Air University Review , January-February 1979

Lieutenant Colonel D. L. Hutchinson

EVER since its creation as a separate service, the Air Force has found it difficult to put its basic doctrine down on paper. As early as 1947 efforts were under way at Air University to record basic doctrine, but the task was not to see completion until April 1953 when the Air Staff published the first USAF Basic Doctrine manual (AFM 1-2). Many factors contribute to Air Force difficulties in this area, but in this article I will develop what I consider to be the current cause. First, however, let me offer a broad yet simplified definition of doctrine and briefly discuss its purpose.

When the fancy wrappings are removed from the various official definitions of doctrine, two important and critical points remain. One is that doctrine is what we believe. There is active discussion concerning the process by which we arrive at this belief-whether it is derived from distilled experience or hypothesized in an analytical manner-and whether, based on the process, the belief is worthy to be titled doctrine. But that is the subject of another article. The second point is that doctrine is what we teach. This includes both formal and informal instruction as well as the learning acquired through socializing. Therefore, doctrine, in a nutshell, is what we believe and teach.

But why should we have a doctrine? What purpose does it serve? Is it worth the effort to record it? I hold that doctrine is essential to any military institution if it is to function effectively in crisis--and in the broader sense to any organization that has more than one member. Doctrine defines the basic beliefs of the organization. It frameworks decision-making so that, in the absence of directions, members can act independently but in consonance with the organizational goals. It also enables the rank and file to identify more closely with the organization and reduces confusion that could arise from ignorance of fundamental values. The value of doctrine is obvious. But its effectiveness can be seriously impaired if careful attention is not paid to its timely recording and effective communication.

Why, then, has the Air Force found it so difficult to record its basic doctrine? I suspect the difficulty stems from one underlying cause--our inability to deal with the concept of varying levels of abstraction in our beliefs. To explain, let me give an example. At the highest level of abstraction, the Air Force believes in centralized control of all air assets. At a lower level of abstraction, the Air Force believes that the tactical air control system (TACS) is the best method to centralize control of tactical air assets. And, at the lowest level of abstraction, the Air Force believes the PRC-41 is the best radio for the ground forward air controller to use in communicating with close air support aircraft. While this is an obvious example of varying levels of abstraction, other determinations are not so obvious.

To me the most difficult task encountered by the recorder of doctrine is the establishment of the various levels of abstraction into which the beliefs of the organization will be classified. An equally difficult task is the grouping of beliefs that are on similar levels and then integrating these groups into the established hierarchy of doctrinal abstraction. It should be noted that this hierarchy of beliefs is a continuum and flows from the most abstract "truths" (basic doctrine) to very concrete notions (procedures). In the Air Force, we have failed to label beliefs at these lower or more concrete levels as doctrine. We call them "tactics," "techniques," "standard operating procedures," "office policy," or some other well intended name. They all have one thing in common, however. They all reflect what we believe is the best way to accomplish a specific task and can, therefore, be considered doctrine. In fact, the other services do consider the lower level beliefs as stated in "How to do it" publications as doctrine. It is interesting that they do not engage in the nebulous and often frustrating activity of trying to record something called "basic doctrine." Why the Air Force has arbitrarily chosen to limit doctrine to what is written in 1- or 2-series manuals is unknown to me, but it has led to a belief on the part of the average officer that doctrine is something that is the concern of only the highest levels of command and has no relevance to him. If asked when he last dealt with doctrine, the average officer would probably answer that he cannot remember. In fact, he deals with doctrine, in the broader sense, every day.

This arbitrary limitation on what we label as doctrine is really inconsequential as long as we understand that doctrine guides our daily activities, and only levels of abstraction differentiate between what beliefs we term doctrine and what beliefs we term something else. It is this lack of articulation of these levels of abstraction that has created the difficulties we have had in recording our doctrine.

I refer to the recording of doctrine as opposed to the development of doctrine because I think that staff agencies, regardless of level of command, do not normally develop doctrine but merely record the lessons learned or the ideas developed by the users and doers in a particular activity. This is not to say that staffs cannot develop doctrine, because they can; but the function is usually performed by others. The recorder's job is to gather all pertinent information in a particular area and then, by a process of inductive reasoning, remove the essence at the appropriate level of abstraction to satisfy the needs of the organization. This is an extremely challenging task and gets progressively more arduous at the higher levels of abstraction.

Our problem today is that we have failed to elevate the level of abstraction of our basic doctrine high enough to satisfy the organizational requirement. We have continually allowed the level of abstraction to drop to a point where there is legitimate disagreement as to what we believe to be the best way to do things. At these lower levels this is not only desired but required if our doctrine is to remain healthy and adaptive, but as basic doctrine it fails to satisfy the organizational requirement. Basic doctrine must be so general that it can command wide agreement and still give latitude for command initiative. Of what value is it, then, if it is so vague to accommodate all? I suggest that it keeps us all going in the same general direction as opposed to striking off on 360 different paths. Let me draw an analogy. I recently reviewed the Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Constitution. The simplicity of that document, after close examination, astonished me. Most of the amendments are one or two line statements at a level of abstraction that permits the agreement of all Americans. But, on the other hand, our legal libraries contain volume after volume of interpretations that have been drawn from just those short statements. The interpretations have adapted over time as the social, political, and economic environment has changed to satisfy the requirements of our country, but they have kept our country headed generally in the direction of a democracy as opposed to the many other directions we could have taken.

Basic doctrine should play this same role in the Air Force, but for some reason we have elected not to pursue the recording of our basic beliefs at that level of abstraction. Rather we have agonized over trying to get agreement on beliefs at a less general level, which has led to the inclusion of material to satisfy various special interests. As a result, we have written something we call "basic doctrine" that is really a compilation of many subjects of which only one is doctrine. Such a manual serves many purposes, but it is not specifically designed to satisfy the purpose of doctrine as stated earlier.

Why have we done this? Perhaps because a more abstract document limited to doctrine would be too difficult to produce, or perhaps we perceive it as having no utility-"Everyone knows that sort of thing." Then, too, we may have perceived the need to inform influential members of our government about the purpose of the Air Force in an effort to defend our existence as being a more urgent need than the recording of our basic beliefs.* I do not know what the correct answer is nor do I know what a document similar to the one I have described would say, but I do believe that it would be as useful to the Air Force as the Bill of Rights is to the United States.

FORTUNATELY, we have a readymade solution to our problem in the very structure we have created for our doctrinal manuals. All that is required is that we adhere to a rigid discipline in writing them. I am referring, of course, to the fact that whether by design or not we have established a three-level framework of abstraction in our I-series (aerospace doctrine), 2-series (aerospace operational doctrine), and 3-series (mission employment tactics) manuals. However, even a casual survey of the existing manuals reveals a lack of consistency in levels found within a given series, and they sometimes appear to overlap those found in more familiar ones such as those in the 55-series (operations). This lack of consistency can lead to confusion and often blurs what should be a clear, concise thread running from the highest level of abstraction to the lowest.

It is understandable, however, when one traces what appears to be the unplanned development of this three-tiered structure. The I-series (aerospace doctrine) Air Force manual was created in December 1951 to accommodate the newly developed manual entitled Joint Action Armed Forces. This was the predecessor of what we know today as Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication 2 (JCS Pub. 2), although at that time it was a joint publication with the Air Force designation of AFM 1-1. Then, in April 1953, AFM 1-2, USAF Basic Doctrine, was added. During 1954 a number of manuals (AFMs 1-3 through 1-11) were added. These dealt mainly with operational doctrine. In August 1965, the 2-series (aerospace operational doctrine) was created, and eventually all of the I-series manuals with the exception of USAF Basic Doctrine (which had now been redesignated AFM 1-1 after the publication of JCS Pub. 2) were revised and published with the new 2series designation. In February 1966, the 3series (mission employment tactics) was created. However, this series was never very popular and even today encompasses only six manuals, five of which apply exclusively to tactical forces.

From this review of the historical origins of our doctrinal structure, I have concluded that there was no coordinated, well thought-out plan to create the now well established hierarchy. It was a pragmatic response to conditions, and that is why there is little consistency in the level of generality within and between series. The point is further substantiated by the revision history of t4e various series. Ideally, the higher the abstraction level of a manual, the less frequently it would have to be revised. This is true because changes in the environment would have less effect on a more abstract belief. Looking first at AFM 1-1, we see that there have been seven editions issued in the 25 years since 1953. That averages a revision every three and one-half years, and, in keeping with this average, the most current draft revision to replace the January 1975 edition is in final coordination at the Air Staff. If we look at the 2-series manuals as a whole, we see that as of this writing, the average age of the 20 manuals in this series is 94 months (almost eight years old), the oldest published in December 1965 (AFM 2-31) and the newest in February 1977 (AFM 26). The 3-series with its six manuals is only one-half month better with an average of 93.5 months. The oldest in that series is March 1966 (AFM 3-5), and the newest is July 1974 (AFM 3-2).

This analysis was done merely to point out that we do not make optimal use of the structure that we have created. Historically, we have changed our basic doctrine more than twice as often as the more specific operational doctrine. Should not a change in basic doctrine result in a refinement in operational doctrine? Presumably yes, but it has not worked that way. The absence of change in subordinate manuals suggests that there is no real thread running through our doctrinal work. We should correct this deficiency if we are to have a sound doctrinal program. Our manuals must lead us logically down the levels of abstraction if they are to achieve maximum utility. Thus we must establish first appropriate abstraction levels for our 1-, 2-, and 3-series manuals and then discipline ourselves to adhere to those levels by writing in such a way as to produce a common link throughout all our publications. Finally, neglect in updating these manuals would necessarily weaken the credibility of the entire procedure.

As an example, our tactical airlift doctrine (AFM 2-4) was last revised in August 1966. That was before our experience at Khe Sanh and An Loc or the reassignment of tactical airlift forces to the Military Airlift Command.

This lack of discipline within our doctrine program has detracted from its utility and will continue to do so unless we take some positive action. I am not referring solely to the staffs or recorders of doctrine but also to the users and doers who develop doctrine. It is our responsibility as professional officers to ensure that the lessons we have learned and' the beliefs we have accumulated are recorded promptly and accurately so our organization can properly benefit from our experiences. A logical and viable doctrine program, from the highest level of abstraction to the lowest, is everyone's business.

Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Hutchinson (B.S., United States Air force Academy; M.S., Troy State University) is Special Assistant to the Commandant for Doctrinal and Conceptual Matters at Air Command and Staff College, Air University (ATC). He has served as a planning and programming officer in the Directorate of Concepts at Hq USAF, and much of his career has been spent flying tactical fighter aircraft, including the F-100 and F-111, with one tour in SEA as a forward air controller and another in F-111s. Colonel Hutchinson is a Distinguished Graduate of the Naval War College Command and Staff Course.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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