Air University Review, May-June 1979

The Intelligence Bookshelf

Intelligence, espionage, counterespionage, and covert operations are important subjects for the military professional interested in our own security and the capabilities of potential enemies. These subjects are also important to private citizens concerned with both a healthy national defense and the preservation of our basic freedoms. Five recently published books offer insights into some of the concepts of intelligence operations.

Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century by Constantine FitzGibbon has a provocative title, but the book itself does not measure up.† Following a brief outline of the intelligence apparatus of the Soviet Union, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, the main body of the work is devoted to the origin, conduct, and conclusions of World Wars I and II with emphasis on political and diplomatic aspects. Secret intelligence in both wars was primarily concerned with cryptographic (code breaking) information.

†Constantine FitzGibbon, Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Stein & Day, 1976, $12.95), 350 pages.

FitzGibbon provides a good description of the work of British Admiral "Blinker" Hall and his Room 40 team reading the secret German messages during World War I, including the Zimmerman telegram to Mexico on 17 January 1917. The British exploited this cable in "perhaps the most perfect large-scale politico-military action" to get the United States in the war. (p. 166) American secret intelligence during World War I was centered on the work of Herbert O. Yardley in the State Department Code Room, which has been largely unappreciated and ignored. Even this effort "quietly faded away" following Secretary of State H. L. Stimson's remark that "Gentlemen do not read one another's mail." (p. 158) This was not to be the last time that such moralistic pronouncements were to take priority over realism in American foreign policy.

Secret Intelligence also has an interesting discussion of the historical impact of President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, the first of which rejected secrecy as a relic from an evil age. Wilson ignored the secret covenants on division of spoils of war reached by our Allies prior to 1917. His moral pronouncements, including a promise to the Germans of a "permanent peace of justice," impressed the enemy but not our Allies. The President seemed never to realize any need for secret intelligence on the concealed plans and intentions of his country's enemies or Allies. He was not alone in the futile hope that the "War to end all wars" would eliminate the need for secret intelligence.

FitzGibbon's conclusion of "almost incredible incompetence by the American Central Intelligence Agency" in the Bay of Pigs operation is surprising. It represents a subjective judgment without the benefit of authoritative writings on the event, including those directly involved.¹ The primary fault must lie with a young, inexperienced president who ordered the Bay of Pigs action and who, after the operation was launched, withdrew vital air support that was part of the approved plan and a key to its chance for success. While some biased media's comments on the Cuban affair could support the authors conclusion, the degree of ignorance displayed here is rare for one purporting to have researched his subject with any care.

The author is more sound in his description of the German Enigma Machine and the Ultra operation at Bletchley, England, where secret German messages were read through the end of World War II. Having served as an American officer assigned to Ultra and later to General Omar N. Bradley's 12th U.S. Army Group, FitzGibbon is able to depict the whole spectrum of cryptographic intelligence from its collection and analysis to its use on the battlefield. The necessary extreme measures to protect knowledge of Ultra, including use of the Lucy Ring to warn Stalin of the attack by Hitler, are well described. But more complete and authentic records of Ultra and its effect on World War II are available in other writings.² Strangely, the author concludes that "Secret intelligence...used in the Second World War...played no important part in the final victory over Nazi Germany so far as the Western powers were concerned." (pp. 29596)

Throughout Secret Intelligence, FitzGibbon takes a hard line against the American failure, in his opinion, to recognize and react against the obvious moves of the Soviets to further Communism during and following World War II. He concludes that the Third World War actually started in the skies over Warsaw in August 1944 when the Soviets used U.S.--made planes, sent for their defense against Hitler, to shoot down American supply planes coming to aid the Polish defenders of that city.

The Soviets viewed 1945 not as the end of World War II but as completion of a successful campaign gaining vast territory, but much remained to be conquered by one means or another. There has not been any failure of Western intelligence to discern Soviet motives; rather, "this sell-out to the Soviets," initially by President Roosevelt, has been protracted by those who control our foreign policy. The outcome of the Third World War "remains undecided, and the Soviet leaders may yet revert to naked aggression if they decide they cannot win either by proxy or by subversion."(p. 321)

Constantine FitzGibbon says he was offered, but refused, a job with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) when it was created following World War II. As a result, he admits to "no direct knowledge of secret intelligence in any form since 1946." With such knowledge he might have spared himself the dubious conclusion of "almost incredible clumsiness" on the part of the CIA on discovery of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. The real facts show a truly sophisticated collection operation involving Air Force aerial reconnaissance and most advanced analysis techniques that identified the missiles soon after their arrival in Cuba. This timely intelligence enabled the President to take decisive action to eliminate the weapons before they became operational.³

Near the end of the book, FitzGibbon evaluates the existing intelligence structure of the U. S. as "based on outmoded, legalistic concepts." The National Defense Act of 1947 not only created an independent U.S. Air Force "when most intelligent persons...were accepting the fact that an autonomous air force was a mistake" but made the same type of error in failing to completely centralize all intelligence and counterintelligence activities in the newly created CIA. The "built-in errors" leave the National Security Agency, the Aerial Reconnaissance Program of the Air Force, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and certain counterintelligence activities of the FBI relatively independent.

The author ignores the duties of the Director of Central Intelligence to coordinate and prevent duplication of intelligence functions. These duties, established by present law, are distinct from the role of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, although assigned to the same officer who is provided with separate deputies and staffs for each responsibility. This distinction was further clarified and reinforced by Executive Order 12036, issued by President Carter on 24 January 1978, which makes it clear that the Director of Central Intelligence is the principal intelligence officer of the U.S. government, controlling the budgets and coordinating the intelligence activities of all departments and agencies.

In summary, Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century only partially treats secret intelligence during World Wars I and II. The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) is barely mentioned, and secret intelligence in the Asiatic wars is ignored. The Defense Intelligence Agency is neglected. Code breaking during both World Wars is discussed, but no mention is made of the work of the National Security Agency. Some apparent conclusions in one part of the book are inconsistent with other parts. This is not a book that a busy Air Force officer should bother to read. There is better writing on each of the subjects treated here.

A good book that explains how intelligence estimates are constructed and fed into the policy-making process is U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat by Lawrence Freeman.† It is a competent exposition of the importance of political considerations, initially in the estimates themselves but more important in the formulation of national policies deriving from the estimates. Top political leaders arrive with their own concepts of world affairs and are not uniformly impressed by intelligence estimates that do not conform.

†Lawrence Freeman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1978, $22.50), 235 pages.

Lawrence Freeman records the rise (under Eisenhower and Kennedy) and fall (under Johnson and Nixon) of the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) produced and strongly influenced by the CIA. Both Johnson and Nixon were irked by the CIA's pessimism concerning U.S.--Indochina policies. Henry Kissinger disliked the "agreed" aspects of the NIEs, preferring to keep different opinions visible so that he and his NSC staff could shape the estimates and the resulting national policies.

A discussion of the key intelligence debates of the 1950s is followed by a detailed study of estimates on the vulnerability of the Minuteman (ICBM) to a first Soviet strike. Under McNamara the objective was preservation of "nuclear stability" with both sides retaining an "assured destruction capability even after the first strike. Superiority was no longer a goal of policy. The U. S. must avoid precipitate actions that would stimulate a counterreaction by the Soviets.

By 1969, the increase in both the number and size of Soviet ICBMs was seen as a real threat to Minuteman, although the Air Force insisted that eighty-five percent of the force could survive. Among the options considered were increased hardening of the silos, making the missiles mobile, and emphasis on antiballistic missiles (ABMs). The latter alternative was viewed as a major impediment to SALT, to which Nixon and Kissinger gave top priority. The Air Force continued to support the three pillars of deterrent: Minuteman, longrange bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Possibly as a show of good faith in SALT, the Soviets slowed ICBM construction in 1970, but in 1971 came the intelligence of a new generation of Soviet ICBMs. The effect was to add urgency to Kissinger's efforts to achieve a breakthrough on SALT. He believed that things would get worse without an agreement. The Soviets' new generation of missiles may have been their "bargaining chip." The SALT agreement was signed in 1972.

Current intelligence indicates that while not actually violating the letter of SALT agreements, the Soviets have pushed and explored every possible loophole. This feeds the Pentagon's suspicion of Soviet motives and the belief that the Kremlin does not subscribe to the V.S. theory of mutual deterrence.

U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Strategic Threat should be read by Air Force intelligence officers and, at least, perused by senior officials concerned with planning and strategic concepts.

Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage and Covert Operations edited by Paul W. Blackstock and Colonel F. L. Schaf is a most complete and useful guide.† It is a bibliography listing the most significant books, journals, magazine articles, and newspaper accounts in each of the four categories of the title and includes a more detailed breakdown within each subject. For each listed document, the editors provide brief annotations of scope and content which are sources of considerable useful information.

For example, the annotation of a Congressional Research Service document records the actions of Congress between 1947-1972 relating to oversight committees for the CIA. Two bills for this purpose reached the floor and were defeated by more than a two-thirds majority. During that quarter-century, only the President controlled the actions of the CIA, but since 1972, Congress has gone to the opposite extreme by injecting itself into covert and clandestine operations--with the inevitable security leaks and losses of effectiveness. A reasonable balance is yet to be achieved.

In contrast to the flood of writings on intelligence and espionage, there is a relative dearth of open information on the organization, functions, and doctrine of counterintelligence and counterespionage. In Part IV of the book, the editors note the paucity of theoretical or even descriptive works about covert operations as instruments of foreign policy.

This guide, designed primarily for the American public, is a very useful book for the busy Air Force officer with an interest in any of the four aspects of the title. It includes a selected bibliography of fifty books suggested for personal collections or small libraries. The publications are primarily about the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but the list includes works on most of our NATO allies as well as on Israel, China, and Japan.

Spies and All That by Ronald M. DeVore is another excellent bibliography of available literature concerning intelligence organizations and their operations.†† It includes a short essay entitled "An Approach to Reading about Intelligence," which outlines the four phases of the "Intelligence Cycle": planning, collection, analysis, and use.

†Paul W. Blackstock and Colonel F. L. Schaf (editors), Intelligence, Espionage, Counterespionage and Covert Operations: A Guide to Information Sources (Detroit: Gale Research, 1978, $18.00), 256 pages.

††Ronald M. DeVore, Spies and All That...Intelligence Agencies and Operations: A Bibliography (Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, 1977, $3.00), 71 pages.

If, as suggested in the essay, the historical development of intelligence activities has suffered from scholarly neglect, this 'little book will help cure the defect. It identifies recent works revealing that the allies were able to read Axis communications throughout World War II, which demands a revision of the earlier histories of that conflict. Some of the seemingly skillful moves by allied generals may be attributed as much to the superiority of their intelligence operations as to their innate skill. The spy in his cloak may be fading, but he now has some "exotic companions such as the satellite parked 25,000 miles out in space, guarding the United States against surprise nuclear attack." Spies and All That. lists many of the documents needed to help the scholar span the infinite variety of areas concerned with intelligence.

THE use of animals constitutes another of the exotic aspects of human conflict, and The War Animals by Robert E. Lubow describes the techniques and results of efforts to train birds and animals for military tasks beyond the capabilities of either humans or machines.† The research here recorded has increased our knowledge of behavior modification in animals--and also, possibly, in humans.⁴

†Robert E. Lubow, The War Animals (New York: Doubleday, 1977, $7.95), 255 pages.

The author traces the use of war animals from ancient times to World War II, when the pigeon was tried out as a homing device for the Pelican missile. But military authorities were unwilling to rely on a bird-based system, and the "pigeon in a Pelican" never became airborne.

As might be expected, the dolphin is identified as the most useful of aquatic creatures. What the dog can do on land, the dolphin is capable of doing in water--including finding and retrieving specific objects. The Soviets have done considerable research in the training of dolphins, no doubt related to military needs. Collection of intelligence by detection of metal objects such as mines and enemy submarines and the delivery or retrieval of sensitive electronic equipment in restricted locations are tasks for which the dolphin is especially suitable.

The last half of the book concerns the selection, training, and use of dogs. In contrast to the superior vision of the pigeon, it is the dog's acute nose that creates its value for intelligence and paramilitary purposes. Even the experienced nose men of the perfume, wine, and cheese industries have not developed the olfactory system of the dog. The hounds (for example, the bloodhound) use ground scent, while the retrievers (pointers and setters) seem to use airborne scent to accomplish their assigned tasks.

Working with the Limited Warfare Laboratory in Aberdeen, Maryland, Robert Lubow undertook a program to train dogs to help Army units in Vietnam track guerrilla infiltrators back to their encampments. Labrador retrievers were selected for this assignment. At least four dogs completed the training and performed well at the feasibility demonstration. Tracking was accomplished after delays of up to an hour after departure of the target. In each case, the dog assumed the down position--a vital element of the stalking training--as soon as the target's presence ahead was perceived. The dogs and all the training data were turned over to the U.S. Army in 1969. Additional dogs were trained and successfully employed in Vietnam for purposes of locating mines and booby traps.

A short chapter near the end of The War Animals records Lubow's contact with the Central Intelligence Agency, which was interested in ways to avoid a tracking dog--apparently as part of a scheme to aid in the escape of American prisoners from North Vietnam, Another chapter discussed methods of injecting odors into potential targets--such as feeding garlic--to ensure that the dogs cannot miss the trail, Still other chapters concern the use of dogs in control of narcotics and explosives at airports,

For one interested in the subject, this is a valuable book, The author, a noted clinical psychologist clearly committed to scientific methods, has made a valuable contribution to a little known field of scientific research,

1. See David A. Phillips, The Night Watch (New York: Atheneum, 1976).

2. See Anthony C. Brown, Bodyguard of Lies (New York: Harper & Sons, 1975). Reviewed by Captain Daniel T. Kuehl, "Military History: Four Approaches: Air University Review, May-June 1978, p. 76.

3. See Ray Cline, Secrets, Spies and Scholars (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1976) and Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks, The C.I.A, and the Cult of Intelligence (New York Knopf, 1974).

4. For a recent study of human behavior modification, see Vance Packard, The People Shapers (New York Little, Brown & Co, 1977)

Colonel Wendell E. "Tex" Little, USAR (Ret), (B.A, University of Texas; M.A., American University) is living in San Antonio, Texas, after serving 21 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, where his assignments included Korea, Japan, Pakistan, and Germany. During World War II, he served in Africa, Italy, France, and Germany. An Air War College graduate, Colonel Little is author of several articles concerning intelligence and strategic planning and a frequent speaker on national security.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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