Document created: 9 September 02
Air University Review, July-August 1979

A Post B-1 Look at the
Manned Strategic Bomber

This has been one of the difficult decisions that I've made since I've been in office. In the last few months, I've done my best to assess all the factors involving production of the B-1 bomber. My decision is that we should not continue with deployment of the B-l's. And I am directing that we discontinue plans for production of this weapons system.¹

With these words President Carter ended the B-1 development project, the only continuing large-scale effort to inject modern technology and new vitality into our rapidly aging manned bomber fleet. To gain the full import of the President's decision, we must look back to three similar statements made earlier by responsible members of the executive branch.

Former Secretary of the Air Force Robert Seamans, speaking before the House Committee on Armed Services, 4 May 1971, said,

The FB-111 does not have the capability of the B-l as projected by a significant factor. It doesn't have the bomb-carrying capability to be a really competitive airplane that does not require tremendous tanker force, that can really penetrate into Soviet targets.²

Ten years earlier, in March 1961, before the same committee of the Congress, General Thomas D. White, then Chief of Staff of the Air Force, admitted,

I say, there is nothing wrong with the B-58 except that it has generally been overtaken by events...It is a very expensive weapons system ...And with a finite budget, let us say, other programs are more important than continuing the B-58.³

And only three weeks earlier Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara had testified:

After weighing all of the advantages and disadvantages, we have concluded that the B- 70 should not, at this time, be carried forward as a full-scale weapon system development.⁴

These decisions marked the termination, or decisive reduction by the executive branch, of each of the manned strategic bomber development programs intended to replace or augment the early 1950's technology of the B-52. In each instance the aircraft involved were engineering successes, meeting the technological challenge that had been set and providing sound flyable airframes that could have filled the originally perceived strategic need. Yet none was procured in strategically significant numbers.

The pouring of vast resources into these redundant development programs to update our manned bomber force, only to have each of them stillborn in terms of a refusal to make the final production decision, has been one of the real tragedies of our strategic arms procurement policy. While one can explain the refusal to produce a given weapon at a given time in terms of competition for scarce economic resources against more acutely felt domestic imperatives or alternative defense needs, the multiple failures to achieve the sought-for production of a new manned strategic system demand a more clearly focused analysis.

The demise of the B-1 sets a benchmark from which a retrospective review of efforts to establish and improve our manned strategic offensive force is imperative in order to determine the best response to these ever more crucial questions: Is there a need for a new manned bomber? If a new manned vehicle is necessary, what should be its characteristics?

To answer these questions it will be necessary to consider the changing role of the manned strategic system, its characteristics and how they contribute to our strategic posture, and the costs that such weapons incur. Then we will project these factors into the future to evaluate the potential for future manned bomber utility and discuss characteristics of such vehicles that would make a contribution to our strategic posture meriting their inescapably high expense.

Evolving Role of the
Manned Bomber

We cannot begin with any assumptions that the manned bomber has an unchallengeable place within our strategic arsenal. It is there because it is perceived to fill a need. It was there ten and twenty years ago because it filled needs then. The needs of the past are not the same as today's needs, however, and the needs that the manned bomber should be evaluated against for the future may well not be the same as those of today.

At the beginning of the atomic era, the manned bomber had a clear and unequivocal role to play. It was the only technologically feasible way to transport the awkwardly heavy weapons of the day to their eventual targets. The essential performance parameters were range and load-carrying ability. The nuclear bomber in its initial form of the World War II-proven Boeing B-29, regardless of the narrow margin by which it could meet these parameters, had no existing competition. Because it depended on forward bases or air refueling techniques then in their infancy, the B-29 was soon supplanted by larger and more capable aircraft, but no other type of vehicle could perform the mission. Thus, in the beginning, there was no debate over whether an air vehicle was destined to deliver the nuclear weapon, only debate over the nuclear weapons themselves and the contribution they would make to modern warfare.

However, the manned bomber was quick to find itself at the center of a hornet's nest of controversy. The high cost of successor aircraft to the B-29 and the organizational problem of carving out a separate Air Force from the living and protesting bodies of the pre-existing services exacerbated the bitter competition over drastically reduced postwar defense resources. The technological inability to predict accurately the performance of new large aircraft, such as the B-36, which were pushing back the frontiers of flight, complicated the problem and ensured that all sides of the argument were well equipped with equally ambiguous data.

The unquestioned primacy of the manned strategic aircraft began to be eroded by the debate over the capability of manned aircraft to penetrate increasingly potent enemy defenses and the embryonic development of ballistic missile technology. The B-29 had easily outperformed World War II fighter opposition. The B-50 and B-36 could give good assurance of successful penetration against the first generation of jet aircraft with limited range and firepower. But as the Soviets proved their tenacity in building and rebuilding effective antiair defenses to blunt any manned bomber attack, the creation of an unstoppable ballistic missile force became the obvious pathway to the preservation of unquestioned strategic offensive capability.

So even while we were building and operating large forces of B-47 and B-52 bombers, the tone of Defense Department spokesmen began to change noticeably. The heretofore unchallenged role of the manned bomber was couched with qualifiers. In February 1959, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy introduced his request for manned bomber funding with these words: "Recognizing that manned bombers will continue to be an important element of our retaliatory forces for some years to come..."⁵ Two years later, with substantial progress in the ICBM program, Secretary McNamara said:

Even though the revised Defense budget provides for a substantial increase in our long-range missile capabilities, we still foresee the need for a large manned bomber force, at least over the next several years.⁶

As these statements indicate, the manned bomber and the ICBM were perceived, at least for a certain period, by a certain number of people within the defense establishment to perform the same missions to such a degree that the utility of the manned bomber was clearly approaching its term.

Missile forces continued to grow in both numbers and reliability. Today, while the technology of the missile continues to soar, we are in the era of stabilization of numbers under the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), and the manned bomber is not only still with us but a whole new explanation for its continued validity has been assembled. At first the payload advantage of the heavy bomber over the missile was cited. Then, as Soviet missilery became more redoubtable, it was the ability of the bomber to launch under positive control to escape a Soviet counterforce attack.⁷ Next came the theme of flexibility. Perception of the role of the manned bomber has thus changed from one of finite duration, to be assumed in due course by the ballistic missile, to one of indefinite duration, which supplements missile technology.

A whole conceptual framework for the integration of the three major strategic delivery vehicles--the manned bomber, intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), and the submarinelaunched ballistic missile (SLBM)--was created in the form of the "Triad." The Triad refers to the insistence on a mix of ICBMs, SLBMs, and SAC bombers that exploit the inherent characteristics of each of the three systems to compound targeting and defense problems faced by a potential enemy. In theory the combination of three types of systems results in deterrent effect superior to that which would result from even a superior force based on any one or two of the systems.⁸

As the manned bomber force has aged, increasingly effective Soviet defenses have complicated the penetration problem, and increasingly capable missile forces have been placed in operation. The need to procure more modern manned strategic systems has become more acute. This trend has seen increasingly insistent and elaborate voicing of the role of the manned bomber. General Russell E. Dougherty J then Commander in Chief of the Strategic Air Command, defended the role of the manned bomber in these terms in his forceful letter to Senator Barry Goldwater in February 1976:

A hardened, long-range, manned penetrating bomber offers a uniquely capable and dependable strategic delivery system that spreads itself reliably and capably across the broadest possible spectrum of those required military capabilities. When completely modernized and manned with skilled, ingenious military crews, such a penetrating bomber offers the United States an overall flexibility of choice and application that is unmatched by any other weapons system. It can:

Carry a larger number of weapons (conventional or nuclear) than any other strategic delivery system--to any fixed targets, anywhere, under a wide variety of circumstances.

Achieve unequalled accuracies in long-range delivery under all circumstances; and, through self-contained sensors, offer our only long-range capability against mobile or imprecisely located targets.

Provide a highly visible deterrent force, one that can be used as a recognizable expression of national determination and resolve in either preplanned or ad hoc contingency situations.

Accommodate (or readily be adapted to) the delivery of multiple types of conventional and nuclear weapons--highly accurate gravity delivered, standoff-launched cruise, ballistic, semiballistic or defensive weapons--in large quantities, for multiple or selective delivery.

Through design growth characteristics, adapt rapidly in tactics and/ or avionics to negate or avoid unanticipated defenses and other threats.

Drive an enemy requirement for extensive diversion of his resources to defensive (vice offensive) systems--but still can be designed with the flexibility to penetrate those defenses if penetration is required for assurance.

Provide us the most effective and economical way to redress the already serious (and worsening) imbalance in deliverable megatonnage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Provide a simultaneous capability for long-range, real (or near real) time strike assessment deep within enemy territory with the flexibility of striking alternate planned targets or withholding unnecessary attacks and retaining weapons.

Be launched as a visible expression of active deterrence, yet be recalled without expenditure of ordnance, even after launch, should the deterrent objectives be achieved.

Provide our nation an assured capability to extract severe penalties on an enemy society, regardless of any unexpected degradation or blunting of our SLBM or ICBM forces; thus providing insurance against unexpected defenses or failure of any aspect of our strategic missile systems.

Be used repeatedly. Depending on the nature of conflict, substantial recovery can be anticipated--thus enabling rearming and reuse for any required strategic purpose in subsequent war fighting or war terminating activities.

Exploit superior U.S. technology and capability; for we can build, maintain and operate a flexible, modern delivery system of this type better than any potential adversary.

Be applied across the spectrum of military capabilities--and is uniquely useful for an infinite number of lesser contingency missions; without loss of ultimate capability as a major delivery system for large nuclear payloads.

Survive blunting and reliably be protected from destruction on the ground through tried, proven launch procedures of Strategic Air Command adapted to reasonable expectations of our modern detection and warning systems.⁹

The role of the manned bomber is clearly at a critical juncture. Those who defend the future need for a manned bomber have marshaled sound arguments. They feel strongly that the bomber contributes significantly to the flexibility and responsiveness of our forces as well as the effectiveness of our deterrence. They argue that the manned bomber can be kept viable in the face of increasingly elaborate and effective defenses. The success of the manned bomber in its role as a part of an effective deterrent to this point is a central theme.

The Achilles' heel of the manned bomber force as well as the question of its rejuvenation is the suspicion that the Air Force and the supporters of a new penetrating strategic aircraft are voicing the type of intellectual bias that would have the United States buying an (expensive weapon system after it is no longer of any objective utility.¹⁰

The opposition to the manned bomber has demonstrated its strength by the defeat of the B-l. The opposition will continue to increase its strength as .the debate drags on, and the bomber force declines in relative importance. If the manned bomber force is allowed to decline through age to a point where it is manifestly ineffectual in the strategic balance, and the functional strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union does not change perceptively, the days of the manned bomber will be over.

Manned Bomber Performance

The specific performance characteristics designed into manned strategic vehicles have often overshadowed all other design or procurement considerations. Airframe performance of a given weapon system has repeatedly been confused with the contribution that that aircraft can make to our strategic capabilities. This phenomenon has sometimes clouded decision-making as well as the rationalization of system development by military and industry alike. A sound analytical approach to the design of manned bombers as elements of our strategic offensive forces requires continuing emphasis.

This situation can be explained by the fact that the development of early manned bombers was characterized by the search for performance characteristics identical in statement to the strategic capabilities being sought. The B29, B-50, and B-36 aircraft had payloads that reflected almost exactly the nuclear weapon dimensions of the day. Their range defined the strategic "reach" that the United States could claim. European bases and air refueling were directly additive to enable the first two of these aircraft to reach intercontinental range.

The first phase of the assembly of our strategic force was a direct outgrowth of World War II aircraft procurement. The B-29 had seen operational service in World War II; the B-50 was an improved, re-engined B-29; and the B-36 design concept had been developed by the air plans section of the Department of War nine months before Pearl Harbor.¹¹ The dialogue between the uniformed services and the aircraft industry, effective as it may have been, was cloaked in secrecy and came under scrutiny of the highest levels of decision-makers and the Congress only late in the process and then in the most general terms. The House Committee on Armed Services hearings on the B-36 bomber program were conducted while the aircraft were actually being delivered. Evidently the Congress felt better able to influence the development of the new Air Force in terms of the number of "Groups" authorized and the amount of military construction to be accomplished. Aircraft design was a fait accompli by the time Congress had its say. Congress had to consider a specific aircraft in terms of how well it met the specifications that had been set by the Air Force. Selection of one design from among competing alternatives had been long since decided by the uniformed service.

The first steps of the manned bomber into the jet age followed a similar pattern. The Congress was at least informed of the development of the B-47 and B-52, but the direction of that development was kept under wraps. Basic characteristics of both aircraft were determined by the obvious need to increase speed and altitude to ensure penetration against improved Soviet fighters. The momentum of the strategic arms build-up was not to be denied. The manufacturer was of proven competence, the engines were the only ones of demonstrably adequate performance. Otherwise the complexity of the design effort closed off any real opportunity for criticism. These two systems reinforced the tendency to think of strategic systems in terms of aircraft performance rather than strategic contribution. A weapon system was perceived to be a single closed system and not a collection of desirable and less desirable capabilities that decision-makers could tailor to fit within cost constraints.

It must be noted, though, that all of the aircraft mentioned to this point were highly successful weapon systems; they not only served their intended purpose but were modified to perform missions that had not existed when they were designed, and they lasted far beyond their intended service life. Indeed, the B-52, first delivered on 29 June 1955,¹² is still the mainstay of the manned bomber force and may well perform a useful strategic role for decades to come. Each of these aircraft has been designed to performance criteria that mirrored simple, straightforward strategic concepts. Range and payload were the key. Once they could meet this standard, all progress was in terms of flying higher and faster, characteristics that seem to hold a certain fascination for the American spirit.

The introduction of complexity into the strategic bomber equation had begun. Range, which had started as a constant, became a variable. Air refueling could extend range almost indefinitely, or forward bases could make range a less exacting criterion. As speed and altitude were perceived to be more necessary to penetrate increasingly effective defenses, speed and altitude were attained at the expense of range. It is central to note that progress in aircraft design is not all in terms of advances in technology; much progress is in terms of the trade-off of a characteristic less desired, range, in exchange for one deemed more acutely necessary, speed. The reduction of payload may also serve to increase both range and speed.

The costs of these trade-offs are not always as obvious as are the desired characteristics obtained in return. Use of European and North African bases was an obvious constraint on U.S. unilateral operation of its strategic bomber force. Hence, these bases were used for a time and then phased out as both political circumstances and technical alternatives allowed. Note, though, that several of the former European bomber bases are still operational for air refueling forces.

The cost of air refueling is more complex. The early uncertain techniques applicable to B29s and B-50s were the subject of slow refinement. Profiting from this early experience, FB-111 and B-52 air refueling is today an accepted part of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) function, and it is practiced on daily training missions. SAC's mastery of air refueling, even complex multiple aircraft operations, is a unique capability in the world today. However, the effectiveness of the bomber that relies on air refueling depends directly on the survival and reliability of its mated tanker or tankers. The less air refueling the better. More reliance can be placed on a bomber that can complete its mission, or at least a degraded mission, without a refueling than on a bomber that must have one or even more refuelings to even reach its target.

The design of the Convair B-58 marked a pronounced departure from the established trend in manned bomber development. Intended to improve penetrating ability radically, the mach 2 B-58 obtained its impressive speed at the expense of range and load-carrying ability. It was absolutely dependent on air refueling, usually multiple air refuelings, to accomplish even the shortest -strategic mission. It could normally carry only a single compact nuclear weapon. The B-58 was planned to replace the B-47 as a complement to the B-52 force. It would have used its great speed to penetrate to the most heavily protected targets. While pushing forward the state of the art in both aerodynamic and avionic equipment design for its day, it possessed minimal capacity for additional equipment or engineering changes in response to the evolving Soviet defenses.

The B-58 program, however, was severely disrupted by a pair of revolutionary changes that affected the strategic bomber function around 1959 and 1960. At the time when the number of SAC aircraft was at its all-time high, two aspects of the future problem of penetrating Soviet defenses became painfully clear. Flying high and fast to outrun opposing fighters and saturate their radar controllers was a thing of the past. Surface-to-air missiles could attain any speed and altitude possible for the manned bomber, and continued missile development would only increase the margin by, which defensive missiles were superior. The other half of the penetration problem was the realization that the integration of radar and other sensors, computers, and communications into the enemy defenses made electronic warfare a key function of any penetrating force. It meant that electronic warfare capability had to be extensive and continually responsive to electronic changes in the enemy threat.

SAC's operational response to these revolutionary changes was to develop the low-level penetration tactic. In 1959 SAC started low-level training in earnest.¹³ Both the B-47 and the B-52 were capable of low-level penetration. They incurred a penalty in terms of increased fuel consumption as well as long-term structural fatigue problems which, while proving costly in terms of eventual modification of aircraft structure, did not detract from the overall effectiveness of the tactic. Low-level flight works by keeping the penetrating aircraft below optimum radar coverage, in the shadow of intervening high terrain, as well as at an altitude where effective interception is difficult for both fighters and missiles.

An effective response to the challenge of increasingly exigent electronic warfare was facilitated by the large volume of the B-52, which permitted the addition of extensive countermeasures equipment and the large electrical power generation capacity required to drive powerful jamming transmitters. The B-47 design largely predated the electronic warfare threat, but some modifications were possible. Further, the large number of B-47s available made it possible to devote significant numbers entirely to an electronic warfare mission. In place of weapons certain of these aircraft carried not only extensive electronic equipment but also additional crew members to operate it.

The B-58, however, could not be adapted in either direction. At low level its fuel consumption was prohibitive and there was no way to attain even token low-level range. The B-58 had a respectable electronic warfare capability, but the elaborate engineering that squeezed the required equipment into a small supersonic airframe did not permit the continual modification which would have been needed to keep up with the changing threat. Added to these problems, the aircraft was found to be extremely costly to maintain and operate. Phase out of the operational force was announced on 8 December 1965, only three years after delivery of the last production aircraft.¹⁴

Even as this revolution in penetration tactics was occurring and the B-58 was being placed in operation in reduced numbers, the Air Force and North American Aviation were developing the B- 70. This large canard-configured aircraft was to fly so high and fast that it would completely overwhelm any defenses. It could carry extensive electronic countermeasures equipment, but it was structurally incapable of efficient low-altitude flight. The political and organizational support behind the evident progress in terms of altitude and speed embodied in this unique aircraft built up a momentum that kept the B- 70 program going long after all involved should have realized that these capabilities were strategically irrelevant. By 1961, President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara were finally forced into the decision to cancel the B- 70 development program.

At this point it had become clear that for any manned bomber to successfully penetrate undegraded defenses, the low-level tactic would have to be flown, and flown at extremely low altitudes, and the latest electronic countermeasures equipment would have to be employed to augment the low-level tactic. High penetration speeds incurred great penalties in terms of range and stress on both equipment and crews. Low-level penetration speed higher than the mach 0.53 to 0.55 attainable by B-47 and B-52 and the mach 0.85 of the FB-111A and B-1 appear to be of dubious utility because they would result in penetration at higher altitudes.

Significantly, the transit time, and hence efficient cruise speed from the launch base to the beginning of the penetration of enemy defenses, is without direct correlation to bomber effectiveness. A mach 2 bomber has no significant advantage over a subsonic bomber if both must penetrate at subsonic airspeeds. Indeed, the durability of the manned bomber as a strategic threat is due in no small measure to the fact that its arrival in the target area occurs after several hours of degradation of enemy defenses by ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear armed tactical aircraft operating from forward bases. Whether or not defenses are specifically targeted, the cumulative effects of a massive nuclear exchange would inescapably reduce the cohesion and effectiveness of any antibomber defense.

Endurance required to orbit while waiting for an executive decision after a launch under positive control is a real asset possessed by the manned bomber and no other strategic weapon. This characteristic also facilitates the assumption of a sustained airborne alert posture which is a highly visible demonstration of resolve that places a significant portion of the force in a position where it is secure from a surprise counterforce action.

With these considerations in mind, it is enlightening to evaluate the two most recent strategic bomber candidates as to their efficiency in adding to the strategic offensive potential of the United States. TheFB-111A's good low-level penetration ability profited from relatively compact airframe dimensions and excellent avionics to achieve extremely low penetration altitudes. It also possesses relatively small radar cross section, radar energy reflectivity, which facilitates the electronic warfare aspect of penetration. Unfortunately, its range is extremely restricted, forcing it to depend entirely on multiple refuelings to accomplish a nominal mission. Its small size also compounds the problem of updating or adding to electronic equipment. The FB111A's mach 2 cruise capability is a very expensive fringe benefit, helpful under only unique circumstances. The cost of the mach 2 ability in terms of weight penalty for the swing-wing configuration is high. The two-man crew of the FB-111A also forces dependence on automatic function to a degree not true of larger aircraft. These considerations contributed to the decision made public by Defense Secretary Melvin Laird on 19 March 1969 to reduce the planned FB-111A force from 210 to 60 aircraft.¹⁵ The FB-111A, with its total dependence on extensive tanker support, is a tactical aircraft straining to perform a strategic mission.

The B-1 was indeed the highest state of the strategic bomber art. Excellent low-level penetration ability, coupled with good electronic warfare capability and large payload, equipped it admirably to perform the strategic mission. Air refueling was essential, but not to the degree necessary for the FB-111. Good growth potential was provided for avionics advances that might be anticipated in years to come. But again the aircraft was overdesigned in terms of its supersonic cruise capability. The excessive structural strengthening and elaborate swing-wing carry-through structure necessary for mach 2 flight were obvious to critics and, being integral elements of the basic airframe design, could not be discarded in order to reduce weapon system cost of a rationalized production version. In view of these excessive capabilities, the unprecedented unit and program costs of the B-1 made it as uniquely vulnerable to its domestic critics as it was supposed to be invulnerable to Soviet defenses.

Thus, as a general trend, we have seen the design of strategic manned systems emphasizing aerodynamic characteristics of speed and altitude long after those characteristics ceased to contribute to the strategic utility of the manned bomber. To attain these no-longer relevant abilities, strategically useful characteristics such as range, load-carrying ability, or system flexibility were given up, or the cost of the weapon system was inflated to unacceptable, or at least unpalatable, levels.

In order to reinforce the argument that the manned bomber development in recent years was unique among strategic systems in retaining excessive, obsolete performance characteristics, it is noteworthy to consider the ballistic missile in comparison. The range of a given missile, determined by launch point and target, defines the speed and trajectory that the missile must follow. Consequently, there has never been the confusion between technological characteristics and strategic utility that exist with aircraft. ICBM evolution has been in terms of warhead weight or megatonnage, the addition of multiple warheads, the development of greater accuracy, the addition of terminal tactics to evade defenses and protection of the missile before launch. All of these are directly applicable factors to the determination of strategic utility. This is not to imply that missile development may at some future time diverge from strategic needs, but for the present the ICBM seems to have remained more closely related to true strategic capabilities than the manned bomber.

The inexorable rise in the cost of all defense hardware has sensitized the public and policymakers alike to the need to ensure that progress in strategic weaponry is attained in the most cost-effective manner. The manned bomber has seen this issue become a crucial obstacle standing between it and continued existence as a viable part of our strategic posture. Aircraft unit costs and anticipated program costs ($88 million and $21.6 billion in the case of the B-1¹⁶) have soared to levels that merit headline notice in any media treatment of the question. At the same time it is paradoxical to note that the overall annual expense for all strategic forces has held steady at approximately 10 to 1.5 percent of the defense budget for recent years.¹⁷

Still, the manned bomber absorbs a high percentage of the annual cost of the strategic program. A figure projected for 1974 to 1980 shows 35 percent of the strategic program going to the manned bomber (including some of the B-1 program), 27 percent to the SLBM force, and only 10 percent to the ICBM force.¹⁸ Since this period includes very little new aircraft production, it is indicative of the high operation and maintenance costs associated with the manned bomber force. Unlike the missile force, where missiles are on alert in their silos while the crews receive training in classrooms, simulations, or procedural drills, the bomber force must fly to keep effective. This requires immense expenditures for fuel, maintenance support, facilities operation, and personnel support. It is a continuing cost that cannot be eliminated without a precipitous decline in readiness. This also makes it extremely difficult to keep a high percentage of the force on alert for any length or time without incurring extreme penalties in terms of costs and proficiency. Quanbeck and Wood estimate the direct operating cost for a squadron of B-52s, of which we have 20,¹⁹ to be approximately $40 million annually with indirect support costs nearly equal to this amount.²⁰

Operating and maintenance costs are a fertile area for potential cost reductions, but these costs are only very partially sensitive to actions aimed at rationalizing operations in the field. Increased efficiency permitting small reductions in personnel or savings in flying hours could be effected at unit level with appropriate encouragement from higher echelons. The institution of personnel procedures making the mission more attractive in order to reduce turnover and, hence, reduce the need to train replacements would be possible at command level. But the basic characteristics of the weapon system being addressed still drive the great majority of the costs. Fuel consumption is a function of the size and efficiency of the aircraft. Complexity, state of the art, and eventually system age drive many of the maintenance costs. An FB-111 unit with smaller, more modern aircraft with only a two-man crew is more fuel and aircrew efficient than a B-52 unit. Likewise maintenance man-hours and spare parts costs for a B52 unit today may be significantly less expensive than they will be ten years from now because of the increasing difficulty of keeping old systems operating.

Beyond the increased costs of day-to-day maintenance, a significant cost of an aging manned system is the requirement to modify aircraft to operate beyond their designed lifetime, to perform missions for which they were not originally intended, and to overcome new threats. The B-52 fleet, for example, has undergone constant modification for years. In mid-1976, B-52s were undergoing five different modifications, all of which were required even if the B-1 had entered the force in quantity. Cartridge starters were put on all eight engines to decrease reaction time at a cost of $35 million; the electro-optical viewing system was being installed on all 269 G and H models, $269 million; Phase VI electronic countermeasures were going on all G and H models, $296 million; short range attack missile (SRAM) launchers were being added, $359 million; structural strengthening of 80 B-52Ds, many of which were at double their original design life of 5000 airframe hours, $208 million. These ongoing changes totaled more than $1.1 billion just to keep the B-52 force functioning.²¹ Indeed, it is reasonable to estimate that the cumulative costs of all modifications of B-52 aircraft now flying well exceed the unit costs of the aircraft when purchased.

In any evaluation of the future of the manned bomber, costs are a prime consideration, whether in dollars, defense manpower, or technology. Not only must any manned bomber force be cost-effective but it must be perceived to be so by the nation. Development and production costs must be held to reasonable levels, with longevity of the system a prime consideration at the outset.

The Future of the
Manned Bomber

The Carter decision to discontinue development of the B-1 was met by rapid aerospace industry response. Rather than undertake the design of a single strategic system to perform the manned strategic mission, two separate systems were proposed. The operational FB111A would be redesigned, adopting B-1 technology to provide a new manned penetrator. Concurrently, proven wide-body transport engineering would combine with rapidly advancing cruise missile technology to produce a cruise missile carrier large enough to provide mass to an attack. This bifurcation of the strategic bomber function provides a simplification of the engineering challenge, but, more significantly, it could, in the view of aerospace industries, represent a tactic more penetrator offers a modest improvement over likely to get an affirmative production decision through the machinery of government for at engine technology enabled an increase in least one of the two approaches. The B-52 force could continue to perform the part of the mission not possible for whichever of these systems goes into production.

The FB-111 proposed as the manned penetrator offers a modest improvement over the FB-111A in terms of range and payload. B-1 engine technology enabled an increase in airframe capacity for an airframe that had otherwise approached its limits of useful growth. The new aircraft should retain the excellent low-level penetration characteristics of the FB-111A and may even increase its capabilities incrementally by employing some avionics designed for the B-1. The FB-111H would still rely on significant air refueling to complete most missions and will probably not have the mission flexibility and electronic warfare expandability of the B-52 or B-1. The FB-111H would not be a practical cruise missile carrier because of bomb bay volume constraints and range degradation if they are carried externally.

The FB-111H suffers from essentially the same limitations that caused its predecessor, the FB-111A, to be held to one-third of the originally intended production run. Its payload is clearly subject to an unfavorable trade-off with range, with most missions probably limited to internal SRAMs or, at most, partial underwing stores. The FB-111H, just as the FB111A, bears the burden of structural design intended for supersonic flight not essential or usable in its primary mission profile. The FB111H, even if it possesses a respectable degree of capability today, would be at the limits of its design and would respond to tomorrow's missions and threats only with the greatest difficulty and expense.

The wide-bodied cruise missile carrier, on the other hand, profits from the great potential growth in capability of the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) and the immense payload potential of existing commercial transport. Using an existing wide-bodied transport as the basic airframe will reduce development costs and lead time, but it may saddle the operational vehicle with the range limitation and highfuel consumption resulting from large fuselage diameter unnecessary for this mission. The cruise missile carrier is, however, essentially not a war-fighting aircraft and must stay well clear of enemy defenses. Consequently, its deployment is rigidly constrained at the outset. Past experience indicates that Soviet response to deployment of such a system will be quick. Development of the ability to detect, identify, and destroy such a basically vulnerable aircraft is strictly within the current state of the art. The uniquely large size of this aircraft may even enable the Soviets to monitor its presence to facilitate interception by long-range missiles or fighters well before reaching optimum firing position.

If indeed these two systems were to be procured, yet another problem would surface. The operations and maintenance costs of two parallel systems would necessarily be higher than costs of a single capable aircraft design. Production runs of both would be lower than optimum, and training expenses would be higher. Any savings effected by purchase of two specialized aircraft based on existing designs would be lost later on through unnecessarily complex operations. Neither of these two aircraft possesses a usable conventional capability; consequently, at least some B-52s would have to be retained indefinitely. This would place the United States back in the inefficient situation of the 1950s with an excessive number of strategic aircraft types to maintain and operate.

These observations on the past of the manned bomber and on present attempts to design new aircraft as well as projections of its future lead to a number of key questions that may offer a useful sketch of what the manned bomber will have to be in order to survive and serve to the year 2000 and beyond.

Why, in spite of its inescapable costs, would we find it necessary to retain and improve the manned bomber as a part of our strategic inventory? Because it would continue to stabilize our deterrent posture by providing the only system that can be manipulated before a nuclear strike is executed in order to signal resolve or perception of a threat of war or to eliminate prelaunch vulnerability. It complements the characteristics of ICBMs and SLBMs in this way, and it is the only vehicle with strategic range and payload that can actually be used to apply nonnuclear firepower in lower level conflicts.

Will the manned bomber remain viable through the remainder of this century as an effective weapon system? Yes, as long as we apply to it available advances in technology. We must depend on SRAMs, the ALCM, decoys, and other more advanced munitions or aids to penetrate defenses too potent for the bomber alone. The bomber will be able to penetrate a modern defensive system only in conjunction with the combined effects of a nuclear exchange where missile-borne weapons will have degraded defenses during the relatively long transit time of the bomber. The bomber will then have particular utility in the subsequent phases of a nuclear war where the aircrew's judgment would be essential and defenses much less of a factor. Any manned bomber, even if primarily intended for a standoff launch of relatively long-range missiles in early phases of a conflict, must retain an ability to defend itself against interception and a residual penetration ability against degraded or limited defenses.

When should new manned systems be procured? When we perceive the need to replace an obsolescing system in order to retain our capability and modification of the old system is no longer practical or cost-effective, or when it becomes apparent that operating and maintenance costs of the old system can be so drastically reduced that capital outlay for a new system is more sound. Thus the decision to purchase a new system could be advanced significantly by industry proposals showing particularly good cost performance. Careful projections must be made in order to allow for the long lead time characteristics of large strategic systems.

What should we buy? Any new manned bomber must first possess the basic characteristics required to qualify as a war-fighting machine. It must have generous range, payload and inherent growth potential, and the ability to employ a variety of munitions and tactics. It would be unwise to select a vehicle so constrained in these areas that responsiveness to an evolving threat would be limited, Any serious candidate must be at the state of the art for subsonic technology: supercritical wing, efficient high bypass ratio turbofan engines, reliable avionics, perhaps much of the sturdy structure of contemporary airliners but without the large volume fuselage, It must have the type of fuel efficiency and dispatch reliability that characterize the best airliners, It should be easy to fly and ideally so similar to transport or tanker type aircraft in handling characteristics that crews could be rotated from one type to the other to sharpen skills, It must be well engineered to protect crew and avionics from the effects of nuclear detonation, It must incorporate technology aimed at maximum structure of contemporary airliners but without the large volume fuselage. It must have the flexible, able to function as a stand-off ALCM launcher in the face of concentrated undegraded defenses, but able to penetrate in later stages of a conflict where defenses have lost their cohesion and effectiveness or when used in a nonnuclear role in a more permissive environment.

If manned bomber development is held tightly to these objectives and within these constraints, the manned strategic vehicle will continue to offer considerable potential for strategic utility far into the future. As long as our position in the world is one where, as a democracy, we are likely to be in the role of a reacting power in international conflict, the manned bomber gives a dimension to that reaction which greatly complicates any opponent's plan of attack while avoiding any appearance of threatening or aggressive advantage.

Notes

1. "Transcript of the President's News Conference," New York Times, July 1, 1977, p. 10.

2. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 3818 and H.R. 8687 to Authorize Appropriations During Fiscal Year 1972 for Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, Naval Vessels, Tracked Combat Vehicles, Torpedoes and Other Weapons and Research, Development, Text and Evaluation for the Armed Forces and to Prescribe the Authorized Personnel Strength for Each Active Duty Component and the Selected Reserve of Each Reserve Component of the Armed Forces and for Other Purposes, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, p. 3534. (Statement of Secretary of the Air Force Seamans, May 4, 1971.)

3. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Military Posture Briefings, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, p. 1124. (Statements of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General White, on March 21, 1961; hereafter cited as H, CAS, Posture Briefings, 1961.)

4. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Authorizing Appropriations for Aircraft, Missiles and Naval Vessels for the Armed Forces, Hearings Pursuant to H.R. 6151, 87th Cong., lst sess., 1961, p.1245. (Statement of Secretary of Defense McNamara on April 11, 1961; hereafter cited as H, CAS, Hearings on H.R. 6151.)

5. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Military Posture Briefing, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, p. 792. (Statement of Secretary of Defense McElroy on February 2, 1959.)

6. H, CAS, Hearings on H.R. 6151, p. 1242.

7. H, CAS, Posture Briefings, 1961, p. 1087.

8. U.S. Department of the Air Force, Strategic Air Command, Directorate of Information, Strategic Air Command Background Information, July 1, 1975, p 13.

9. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Fiscal Year 1977 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings on S. 2965, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, pp. 2831, 2832.

10. Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 41.

11. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Investigation of the B-36 Bomber Program, Hearings on H. Res. 234, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1949, p. 34, response by Secretary for Air Lovett.

12. U.S. Department of the Air Force, Strategic Air Command, Command Historian, Development of Strategic Air Command, 1946-1976, March 21, 1976, p. 49.

13. Ibid., p. 77.

14. Ibid., pp. 101, 122.

15. Ibid., p. 144.

16. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, FiscalYear1977 Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, and Active Duty, Selected Reserve and Civilian Personnel Strengths, Hearings on S. 2965, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 1976, p. 3007. (Statement by Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Jones.)

17. U.S. Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY 1977 Budget and Its Implications for the FY 1978 Authorization Request and the FY 1977-1981 Defense Programs, January 27, 1976, p. 41.

18. Alton H. Quanbeck and Barry M. Blechman, Strategic Forces: Issues for the Mid-Seventies (Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1973), p. 66.

19. U.S. Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY 1978 Budget, FY 1979 Authorization Request and FY 1978-1982 Defense Programs, January 17, 1977, p. C-5 (Twenty-four strategic bomber squadrons less four squadrons of FB-111s).

20. Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood, Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force: Why and How (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 26.

21. "B-52 Lifetime Extension Effort Pushed," Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 10, 1976, pp. 140, 141.

Lieutenant Colonel John J. Kohout III (USAFA; Diplome de l'Institut, Institut d'Études Politiques, Paris), prior to his recent assignment to Hq USAF, was USAF Research Associate, Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University. He was Chief, Mission Development Branch, 42d Bomb Wing, Loring AFB, Maine, and bas flown B-52s, C-and EC-47s, and T-29s. Selected an Olmsted Scholar in 1WS, be subsequently served at Clark A8, Philippines, and Tan Son Nhut AB, Republic of Vietnam. Colonel Kohout taught at the USAF Academy, serving as chairman of French courses and executive officer of the Department of Foreign Languages and liaison officer at the French Air Force Academy. He is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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