Air University Review, May-June 1979
Questions of military doctrine and force structure may seem somewhat esoteric to many Air Force officers absorbed in their day-to-day concerns. But doctrine and force structure are nothing more than our method of fighting and the number and type of forces that method requires. Doctrine and force structure ultimately define the job of every officer in the Air Force, and the correctness of that definition determines whether each officers effort will lead to success or failure.
Spending money on defense will not give us security if our doctrine is wrong, or if our force structure does not suit our doctrine. There is an anecdote, probably apocryphal, concerning a 1930s' meeting between Charles de Gaulle, then a junior colonel, and Leon Blum, the Premier of France. De Gaulle supposedly approached Blum and expressed concern about the state of France's defenses. Blum replied, "But we are spending more for defense than the previous government!" De Gaulle's rejoinder, "It is for what you are spending the money that concerns me," reflected his awareness of how important doctrine and force structure could be, an awareness too few Frenchmen shared.
The reasons why doctrine and force structure are important are clear. Perhaps less obvious, but equally important, is what the relationship between doctrine and force structure tells us about the way we make defense decisions. Obviously, our force structure should follow logically from our doctrine. The present article will suggest that this may not be the case; a suggestion which may, in turn, pose some interesting questions about the defense decision-making process.
U.S. ground force doctrine is a good example of the problem. Theoretically, there are two basic types of ground force doctrine: firepower/attrition doctrine and maneuver doctrine. Both employ the same elements, fire and maneuver, but firepower/attrition doctrine uses maneuver primarily as a way to transport and position firepower so that firepower can physically destroy the enemy by attrition. According to firepower/attrition doctrine, the object of military action is physical destruction of the enemy. This is not the object of maneuver doctrine, where firepower is used only when necessary to create opportunities for maneuver. Maneuver doctrine's object is to break the spirit and will of the enemy command by creating surprising and dangerous operational or strategic situations.
In modern times, World War I provides the best example of the application of firepower/attrition doctrine. At Verdun, the Germans attained the ultimate refinement of firepower/attrition. On the basis of previous calculations of relative casualty rates, they seized a few square miles of land specifically to create a human "meat grinder." The essence of the firepower concept, as expressed at Verdun, is simple: if you can apply enough firepower to the enemy, you can destroy his equipment and kill his troops until he no longer has equipment or troops.
In contrast, maneuver doctrine in the twentieth century has usually meant armored warfare.1 The first person to realize the potential of maneuvering tanks as an alternative to the Verdun slaughter was the British military thinker Major General J. F. C. Fuller. Fuller realized that the best way to employ the new tanks invented during World War I was to emphasize their mobility: "During the [First World] war ...the tank had been used as a self-propelled armored gun...had the war lasted another year, it would have become apparent that in themselves tanks...were not weapons, but instead vehicles...their dominant characteristics were new means of movement. ..."2 Fuller noted
the ultimate connection between will and action; that action without will loses coordination; that without a directing brain an army is reduced to a mob. Then it became fully apparent...that by means of the tank a new tactics could be evolved, which would enable a comparatively small tank army to fight battles like Issus and Arbela over again. What was their tactical secret? It was that, while Alexander's phalanx held the Persian battle-body in a clinch, he and his Companion Cavalry struck at the enemy's will, concentrated as it was in the person of Darius. Once this will was paralyzed, the body became inarticulate.3
The Germans picked up this theory from Fuller via General Heinz Guderian and embodied it in the panzer concept. But even before Guderian, General Hans von Seeckt had given the German army "a gospel of mobility...In the exaltation of maneuver, these post-war [WWI] German manuals offered a striking contrast with those of the French Army. ..."4 Guderian notes that the French
doctrine was the result of the lessons that the French had learned from the First World War, their experience of positional warfare, of the high value they attached to fire power, and of their underestimation of movement. These French strategic and tactical principles...[were] the exact contrary of my own theories...5
The clash in 1940 between the German maneuver doctrine and the French firepower doctrine resulted in a striking victory for the German army.
The Germans adopted a maneuver doctrine for two reasons particularly relevant to the U. S. situation today. The first was that the Germans, like the Americans today, could not match their opponents in numbers. The Polish, French, and British armies combined were a much larger force than the German army. Soviet and other Allied forces were still numerically superior in 1941. The Germans--or at least Germans such as Guderian who understood and pressed for a maneuver doctrine--realized maneuver could give a psychological multiplier to the forces of the party employing it. A relatively small force could break the spirit and will of the enemy high command by a series of rapid and unexpected moves.
Guderian's campaign in France was a brilliant example. His force, which shattered the plan and nerve of the Allied high command by its daring advance through the Ardennes to the English Channel, consisted essentially of only three divisions. At no time in the decisive fighting in the French campaign did the Germans have more than ten panzer divisions, yet these did the bulk of the fighting. Their success demonstrated that maneuver doctrine is the military equivalent of judo, substituting balance for brute force. Like judo, it is the best technique for the belligerent with less brute strength.
The Germans also discovered at the outset of World War II that maneuver doctrine reduces casualties. Because its object is to destroy the enemy's mental cohesion, not to destroy his men and equipment by slow, costly attrition, maneuver doctrine lets the offensive forces avoid tactical engagements rather than seek them. German casualties were light in the Polish campaign; both German and Allied casualties were relatively light in the subsequent French campaign of 1940. Even in the 1941 Russian campaign (before Hitler had abandoned a maneuver doctrine), German casualties were still acceptable for a country which had to conserve its manpower. The large number of Russian prisoners captured by the Germans in 1941 further attests to the ability of maneuver to destroy an enemy's will without destroying him physically.
Some defense analysts have argued that modern defensive firepower has now become so overwhelming that maneuver is no longer possible, and a firepower/attrition doctrine is the only option. This may be a dangerous assumption. The battle of Kursk demonstrated that World War II firepower, like its more sophisticated modern counterpart, could also defeat an armored force attacking a defended position head-on. What happened at Kursk was not the defeat of maneuver doctrine, but a failure to use it. Kursk is a classic example of the high price paid by those who abandon the principle of maneuver.
By contrast, the Israeli counteroffensive across the Suez Canal in 1973 showed that maneuver doctrine could bring decisive results against modern firepower. Analysis of the 1973 war has tended to stress the increased effectiveness of firepower on the defense, but it has overlooked another, perhaps more important lesson: that blitzkrieg remains viable. Properly understood, blitzkrieg is the use of mobility to create situations that the opponent does not expect. The Israeli armored thrust across the canal, the decisive military action of the Sinai campaign, was a classic example of maneuver doctrine in that it surprised the Egyptians and upset their strategic plan. Had the superpowers not intervened, this maneuver might well have enabled the Israelis to achieve their war aim of restoring the Suez Canal as the cease-fire line.
Despite the apparent desirability of maneuver doctrine on the modern battlefield, the U. S. Army seems to prefer the firepower/attrition doctrine of World War I. A study of Army doctrinal publications shows little concern for maneuver, except as a way of transporting and positioning firepower. The new Army FM 100-5, Operations, is a prime example. The second section, entitled "Modern Weapons on the Modem Battlefield," describes the battlefield as an almost mathematical diagram of overlapping ranges, rates of fire and kill probabilities. It discusses the firepower capability of the tank before mentioning its far more important mobility.
This chapter sets the tone for the rest of the field manual. For example, the section entitled "Battlefield Dynamics" (chap. 3, p. 3-4) addresses the strength of the defender in terms of his ability to apply or avoid firepower. The attacker, on the other hand, appears to be at a disadvantage, because "the weapons of the attacker are not as effective as the weapons of the defender, and his forces are more vulnerable," The section does not mention the attackers' advantages of bypassing the defender or striking his flank or rear. When mobility is finally addressed (p. 3-4), it is as a means of concentrating firepower. When 100-5 discusses the offensive (p. 4-1), it gives destruction of enemy forces as the first purpose of offensive action. "Destroy his [the enemy's] will to continue the battle" is tacked on the end of purpose #3, just slightly above deception and diversion as a main objective.
Only a few, isolated sections of Field Manual 100-5 approach a useful understanding of maneuver. In general, the doctrine expressed in 100-5 (and thus by the Army) is the same as that stated in the French manuals of 1940, " 'of the two elements, fire arid movement, fire is preponderant.' "6
The doctrinal issue of firepower versus maneuver is of importance to the Air Force, which must provide most of the tactical air support for America ground forces. Thanks to NATO plans for a firepower/attrition defense, the utility of tactical air has become increasingly doubtful in a European scenario. Because of the NATO forward defense strategy, which is based on the firepower/attrition concept, the first days of the central front war will be decisive. However, in order to avoid unacceptable losses to Warsaw Pact air defenses, NATO's tac air units will have to spend much of their effort during the first days of a War attempting to suppress air defense systems. In doing so, they will be fighting a private war with little relevance to the main ground conflict during the ground war's decisive phase.
The question we are exploring here, however, is not doctrine per se, as important as that is. We are examining the relationship between doctrine and force structure. If, for purpose of illustration, we turn again to the Army, what do we see in its force structure? Does Army force structure also reflect a belief that war is predominantly a matter of firepower rather than maneuver?
Not surprisingly, the structure of the Army does not reflect a maneuver concept of war. The clearest evidence is the prevalence of foot infantry. Maneuver warfare (at least in Europe and the Middle East) generally requires mechanized forces, especially tanks, rather than foot-mobile infantry. Of the 16 active Army divisions, 6 are foot infantry.7 In contrast, the Soviet army, which has in general a maneuver concept of war, has no regular foot infantry: only its 7 airborne divisions are not mechanized.
Another indication that the Army's force structure does not reflect a maneuver doctrine is its logistics system. If war is conceived in terms of maneuver, a quick decision is generally anticipated; there is less expected need for massive resupply and repair efforts. The primary requirement is for initial combat power: for divisions and for combat battalions. The Soviet army, with its high ratio of divisions to total manpower, and of equipment to men within a division, reflects the requirement for high initial combat power. Applying both of these indices to the U.S. Army, we see that if the present Army of 790,000 men were organized on the Soviet model, it would field approximately 50 divisions, not 16. The differential goes largely into a massive logistics system. Similarly, while a Soviet armored division of about 9500 men has 325 tanks, a U.S. armored division of approximately 16,500 men has 324. In the U.S. Army, neither the ratio of divisions to total manpower nor that of equipment to manpower within a division reflects the usual force structure priorities associated with a maneuver doctrine.
A comparison of U. S. and Soviet armored vehicle design shows consistency with U. S. rejection of maneuver doctrine. Soviet tank design gives top priority to characteristics desirable in meeting engagements, the type of engagement anticipated to be most frequent in a war of maneuver. These include low silhouette (at the expense of main gun depression capability); high accuracy of the main gun at short and medium, rather than long, ranges; and high automotive reliability for a specified number of operating hours (instead of easy maintainability). In contrast, U. S. tank design emphasizes characteristics more desirable when fighting a set-piece action from a prepared position: good main gun depression for defilade or hilltop defense firing--at the expense of an M-6O silhouette almost one meter higher than a T -62; an emphasis on complex fire control and main weapon systems intended to give accuracy at long ranges (e.g., the M-6O, A2); and an emphasis on battlefield maintainability in anticipation of a stable battlefield and a slow tempo of operations. Comparisons of the Soviet BMP and the proposed U.S. infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) show parallel differences.
Thus, the U.S. Army does not have a maneuver doctrine, and, not surprisingly, Army force structure does not reflect a maneuver doctrine. This seems quite reasonable. Since we have also seen that the U.S. has a firepower/attrition concept of war, we would naturally assume the force structure reflects that doctrine.
But does it? Some questions can be raised about the degree to which Army force structure reflects a firepower/attrition concept of war. In some, respects force structure does reflect such a concept; for example, the large logistics system is intended to provide the support required in an attrition-oriented firepower conflict. But other elements in the force structure seem as inconsistent with firepower as with maneuver doctrine.
The prime example, once again, is foot infantry. Just as foot infantry has too little mobility to be effective in a war of maneuver, so it is also a poor investment if the requirement is firepower.
The firepower per man of foot infantry is inferior to that of any other type of combat force. For example, a foot infantry squad of 11 men normally has an organic firepower of 11 M-16 rifles and 2 light antitank weapons. A mechanized infantry squad of 9 men, with its organic IFV, has one 25 mm cannon, 9 antitank weapons, 1 machine gun, and M-16 rifles. A tank crew of only 4 men has a 105 mm cannon with 55 rounds of ammunition, plus 2 machine guns. Another interesting indication that Army force structure does not optimally reflect a firepower doctrine is provided by comparing U.S. and Soviet ratios of manpower to firepower. As previously noted, the Soviets conceive of war largely in terms of maneuver. Yet their army has a higher ratio of firepower systems to men than does the U.S. For example, a Soviet motorized rifle division of 12,000 men has up to 90 artillery pieces plus 18 multiple rocket launchers, for a man to major-firepower system ratio of as low as 111:1. AU. S. mechanized division of 16,300 men has 66 artillery pieces, for a ratio of men to guns of 247:1.
If the structure of the Army does not reflect a maneuver doctrine, yet also does not consistently reflect a firepower doctrine, what doctrine does it reflect? It would seell1 that it does not systematically reflect any doctrine.
Why does force structure not seem to be a logical reflection of doctrine? It may be because Army force structure and the structure of the Air Force and Navy as well to large degree reflect a defense decision-making process strongly influenced by intrainstitutional factors. Intrainstitutional factors are those influences that reflect not the objective purposes of and obstacles facing the service--such as mission and threat--but rather the parochial interests and outlooks of groups or individuals within the organization.
It should not surprise anyone who has studied organizations that a service's decision-making process over time becomes strongly influenced by intrainstitutional factors. It is not a phenomenon peculiar to the U. S. Army or Air Force. It could be seen in the French army in the 1930s, the Russian army in the early part of this century, and in the Prussian army before Jena. It is visible in almost all of our government bureaucracies. It can be found in many elements of the private economy, particularly the more established industries such as steel and railroads.
To say that intrainstitutional factors strongly influence our defense decision-making process is not to say that the current crop of generals, admirals, and civilian defense decision-makers are singularly inept. To be sure, such a situation does indicate a leadership failure, but primarily it reflects normal human behavior. Unless an institution is periodically called to account; with its continued existence as an institution in question, in terms of its objective purpose and the environment in which it must compete, the individuals within the institution tend unconsciously to lose sight of both the purpose and the environment. People tend over time to equate their most important concerns with those which require most of their time. Most of a general officer's time is dedicated to ensuring the well-being of the element of the service that he commands in its day-to-day administrative life within the service, not to worrying about a potential enemy. That same general officers time went into similar concerns when he was a captain, a major, or a colonel, i.e., when he formulated his basic assessment of what is important.
It seems possible to identify a link between intrainstitutional factors and at least some of the discontinuities between doctrine and force structure to which this article has alluded. If we examine the continued prevalence of foot infantry in the Army in light of possible intrainstitutional explanations, we see something interesting. The Army high command levels, which play the most significant role within the Army in setting force structure, have been dominated by generals with an infantry background. Of our 13 Army chiefs of staff since World War II, 9 have been from the infantry and only 1 from armor.
In his book On Watch, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, the former Chief of Naval Operations, stated:
Internal forces in the Navy had contributed to unbalancing it in the 1960s.... for the last quarter-century or more there have been three powerful "unions," as we call them, in the Navy--the aviators, the submariners, and the surface sailors--and their rivalry has played a large part in the way the Navy has been directed.... Whichever union such a commander comes from, it is hard for him not to favor fellow members, the men he has worked with most closely, when he constructs a staff or passes out choice assignments. It is hard for him not to think first of the needs of his branch, the needs he feels most deeply, when he works up a budget. It is hard for him not to stress the capability of his arm, for he has tested it himself, when he plans an action.8
There is no reason to believe that the unions Admiral Zumwalt described are restricted to the Navy. Does the Army continue to have a substantial amount of foot infantry because the infantry "union" has dominated the Army high command? Does the Air Force continue to plan expensive new generations of fighter and attack aircraft because they are more cost-effective than ground-to-air and ground-to-ground missiles, or because the tactical air "union" strongly influences the Air Force high command?
Unfortunately, the studies required to establish the degree of intrainstitutional influence in the defense decision-making process do not exist, at least in forms useful to national decision-makers. Few tasks have greater potential significance, and few could contribute more to the efficiency and effectiveness of our defense forces, than undertaking thorough, usable studies of the role intrainstitutional factors play. If such studies were to establish that these factors playa large or even controlling role in determining force structure, they could open the way for objective reanalysis of current force structures. This in turn could create an atmosphere in which beneficial restructuring might take place. The defense decision-making process itself might be redesigned to ensure that a reform of force structure would not be merely a one-time event, after which old habits would reassert themselves.
We must begin to examine all our organizations in terms of the structure and resultant internal dynamics of the institution itself. It is unlikely that the armed services, or other governmental organizations, will be reduced in size or complexity. However, the internal structure of these organizations can, and must, be modified so that intrainstitutional factors do not work at cross purposes to the organizations objective reason for being. Merely calling an organization an air force or an urban mass transit administration does not in itself mean that the organization will effectively defend the nation or improve public transportation.
The officers of the United States Air Force could playa key role in this process by examining the influence of intrainstitutional factors in the decision-making process in the Air Force. Do these factors playa role in determining the structure of the Air Force? If so, how great a role? Have they created discontinuities between doctrine arid force structure? Do they inhibit realistic analysis of current and potential doctrines, or even of the threat? Air Force officers are better qualified than any outsider to give these questions the knowledgeable study they require. Such study could give the leaders of the Air Force and the nation the insights they need to avoid the fate which has befallen most militaries dominated by intrainstitutional concerns--defeat.
Washington, D.C.
Notes
1. The "infiltration tactics" of the German infantry in the latter part of World War I. however, and of the Chinese, Korean. and Vietnamese communists since, are a form of maneuver doctrine.
2. J. F. C. Fuller, Armament and History (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945), p. 143.
3. J. F. C. Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961 (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1961), pp. 242-43.
4. B. H. Liddell Hart, The German Generals Talk (New York: William Morrow & Co., Inc, 1948), p. 14.
5. Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Ballentine Books, 1967), p. 73.
6. B. H. Liddell Hart, p. 14.
7. Two of these are now being converted to mechanized infantry. In addition, all three Marine Corps divisions are foot infantry.
8. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch: A Memoir (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), pp. 63-64.
The opinions expressed in this article are the sole responsibility of the author and should not be assumed to reflect the views of Senator Hart, the Armed Services Committee, or any member of Congress.
Contributor
William S. Lind
(A.B., Dartmouth College; M.A., Princeton University) is legislative assistant for the Armed Services Committee to Senator Gary Hart of Colorado He has served as legislative assistant to Senator Robert Taft, Jr., of Ohio, and assisted him in the preparation of the Taft white paper on defense His publications include a critique of US Army doctrine in the Military Review (March 1977); proposals for restructuring the Marine Corp, in the Marine Corps Gazette (December 1975); and a critique of current naval force structure in U S Naval Institute Proceedings (March 1978) Mr. Lind is a doctoral candidate at Princeton.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.