Document created: 9 September 02
Air University Review, July-August 1979

In the mid-1960s, Soviet leaders initiated a substantial buildup of strategic nuclear weapons. In February 1978, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, in his annual defense report to the House Armed Services Committee, noted that a "standoff or stalemate" existed in the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.¹

Numerous essays, monographs, and books have been published dealing with the subject of alleged strategic parity between these two superpowers. Western military analysts have expressed fear that, if the present trend continues, the Soviet Union will eventually gain strategic superiority. Such a situation, they contend, could be potentially disastrous for the United States because it would give the Soviets tremendous leverage in international political and military confrontations. Nuclear blackmail could become a reality.

In early 1977, Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies published Francis P. Hoeber's monograph, Slow To Take Offense: Bombers, Cruise Missiles, and Prudent Deterrence.* As a result of the cancellation of the B-1 bomber, Hoeber's monograph may appear obsolete, but such happens not to be the case. Aside from the possibility that at some time in the future a successor to the B-52 may yet materialize, this effort provides an excellent discussion of the characteristics of the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and the land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. Hoeber's competence and rationality prevail over the complexity of the issues he confronts. Slow To Take Offense is a significant contribution to a field that historically has attracted more than its share of polemics and diatribes. The author's argument for a strategic nuclear deterrent that does not rely on hair-trigger response and that can react to a variety of challenges would appear to appeal to a wide segment of the American public.

*Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Jacquelyn K. Davis, SALT II: Promise or Precipice? (Miami, Florida: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1976, $2.50), 45 pages, appendices.

His unemotional, tightly reasoned analysis--written and published prior to the cancellation of the B-l--argues that the strategic trend in favor of the Soviet Union can be ultimately checked by development, production, and employment of a new manned bomber and air-launched cruise missiles. The B-52, Hoeber emphasizes, was developed in the post-World War II period and cannot last beyond the 1980s, even if upgraded. The long-range strategic bomber is the only part of the Triad (bombers, land-based ICBMs, and missile-launching submarines) with a conventional capability. This ability to deliver conventional weapons could conceivably abort conflict escalation in various confrontation situations.

Also, the manned penetrating bomber possesses a counterforce ability--as opposed to countervalue targeting, which threatens the civilian population--and is recallable. The threat of assured destruction (primarily destruction of enemy cities), according to Hoeber, "is not adequate to the deterrent needs of the country, since such an apocalyptic response would be inappropriate in many cases." (p. 11) Thus, the quick reaction of ICBMs could be an important disadvantage. The bomber has flexibility in limited strategic operations and in conventional use and complicates enemy planning for a surprise or pre-emptive attack. The air-launched cruise missile, Hoeber notes, should not be considered a potential substitute for the bomber. However, a strong ALCM research and development program should be emphasized. He observes that advanced bomber deployment and development of the ALCM should go forward, unencumbered by a Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreement "that is not verifiable with high confidence and does not insure equivalence." (p. 121)

The question of a potential SALT II agreement is the subject of an important monograph by Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Jacquelyn K. Davis, SALT II: Promise or Precipice?* The authors contend that the Soviet's deployment of heavy ICBMs (SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19) means that any SALT II agreement must provide the United States with the ability to develop strategic programs necessary to prevent additional erosion of the American strategic position.² Pfaltzgraff and Davis favor deployment of a supersonic bomber; equipping B-52s with cruise missiles, air-launched ballistic missiles, or short-range attack missiles; and development and deployment of an advanced missile such as MX.

*Francis P. Hoeber, Slow To Take Offense: Bombers, Cruise Missiles, and Prudent Deterrence (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1977, $3.95), 136 pages, appendix, tables.

Hoeber, Pfaltzgraff, Davis, and numerous other American and European defense experts and observers are gravely concerned over the significant increase in the Soviet's strategic nuclear capability--and also, it might be noted, in the vast increases in Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. Particular concern has focused on the Soviet's SS-18, an ICBM with a throw-weight about six times as large as Minuteman III. The SS-18 poses a severe threat to the U.S. land-based missile force.

The continued growth of Soviet strategic nuclear forces in relation to U.S. strategic power could eventually symbolize a shift in strategic superiority to the U.S.S.R. This circumstance might portend developments in international political and diplomatic affairs highly unfavorable to the United States.

The hard truth as seen by these authors is that the Soviet Union, rather than accepting strategic parity, is driving hard toward superiority in strategic military power, an objective set by Russian leaders in the 1960s. They argue that the United States requires a determined strategy to redress the balance and provide for effective American and Western security.

About 25 years ago, the late, distinguished American military and strategic authority Bernard Brodie wrote that in the decades ahead the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent would have to be the "constant monitor." He meant that it must be refurbished and always be the best. This is because it is the single capability that if allowed to seem to deteriorate in relation to the Soviets', the result could conceivably be catastrophic to the United States.

Hoeber, Pfaltzgraff, and Davis have drawn the issues and sounded a cautionary signal, warning of what they believe to be drift in American strategic policy and programs.

Notes

1. New York Times, February 3,1978.

2. For a useful, selective SALT bibliography, see Richard Dean Burns and Susan Hoffman, The SALT Era: A Selected Bibliography (Los Angeles, California: Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, 1977), $2.50, 43 pages.

Herman S. Wolk (M.A., American International College) is Chief, General Histories Branch, Office of Air Force History, Headquarters USAF. Formerly a historian at Headquarters Strategic Air Command, in 1974-75 he was a member of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Special Project on the History of the Strategic Arms Competition. He has published many articles and essays on military history and is a contributing author to Evolution at the American Military Establishment since World War II (George C. Marshal Research Foundation). Mr. Wolk is a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor