Air University Review , January-February 1979

Presently, and into the foreseeable future, close air support aircraft will require assistance in finding, identifying, and acquiring battlefield targets. Classically, this function has been shared by ground-based forward observers (FOs) and forward air controllers (FACs) and by airborne FACs. But even in some phases of the war in Vietnam, the strength of the surface-to-air defenses was becoming a serious consideration, and for some missions, led to experimentation with fighter-bomber aircraft in the "fast FAC" or strike control and reconnaissance (SCAR) role. These attempts to alleviate the survival problem did so, however, by means that were inherently unsuitable for surveillance and fire control in the unorgal1ized and cluttered environment of the battlefield. With the continuing development of surface-to-air defense technology, as evidenced by the Israeli experience in the 1973 war, this situation has been exacerbated.

In each succeeding conflict of this century (World War II, Korea, and Vietnam), the contribution of tactical air support has been reaffirmed. Even as the conditions on and over the battlefield have changed, so have the tactics and procedures of air-ground cooperation adapted, adding new techniques to keep pace. Consequently, aerial surveillance, target development, and fire support in the battle area are now well recognized as vital military capabilities.

There is no reason to doubt that the need for these functions should be any less pressing in the defense of NATO. But the developing Warsaw Pact ground combat and surface-to-air defense forces might well impose conditions that could drastically alter the requirements for surveillance and fire control and could force changes in the means employed to provide those functions. These are the circumstances that must be recognized in considering the future of the airborne forward air controller.

Although the post-Vietnam USAF force structure has continued to support a modest number of tactical air support squadrons (TASS) to provide forward air controllers to the tactical air control system (TACS), there is a growing uneasiness concerning their survivability over a modern battlefield because of the strength and effectiveness of modern Soviet battlefield antiaircraft (AA) gun and surface-to air missile (SAM) defenses. These developments indicate clearly that, in future tactical combat, friendly air forces will face a technologically advanced and dense air defense system with redundant coverage, ranging from low to very high altitudes. In addition, the design trends have been toward mounting these weapons on self-propelled chassis to provide mobility consistent with the armored forces the defense units are intended to protect. Thus, through sheer numbers, AA weapons of smaller size and less distinctive shape combined with greater vehicular mobility result in battlefield defenses that are becoming harder to detect and to avoid or attack.^l

Similarly, the new armored combat vehicles (ACV) introduced into the Group of Soviet Forces Germany have increased speed and battlefield mobility, a greater proportion of the artillery is self-propelled, and both ACV s and artillery are better protected.² Greater mobility means that combat forces are more readily dispersed and hidden. This places a premium on the NATO surveillance and firepower systems' ability to achieve short reaction times, approaching the ultimate of real-time surveillance and fire direction. Better protective armor indicates that supporting fires must be accurate to be effective; hence, target tracking or homing munitions may be necessary. Finally, because of the numerical superiority of the enemy, it would be important to be able to adjust fire continuously and to determine rapidly when a target had been killed, both to utilize scarce NATO firepower units efficiently and to ease ammunition re-supply and conserve stocks. Consequently, the need for effective fire support for NATO ground forces is increasing at the same time that the enemy's battlefield defenses are becoming stronger.

Facing a numerically superior enemy, imbued with a relentless doctrine of the offensive and well equipped for mobile, armored operations, the NATO ground commander is confronted with a formidable problem in marshaling sufficient firepower to engage enemy targets at the rate at which they could appear. The likely hostile surface-to-air defense, which could militate against the extensive use of an airborne FAC over enemy forces, suggests that the precise nature of the need for air support will not be perceived until the leading enemy elements come, at best, within line of sight of forward Army forces. In the absence of locally controlled aerial surveillance over the battlefield, the forward ground force commander, together with his USAF air liaison officer (ALO), is likely to be heavily dependent on Army forward observers in deciding when enemy strength threatens to exceed the combat capability of his organic and supporting ground firepower.

Further, even under the best of meteorological conditions, the FO cannot be expected to acquire targets more than a few kilometers in advance of his location. This means that the limited time and space available to bring the enemy under fire will severely inhibit the rate of application of available firepower, air or ground. Nor is it at all certain that an FO will always be in the right place at the right time, particularly since the defensive posture adopted by NATO gives the choice of the timing and location of attacks to the Warsaw Pact forces. Even if he were initially positioned advantageously, the FO, with his limited ability to change vantage points quickly, could have his performance degraded by enemy use of obscuring smoke and the inevitable battlefield haze, dust, and smoke from exploding rounds. Under these circumstances, the full capabilities of supporting artillery and of air strikes cannot be realized. Both suffer from the restricted range of vision of ground-based observer's into the enemy rear. As a result, beyond the limited range of the FO, artillery is able to engage effectively only relatively static area targets, and without aerial surveillance, air support would have to look to its own self-contained target acquisition capabilities.

Most, if not all, of these targeting and fire control difficulties can be alleviated by the use of a mobile aerial platform. In accomplishing the necessary tasks of surveillance, targeting, fire control, and damage assessment, there are obvious advantages to be gained from applying man's memory, reasoning, and decision-making capabilities. Similarly, it is clearly beneficial to be able to observe from a low, slow, maneuverable vehicle that is able to stay close to the intended target, thereby greatly reducing the deleterious effects of poor weather, terrain, vegetation, and localized battlefield smoke and dust.

Thus, the desirability of real-time aerial surveillance and control of firepower to exploit the full range of artillery and to enhance the utility of air strikes in direct support of the ground battle seems, clearly, still to be with us. But in view of the increasingly hostile ground-to-air defense environment, neither the airborne artillery spotter nor the airborne forward air controller, as we have known them in the past, is the solution--he is the problem!

Two aspects of the problem of providing adequate fire support to defending NATO ground forces stand out. One is that both Army and Air Force fire support systems need aerial surveillance and fire direction and control to obtain the best results. The second is that the vulnerability of the kind of manned system (low and slow) that can do the job is likely to be intolerable, given the Warsaw Pact ground-to-air defense environment. Moreover, even if the ground-to-air defense threat could be suppressed sufficiently, the essential air-to-ground and air-to-air voice communication links could be severely disrupted by enemy jamming with the airborne F AC located in the forward battle area.

To surmount these two types of vulnerability, the USAF has considered alternatives to the classical airborne FAC operation, now mounted in OV -10 aircraft. One suggestion being considered is the use of two-place tactical fighters. While undoubtedly providing some increase in survivability, although at the expense of what could turn out to be a serious decrease in the ability to accomplish the surveillance and control mission, it is not at all clear that a sufficiently large increase in survivability would result, given the capability of modern battlefield air defenses, nor that the effect of enemy ECM would be diminished. A second suggestion is to retain the OV -10 aircraft but withdraw its operating location to the rear a distance sufficient to minimize the air defense and jamming threat. By so doing, the surveillance and strike control functions would be largely abdicated, leaving them to the ground F AC, while retaining only the battle management function. Neither of these alternatives appears to be a satisfactory solution to the problem as a whole.

The Army faces a similar situation in attempting to provide the tactical ground commander (e.g., brigade or division) with surveillance of threatening activity to the desired depth in the enemy rear areas and for over-the-hill target development and fire control for artillery (particularly for Copperhead rounds).^* The limited range of vision of the FO on the ground and of the scout helicopter flying nap-of-the-earth along the FEBA indicates the need for some form of elevated vantage point in the battle area. For these purposes, the Army has embarked on a systems technology demonstrator program called "Aquila" to explore the technical feasibility and operational utility of a mini-remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) system.³

The efforts of T AC and TRADOC to develop joint air-ground procedures and tactics are based on the premise that air support of ground forces must truly be a joint effort to be successful. As described above, the congruence of Army and Air Force needs for aerial surveillance, target development, and fire control in the battle area argues strongly for a joint solution. Further, to preserve the irreplaceable capability of man involving his reasoning and understanding of the combat situation, he should be removed from an environment that leads to working under stress. The latter often leads to errors on nonroutine tasks, induces fatigue that limits his powers of observation, and slows his reflexes or, on the contrary, induces jumpiness or overreaction. What is required is an instrumentality that can perform the necessary functions, will permit removal of man from the hazardous environment over the battlefield, will be sufficiently survivable (either through proliferation or reduced vulnerability), and can serve two masters simultaneously--the Army and the Air Force. It would appear that a suitably designed, organized, and controlled RPV system could satisfy these requirements.

The basic components of such a surveillance and fire control system might be as follows:

1. An unmanned vehicle equipped with suitable sensors and a laser rangefinder/ designator.

2. A data link (vehicle status, command and video).

3. A ground control station with access to the Army air-ground system (AAGS) and artillery fire direction center (FDC).

4. A data link (relay) from the ground station to an appropriate point in the Air Force TACS.

With the exception of the link to the Air Force TACS, prototypes of equipments matching these needs are included in current Army developments. The Aquila mini-RPV program, after overcoming early difficulties, has demonstrated the feasibility of the launch and retrieval and in-flight control of a small, unmanned vehicle on typical operational-type mission profiles, largely under the preplanned, automatic control of the ground station. Under a separate program, a jam-resistant data link has been tested successfully in an RPV at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, and now is entering engineering development.

If these efforts progress successfully, the resultant system could make a major contribution toward overcoming the Army surveillance and firepower limitations noted above. Also, they could assist in more closely coupling the USAF close-support capabilities to the real needs of the ground battle without placing FAC pilots at high risk. Neither of these advantages can accrue, however, unless the appropriate level in the Air Force TACS (e.g., the battalion or brigade tactical air control party) can be linked directly to the Army echelon that receives the data-linked surveillance video from the mini-RPV. If this were to be done, the tactical air control party (TACP) FAC would be able to observe the combat area as if he were airborne over it (within the limits of sensor fidelity, field of view, etc. that are technically and operationally feasible) and could then perform his assigned duties in accordance with existing doctrine.

Is such a joint battlefield surveillance and fire control system feasible and practical? Technically there seems to be little doubt that it is. Doctrinally, at first glance, there would appear to be serious questions: How would the mini-RPV be fragged and controlled so that the Army and Air Force each have an appropriate share of the available mission time? But considering the current drawing together of the Army and Air Force on joint fire support problems, this question may recede in importance, particularly when it is recognized that both organic fire support by the Army and close air support by the Air Force are necessary to enhance the performance of the ground forces in battle.

Operationally, a potentially troublesome feature is matching the number and location of the RPV control stations in, say, a brigade to the number and location of the ALO/FAC personnel with the TACPs assigned to that brigade and its subordinate units. Although an even one-on-one match might be worked out organizationally, it might not prove advantageous to locate each FAC with an RPV control station (even though desirable for easier access to the surveillance video) rather than at his assigned ground unit command post where he can be privy to the ground commander's assessment of the tactical situation and where the necessary communications already exist. Alternatively, if the TACP in question were manned by both an ALO and one or more FACs, the former could remain with the command post as the ground commander's air adviser, while the FACs could deploy to RPV ground stations for direct access to the surveillance video. In this case, all RPV ground stations would have to contain additional necessary display equipment to permit the FAC to work along with the Army intelligence and artillery personnel. Also, the normal TACP communication equipment would have to be provided to allow the FAC access to the Army tactical nets and to the Air Force air request and air-to-air nets.

Instead of adding to the size and complexity of the RPV control station and tying a FAC down to it, another possibility would be to place the FAC in an aircraft (to which the RPV ground station would relay the video) that could then work with any of the RPV control stations operating with the ground unit to which the FAC is assigned. The mobility and flexibility of employment would be welcomed as it would then match that of the attack aircraft themselves (at least over those battle areas where RPV surveillance units were deployed). In this configuration, the airborne operation might take on more of the character of a miniature airborne battlefield command and control center (ABCCC) than that of simply a FAC as it would be conceptually possible for several RPV stations to be passing video to the same airborne post. By flying relatively low and over friendly territory, sufficient immunity to enemy jamming and surface-to-air defenses should result.

Suppose that appropriate hardware, organization, procedures, and tactics could be worked out to provide a joint surveillance and fire control system over the battlefield. What advantages would result? Several come to mind immediately. By expanding the horizon of the real-time reconnaissance and surveillance available to the front line ground commander, he should be better able to identify the tactical plan of the enemy attack, thereby allowing him to deploy his defensive forces to best advantage. At the same time, the depth of the killing zone for his supporting artillery fires can be extended to the full range of the guns, permitting a greater volume of fire to be delivered prior to enemy forces closing to engagement range. Also, the accuracy (hence, effectiveness) improvement from the use of Copperhead will allow the engagement of point targets, such as armored combat vehicles and forward command posts, at these longer ranges. Similarly, the quantity and quality of close air support opportunities should be enhanced as a result of the improved target development capabilities and the effectiveness of the missions flown increased by the ability to designate targets for homing munitions well beyond the range of the ground FO. Moreover, the prolonged exposure of fighters attempting the same task with self-contained surveillance and designation systems could be avoided.

The sharing of a joint battlefield surveillance and fire control system could provide the Army and the Air Force with a valuable means for coordinating ground and air supporting fires so as to be mutually supporting. For example, for those fire missions assigned to close air support aircraft, Army artillery could be employed to provide simultaneous suppressive fire on known or suspected enemy ground-to-air defense forces in the area. While not a new idea, having been employed in 1952 during the war in Korea,⁴ it is not a standard joint procedure, either. But with the increasing ground-to-air defense threat, the use of artillery for battlefield suppression should become increasingly attractive.

Recent TAC/TRADOC efforts to develop cooperative tactics for the employment of scout/armed helicopter teams and A-10 aircraft have not only pointed up the critical role played by an on-the-spot battle manager, but his vulnerability, if located in the air close enough to the combat area to do his job properly. The concept of an RPV surveillance and fire control vehicle appears to offer the opportunity to remove the battle manager to a less hostile environment and retain the indicated benefits to be derived from the cooperative employment of helicopters and close air support aircraft.⁵

In Summary, the addition of a joint surveillance and fire control RPV system to the air-ground team could substantially increase the volume, rate, and effectiveness of both ground and aerial supporting fires by bringing the enemy under more accurate fire, beginning at greater ranges from friendly positions, than is now feasible. At the same time, the need to place men in positions of high risk (i.e., the airborne FAC and the air-or-ground FO) would be sharply reduced. The technology now exists to permit remotely manned systems to perform the needed tasks in many combat situations and environments. However, flexible, innovative planning and experimentation are still needed to exploit the potential capabilities of RPV s for battlefield surveillance and fire control. The Army has taken a giant first step with the Aquila program. The TAC and TRADOC joint efforts are moving in the right direction and, if pursued appropriately, could lead to the development of sound doctrine and effective organizational, operational, and support procedures that could make an airborne surveillance and fire control RPV a fully integrated member of a joint tactical air-ground fire support system. Let us hope that the potential contributions of remotely piloted vehicles will not be inhibited by the same lack of imagination and flexibility exhibited by an anonymous Army spokesman who, having observed the first successful aerial bombing trials in 1911, commented that, "the continuation of such schemes can serve no practical purpose whatsoever."⁶

Notes

1. Daniel K. Malone, Colonel, USA, "Air Defense of Soviet Ground Forces," Air Force Magazine, March 1978, pp. 78.83.

2. "The Military Balance 1977/78," as printed in Air Force Magazine,

December 1977, pp. 118-26.

3. F. David Schnebly, "The Development of the XMQM-I05 Aquila Mini-RPV System," Proceedings, Fourth Annual Symposium, June5-9, 1977, National Association for Remotely Piloted Vehicles. Figure 1 is adapted from Schnebly's article.

4. Robert Frank Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1961), p. 506.

5. "A-I0/AAH Together Pack More Punch Than Separately, TAC/TRADOC Find," Armed Forces Journal International, June 1977, p 18 See also "A-I0/Helicopter Tactics Prove Effective," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 6, 1978, pp. 217-18

6. Not content with this unequivocal decision, the same Army spokesman continued: "Any dream of aerial conflict is merely the product of a fertile imagination, a malady often encountered in younger men with insufficient service to recognize certain things as manifestly absurd" See Aaron Norman, The Great Air War (New York Macmillan Company, 1968), pp 21-22

John W. Ellis, Jr., (B.S., University of California, Berkeley) is a Senior Engineer with the Rand Corporation. Following World War II service as a naval officer in the Southwest pacific, he participated in Rand’s pioneering strategic systems analyses. Since the early 1950s, his work has dealt with general purpose forces, including analyses of counterinsurgency operations and close air support systems. He has served on loan to TAWC (Skoshi Tiger combat evaluation of the F-5) and to MACV (analysis of aircraft losses to ground fire in South Vietnam. His present responsibilities involve tactical air operations in theater conflict.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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