Air University Review, July-August 1978

Air Force Objectives in Space

·Maintain a free space environment.

·Deter actions in space which are adverse to the interests of the United States and, should deterrence fail, counter those actions.

·Conduct operations in space in support of other national security objectives and national space operations,

·Maintain a space oriented technology base that:

--Minimizes the possibility of technological surprise.

--Supports deployment of military space systems.

--And permits identification of promising space concepts and doctrine to meet national security objectives in the future.

Ask any Air Force officer, rated or nonrated, to describe an F-15, F-16, B-1, or A-10 and its mission, and you will probably get a very credible response. Sure, many details will not be there, but overall we understand and are familiar with our new aircraft. Unfortunately, the same is not true of existing and new systems that will directly affect these aircraft's ability to operate in a strategic or technical environment effectively. Our officers do not know, nor in many cases do they care to know, the details of our military satellite systems, even though these systems may make the difference over tomorrow's battlefield.

In a complete reversal of the usual situation, our civilian leaders in the Department of Defense seem to understand the significance of military space systems better than the professional military. For instance, Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, speaking at an Air Force Association Symposium in Los Angeles on 22 October 1976, said, "For airpower and for spacepower, we cannot tolerate a posture of equivalence; we must maintain always a position of clear superiority; we must always seize the initiative."

The reason for this lack of understanding cannot be a lack of available information. The unclassified literature abounds with descriptions of the design, operation, and roles of our military space systems. Indeed, Soviet intelligence undoubtedly has a very complete and accurate picture of all our satellites. The sheer magnitude of Soviet space activity is eloquent testimony to their grasp of the pivotal importance of such systems in today's and tomorrow's conflicts. Yet, the U.S. military, by and large, has yet to learn this lesson.

We have reluctantly reached these conclusions after three years of lecturing at Air University schools. The general situation is professional parochialism. The only officers who have taken the trouble to inform themselves about space systems are usually those who work closely in the space field. Most others have no idea how we use space systems today, much less what systems are under development or what the overall impact will be. All too frequently the attitude is either indifference or a profound conviction that military space systems are merely flashy gadgetry.

Three factors contribute to these attitudes. To begin with, satellites are not airplanes. Those who advocate the military uses of space today are in much the same situation as Navy advocates of aircraft carriers in the mid-1930s, or air power advocates until the end of World War II. Second, there is no single organization with primary responsibility. AFSC, ADCOM, SAC, DCA, and many others all have some piece of the pie. Space systems have no high-ranking spokesman, no single manager to orchestrate our efforts, below the level of OSD. Finally, much of the information is classified with a strict need to know, making lateral communication of existing capability difficult or impossible.

The net effect is that the United States is today operating with a badly flawed military posture regarding space. Our present systems are underutilized since the operating commands are unaware of current potential. There is little system architecture or military space doctrine. Some efforts, to be sure, are underway in these areas, but progress is painfully slow. The operating commands cannot generate the appropriate statements of Required Operational Capability to enhance the effectiveness of their current forces until the information is widely known and understood, and the issues analyzed and debated. Plans, and particularly joint plans, are inadequate to deal with conflict that includes space warfare. Soviet testing of antisatellite weapons leaves no doubt about their ability to cripple our space systems. In short, we are ill-prepared to perform the tasks cited at the beginning of this article.

We recommend two actions toward correcting the problem. The first step should be to reorganize. Colonel Morgan W. Sanborn has summarized this area in his excellent article in the January-February 1977 issue of Air University Review. We wholeheartedly agree with his assessment and recommendations concerning the need for a separate space command, which would offset some of the parochialism mentioned earlier. Second, and just as important, we must have the active participation of the operating commands in formulating requirements and shaping the evolving doctrine. Just as it is folly to ignore space systems in our present plans, tactics, and strategy, so is it folly to try to design and structure a space architecture without integrating the functions into today's combat operations. The Air Force desperately needs a dialogue between the space planners and the organizational commands.

There has been a start. The Director of Space, Hq USAF, conducted an Air Force Space Symposium in January 1977. The purpose of the symposium was to provide a forum for exchange of ideas and concepts between the operating commands and the systems development community. Emphasis was to be on the identification of new concepts and operational requirements for the utilization of existing and future space systems to enhance DOD missions. However, only ADCOM was familiar enough with our present and planned space systems to provide substantive requirements for future operational capabilities.

A meaningful debate on space forces, functions, and doctrine requires that the participants be knowledgeable. How can this information be obtained? One method would be a series of briefings to the major command staffs, detailing what we can do now and where we are headed. The classification problem can be partly avoided by stating capabilities without revealing methods. This would at least provide a knowledge base to work from. Individuals can consult a host of periodicals and journals, such as Aviation Week & Space Technology. Air Force, Aerospace Daily, and Space/Defense Daily to keep abreast of current developments. Classified sources include New Horizons II (June 1975) and reports from The Rand Corporation.*

*DOD personnel can obtain bibliographies by writing to ACSC/ EDCW, Maxwell AFB AL 36112.

The time for professional Air Force personnel to study the art of war in and from space is now. Spaceborne capabilities are not "something down the road" but a current reality. Space is vital to our operations now and will become more vital with time. To quote Colonel R. M. Cameron, Deputy Director of Space, DCS Research and Development:

The Air Force considers space as the fourth operating medium (in addition to the land, sea, and air) whose principal use is to aid in the deterrence of all levels of warfare....

The Air Force is well into its second decade of involvement in space. We have made great advancements and tremendous strides in operating in this relatively new medium. I now see satellites playing key roles in supporting military operations at all levels of conflict and increasing our capability to project the airpower of the United States, as necessary, to enhance our national security.

In the future, space systems will provide in-being support mechanisms ready to assist military operations worldwide. Communications, navigation-positioning, and weather surveillance systems will always be in place, awaiting the arrival of our forces deployed from the CONUS; thus, enabling us to deploy our military power, when necessary, to anywhere in the world on much shorter notice than is possible today.

Hence, the ability of space systems to pin-point targets, to allow friendly forces to locate themselves accurately, to permit all echelons to communicate information at high data rates--coupled with the data processing capability to assimilate enormous quantities of data and display information for decision-makers suggest major impacts on military operations in the future. But what we have seen to date or can foresee in the immediate future is but a small part of the true potential of the utility of space.

Lieutenant Colonel Charles H. MacGregor (M.S., University of Southern California) is Chief, Electronic Warfare and Space Division, Air command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He has had assignments to Vandenberg AFB, California, as the Telemetry Officer for the Minuteman Test Program; Eastern Test Range, as the DOD Network controller for the Titan III, Atlas-Agena, and Apollo programs; Sunnyvale, California, in the Air Force Plant Representatives Office, Lockheed; and to Air University Institute for Professional Development as Chief of the Space Division. Colonel MacGregor is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College.

Major Lee H. Livingston (USNA; M.S., AFIT; M.S., George Washington University) is Deputy Division Chief, Satellite Systems Division, 6555^th Aerospace Test Group, Patrick AFB, Florida. His assignments have been in the Rocket Propulsion Laboratory, Edwards AFB, California; linear accelerator division of a defense nuclear agency; in the Space and Missile Systems Organization; as a faculty member at Air University Institute for Professional Development and Air Command and Staff College. Major Livingston is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and ACSC.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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