Air University Review, November-December 1978

The A-10 in Central Europe:

a concept of deployment-employment

THE HISTORY of warfare and the profession of arms is replete with examples of technological advances having revolutionary impact: the stirrup, the longbow, the musket, the machine gun, the stick, etc. The stick? Well, maybe not all the revolutionary impacts were due to advances in technology. When Swiss foot soldiers defeated feudal armies of mounted armored knights in the fourteenth century, simply by unseating them with long sticks, the achievement was hardly attributable to technology. It resulted from optimum employment of a simple but potentially decisive weapon. Until that battle in 1339, the pike had not been employed to its full potential. This article will examine the role of the A-10 aircraft in Central Europe, in an effort to ensure that we employ "the stick" to its full potential.

In 1970, the United States Air Force took a revolutionary step backward--in order to take two steps forward--by requesting proposals for the competitive development of a specialized close air support aircraft, the A-X. In 1974, the Department of Defense authorized the Air Force and the Fairchild Republic Company to proceed with production of the A-10--winner of the A-X competition--the first Air Force aircraft ever designed and developed specifically for the close air support mission. In a military service and a civilian industry both noted for their necessary pressing of the technology frontier, we have seen developed a weapon system that achieves by design the basic aerodynamic performance of an era over thirty years past. Yet that same aircraft gives us certain superior capabilities never before seen over the battlefield. But the question remains: Do we know how to employ this "revolutionary" system optimally? We may need to rethink some of our current habits in managing and employing aerospace weapon systems--habits that have been developed over a long time--some perhaps for as long as thirty years. In the parlance of economists, the A-10 is a "labor-intensive" system; we are accustomed to employing "capital-intensive" systems.

The weather confronting the A-10 in Central Europe is so basic to the mission problem that it deserves to be classified as part of the threat. Although the particular weather obviously varies with the time of year, a common condition is low overcast with rain. Approximately one out of three mornings during the fall and winter presents ground fog, which may not lift until midday. The highest incidence of low ceilings is in the winter and, in particular, from December through February. Army Field Manual 100-5 advises ground commanders that during those months they can "expect a one-third degradation in close air support missions" because of ceilings that are 1000 feet or less.¹ More specifically, weather conditions of better than 2000-foot ceilings and two-mile visibility exist for 73 percent of the time on an annual basis and 53 percent during the winter months. But weather conditions equal to or better than a 1000-foot ceiling and one-mile visibility exist 85 percent of the time on an annual basis and 73 percent during the winter.² Thus, the weather in Central Europe becomes a primary factor in the formula for solving the close air support problem.

Since the Air Force does not yet have the capability to kill a tank in all weather conditions, the next best thing is to maximize one's capability to do so in adverse weather, i.e., in visual (but minimally so) conditions. The A-10 was designed to that specification. The maneuverability criterion was devised to afford a capability for mission performance under a ceiling of 1000 feet with one-mile visibility.³ That goal was essentially attained. In flight evaluation, the aircraft has demonstrated a capability to perform the visual ground attack mission in reduced visibilities down to one and one-half miles.⁴ As any pilot knows, visibility is the more critical of the two weather factors. With good visibility beneath the ceiling, ceiling becomes-less of a problem provided the pilot can get, or stay, under it.

The forward-deployed Soviet ground forces in East/Central Europe--outside the Soviet borders--are organized into four "Groups of Forces" totaling 31-ground divisions. These four are the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), Northern Group (Poland), Central Group (Czechoslovakia), and the Southern Group (Hungary).

Added to these Soviet forces in the four satellite countries are the indigenous forces of the host countries: 37 divisions, including the 6 in Hungary, making a total of 68 Warsaw Pact divisions in those four countries. However, not all of the non-Soviet divisions are maintained in a Category 1 state of readiness. If we exclude the forces in Hungary (as the Pact does in defining the "Central" region) and those non-Soviet divisions that are not earmarked for immediate employment, there remains a total of 48 divisions available for employment without additional reinforcement.* There are 16,200 main battle tanks in operational service with the divisional formations presently in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany.⁵

*The Warsaw Pact Ground Forces were discussed at length in the July-August 1978 issue of the Review (Colonel Robert D. Rasmussen, "The Central Europe Battlefield: Doctrinal Implications for Counterair-Interdiction," pp. 2-20.

By contrast, the corresponding number of tanks on the NATO side in the same region is 6405.⁶

The 20 Soviet divisions in the GSFG are organized under five army headquarters: two tank armies and three combined-arms armies. The GSFG has all the ingredients of a Soviet wartime "front" (army group), and this is obviously the role that the GSFG would play in a Warsaw Pact NATO military conflict.

Based on the known strength, disposition, and organization of the GSFG, an invasion scenario can be postulated in accordance with Soviet doctrine and training; this postulation has been formulated by Graham Turbiville. (See Figure 1.) "It must be assumed that the main mission of the GSFG Front will be to defeat the most powerful groupings of enemy forces in West Germany, secure Rhine crossings and drive to the English Channel."⁷ In this scenario, the GSFG front, with East German divisions integrated, would cover the West German border from the vicinity of the Elbe to the Czechoslovakian border. Polish and Soviet Northern Group forces would cover the northern flank, while the Soviet Central Group with Czechoslovak units would operate on the southern flank. These forces could be joined by the Southern Group and Hungarian units, either through the Danube valley, if Austrian neutrality were violated, or through Czechoslovakia.

The invasion scenario has the 3rd Shock and 1st Guards tank armies, the heavy offensive punch of the GSFG, in a combined thrust on a common axis along the Göttingen-Aachen line, "the rough dividing line between NATO's Northern and Central Army Groups [NORTHAG and CENTAG]."⁸ In the words of Turbiville:

It is along this axis that the weight of he two armies' 3,100 tanks would probably advance, seeking to split the two NATO army groups, isolate U.S., Canadian and West German forces in southern West Germany and send armored spearheads racing through the Low Countries to the Channel.⁹

A-10 Deployment-Employment

The A-10 is now operational within the Tactical Air command, but has not yet been based in Europe. A news report in the fall of 1977* stated that the A-l0 was likely to be based in Great Britain and West Germany.¹⁰

*Editor’s note: This article in somewhat different form was presented by the author to the 1978 Air University Airpower Symposium in February 1978.

According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, "NATO suffers from having too few airfields." After noting the superior numbers of Warsaw Pact tactical craft in the theater, the Institute's report for 1977-1978 states: "Since squadron can be moved quickly, the NATO numerical inferiority... could rapidly be redressed if enough airfields were available."¹¹ The Defense Secretary's Annual Report for FY 1977 (published in January 16) noted then the continuing buildup of new tactical aircraft in the Soviet/Warsaw Pact air forces, and in particular, the substantially improved range, payload, avionics and ECM capabilities." The report then stated:

Most dramatic is the increasing ground attack capability, which has enabled the act's tactical air forces to engage in a broader range, of offensive as well as offensive missions, in particular the capability to conduct strikes against most of European NATO's airfields without prior deployment.^l2

This dual NATO problem--a shortage of airfields and vulnerability to Pact air-strikes of those already employed--argues for introducing the A-10 onto airstrips not presently supporting NATO air combat units. An A-10 deployment of this type would avoid aggravating the airfield shortage problem and, at the same time, reduce the effective vulnerability to Pact air-strikes by compounding their target coverage requirement. This alternative-basing concept was presented with an "avoidance of negative" rationale. Now turn to an "achievement of positive" rationale.

The A-10 aircraft has certain distinctive characteristics and capabilities designed into it through specifications. Those characteristics are lethality, survivability, simplicity, and responsiveness.

Lethality was achieved through the A-10's capability to carry as much as 16,000 pounds of conventional weapons, but in particular through its specially developed 30mm gun. The A-10 with GAU-8/A30mm gun has demonstrated its tank killing ability against the Soviet T-62 main battle tank.^l3 The A-10 will also employ the other antiarmor weapons available, such as the Maverick missile and the Rockeye cluster munition.

Survivability of the A-10 was attained through its maneuverability at appropriate airspeeds and altitudes and through its design and construction as a hardened aircraft. The A-10 has been proved through tests to be capable of defeating the Soviet 23mm cannon.^l4 While the A-10 can be absolutely lethal, its survivability is obviously a relative quality. In short, when taking hits, it' is more survivable than any other aircraft. Thus, its employment, obviously, must still be sensitive to attrition-limiting considerations.

Simplicity and responsiveness. The operational mission rationale for simplicity in the A-10 was to maximize its sortie rate and minimize its maintenance requirements. This simplicity was intended to be instrumental in its responsiveness, not only in its reliability and availability but also in basing flexibility. In the words of General William Momyer, the principal Air Force witness at the Senate Close Air Support Hearings in 1971:

The responsiveness of the A-X close air support aircraft will be enhanced by its special capabilities and the options they provide: a fast enroute time from either ground or airborne alert, a capability for long-loiter time over the battlefield and a forward basing capability when required.^l5

To achieve this forward-basing option, the Air Force requested a forward airstrip takeoff performance of 1200 feet with a reduced fuel load and payload.¹⁶

The A-10 has demonstrated a takeoff distance of 1900 feet in the high desert, with four 500-pound bombs and 750 rounds of 30mm ammunition;^l7 at lower altitudes and without bombs the distance would be less. The USAF specification for this forward airstrip profile was a 50 nautical mile (nm) flight to the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), 30 minutes in the battle area, and then a 150nm flight back to a rear base for refueling and rearming.¹⁸ General Momyer described the concept:

We would base further to the rear on a main operating base; and then we would have a forward operating base where we would come in periodically with a squadron and then advance as far forward as we thought the situation would permit. I would call it a forward operating location at which we would have a flight based and we would then rotate through it.^l9

The Air Force has always been skeptical about forward-based ground alert, and for good reason. The primary argument always advanced in favor of forward ground loiter was the reduced response time possible. But this reduction in time is only in relation to rear-based ground alert at a greater distance from the FEBA. The airborne alert or air loiter option provides response times superior to either of the ground alerts. Add to this fact the problems associated with forward-basing, i.e., logistic support, night and adverse weather recoveries, security problems (from sabotage to artillery to tanks), and the added expense, then one has good reason to doubt the concept of forward basing.

The Air Force never did intend for the forward-basing option to entail a forward logistics base; it was a staging through concept--through an austere forward location "with little or no ground support."²⁰ As reflected in the profile noted above, the aircraft would get its main load of fuel and ordnance at a rear base and then land at the forward location to be available for scramble. But if the airborne alert is better for quick response, why did we want the forward-basing option? General Momyer's answer dates from 1971:

In some cases, it may be desirable for the A-X to stage through forward operating locations on ground alert when this will significantly reduce enroute time to the target area and the expenditure of airborne alert time is not justified.²¹

This extended waiting on-call, in the air or on the ground, envisions a scenario in which there may be no targets available or at least none requiring close air support (CAS)--for extended periods of time. But, this is a South Vietnam-type scenario. One can hardly argue that there will be any shortage of targets in Central Europe! In fact, the Air Force, with its eye on the Central European scenario, has tested and demonstrated the A-10's "sortie surge" capability. In February 1977, two A-10s flew 34 sorties (17 each) during an 11-hour period; these were 120nm missions dropping four 500-pound bombs and making two 30mm strafe passes on each sortie.²² Even in Vietnam, once the ground unit had a contact and the air support whether scrambled or diverted-kept coming out the end of the pipe overhead, the ground commander did not care from whence it came. And in Europe, once the war begins, there will be no need to sit and wait for targets for any extended period of time. In short, the benefit of forward-based ground alert is derived in the situation wherein there is no present need for close air support capability in the air. In Europe, once the battle starts, we will need it in the air! In that case, let us see if there is a rationale to be found in having the close air support capability on the ground, at a forward location, prior to the start of battle.

There is one area in which the Air Force has always been at a disadvantage in the inevitable comparisons with the air support provided by the Army or Marine Corps to their own ground units: the asserted benefits of "air troops living with the infantry."²³ With the exception of units such as the 1st Air Cavalry Division in Vietnam, it would seem that this distinction has been somewhat tenuous in practical effect. The Marine Corps attack air units operated in Vietnam from fixed bases remote from the front lines and were also dependent on the forward air controller (FAC) for interface with the ground unit. The majority of the Army's attack helicopters were normally assigned to units at corps or higher and attached to divisions for particular operations. The Air Force has maintained that the air liaison officers (ALOs) and FACs permanently assigned to the ground units have sufficiently established the desired interface between air and ground. Even the new Marine concept of Harrier employment does not disperse the aircraft to live with the troops in the front lines. And proximity itself does not ensure any great benefits associated with living in. The fighter pilots flying out of Bien Hoa in Vietnam may have been based only 15 miles from the 1st Infantry Division unit they were supporting, but the troops in the air and on the ground lived and worked in two different worlds. So what is the primary advantage derived from the Army's and Marine's forward-basing of air support? It would seem to be, in practical terms, in the form of joint planning, coordination, and training, prior to the start of battle.

The Central Europe setting for the A-10  has several unique features that seem to argue for an increased direct interface between the A-10 and the ground units. It should be obvious that ALOs and FACs assigned to ground units have a better understanding of the ground commander's capabilities and limitations, force dispositions, and battle plans than does the fighter pilot who flies over the unit only periodically. Often in Vietnam, it was the ground unit's FAC who had the most knowledge within the unit of the terrain in the unit's tactical area of responsibility. This knowledge, of course, was gained from frequent and regular visual reconnaissance flights over the area (low and slow). It would certainly be desirable if the supporting CAS pilot had the same type of knowledge and understanding of the ground unit's situation and the same intimate familiarity with the terrain in the supported unit's area of responsibility.

Another factor to consider is the operational environment once combat starts. The forward air controller in the Central Europe combat scenario will not be the solid interface with the ground unit that he was in Vietnam. First, there will be no airborne FAC (as presently equipped) over the battlefield. Second, communication with the ground FAC will probably be unreliable, due to jamming. Third, the bedlam that can accompany a defensive battle on the ground against strong odds would degrade the ground FAC's ability to be in the right place at the right time for effective strike control. All these factors add up to a need for the CAS pilot to assume more responsibility for his own air strike and the need to be able to communicate (not just talk) directly with someone in the ground unit (whether battalion or company commander or forward artillery observer). The concept of a FAC airborne in a scout helicopter appears to hold promise, but, regardless, this rationale still applies. Similarly, there can be a role in traffic control for the airborne FAC, at a safe distance behind the FEBA, but this does not change the requirement for the CAS pilot to be able to control his own air strike in consonance with the ground unit's needs.

Dedicated mission. For the first time in Air Force history, we have an aircraft that is essentially dedicated to the CAS mission. While there are collateral roles the aircraft can play, no one envisions the A-10 fleet being pulled off the CAS mission, in Central Europe, to seek out MiGs or perform deep interdiction. The specialization of the aircraft thus limits it to battle--and training for battle--in the vicinity of the FEBA. In the past, with our multipurpose aircraft, we could never afford to commit our units to this degree of dedicated CAS mission training, because of the training demands of other missions. It appears now that we can and should, to maximize mission effectiveness.

Combined-arms training. The Central Europe setting provides the unique opportunity of providing routine training, in peacetime, in the exact ground setting and with the same units that will be involved in the battle if and when the war breaks out. CAS pilots, in regular and routine continuation training, could meet face-to-face with the supported ground units' key personnel in planning and critique sessions before and after regular joint training. Let's face it, the A-10 needs to be a full-time partner in the ground battle and, thus, needs to become a regular member of the combined-arms team in its training. This partnership can be achieved--to the extent feasible--by routine forward training operations out of army unit locations with collocated airfields or airfields immediately adjacent to the supported army unit. Again, the key measure of merit in this concept is the ability for air troops and ground troops to meet face-to-face before, during, and after the joint combined-arms training. Thus, operating from an airfield five miles away from the ground unit is not, of itself, sufficient; and neither is once or twice a year.

The Labor-Intensive System

As already noted, the A-10 is a simple aircraft; as such it is a labor-intensive system. Our present crop of fighter pilots, generally at the rank of major and below, has little, if any, experience with such systems (unless they have served a FAC tour). The A-10 does not even have an inertial navigation system (INS). Every Air Force pilot who has gone through fighter training in the F-4 or A-7 has had the luxury of learning to navigate with the INS. Low-level navigation training is intended to teach pilotage, but, because of the INS, that pilotage ability in our average young fighter pilot is relatively weak--in relation to other days and systems. (As a recent F-4 squadron commander, I can say that in at least 90 percent of the cases when a squadron crew got off course or missed a target in a visual low-level navigation training problem, it was because the INS failed or had an error that was not recognized or corrected for; and I include myself in this group.) The F-4 weapon system operator, especially if he is expert with the radar, can save the pilot from the error of his ways; but too often he also succumbs to the lure of the INS. The point here is that technology has become a crutch, and without it we wobble. The pilot must learn (or relearn) to walk without a crutch. And the high-level managers who devise training programs and control procedures must learn (or relearn) to adapt their thinking to the labor-intensive system.

A recent news article, narrating an A-10 temporary deployment to Western Europe, reported that the pilots "were vehement in their opinions that the aircraft needs an inertial navigation system to permit it to get to the target areas while flying at 100 ft or less in hazy conditions."²⁴ I agree with that. The INS is a tremendous aid. But in the meantime, and also after installation of an INS, there are things we can do in our training and management programs to enhance the capability of this labor intensive system. Remember, it also has no radar.

Since the A-10 is intended to be a low-level and adverse weather weapon, that is the realm and those are the conditions under, which it should train in Europe. And, in particular, it needs to train over the very ground where it will fight, i.e., between the inter-German border and the buffer zone and under the buffer zone itself. We need to develop in the A-10 pilot the same type of familiarity with the border area terrain that is possessed by the Army helicopter pilots authorized to fly the border patrol. This would obviously be done in a structured and graduated training program, and the pilots would be progressively certified by sectors of the border area until familiarized with the entire border. Since the border is long there could be primary, secondary and even tertiary (if need be) sectors and levels of familiarization and certification. For example, half the pilots could have one NATO army group area as primary and the other army group area as secondary. As an example of training, the first border flight could be with an Army helicopter pilot who could expertly point out the pertinent terrain features and ground unit areas of responsibility. The point is to develop in the A-10 pilot in Europe the ability to operate in the area and in conditions we expect him to perform his primary mission--including under a 1000 feet ceiling with visibility of two miles or less. Let me cite some examples, including personal experience, to illustrate the concept.

Every pilot who has flown extensively out of any particular airfield know he gains an intimate familiarity with the local terrain and built-up area in the immediate vicinity of the field. When penetrates a ceiling in the vicinity of the field, he recognizes features on ground that tell him where he is, and he proceeds from instrument, navigation to visual contact navigation--even if he cannot yet see the field. If a pilot regularly flies a particular low-altitude route under visual conditions, he gains a familiarity with that general route that enables him to put away the maps and disregard the navaid instruments. At my last station, I could take off from the home base, and, at low altitude and under restricted visibility conditions, proceed via a circuitous route through the local area to the local range without ever referring to a map or the INS. There was nothing special about it; I just knew the various checkpoints and the general heading to the next one.

That is the kind of battle area familiarity we need to establish with the A-10 pilots in Europe. Then they can proceed via familiar routes to any of a selected number of familiar checkpoints, from which they know the heading to the particular target area, which they will recognize when they get there. And they can do all this beneath a ceiling of 1000 feet--or, even 500 feet--and with a visibility, of two miles or less. The critical factor is that they need to have enough visibility to keep unveiling checkpoints out in front of them before they overfly them. (And we should note, the airspace control system must let them proceed all the way minimum altitude, under the cloud ceiling, by visual flight rules--whenever they need to.)

This realistic training to establish the necessary familiarity with the local battle area can be facilitated and enhanced by operating the A-10 aircraft out of army airfields collocated with the units to be supported, whenever feasible. This operation out of army airfields is not necessary to achieve the desired battle areas familiarity, but it would reinforce it and tie in with the proposed concept of face-to-face combined-arms training.

Centralized Control
of the Air Arm

Operational control of the A-10 resource in Central Europe has a relationship to basing concepts. In the proposed concept of forward operating locations with army units and the regular participation in combined-arms training, the principle of centralized control is firmly adhered to. The U.S. Army must understand this fact at all levels. Air power, and the A-10 in particular, will still be a scarce resource, and the employment principles of centralized control and decentralized execution will be of vital importance to the outcome of the ground battle. The proposed direct interface and full-time partnership between the A-10 fleet and the army units do not incorporate an approach to organic status. Mission dedication must not be confused with unit dedication. The U.S. Army should welcome the interface and the partnership because they will benefit also, but they must not be misled concerning the type of partnership.

The Army obviously endorses the principle of mass. The principle of concentration in the employment of the A-10 in its counter-armor role should be readily endorsed by the Army, also. All that should be necessary is to illustrate the problem in the postulated invasion scenario presented above, and the need for centralized control should be obvious. If the main thrust is north of Kassel, then 100 percent--or even 50 percent--of the A-10 fleet could not be left committed south of Kassel; they would be inapplicable to the war. We could win the battle in CENTAG and lose the war for NATO. Similarly, if the main thrust were identified in the vicinity of Fulda, then CENTAG and V Corps would receive the preponderance of the A-10 effort, as long as that priority was maintained. If the front was stabilized, then breakthroughs would receive the priority.

The reader may even question the need to address this subject, and perhaps rightly so. But the U.S. Army, at all levels, seemingly has such an affinity for organic air support that I feel it necessary to clarify the concept. It would be a shame if a newly productive partnership were injured on the rocks of a frustrated rise in expectation. One duty in a partnership is to establish and maintain a working rapport.

It should be possible, within the established NATO tactical air control structure to preallocate an equitable number of A-10 resources between the Army Groups/ ATAFs, and then down to Corps/ ASOC level (as in Vietnam, post-1968). If a tentative allocation, for planning purposes, could be made down to the divisions, it would facilitate the joint planning and training advocated herein. At all levels, the caveat attached to the allocation, i.e., subject to higher priorities at higher levels, would be understood.

Forward -Deployment Concept

On the foregoing foundation of available problem solutions, unique opportunities, and potential force multipliers, we are ready to build a more detailed concept of deployment. The proposed concept of forward-deployment is at least a two-rank deployment, and possibly three ranks. The rear rank will be in West Germany or Great Britain. The most forward rank, in general, is that proposed to be at the army airfields collocated with major maneuver unit headquarters. The key features we seek in the rearmost rank of basing are security and logistic supportability. (Remember that responsiveness, once the battle starts, will be served primarily by the airborne stream.)

Rear base security is obviously a relative quality, generally measurable by distance from the FEBA (in relation to the range of various threats) and by the interposition of any obstacles to attack. In terms of air attack vulnerability, as a generalization, the Warsaw Pact East European-based first and second generation tactical aircraft can cover all of West Germany; the third generation aircraft can additionally cover Great Britain.²⁵ Of crew-served ground force weapons, the maximum range weapons in each category are noted in the accompanying chart.²⁶

Using the range figures in the chart, we can see that the Scaleboard (nuclear only) will cover all of Western Europe. From the westernmost points of the inter-German border, the Scud-B will cover all of West Germany and the Benelux countries, but it not reach Great Britain. From the German border, the Frog-7 leaves most of West Germany uncovered, but it reaches some of the forward army airfields (which is no problem to peacetime forward operating location training operations). Looking for major natural obstacles to an east-west ground attack, other than mountains that serve only to channel the invasion, we find the Weser River, the Rhine River, and the English Channel. The only one that will stop Warsaw Pact tanks is the English Channel.

When one considers the logistic supportability of the rear main base area, it seems clear that Great Britain is more supportable than the continent, by both air and sea, especially once war begins. The north-south lines of communication from the ports to the southern CENT AG area could be severed by a main thrust in the center sector.

Three-Rank Deployment

Thus, Great Britain is the preferred rear main base area.* It is both more supportable with logistics and more secure from the East European threat than is West Germany. We will employ the forward-basing concept that was quoted in the Senate hearing testimony in 1971: the rear main operating base or bases (MOBs) in Great Britain, the intermediate forward operating bases (FOBs) in West Germany, and advancing on forward, more numerous forward operating locations (FOLs), collocated with army units. The MOBs will be where the A-10s are permanently based and from where they will continuously be deployed forward on temporary duty (TDY) at the several FOBs in West Germany. The majority of the unit's continuation training should be flown while on TDY to the FOBs in West Germany. Unless special requirements (such as range availability for live Maverick firings) dictate otherwise, the maximum possible A-10 training should be accomplished in West Germany, with the remainder done in Great Britain. To deploy to Spain for routine gunnery training, in the better weather of the Iberian peninsula, would be counterproductive to mission capability. We need to train over the terrain and in weather conditions of the future battle area, and dive bombing is not what is needed.

*The U.S. Air Force announced on 27 January 1978 that an A-10 wing would be based at RAF stations Bentwaters and Woodbridge in early 1979. It was then announced on 15 March 1978 that the Federal Republic of Germany had agreed in principle to the establishment of forward operating locations in Germany for the A-10 aircraft based in the United Kingdom.

Forward operating location. A sample listing of potential FOLs in the CENTAG area is shown in Table 1. These Army airfields, at first glance, appear to be collocated with the major U.S. Army maneuver unit headquarters in the V Corps and VII Corps areas. To the extent feasible, the A-10s, while TDY to the FOBs for training, should be further deployed forward to the selected FOLs for their joint training. As in the original concept, these FOLs would be austere locations; their security would be provided by the in-place army. Flying operations--at least landings--would be planned for day-visual conditions only. Night recoveries would be at FOBs. It might be feasible to stock them with a minimal fuel supply to support turnarounds; if not, the aircraft would land at their home FOB for refueling. The aircraft would then stage forward to the FOL to continue the ground phase of the joint training and fly the next training sortie out of the FOL. This FOB turnaround would also exercise the quick turn skills of the ground crews at the FOBs, which will be their primary function when the war starts.

*A listing of Army airfields collocated with the major U.S. Army maneuver unit headquarters. Units with no runway listed have only heliports. Where a unit location with no runway has an AAF close by, that AAF is indicated in parentheses.

Source: DOD Flight Information Publication

Particular FOLs that may be used could also have special qualities inviting their continued use as combat turnaround bases (e.g., Wiesbaden). Otherwise, forward deployed A-10s at the FOLs will return to and operate out of the FOBs when battle begins. They could fly their first combat mission out of the FOLs, if configured properly. If the maintenance of battle configuration at the FOL is feasible, then all aircraft at the FOLs could be routinely placed on 12-hour alert status while deployed forward. This alert status would allow normal training and normal lifestyle to continue until the alert status would increased. Once the war starts and the covey of A-10s at the FOLs is flushed airborne, then the job of the FOBs will be to keep them airborne--and loaded for tanks!

The runway length that will be required for the FOLs is not known. What a commander will consider acceptable for combat or emergency operations is something different from what he will desire for routine training operations. A combination of the demonstrated forward airstrip takeoff distance of 1900 feet and the standard 80 percent factor (i.e., maximum takeoff distance allowed equals 80 percent of available runway) yields a minimum required runway of about 2400 feet. To allow the desired margin for routine training operations and varying conditions (e.g., wet runway), a 3000-foot airstrip should be sufficient for peacetime training. In Table I, six army airfields that meet the criteria are collocated with or adjacent to U.S. Army major maneuver unit headquarters. There are two more qualified army airfields in the allied army training area at Grafenwohr, making a total of eight in the V and VII Corps areas alone. Probably most of the other army airfield runways could be lengthened by the several hundred feet required to achieve the desired distance; either asphalt or perforated steel planking would suffice.²⁷

To achieve the direct interface and joint training desired, the ideal would be to have an FOL and a constant deployment at every maneuver brigade and cavalry regiment location. However, because of runway and aircraft availability limitations, that may not be feasible. A more probable arrangement would be to have at least one FOL with each division and an FOL with each independent brigade and armored cavalry regiment. If need be, the number of aircraft available for forward, deployment could be rotated among the FOLs.

At an absolute minimum, we need to establish FOLs associated with the major army training areas and then participate in the combined-arms training conducted there. Those areas and that training should also provide the opportunity for live-fire training with the 30mm gun, including joint tactics. It would also provide the opportunity for training with the West German army units that use those areas also.

The OV-10 fleet in West Germany should be tasked with the added mission of supporting the A-10 FOB-FOL network with the movement of personnel and materiel as required. This would be the means of promptly moving spare parts or technicians to fix aircraft at FOLs that could not be flown to FOBs.

To achieve the interoperability and combined capability we need for alliance warfare, under centralized control of the air arm, we also need FOLs at allied army unit locations. These could be less in number than with U.S. Army units, but at a minimum they should be one per German Corps and one per other-national army. The object is to have A-10 pilots familiarized with the terrain and friendly force dispositions along the entire eastern border. Training operations in all those areas are thus required. The major army training areas in NORTHAG (e.g., Bergen Hohne) require the same consideration as those in CENTAG.

Forward operating bases. The basic criterion for our FOBs in this concept is that they should be airfields not presently supporting U.S. or allied air combat units. This means support bases, training bases, or any other military airfields that do not house a combat capability inviting a Pact first wave strike. In addition to air force and naval air bases, we should consider minor military airfields such as Buckeburg in NORTHAG and Mendig in CENTAG. If an FOB was collocated with an army unit, that would be a bonus in this concept. Again, a decision on runway length is required, but a range of 5000 or 6000 feet should be sufficient. We obviously want these FOB runways to handle the A-10 with a full fuel load and whatever is envisioned as the maximum payload required in the continental operations. The airfield must also have or be equipped with the minimum necessary facilities to enable night-adverse weather operations. From the available candidate FOBs, the selection will be guided by supportability and security.

How MANY of what type of bases does this concept entail? That will depend to a great extent on how large an A-10 fleet is to be based in Europe. News reports have varied from one to three wings. For an illustration exercise, let's deal with percentages of whatever the total aircraft number turns out to be. I would advocate two or more bases for the rear MOBs. We should be able to keep 50 percent of our aircraft fleet deployed forward to the FOBs. (This should be the only regular TDY commitment, and the pilot manning could be adjusted as required, e.g., 1.5 crew ratio.) The number of FOBs required would be, at a minimum, the number required to support 100 percent of the European-based A-10 fleet in combat operations. (When the war starts, the aircraft at the MOBs in Great Britain move forward to the FOBs.) It would probably simplify management if the number of FOBs were kept symmetrical to the number of MOBs (e.g., two or per FOBs per MOB). The number of FOLs would be determined in accordance with the objectives, criteria, and limitations outlined earlier, but aircraft should be deployed to the FOLs by at least pairs. As many as 100 percent of the aircraft from the FOBs could be kept deployed forward to the FOLs. I would envision a dozen or more FOLs in each army group area.

That wraps up the proposed concept of deployment-employment for the A-10 in Central Europe. In sum, it is hoped that what has been presented can contribute to actualizing the truly unique and possibly decisive potential of "the stick."

Hq USAF

Notes

1. FM 100-5, Operations, Department of the Army, 1 July 1976, p. 13-12.

2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Close Air Support: Hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Close Air Support of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., October, November 1971, p. 214. Hereafter cited as Close Air Support.

3. Ibid., p. 182.

4. "A NATO Preview," NATO's Fifteen Nations, April-May 1977, p. 92. Confirmed by telephone conversation with pilot involved.

5. The Military Balance: 1977-1978 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), p. 110.

6. Ibid. These tank numbers are the figures with which the NATO negotiators are concerned in the mutual reduction of forces negotiations. These figures do not include reserve stocks.

7. Graham H. Turbiville, "Invasion in Europe--A Scenario," Army, November 1976. p. 20. Turbiville was a Soviet military affairs analyst for the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1969 to December 1975, when he resigned to pursue doctoral studies.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 19, 1977, p. 53.

11. The Military Balance: 1977-1978, p. 108. Emphasis added.

12. FY 1977 Annual Defense Department Report, January 27, 1976, pp. 98-99.

13. USAF Fact Sheet, A-10 Close Air Support Aircraft, Office of Information, Air Force Systems Command, May 1977, p. 4.

14. Ibid., p. 2.

15. Close Air Support, p. 181. Emphasis added.

16. Ibid., p. 193.

17. USAF Fact Sheet, p. 7.

18. J. Philip Geddes, "A-10--USAF Choice for the Close Air Support Role," International Defense Review, February 1974, pp. 72 and 74.

19. Close Air Support, p. 212.

20. Ibid., p. 241.

21. Ibid. Emphasis added.

22. USAF Fact Sheet, p. 12.

23. Close Air Support, p. 239.

24. David A. Brown, "A-10 Pilots Stress Navaid Requirements," Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 19, 1977, p. 52.

25. R. Meller, "Europe's New Generation of Combat Aircraft." International Defense Review, February 1975, pp. 180-S1.

26. Understanding Soviet Military Developments, AC of S for Intelligence, Department of the Army, Washington, GPO, 1977, pp. 69-74; FM 30-40, Handbook on Soviet Ground Forces, Department of the Army, 30 June 1975, pp. 6-39 to 6-55.

27. The A-10 is designed to have an "unprepared airstrip" capability, but as of this writing, it has not been tested, except for a desert dry lake, which is too hard a surface to be meaningful. Aviation Week & Space, Technology, June 20, 1977, p. 88.

We (aviators of World War I) could see the utter helplessness of the armies on the ground. They were merely thousands of men led to shambles, as a result of a faulty system which was entirely oblivious to the meaning of modem war.

Brigadier General William (Billy) Mitchell
"Memoirs of World War I," Liberty Weekly, 1928

Colonel Robert D. Rasmussen (B.A., University of Omaha; M.A., Arizona State University) is assigned to the Deputy Directorate for Force Development in the Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. He served as a fighter pilot overseas and in TAC and as an F-100 and F-5 instructor, Luke AFB, Arizona. In Southeast Asia he had a tour with the Army as ALO/F AC. He was a staff officer in Hq TAC and operations officer and commander of air-to-air and air-to-ground F-4E squadrons. His articles have appeared in USAF Fighter Weapons Newsletter, TAC Attack, and Air University Review. Colonel Rasmussen is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and a Distinguished Graduate of Air War College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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