Air University Review, July-August 1978

There has been a demonstrable trend to reduce or eliminate certain military benefits. In those selected areas where a dollar saving can be realized, military pay and compensation programs are being converted to civilian pay scales and policies.

Air Force General George S. Brown, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commented in his statement to the Congress on the U. S. defense posture:

Readiness of our force is being threatened by mounting concern among the Service members for their benefits, and standard of living. These true volunteers freely commit themselves to the defense of our Nation In return, they expect their leaders to commit themselves to the Service member in insuring that they have an adequate standard of living.

Since 1972, there have been repeated attempts to reduce, eliminate, transfer, and transform military benefits which in the past have helped to convince the individual to enlist or to make Military Service a career. The GI Bill, which in the opinion of some recruitment officials has been the single most important enlistment incentive, has been restructured and replaced by a pay-as-you-go program.

Pay raises have been held below the rise in cost of living, resulting in reduced purchasing power. Medical benefits have been modified, reduced, or eliminated. Threats of further reductions are constantly highlighted by private publications targeted at the Service members.

Twenty percent of our Army's enlisted members work at a second job and approximately 50 percent of their wives work. Over 60 percent of our current enlisted personnel have entered the Service since 1972. Since they enlisted they have, in effect, experienced only losses in their purchasing power and benefits. We must defuse this issue before it severely impacts on our readiness.¹

In addition to General Brown's concern for military readiness, there is a danger of eroding the "Service" concept.² This erosion and trend toward only "civilianizing" those programs that realize dollar savings may lead the military members themselves to move toward a total civilian compensation program.

The new recruits voluntarily accept the special restraints of the military career. The recruits view their employment as being unique. They are not committed to a normal civilian "job"; they are in the "service," the service of their country, and certain noncivilian demands are expected of them.

A civilian company that adopted any portion of the existing military restraints would have to pay extra compensation to maintain the same quality of its labor force. Some examples of these restraints are the following:

Rigid appearance standards. An airman can lose his job for not complying with the appearance standards. For example, since 1972, over 1900 airmen have been separated from the service for failure to comply with Air Force weight requirements.³

Permanent changes of station (PCS) requirements. When a move occurs during a period of service obligation, the individual is usually required to move, regardless of his or her desires. These moves may come on relatively short notice.

Short tours. The service member must endure extended periods of family separation, both PCS (1 year) and extended TDY (179 days). These assignments include such places as Clear, Alaska; Greenland, and Diego Garcia.⁴ Civilian employers pay thousands of dollars to induce employees to endure such assignments. For example, in Clear, Alaska, a civilian motor pool vehicle operator receives over $34,000 per year, and a cook receives over $39,000 per year.⁵

Isolated tours. These assignments are family accompanied tours, but in areas of isolation. There is no additional compensation for family hardships experienced in such isolated areas such as Zaire, Iceland, India, Ryukyu Islands, Upper Volta, and Point Barrow, Alaska.

Hostile fire. Service members live under the threat of losing their lives, limbs, or becoming prisoners of war without adequate compensation. Most civilians who are employed in war areas are substantially compensated for the additional risk, often receiving two or three times more than their military counterparts.

Strict hierarchical progression. No matter how well one performs, he or she can be promoted only one step at a time and only after serving a required amount of time in a previous grade.

Discipline enforceable by the judicial process. Trial by jury and possible imprisonment-special rules, "action unbecoming an officer"⁶ --a different code governs the service man. For example, a serviceman could be imprisoned for committing an offense while a civilian committing the same offense might only lose his job. A prime example is Article 92, paragraph 3, Dereliction in the Performance of Duty. A person is derelict in the performance of his duties when he willfully or negligently fails to perform them, or when he performs them in a culpably inefficient manner.⁷ During 1976, 1367 specifications (one general court-martial, eight summary courts-martial, twelve special courts-martial, and 1346 Article 15s)⁸ were categorized as Dereliction in the Performance of Duty.

Political limitations. There are limitations imposed on a service member's political candidacy and candidate support, as is also the case with Federal Government employees One Air Force regulation lists 18 political "shall nots" for members on active duty.⁹

Flexible contracts. The service member is subject to changes in leave policy, retirement plan, bonuses, veterans benefits, etc., yet he must adhere to other contractual commitments, such as service obligation incurred by enlistment or schooling. For example, the proposed Retirement Modernization Act (RMA) would rescind the 50 percent of base pay retirement plan that was in effect at a prior enlistment date.

No overtime compensation. Military members are subject to twenty-four call with no overtime. During periods of conflict (Vietnam) and states of increased readiness (Cuban crisis), overtime is a readily accepted way of life. In addition, a portion of the military force must remain on constant alert (weekends and holidays). Portions of the Air Force, Army, Marines, and Navy (ships at sea) are "on the job" during holiday periods. Some civilians employees working during these same periods receive double time compensation as "holiday" pay.

Restrictions in privacy. For example, rank, position) and pay are available for public knowledge; complete dossiers are maintained, some evaluations are secret, and a picture of the individual is furnished the promotion board.

No union representation of collective bargaining. Our Military leaders may be asked to wear "too many hats." A system that forces the same individuals to represent both management and labor can lead to a dangerous type of criticism. For example, some may argue that the proposed Retirement Modernization Act was intentionally designed to include features that would increase the retirement pay for most generals (or anyone else who is allowed by law to serve 30 or more years) from 75 percent of base pay to 78 percent for the purpose of reducing any organized military effort to challenge the program.

Economically bound to a very rigid al-or-nothing retirement system. If, for any reason (the above restraints, job satisfaction, family considerations, or desire to enter another career) the service member does not complete 20 years of active duty, he or she forfeits all of the retirement benefits unless subsequently qualifying for reserve component retirement.* After 10 to 15 years of service, individuals today have so much invested in the retirement program that they become economically bound by a very rigid, all-or-nothing retirement system. To protect civilian employees from enduring the above retirement restraints, Congress passed the Pension Reform Act of 1974. It is now illegal for private pension plans (even if the plan is noncontributory, which over 80 percent are) to establish a plan with no vesting.¹⁰

*Note: The RMA provides for vesting at 5 or 10 years, depending on whether separation is involuntary or voluntary.

The Military work force accepts these 13 restraints without seeking extra compensation primarily because most service members believe they are serving their country and not working at a "job." If the "service" concept is eroded by "civilianizing" those military benefits that could save money, a door may be opened that could cost many times the amount the "civilianizing" is trying to save.

Most service members would be satisfied just to maintain their standard of living and receive those benefits that were promised at enlistment. However, if past trends continue, the service member may unintentionally be encouraged eventually to give up some military benefits (the base exchange and commissary) in exchange for civilian benefits (overtime, retirement vesting, no forced retirements, substantially higher compensation for isolated or remote tours, political freedoms, collective bargaining, etc.).

Notes

1. Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, 15 February 1977, p. l.

2. Dr. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., Keynote Address, 5th Symposium on Psychology in the Air Force. U.S. Air Force Academy, 8-10 April 1976, Proceedings.

3. Air Force Times, 7 February 1977, p. 17.

4. AFR 36-20 Table 4-1, 30 June1976.

5. FJCC Wage Adjustment Proposal, Number KA275000-DL-0224, 1 June 1976 rates.

6. Manual for Courts-Martial United States 1969 (revised edition), Uniform Code, Article 133.

7. Manual for Courts-Martial United States 1969 (revised edition), Chapter, XXVII, paragraph 172 c.

8. AMJAMS Monthly Reports, "Courts-Martial Activities and Reportable Article 15 Actions," December 1976.

9. AFR 110-2,24 October 1975, Attachment 1, paragraph 3.

10. The Conference Board "FOCUS," volume XII, no.2, February 1975.

Captain George T. Naddra (B.S., Miami University) is Commander, 47^th Communications Squadron, 46^th Aerospace Defense Wing, Peterson AFB, Colorado. He served at Hq USAF as an executive officer, DCS/Studies and Analysis and at ADCOM/KR as a computer equipment design engineer. He has been selected by AFIT to pursue a master’s degree in computer science. Captain Naddra is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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