Air University Review, November-December 1978
Major Donald J. Alberts
Captain Leroy Mock
IN THE September-October 1977 issue of Air University Review, Major Robert A. Heston posed the question: "Considering the likely threat posed in Europe, are we organized and trained well enough to ensure air superiority?" While never definitively answering his own question, he proposes a training program for multi-purpose fighter aircrew that would seemingly make us, as an Air Force, more capable in the air-to-air segment of air superiority.
My proposal to specialize the F-4 and F-16 TFT [Tactical Fighter Training] schools and operational squadrons is based on the contention that pilots cannot effectively maintain the proficiency necessary to accomplish both the air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. Survival in the modern aerial battlefield will require intimate knowledge of the mission, and we may not have time to reorient our training after the battle has begun. 1
We, the present authors, do not violently disagree with the overall philosophy of specialization expressed in that article. But viewing the possible battlefields of the near and intermediate future in both Europe and Asia, we fear the logical implications of further specialization, as it would apply to non-air-to-air dedicated units. Further, our concern lies not so much in the area of tactical fighter training schools but rather in the day-to-day training of operational air-to-surface and defense suppression squadrons, the combat readiness of those squadrons, and the ability of the individual aircrew member to accomplish his mission and survive a conventional war of some unknown duration and intensity. Our own viewpoint is from the training problem in a most--perhaps the most--diverse tactical fighter wing in the Air Force. Our wing possesses three air-to-surface F-4D squadrons, one defense suppression/Wild Weasel F-4C squadron, one RF-4C tactical reconnaissance squadron, and one MC-130E special operations squadron. The inherent specialized systems, taskings, and missions of these aircraft only add to the spice of life here in the Pacific. We support the position that specialization of air-to-air dedicated units was long overdue, and we worry about the results of increased specialization on the non-air-to-air specialized units.
First, a doctrinal note of key importance to one of the writers is that the United States Air Force, in his opinion, does not presently have, nor is it scheduled to have, a true air superiority fighter in its inventory. While we have superb air-to-air machines in the F-15 and F-16, both of these weapon systems are limited in application because they can fight only half of the air superiority battle, that half of the air battle concerned with countering enemy fighter aircraft. The closest thing the USAF has to air superiority is the everforthcoming F-4G. Even the F-4G, an aircraft that can fight the entire battle, when it becomes fully operational, is technologically limited in performance and maneuverability against both the enemy fighter threat and the more advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. Heston's rhetorical question, from our standpoint, must be answered with a no--we are not organized and equipped or trained to ensure air superiority, nor will we be until we can guarantee the defeat of the enemy's SAM systems and fighters. 2
Our second major assumption is that the Tactical Fighter Force is currently undergoing a fundamental change in training methodology away from the Designed Operational Capability (DOC) system of Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 51-34 toward the Graduated Combat Capability (GCC) system as outlined in MCM 51-50. Under the old DOC system, which applied until 1 January 1978:
. . . units with multipurpose fighter aircraft (e.g., the F-4) would be assigned a primary and a secondary Designed Operational Capability…. Each DOC entails specialization in either air-to-surface or air-to-air weapons employment. The air-to-air DOC encompasses two segments: air superiority, which involves offensive air-to-air weapons employment; and air defense, which involves area or boundary defense. The air-to-surface DOCs are divided into conventional and nuclear weapons employment. 3
This guideline was not universally applied, at least not in PACAF, which had already further specialized into single DOC functions and was enlightened enough to have created a defense suppression DOC for an F-4 operational unit. Development of the defense suppression DOC was an evolutionary process, involving almost continual negotiation between the unit and higher headquarters to resolve differing viewpoints on how the aircrews should be trained and what skills the individual aircrew needed to possess in order to be truly mission-ready. This evolution uncovered unexpected doctrinal and procedural problem areas, not all of which have been fully resolved under the GCC system. However, this same process has pointed the way to a possible solution of the overall training problem for air-to-surface committed units, given a degree of flexibility air-to-round missile specialization, and basic and open-mindedness on both the level of the unit and higher headquarters staff levels. We shall return to this solution later in the discussion.
Doc training involved two separate but related training standards, sorties and events. To stay mission-ready (MR), 4 an individual had to fly no less than a specified number of creditable sorties in a six-month period. Further, in a completely separate count, he had to accomplish a designated minimum number of discrete training events, such as dropping x low angle bombs, y high angle strafe passes, z armed reconnaissance routes, etc. 5 Events and sorties taken together were thought to guarantee skills and proficiency in the use of the weapon system to accomplish mission tasking. Failure to achieve a given number in either category caused regression to a nonmission-ready status. Prior to 1 January 1978, air-to-air training for air-to-surface DOC units within PACAF was limited to 16 sorties per six-month period, of which two sorties had to be basic fighter maneuvers (BFM) offensive and two had to be BFM defensive. Failure to meet these goals did not result in regression (an exception to the general rule) but had to be waived by Hq PACAF/DO. 6
Graduated Combat Capability training is subtly different from the old standards of sorties and events. The current method of training, in PACAF at least, is based on the philosophy that flying a given number of sortie types, using scenarios that necessitate the performance of real-world tactics, should allow the aircrew to maintain a given combat capability at a certain level of proficiency. For air-to-surface units, nonscenario basic weapons qualification rides are also provided. There are certain prescribed events that must be accomplished, but in general, these are not tied to any specific numbers. "The term 'event' in this context is synonymous with 'task' and is not intended as an item to be 'logged' in any specific numbers." 7 The number of air-to-air sorties depends on the specific combat capability assigned to the unit (here in PACAF, these sorties are currently prescribed). 8 For example, an air-to-surface unit might be assigned the requirement to maintain GCCs of basic air support, basic nuclear proficiency, Maverick air interdiction. Each of these Graduated Combat Capabilities is separate and distinct, but there is some trade-off in the sorties thought to enable proficiency in each GCC. Not every member of the unit has to be mission-ready in each GCC at any given time. The current number of recommended air-to-air sorties in PACAF for an aircrew member maintaining MR status in the above-mentioned four distinct GCCs is 14. One could argue that the trend exists toward less air-to-air training for air-to-surface and defense suppression units rather than maintaining a stable number or increasing. We feel that if Heston's plan were adopted, this trend toward fewer air-to-air-dedicated sorties for air-to-surface units would become more severe.
Our main concern in this regard centers on dissimilar air combat tactics (DACT) training. DACT involves matching aircraft of one type against a different type of fighter, preferably having a simulated adversary fairly close in performance to enemy aircraft for the sake of realistic simulation and training effectiveness. The present best source of DACT lies in the use of assets from the Aggressor program: F5Es simulating MiG tactics.9 Aggressor resources are limited, but some expansion capability is present.10 However, if Heston's desires are met and the number of sorties devoted to DACT for air-to-air specialized units is doubled over the present level, those sorties must come from somewhere. We suspect that the only real source of increased DACT sorties for air-to-air units lies in cutting back the sorties presently dedicated to air-to-surface units. Frankly, this possibility frightens us, primarily because both authors are in air-to-surface specialized units.
One more assumption needs to be examined: in the opening stages of a conventional war, USAF and allied tactical forces will be evenly matched or, more likely, significantly outnumbered. Analysis of simple force posture comparisons indicates the high probability of this eventuality, although Korea is not an open-and-shut case as is Europe.11 The main concern is with "functional" balance. For example, depending on warning time or lack thereof, we might find ourselves in a war in Korea with the forces on hand. PACAF, USMC, and USN carriers/fighters are available, but it is unlikely, in our opinion, that all available aircraft could be simultaneously rushed to the peninsula. Some USAF/allied/ other service aircraft will be required for close air support, others for defense suppression if the ground advance of the enemy is to be halted. While not necessarily so, the North Koreans could retain and use the vast majority of their aircraft as an umbrella over their attacking ground forces, or to fill in the gaps caused in their SAM system by defense suppression action.12 In any case, the targets of enemy defending fighters are rationally (and traditionally) our fighter-bombers attempting to bomb his troops or disrupt his lines of communication. Thus, it is quite likely that USAF pilots will be tasked to perform missions beyond those for which they had been primarily trained.
Now we can start to focus on the central uneasiness we feel. Heston tells us that "the tremendous power of specialization and training is evident when considering that the top 15 German aces of World War II accounted for 3574 kills."13 The contention may well be true. But there is an alternate, or perhaps a corollary explanation: some or all of the 3574 pilots involved in the other aircraft may have been overly specialized in air-to-surface endeavors or may not have been properly trained to negate the attacks upon them, much less trained to gain the advantage and then destroy their attackers. If Heston's plan is accepted as proposed, and he is correct in maintaining that "there would be a residual capability in the secondary missions, but a combat-ready level of proficiency would be lacking,"14 then our air-to-surface tactical fighters are unlikely to be able to accomplish their missions in an efficient, survivable manner. To be honest, we need to know some percentages of intended specialization (i.e., how many squadrons would be air-to-air, etc.,) before we can adequately evaluate the full impact of his proposal. However, all the air-to-air-trained crewmembers would be lacking in the proficiency necessary to perform interdiction and close air support, capabilities vital to stopping an enemy attack. These capabilities may be of paramount short-term importance.15 We are currently specializing a number of air-to-air squadrons. Increasing the specialization level even further would tend to reduce the air-to-air training resources available to the air-to-surface and defense suppression units and, by the very nature of the proposed specialization, would leave these non-air-to-air units with a "lack of combat-ready proficiency" at air-to-air. This is what is intolerable to us in his proposal.
If one is deployed to Korea as a Wild Weasel aircrew member and committed to combat in the defense suppression role, he must be combat ready in both defense suppression and air-to-air or he will not be able to accomplish his mission and/or survive. This is particularly true for the defense suppression squadron but is also valid for all air-to-surface committed forces. Once committed to combat, the aircrew survives the first missions on the skill and experience that have been previously acquired, probably through peacetime training. Our current training philosophy is based on this principle. Realistic training, mock combat, and other similar simulations will hopefully prevent unnecessary losses in the first days of combat. Likewise, if an aircrew is not combat ready in air-to-air, can that aircrew be expected to survive if air-to-air combat is forced upon him?
Again, we return to the probability that defense suppression and air-to-surface forces will be compelled to engage enemy fighters. To a certain extent, this can be viewed as a tactics and planning problem, but unless friendly force posture is such that we can guarantee a majority of aircraft employed as air-to-air combat air patrols, the probability of such engagement is quite high and becomes higher as the percentage of total force devoted to counterair becomes lower. The enemy is free to decide where and when to commit his fighters. Even if air-to-surface or defense suppression aircraft are escorted, the escort can become engaged, leaving those escorted at the mercy of follow-on attack tactics. The authors' personal experiences in both Red Flag and Cope Thunder l6 indicate that, if the enemy attackers are numerous, they will in fact penetrate, outfox, or in some other devious manner, manage to get past the air-to-air protection and "tap" the strike or defense suppression aircraft.17 While the battle occurs over or near his territory, the enemy can readily continue to commit aircraft to counter the friendly air action. Protecting escorts can be stripped away or outnumbered. One must remember the reason we need air-to-air fighters in the first place. To sweep the skies clear of enemy fighters does little by itself to stop his offensive. We try to destroy his fighters so that they will not stop our bombers from attacking his ground assets. Our air-to-surface committed forces are the prime reason friendly air forces are operating over enemy territory in the first place.
Today, in a real-war, first-day situation, a choice presents itself to the aircrew once the friendly bomber or defense suppression aircraft is attacked. The friendlies can attempt to retain their ordnance and disengage toward the target, or jettison their ordnance and either turn back toward home or engage the enemy. Engagement would be foolhardy if the concerned aircrew were not combat ready in air-to-air. Engagement under this condition has the built--in disadvantage of automatically meaning a failure of the primary mission--the bombs do not get to the target-the enemy can disengage immediately because once the ordnance goes, so does our threat to his ground forces, supply lines, etc. His defending fighters are automatically successful, regardless of what happens from that moment on. Once the ordnance is gone, there is no compelling reason for anybody to stay around. The first alternative presented, therefore, is preferred from the aspect of mission accomplishment, retention of ordnance, defeat of the enemy attack, and continuation on to target. Without continued emphasis on air-to-air for air-to-surface units, this option of continuing on to target becomes less viable.
For defense suppression aircrews, this dilemma is particularly acute because they, like their air-to-air counterparts, are normally operating in support of the primary mission. If enemy air can drive the Weasel off, the strike force and air-to-air escorts become even more vulnerable to SAM attack. The Weasel cannot suppress the SAM if he is not there or has gotten rid of his defense suppression ordnance in order to stay alive. If the strike aircraft are being closely escorted, the escort cannot afford to leave them to aid the Weasels, since that will leave the strike birds vulnerable to air attack and mission failure.
Much of the problem is self-imposed by our concept of air-to-air training. The either/ or choice of proficiencies is or can be a false issue. In the past, we may have been too narrow-minded in conceptualization or too demanding in tasking. Let us take the defense suppression mission as an example. Until 1 July 1977, the Weasel in PACAF had a primary DOC of defense suppression and a secondary DOC of air-to-ground conventional. Within the primary DOC, the defense suppression aircrew had to perform (and was limited to a maximum of) 12 defensive combat maneuvering (DCM) sorties. DCM was and remains very clearly defined as negating an enemy attack and is restricted to just that.
To engage in offensive maneuvering, one had to be required to perform air combat maneuvering (ACM) as an event. ACM is differently defined and regulated in training than is DCM. Neither of the two allowed forms of air-to-air training fit the expected combat employment of the Weasel force. The answer, here in PACAF at least, was first to analyze the defense suppression mission. The initial change was the elimination of the primary and secondary DOC concept as redundant. New training events were introduced in the DOC that flowed from the analysis of the Weasel mission. The Weasel was required to train in those things necessary for him to carry out his combat mission. The Weasel does not need to know all aspects of air-to-ground gunnery, nor of air-to-air combat. He does need to know and be proficient at some aspects of both. Does it make sense to know all there is to know about radar AIM-7 and AIM-9 missiles and their employment, high-angle deflection gun passes, and the total use of the aircraft cannon in air attack if your probable mission profile indicates you will not have two of those three systems available to you? It certainly does not. In this present case, the Weasel in the performance of his Weasel mission cannot carry AIM-9s and is unlikely to carry a gun since that option takes up a weapon station that will, in all probability, have either fuel or ordnance on it. What the Weasel needs to know is how to employ AIM-7 missiles quickly and effectively with a high probability of single shot kill. He must, to perform his mission, have the capability to negate an enemy attack and either destroy the enemy or drive him off. The Weasel cannot leave the target area if he is to accomplish his mission; he must stay and suppress the enemy SAMs, just as the strike pilot must reach his target with bombs to be successful. Neither the Weasel pilot nor the strike pilot must be a specialist at the air-to-air skill to do this, but he should be well enough trained to fight his machine against the enemy in his combat configuration and with the weapons he has at his disposal.
Our first requirement is to analyze the unit mission in detail. Within the GCC concept, individual squadrons should be better able to identify the degree to which their probable wartime tasking will expose their aircrews to enemy air. For example, a squadron with a required GCC of interdiction is, in general theoretical terms, more likely to encounter enemy aircraft in the fulfillment of its mission than is a squadron tasked with close air support. While both need a certain amount of regularized air-to-air training, one squadron may need it more than another. Knowledge of the probable area of employment, enemy strength and weakness, and our own contingency plans is a necessary part of this evaluation.
The most direct solution, in conceptual terms, appears simple. Earlier we pointed out that the dilemma we face in specialization is perhaps a false one because it creates an either/or choice where none may really exist. There is no need to train an air-to-surface aircrew member in the full range of air-to-air, but he does need to know how to use the weapons at his disposal to drive off or destroy an enemy and continue with his mission. Since we are moving into the use of the GCC system to produce both unit and individual combat readiness, it seems feasible to create a GCC in counteroffensive air-to-air capability.18 Through proper selection of training tasks to be accomplished, aircrews can master a portion of the total possible air-to-air knowledge and skills, including, it is hoped, that portion directly related to the aircrew's probable combat configuration and weapon availability. In the case of the F-4, such training tasking would logically center on the use of the AIM-7 system. A typical training event sequence, for example, could feature ground-controlled intercept warning of closing bandits, visual acquisition and identification, radar lock-on, and a quick missile firing simulation (within system parameters) to achieve a "kill."19 Separation or continuation to target from that point would depend on the tactical situation, the number of bandits, etc.
Further, future training under MCM 51-50 would seem to lend itself to progressive scenario training techniques. 20 If these training programs prove successful, training toward a given set of GCCs, including counteroffensive air-to-air could be regularized with scenarios arranged in building-block fashion. Dissimilar counteroffensive air combat tactics (ACT) should be a planned portion of each aircrew member's progression. Continuation training could progressively expose the inexperienced aircrew member to more difficult simulated combat conditions, with participation in exercises such as Red Flag/Cope Thunder as the capstone of recurring training. After a specified level of proficiency has been reached, counteroffensive ACT should be a planned portion of all tactics rides. The attacker, even if in a similar aircraft, can use basic fighter manuevers or commonly known hostile intercept techniques. If the operational aircrew member cannot reach that level of proficiency, in our opinion he should not be flying fighter aircraft in the first place, for it is clear that he will not be truly combat ready and, therefore, will constitute a liability to himself, his squadron, and the Air Force when he does fly in combat. Further, after a crew member has reached this level of safe, mature performance, he can repeat the entire training sequence from basic fighter maneuvers to advanced handling tactics missions such as dissimilar air combat tactics training, but with simulated' combat configurations. Flying an air tactics mission as a "mud-beater" in a clean configuration has its merits, 21 but it is not quite the demanding case that will be necessary in combat if the mission is to be accomplished. There is nothing inherently unsafe in high gross weight maneuvering-unless such handling is unfamiliar to the aircraft handler. Any action within the designed performance envelope of the aircraft can be made safe if it is approached gradually and with full knowledge.
We must still face the larger problem of restrictions on training, especially for inexperienced crews. Maximization of operational continuation training is not possible until many of the often self-imposed restrictions are removed. 22 It is also somewhat paradoxical that we must worry about training to a combat-ready status in the operational squadrons. In wartime, a young fighter pilot comes out of the replacement training unit (RTU), or in Heston's terms, a TFT, and goes into combat where aircraft loss and death are very real possibilities. Yet, in peacetime, the same young man enters an operational squadron and is faced with multiple restrictions and "can't dos" on his flying activities until he becomes experienced. If we sincerely believe that fighter aircrew members in USAFE, PACAF, and the dual-based units can be committed to combat at a moment's notice, then there is no real excuse for putting limitations on their flying activities. If they are too inexperienced or unknowledgeable to do pop-up attacks or land in weather that has deteriorated to l00-feet overcast with a visibility of one-fourth of a mile, they will not be any better equipped to handle such problems tomorrow morning when the war begins. The enemy probably will not honor a 90° turn, a rocking of wings, and a turn back to course as a signal to knock off an attack because his victim has not been properly certified in DACT. Even if it is peacetime, if any individual in an operational squadron must have restrictions placed on his performance of flying combat-related and required tasks, he is not combat ready! He should not be placed in a position where he can be sent into combat immediately. Even the new GCC concept does not alleviate this problem, although the philosophical trend behind the concept is in that direction.
WHILE somewhat outside the scope of this discussion, there are at least two long-term organizational suggestions that might be further investigated. The first is similar to Heston's proposal for TFTs, but differs in resource intensity. Since it is peacetime, what would be wrong with an extended TFT program that covered perhaps 250 sorties and took 18 months or more to complete? Enough repetition would have to be provided so that the graduate is in fact a fully qualified basic combat-ready fighter pilot. Some specialization would be possible toward the end of the program, based on the GCC concept, so that graduates could then be assigned, fully qualified, to a unit tasked with the appropriate specialties. For the air-to-air portion, the training would include full qualification in the counteroffensive GCC basic level, and those slated for air-to-air tasked squadrons would undergo more intensive training in the weapons used in the full range of air-to-air combat. For the F-16, we have a golden opportunity, since the TFT programs have not yet been finalized, nor is there agreement on probable combat loads, tasking, and basing. The specialization decision here should take into account the residual air-to-air capabilities of typically configured air-to-surface tasking. Counteroffensive air-to-air training would then center on optimum/maximum use of the residual systems.
Another alternative, similar in concept to the extended TFT, would be a two-tier fighter pilot system. After finishing TFT, the young officer would be assigned to a TAC unit that is not dual-based and does not have an immediate stand-by commitment. The young member would spend one full tour in this unit before becoming eligible for overseas front-line duty. The experience problem overseas would disappear, career planning/manning would seemingly be made easier, and there might well be less turbulence in the personnel system. It is even conceivable that remote tours could be coupled with longer tours in the same theater as part of an assignment package. Overseas squadrons could thus concentrate on finding solutions to tactical employment problems they will face in their areas of operations. If war should break out, TAC augmentation forces would seemingly be no worse off than the overseas operational squadrons are now. We would have a far more highly trained, proficient, and competent initial cutting edge to our air power sword.
RETURNING to the immediate problem raised by Heston in the area of an increase of air-to-air efficiency in our fighter forces, we can think of yet another possible solution. This subject has caused much debate within the fighter community recently. Major Heston cited inexperience as the rationale for having wingmen. 23 While true, at least traditionally, this is only one of two reasons for putting a man on the wing. The second reason is the more germane to this particular discussion. Somebody is needed to cover the leader, to visually sweep his blind spots to keep the leader from being caught unawares. In the parlance of fighter pilots, the wingman's primary historical functional responsibility in all air forces has been to "check six o'clock." In the high speed ("speed is life"), complex, and always confusing modern aerial combat arena, mutual support serves to allow each individual fighter the ability to keep another clear of attack. In multiaircraft engagements, there seems to be a tendency for fights to break down into "1 versus 1 or more," where mutual Support is at a minimum. Further, rumors leaking from Red Flag, Cope Thunder, and other sources indicate that most kills registered against most types of aircraft are "unobserved shots," that is, an enemy being in a lethal position without the friendly pilot seeing him. We strongly suggest that the greatest immediate increase of efficiency to be gained in our air-to-air capability over hostile fighters in future wars lies not so much in increased specialization but rather in increased seating capacity. The arguments on both sides of this issue (two seat fighters versus single-seat fighters) seem to be grounded more in emotion than in objective, provable fact. 24
We realize that long-term solutions require long, often painful, periods of transition time before they can be put into effect, but in peacetime time exists to make such transitions. When an air force goes to war, it fights that war with the doctrine, habits, and expertise it has on hand and only painfully and slowly develops new doctrine, tactics, and expertise during the war. In the near term, we live in an exciting time in the tactical fighter business. It took us approximately 18 years before we adopted our present air-to-air tactical concepts, but, once adopted, we have revolutionized ourselves as a force. We are bringing three new combat aircraft and two remade new models (F-4G and EF-111) into the inventory in the next few years. We are embarking on a new concept in gaining and maintaining combat capability. However, we would do well to take a little time to experiment with innovative ideas and derive test results before we lock ourselves in concrete. This is particularly true of the F-16 program.
WHILE we agree with Heston that specialization is desirable for designated air-to-air units, we strongly believe that the minimum degree of air-to-air skill required for air-to-surface and defense suppression aircrews is the full capability for combat-ready counteroffensive tactics and maneuvering, based on the air-to-air weapons and techniques that would be part of the expected combat mission configurations. We are presently specialized, and perhaps some fine-tuning is necessary in the percentages of units dedicated to each role. But much improvement in efficiency is available within our current programs. We cannot afford to have further degradation in the amount and quality of air-to-air training for non air-to-air specialized aircrews. It will not do any of us much good if, after the next war, the air power historians say that: "USAF counterair units built up an impressive, favorable exchange ratio of 15 to 1; however, the top 15 (fill in your favorite enemy) aces accounted for 3574 kills among American strike aircraft." We agree that "even a few capable fliers trained in the best air-to-air fighters can carry out this mission with the highest probability of success," 25 but we would add, and insist, that the ability to carry out the majority of assigned tactical air tasks successfully ultimately depends on the capability to reach a target with ordnance still on board and then deliver that ordnance. The enemy fighter pilot is also tasked with Richthofen's oft-quoted dictum concerning patrol, destruction of the enemy, and rubbish. However, we prefer to remember the statement attributed to Patton, that our task is not to die for our country but to make some other fighter pilot die for his.
Kadena Air Base, Japan
Notes
1. Major Robert A. Heston, USAF, "Specialized Air-to-Air Combat Training," Air University Review, September, October 1977, p. 84.
2. Major Donald J. Alberts, USAF, "A Call from the Wilderness," Air University Review, November-December 1976, pp. 35-45. See also Benjamin S. Lambeth, Soviet Training and Tactics for Air-to-Air Combat (U), R-2163-AF (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, September 1977).
3. Colonel Robert D. Russ, USAF, "Air-to-Air Training under the DOC System," Air University Review, January-February 1977, p. 70.
4. Multi-Command Manual (MCM) 51-50, vol. I, 12 August 1977, defines mission-ready status as: "Trained to a specific combat capability for immediate introduction into combat at that level." Under MCM 51-34, the old system, mission-ready was essentially the same, except the criterion was the ability to perform the unit mission as tasked.
5. See, for example, MCM 51-34, 26 April 1976, copies of which should still be available, although the series has been superseded by MCM 51-50.
6. MCM 51-34, Chapter 6 (PACAF only).
7. MCM 51-50, Chapter 6 (PACAF only), draft, n.d.
8. For example, Figure 6 of Chapter 6 (PACAF only) for 51-50 lists 4 sorties for a Bl (basic air support GCC), 6 sorties for Al (basic nuclear familiarization), 10 for the Maverick specialty (including 4 sorties for Bl and 6 for A1), and a total of 14 sorties for an aircrew member mission ready at the highest tasked level; in this case B1A1G2G1B2, or, in words, basic air support, basic nuclear familiarization, Maverick qualified, Pave Spike qualified and basic interdiction.
9. "Aggressor Units Hone TAC Pilot Tactics," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 6, 1978, pp. 153-57.
10. Ibid., p. 153. A fifth squadron is possible.
11. Most analyses point to our being outnumbered in both cases, but many qualitative/subjective judgments are necessary to describe a meaningful level of either parity or inferiority in Korea. With warning and nonintervention by the People's Republic of China, the friendly allies can have a quantitative combat air power superiority in 48 to 72 hours, depending on where the carriers are and other U.S. reactive measures. See The Military Balance: 1977-1978 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977), pp. 6-7, 60-61, and 107.
12. Several sources can lead one to believe that the Soviets and their doctrinal disciples such as the North Koreans have an option. While the vast majority of war starting scenarios envision a pre-emptive attack on allied airheads, confidence In SAM systems and an air strategic defensive might be a more efficient use of a limited resource from the standpoint of an intensive equipment-using conflict. The Egyptian Air Force, while engaging in some interdiction/battlefield interdiction work, was used to a great extent in October 1973 War. See Nadav Safran, "Trial by Ordeal: The Yom Kippur War, October 1973," International Security, Fall 1977. One also vaguely remembers that the Battle of Britain was won on the defensive.
13. Heston, p. 84, Original data cited from Edward H. Sims, Fighter Tactics and Strategy, 1914-1970 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 255.
14. Heston, p. 83.
15. Again, the Israeli experience of 1973 is illustrative, as is perhaps the French and Russian experience of World War II. The Israelis wanted to use defense suppression as a technique of gaining air superiority. However, political considerations and initial enemy successes forced the air force into close air support early in the fighting. If one cannot afford to give up ground, the price one is willing to pay to hold that ground can be quite high.
16. Cope Thunder is PACAF's Red Flag. Red Flag is an exercise in TAC where a unit is exposed to mock combat under very realistic conditions of simulation.
17. The proper use of escort fighters is the subject of an open ended doctrinal debate in the American fighter/pursuit field since World War I. Basically there are two main competing beliefs. One school feels that the escorting fighters should stay right with their escorts until the enemy engages them. The other school believes that the fighters should sweep ahead and engage the enemy. Our personal beliefs tend toward the former school of thought, with the reservation that we would not be consistent so as to avoid being stereotyped by the enemy. Timing in relation to airspace and the escorted aircraft is critical.
18. In keeping with the nomenclature of the new system, we cannot resist tentatively wishing the "alpha numeric" of the two-level proposed GCC to be termed Counteroffensive 1 and Counteroffensive 2, or CO1 and CO2.
19. It seems easy, but we suspect the first run-through would produce some surprises and frustrations. We simply do not train specifically to do these things. We do train to offensively engage and use all our weapons, which trains us in turning engagements that might not be too tactically sound. The Israelis found that getting out of turning dogfights in a multiaircraft engagement, once commenced, was very difficult.
20. PACAF has chosen to experiment with the scenario training idea as its vehicle for building GCCs, both for air-to-air and air-to-surface training. Interested fighter wing directors of operations can wire 18TFW/DOT for a sample air-to-surface program.
21. The aircraft performs best that way, and it is the way the airplane will fight, if external tanks and ordnance are jettisoned. As pointed out, jettisoning automatically precludes mission success if it occurs prior to the target.
22. We are not opposed to safety. But we would like to see a philosophy similar to that of the Israelis: if the majority of line jocks think a restriction is not a good one, it is amended or eliminated. See MCM 55-200, 20 July 1977. Major command local restrictions and procedures are found in separate Chapter 4s.
23. Heston, p. 86.
24. Unpublished notes from the 1977 Fighter Symposium, "The Single Seat Fighter Again--Still the Best Option" versus "Why Our Next Generation Fighters Should Be Two Seat Aircraft." See also Major Barry D. Watts, ″A Comparison of Team and Single Ship Approaches to Aerial Combat" (Unpublished paper, USAF Academy, December 1976).
25. Heston, p. 84. If one is interested in building capability for air-to-surface units, see and digest the two-issue series of articles collectively entitled "Training toward Combat Capability," in the USAF Fighter Weapons Review, Winter and Spring 1977 (Nellis AFB, Nevada: USAF Fighter Weapons Center, 1977).
Contributors
Major Donald J. Alberts (M.A., Georgetown University; M.S., University of Southern California) is a planning and programming action officer in the Doctrine Development Branch, Directorate of Concepts at HQ USAF. Previously, he served in PACAF as a Wild Weasel pilot and full-time additional duty wing-training officer; his other operational assignments have all been in fighters in both USAFE and PACAF. Major Alberts taught political science at the Air Force Academy from 1971 to 1975. He is coeditor and co-author of Political Violence and Insurgency: A Comparative Approach. Major Alberts was author of the outstanding Review article published in fiscal year 1977, "A Call from the Wilderness," which appeared in the November-December 1976-issue.
Captain Leroy (Pete) Mock (M.A., Northern Arizona University) is assigned to the USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellis AFB, Nevada, as the Deputy F-16 Project Manager for the F-16 Multinational Follow-On Test and Evaluation/Tactics Development and Evaluation. He has been actively flying fighters (F-4C/D/E, AT-33) operationally or in training as an instructor in PACAF and TAC at Misawa AB, Japan; DaNang AB, RVN; Myrtle Beach AFB, South Carolina; Luke AFB, Arizona; and at Kadena AB, Japan, where he was Chief, Fighter Training Branch, 18TFW/DOT. Captain Mock is a 1978 graduate of the Air Command and Staff College seminar program.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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