Air University Review, March-April 1978

The United States on Diego Garcia

a question of limits

In Through the Looking Glass, Lewis Carroll describes the country of the Red Queen, where one has to run as fast as possible to stay in the same place. This situation is similar to the one faced by modern American foreign policy. Because it is a superpower, the harder the United States works at protecting its interests the more it seems that there can be no advancement of those interests. Many nations, especially those in the third world, automatically respond to American actions with charges of imperialism. Furthermore, military moves by the United States can touch off reciprocal moves by the Soviet Union. At home, too, government policy is the subject of pressure to minimize defense expenditures. Liberals regard increases in the military as something of an overkill. While the accuracy of such a charge is debatable, the idea of overkill raises an important issue in American foreign policy: the problem of setting limits on the size and scope of military operations that will provide maximum benefits without generating new security threats.

This concept of limits is especially applicable to the American presence in the Indian Ocean. specifically concerning United States policy toward the island of Diego Garcia. That island, the home of an American communication facility, lies in the approximate center of the Indian Ocean, no closer than about 2500 miles to any major land mass. This centrality, as well as the fact that it is isolated from the sensitive littoral states,¹ accords it great value to strategists. Effective use of this position thus depends on the nature of the facilities installed there. The transformation of the communication facility into a naval support base, therefore, focuses the question of limits on what the status of the installation on Diego Garcia should be.

The purpose of this article is to show how a policy of nonexpansion beyond present construction projects on Diego Garcia would best promote peace. This objective will be accomplished by examining major aspects of the problem: development of the American presence on Diego Garcia and in the Indian Ocean in recent years, the nature of the controversy surrounding the facility there, the failure of alternate proposals to achieve a solution, and the way in which a nonexpansion policy will work to promote peace.

The problem of Diego Garcia has been developing for more than a decade, and a multitude of events has contributed to today's complex situation. To appreciate the significance of Diego Garcia thus requires an understanding of those past events, beginning with the change in the British government in the early 1960s.

Soon after taking power in 1964, Britain’s new Labour government found itself heir to defenses that were overextended and under-equipped. Seeking to minimize foreign defense commitments, the British leaders decided to withdraw forces from areas east of Suez within seven years. However, in 1966 the United States and Great Britain decided that their mutual security interests would be best served if they maintained an installation in the Indian Ocean.

In order to obtain such a facility, Britain formed the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) from the Chagos Archipelago.² As an incentive to British participation, the United States agreed to lower the cost of a group of Polaris submarines that it was selling to Britain by $14 million.³ The agreement, however, was kept as quiet as possible, so as to secure purchase of the islands from Mauritius, which at this time was gaining its independence and feared a foreign military establishment in the area, even though it would be some 1200 miles away. Despite assurances to the contrary, the purpose of the BIOT was to serve as the home of such an installation; and soon after its purchase, the island of Diego Garcia was quietly leased to the United States.⁴

At that time, the British withdrawal "East of Suez" was viewed in the West as a disastrous move, for it was felt that the cutback would create a power vacuum. This view was predicated on the assumption that littoral states would be unable to defend themselves.

The Western notion of a power vacuum was not echoed elsewhere. Indian Ocean area nations claimed that this concept would undermine their independence and development by inviting Big Power intervention and negating third world nonalignment. Joining the littoral states in denouncing the West was the Soviet Union, charging that the power-vacuum concept was imperialistic.⁵

Despite the rhetoric, the Soviet Union was the first major power to increase naval activities in he area. In 1968, a small naval force, including missile-bearing warships, entered the Indian Ocean. In 1969, the Pacific and Black Sea fleets of the Soviet Navy held joint maneuvers in those waters. Later in the same year, the Soviets began maintaining a permanent surface vessel presence in the area.

As for the United States, its actions at this were largely confined to the Navy's bid for a base on Diego Garcia, designed to counter the growing Soviet presence. Failing in its attempt, the Navy was left with only the Mideast force at Bahrain, a symbolic patrol of outdated ships that had been there since 1948.⁶ The Navy tried again with a different in 1970 and received approval for an austere communication facility on Diego Garcia. This base was to provide support for increased activity that naval authorities had convinced Congress would be necessary in the near future. That naval escalation was not begun until 1971, when decreasing activities in Vietnam offered the opportunity to send modern ships into the Indian Ocean.

The need for such escalation was soon evident. The India-Pakistan and Yom Kippur wars had brought a larger Soviet force into the area, as well as the greater American presence. United States national security analysts perceived the Soviet build-up as a threat to American interests. This threat was especially significant in terms of the military and diplomatic pressure that the Soviet Union would be able to employ in its dealings with littoral states.⁷ Moreover, the 1973 oil crisis demonstrated the vulnerability of the sea-lanes and how easily oil shipments might be blocked in some future war. The United States thus drastically increased its naval forces in the Indian Ocean.⁸ The American policy was justified in terms of the Nixon Doctrine, which called for a reduced United States presence around the world. State Department officials contended that such escalation would aid American allies in the area by providing a stabilizing influence, apparently to pre-empt the need for a major United States action if the situation were to become more precarious in the future.⁹ American presence was also expected to ensure that the lanes of oil traffic, running from the Persian Gulf through the Indian Ocean and on to Europe, Japan, and America, would not be blocked.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the United States failed to keep pace with the advance of Soviet activity, which always managed to have more ships in the region. Because of the superiority of some American ships, it is impossible to determine objectively if either side held a clear advantage.¹¹ The Soviets, however, did not merely escalate their naval presence. Anchorages and installations were actively sought and gained. The most significant of these were on the island of Socotra, at the entrance to the Red Sea; in Yemen; in Mauritius;¹² and most important, in Berbera, Somalia, which was later discovered to be a substantial missile-handling facility."

In addition to increasing its presence in the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Union also looked forward to the reopening of the Suez Canal, which would shorten by about 8000 miles the distance that Soviet ships would have to travel.

The United States at this time was not inactive in the Indian Ocean area. In addition to stepping up naval activities, it, too, sought bases in the region. The long-standing base at Bahrain was under pressure from the local government to dose. Yet because of improved relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia, possibilities of building establishments there were increased. The United Stares Navy wanted a dependable, permanent base in the Indian Ocean. The logical Navy choice was Diego Garcia. Without such a base, the nearest fuel facilities would have to be in distant Australia or the Philippines. These seemed remote or inefficient possibilities. Thus, in 1974, a request was sent to Congress for the money to expand the communication facility into a logistics support base. With this request, the present controversy about Diego Garcia began.

By the time of the 1974 Hearings before the House Subcommittee on the Far East and South Asia, the question of desirable limits on military deployment had produced two major schools of thought: the expansionists and the minimalists. Expansionists feared the growing Soviet presence and the instabilities of the Indian Ocean region. They sought to remedy this problem by establishing a real and permanent facility that would strengthen the American presence in the Indian Ocean, to be accomplished by a major naval commitment there. Minimalists feared that such actions would cause a superpower arms race in the region and sought to halt or minimize American activity in the area.

These two attitudes were rather pronounced in the Subcommittee Hearings, which in themselves were quite significant. Recommendation or disapproval of the proposed Diego Garcia expansion by the Foreign Affairs Committee would have a major impact on American foreign policy. The hearings would effectively determine the nature of American activities in the Indian Ocean, and Diego Garcia was to he the test-case. The veracity of this statement is better appreciated after examining the island's strategic significance, the expansion plans, and the nature of the present controversy.

As previously noted, Diego Garcia's isolated central position in the Indian Ocean makes it very valuable to strategists in that the nature of the facilities there would determine how effectively such a position would be used. Until the summer of 1976, Diego Garcia held only a communication facility. In July construction began which will transform the island into a logistics support base, intended to service a carrier task force and relieve the strain of having to depend entirely on facilities in Australia or the Philippines. This installation would have a twenty-eight-day fuel storage capacity, a harbor capable of admitting fleet warships, and a 12,000-foot runway. This is not the original base that the Navy had wanted, however, although it is close to it.¹⁴ The Navy had desired a base in the Indian Ocean since 1959, when it saw that those waters would probably be an area of future American deployment.¹⁵ Eventually, the plans were developed to a point that required a permanent naval and air support facility capable of troop-staging and extensive aircraft trafficking.

Unable to achieve this goal immediately, the Navy then decided to approach it in stages: the first stage was the communication facility; the projects now under way constitute the second; and the third stage would be further expansion to achieve a permanent, multipurpose base.¹⁶ It was this final step that most disturbed minimalists, who feared that it would stimulate an arms race in the Indian Ocean. Although the Navy denies that what it actually wants is the maximum facility, the evidence indicates that this argument is only rhetoric used to quiet minimalist forces.

The minimalists met head-on with expansionists in the 1974 Hearings and again in Congress in 1975. The views expressed by both sides also reflect the worldwide controversy about the question as well as the American debate.

Illustrations of this debate can be found repeatedly in those hearings. The expansionists argued that upgrading the facilities on Diego Garcia was crucial to the entire spectrum of United States’ interests in the region. Essentially, the argument was that the status of the base directly influenced naval effectiveness and that the security of American interests was dependent on that effectiveness. The Defense Department stated that the United States had three major concerns in the area: (1) maintaining dialogue with Arab states; (2) protecting the sea-lanes, especially oil routes; and (3) countering the Soviet presence. All three were considered justifications for strong United States forces in the ocean, especially the latter two.

Because of the "delicately balanced system" ¹⁷ of oil production and distribution, American military presence was necessary to provide a deterrent against disruption of oil supplies vital to national defense. The Defense Department witness, James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, explained that the 1973 oil crisis had demonstrated that threats or coercion on the part of a major or even minor power could check the flow of oil to the United States and its allies. The essential value of Diego Garcia thus lay in the idea that it allowed a stabilizing American presence to be maintained "efficiently and economically." The central location of the island would provide better defense of the sea-lanes than any of the more remote support bases, by enhancing the effectiveness of American naval deployment in the area. The American deployment, then, was the key to advancing United States security interests in the Indian Ocean.¹⁸

That "stabilizing influence" that the Navy was to provide was a maintenance of conditions favorable to trade.¹⁹ The Soviet presence was seen as counter to this goal. Noyes pointed out that the Soviet Union then had 29 ships in the Indian Ocean, of which approximately one-half were combatants. He further stated that this presence was a potential threat to United States interests.²⁰

Herein lies a crucial issue in the understanding of the expansionists' beliefs, i.e., the perception of a Soviet threat. It is important to note that, in the hearings, the expansionists attempted to minimize their obvious concern over Soviet activity in the area. They apparently wanted to justify Diego Garcia in terms of interests that can be perceived as other than military competition between the superpowers and thus negate the fears of the critics of expansion that a war might be the result of such competition. A State Department witness, Seymour Weiss, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, echoed Noyes in the statement that "there is a potential threat when there is a Soviet force which is substantially in excess of our own."²¹ Further questioning of Weiss revealed that instability in the region was regarded as counter to American interests, a point important to understanding why expansionists want a larger United States presence: they fear Soviet control.

This attitude is reflected on a world scale by nations such as Iran and China, who see United States activity as an aid in protecting their interests.²² Britain, Singapore, and Pakistan also favor American response to the Soviet Union.²³ Japan and Western Europe are concerned about oil shipments. Even Australia and France have sent ships in hopes of aiding the United States in striking a balance. The main idea, however, is that American presence will prevent Soviet domination of the region.

It is this reasoning that minimalists attack. They view it as merely power-balance politics. Furthermore, they are afraid that the result of this competition will be either superpower domination of the area or an Indian Ocean war. This opinion was reflected in the testimony of Dr. Earl Ravenal, Professorial Lecturer at the School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, a leading advocate of the minimalist position.

Dr. Ravenal insisted that the United States could no longer be the "policeman of the world" and that the decision concerning Diego Garcia would also concern the question of whether the United States was going to continue to engage in power politics abroad.²⁴ The statements of Dr. Ravenal were reinforced by those of Rear Admiral Gene LaRocque (Retired), Director of the Center for Defense Information, who declared that the United States Navy was trying to start an arms race in the Indian Ocean by exaggerating Soviet strengths and American weaknesses.²⁵

In this declaration, the minimalist view becomes apparent, i.e., that the military is misleading Congress (and everyone else) as to the actual importance of Soviet presence. In doing so, the minimalists fall victim to their own perceptions. In attempting to detract from the formidability of the Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean, the minimalists tend to ignore it almost completely. Instead, they place extreme emphasis on United States activities and bow these are dangerous to peace.

India, one of the main opponents of American presence in the region, is representative of this attitude. It has been stated by the Indian Ministry of Defense that it has regarded superpowers in the region as a security threat since 1972. Furthermore, American presence has been viewed as an "adverse factor."²⁶ The base at Diego Garcia is expected to increase the threat, rising out of the fear of intervention.²⁷

That fear, however, is not limited to littoral states. It is also apparent in Congress, where

many members fear another war like Vietnam. Even stronger is the fear of instigating a major arms race in the Indian Ocean. In 1975, the majority leader, Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) led a move to block the expansion of Diego Garcia on the grounds that it would start such competition. This move revived the arguments that had been used in the hearings, but with an addition.

While the minimalists once again spoke of leading the way to peace, the usual expansionist response was supplemented by the proof that the Soviet base at Somalia was indeed a missile-handling facility. This new "threat" effectively killed opposition to expansion at the time. Nevertheless, a short time later the minimalists sought a delay so as to allow arms-limitation talks with the Soviet Union. This time they succeeded, and construction was postponed until July l976.²⁹

That time has passed, and expansion is now under way. This decision would seem to settle the affair, but it does not. Instead, the question of limits becomes more exacting, demanding a better grasp of reality, not merely rhetoric.

In the light of a decision by Congress concerning Diego Garcia that does not settle the issue, one would do well to consider what courses of action are available. Apart from nonexpansion on Diego Garcia, which will be discussed later, there are two major possibilities: the "zone of peace" concept and bilateral arms-limitation talks.

The arms-limitation talks idea has been the subject of much debate in recent years, as both the United States and the Soviet Union claim to desire such meetings but seem to actively avoid them. Despite governmental inaction, the debate over the merits of this proposal goes on. Its supporters argue that such an agreement would eliminate the need for a base on Diego Garcia. Critics claim that the talks will not be honored. Whether either argument is right is unknown, as both the Soviet Union and the United States have taken steps to avoid such discussions.

On the Soviet side, those steps are part of Brezhnev's "Peace Program," which is responsible for establishing a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean. An important aspect of the program, renewed last year by the Party Congress, is to advance the superpower status of the Soviet Union through an undermining of United States policies abroad.³⁰ Thus, the Soviets are uninterested in arms-limitation in the Indian Ocean.

On the American side, actions taken to delay talks range from charging a lack of Soviet interest to claims that the United States needs a position of strength before it can begin bargaining, i.e., an Indian Ocean base. Even in the delay period established by Congress for promoting talks, no action was taken.³¹

While neither country makes a move to start any discussion, both blame each other for the delay. Even without the rhetoric, however, each party's working policy has shown that neither wants arms talks nor considers them in its interests.

Also, both sides refuse to come to terms with the concept of a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean. While this idea is favored by the littoral states as the best road to peace and development, the superpowers view it as an infringement on the concept of an "open" sea. The United States and the Soviet Union do not wish to have their extensive naval activities in the region limited.³²

It becomes apparent that both the United States and the Soviet Union are unwilling to engage in situations that would depend on bilateral or multilateral agreements and thus regulate their respective defense policies in the area. The renewal of Brezhnev's Peace Program and reports from inside the Department of State attest to this idea. Thus, the alternatives die before they have a chance to work, as a result of the Big Power foreign policies.

Those policies make the question of limits paramount, since the United States must then achieve the goal of security on its own.

In order to establish a desirable limit to United States policy regarding Diego Garcia, it is necessary to eliminate the vast amount of rhetoric and determine the true state of affairs. Effectively, this imperative requires a judgment of whether Soviet presence is a threat to the United States. If there is such a threat, then the issue becomes one of how much presence is enough. Is Diego Garcia crucial to this presence?

There is little doubt in the West that the Soviets are in the Indian Ocean to stay. Their objectives in the area are threefold: (1) to establish a shipping outlet to the south, a goal which has been of Russian concern for centuries;³³ (2) to solidify the image of the Soviet Union as a superpower by undermining Western power and influence, especially by jeopardizing oil shipments vital to the West;³⁴ and (3) to inhibit Chinese actions and influence in the area.³⁵

Despite minimalist arguments, these objectives are perceived as a threat to American interests. The threat is real rather than imagined because of the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean. That presence might be used to block oil traffic. Furthermore, the forced withdrawal of the Mideast force from Bahrain leaves the United States without a permanent establishment in the area. Thus, Diego Garcia assumes a physical value in terms of American response to the Soviet presence. The threat is enhanced, however, by the perception of such a threat by American leaders. The problem for the United States is the establishing of a necessary limit to its response to the Soviet build-up. (As noted above, Diego Garcia is also accorded a symbolic significance.) Therefore, policy concerning the status of the base there is crucial to both physical and perceived aspects of United States security.

That policy should be one of nonexpansion. While the Soviet presence is real,³⁶ overreaction by the United States would only expand it. The Soviet naval forces in the Indian Ocean, already numerically superior to American forces, have managed to stay ahead of any increases by the United States. Much of this expansion has been from motives that are purely Soviet initiatives. Some, however, were triggered by American expansion. One example of such increases came in 1971, when Soviet and American naval forces in the Indian Ocean were enlarged because of the India-Pakistan war. The additional Soviet ships did not withdraw until the Enterprise had done so. Another example was in 1973, when the United States increased its Indian Ocean presence following the Yom Kippur War. The American increases were soon followed by expanded Soviet deployment.³⁷ Such increases place additional significance on Diego Garcia. The status of the base there will affect the character of the American response to the Soviet presence and thus influence Soviet reaction to United States policy in the area.

When present projects (runway extension, fuel storage, and harbor dredging) have been completed, the base at Diego Garcia will provide a valuable but limited support facility for United States operations in the Indian Ocean. There will be no troop-staging activities on Diego Garcia, nor will there be any permanent naval detachment. Yet, these limits do not necessarily compromise security, as the base will he able to service B-52s and attack-submarines.³⁸ These limits will not exist, however, if the expansionists are triumphant. It therefore becomes important for the United States to develop a specific policy concerning that base, in terms of its functions and status, if the expansionists are not to win merely by their persistence.

The function of the base must he a minimal one. Presently, the United States has access to ports in eighteen littoral states.³⁹ Diego Garcia is necessary because of the Babrain withdrawal and especially as a "potential." It must not be used as a troop-staging facility, for this could be interpreted as a belligerent act, as could any further expansion in the base. Moreover, a larger base on Diego Garcia is not needed to compete with the Soviet base at Berbera. In 1977, Somalia ordered all Soviet personnel and facilities out of the country.⁴⁰ Diego Garcia, combined with American, French, and Japanese naval forces in the area, thus provides an adequate response to the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean region.

For those who argue that the facility should be removed because it is unnecessary, there are four considerations. The First is that the base does exist. Removal might be taken as a lack of resolve on the part of the United States, which could spur further Soviet increases. Second, in light of the Babrain withdrawal, there is no longer a permanent American force in the area. Without an establishment such as Diego Garcia to be a constant reminder of American intent, security of the oil routes could be jeopardized. Third, the island lends itself to efficiency and economy in military deployment. Finally, the base is necessary for its potential uses. Due to the instability of the Indian Ocean region, it is highly desirable to have a dependable facility ready. The word potential must be stressed, however. To use the base as little as possible would offer diplomatic advantages, as both internal and external forces regard Diego Garcia as a symbol of United States interventionism.

These considerations lead to the question of the future status of the base. While it is useful in countering the Soviet presence and protecting American interests, to expand it would invite increases on the part of the Soviet Union in addition to the regular Soviet schedule of escalation. Moreover, increases on Diego Garcia would provide excellent "justification" for such additions.

Furthermore, the policy' of nonexpansion should specifically deal with this idea of status. As the evidence has borne out, the Navy has been able to accomplish its goals, if only by sheer persistence. This is largely due to the lack of a comprehensive policy that states the objectives and limits of a Diego Garcia base.

Such policy is not without its critics. Expansionists will view it as a compromising of security interests. Minimalists will still have to face the United States presence and the possibility of intervention.

This fear is unfounded. American leaders have expressed the attitude that the United States should not dominate the Indian Ocean region, but as yet these leaders have not taken concrete action to implement such a policy. Nonexpansion offers the opportunity of transforming this idea into action.

At the same time, however, this policy will not compromise security interests. As noted above, the major Soviet base in the area has been ordered removed, thus impairing Soviet power in the Indian Ocean region. Coupled with the rather extensive naval forces that the United States is able to deploy in the ocean, this base will provide an adequate response to the presence of the Soviet Union. To increase the facilities there is not really necessary unless a permanent, large-scale presence is desired in the region, and that type of activity would serve only to spark Soviet increases. Essentially, then, nonexpansion would establish a limit to American presence in the Indian Ocean that would advance security interests without spurring future threats to those interests. Such a policy should make a contribution to peace without jeopardizing United States security.

1. U.S. Congress, House, Committee of Foreign Affairs, Proposed Expansion of the U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 90

2. While Chagos is its most important part, the British Indian Ocean Territory also contains the islands of Aldabra, Farquhar, and Desroches.

3. New York Times, 17 October 1975, p.3.

4. K.P. Misra, " International Politics in the Indian Ocean, "Orbis, Winter 1975, pp. 1099-1100.

5. Ibid.

6. Mideast force consists of a flagship, La Salle, and two destroyers.

7. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Indian Ocean, 93^rd Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 22.

8. Bruce Chou, "The United States and Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean," Asian Outlook, July 1974, p. 22.

9. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Indian Ocean, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 141.

10. Japan, which depends on the Persian Gulf for 79.6 percent of its oil, is reached through the Straits of Malice. Europe and America, which depend, respectively, on the Gulf for 64 percent and 30 percent of their oil, are reached through the Red Sea or around the Cape of Good Hope.

11. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Means of Measuring Naval Power with Special Reference to U.S. and Soviet Activities in the Indian Ocean, by the Foreign Affairs Division of the Congressional Research Service, Committee Print (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 15-16,

12. Mauritius has apparently changed its policy on foreign activity after learning of the true nature of the BIOT.

13. New York Times, 6 July 1975, p. 3.

14. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator John Culver (D-Iowa) speaking on the amendment to the 1976 Military Construction Act, No. 1054, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 6 November 1975, Congressional Record, pp. S19451-52.

15. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Indian Ocean, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 90.

16. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Strom Thurman (R-South Carolina) speaking on the Amendment to the 1976 Military Construction Act, No. 1054, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 6 November 1975, Congressional Record, p. S19462.

17. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs committee on the Indian Ocean, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 87.

18. Ibid.

19. W.A. C. Adie, Oil, Politics, and Seapower: The Indian Ocean Vortex (New York: Crane, Russak, and Co., 1975), p.12. Although Adie concludes that military manipulations are the wrong answer to the oil supply problem, he emphasizes that a major American goal is regional stability.

20. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Indian Ocean, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 61.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., p. 28

23. G.S. Bhargava, "India’s Security n the 1980’s, "Adelphi Paper No. 124 (Summer 1976), p.23.

24. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Indian Ocean, 93d cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 37.

25. Ibid.

26. Bhargava, p. 19.

27. Ibid.

28. New York Times, 6 July 1975, sec. 4, p.3.

29. U.S. Congress. Senate, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 6 November 1975, Congressional Record, p. S19465.

30. Strategic Survey 1975 (London: International Institute for strategic Studies, 1976), p. 25.

31. New York Times, 8 July 1975, p. 2.

32. Misra, pp. 1098-99.

33. Alvin J. Cottrell and R. M. Burrell, "Soviet-U.S. Naval competition in the Indian Ocean," Orbis, winter 1976, p. 1109.

34. Ibid.

35. Dennis Chaplin, "Somalia and the Development of Soviet Activity in the Indian Ocean," Military Review, July 1975, p. 9.

36. Ibid.

37. Norman Polmar, Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the 1970s (New York: Crane, Russak, and Co., 1974), pp. 313-14.

38. Hearings before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the Indian Ocean, 93d Cong., 2d sess., pp.125-26.

39. U.S. Congress, Senate, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 11 July 1975, Congressional Record, p. S12440.

40. "Airlift to Ethiopia," Newsweek, January 23, 1978, p. 34.

Ryan J. Barilleaux is an honor student in political science and holds an academic scholarship from the University of Southwestern Louisiana. He serves on the Curriculum committee of the department of political science and heads a research committee of the university honors program. He has been selected as the Louisiana state alternate in the Harry D. Truman Scholarship competition.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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