years with the University of Maryland (European Division), teaching in Greece, Turkey, Germany, and Spain. He has read papers at several historical conferences and has published over 50 book reviews it) scholarly journals. Dr. Dunn is a Vietnam veteran and a former member of the South Carolina Army National Guard.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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