Air University Review, January-February 1978

In late January 1975, the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command (SAC) General Russell E. Dougherty, selected and the Air Force Chief of Staff, General David C. Jones, approved the assignment of Colonel Eugene D. Scott as commander of the USAF's 47th Air Division.¹ Normally, selection of a SAC air division commander would generate only limited, mostly local, attention, but this assignment had repercussions far beyond the two northwestern U.S. bases that comprise the 47th Air Division. The assignment was exceptional because Colonel Scott (then a brigadier general selectee) is a navigator, the first navigator to assume command of an Air Force combat flying organization.

Colonel Scott's assignment culminated more than a year's effort by the Department of the Air Force to eliminate an outdated and discriminatory provision of the U.S. Code that limited command of Air Force flying units to rated pilots.² Section 8577, Title 10, was originally designed to protect a fledgling Army Air Service from exploitation by the parochial interest of competitive branches of the Army. However, in more recent years the Title 10 restriction had become a severe limiting factor in the progression of many career-motivated nonpilot officers. Navigators in particular were affected. Excluded by legislation from command opportunities within their area of specialty, air operations, navigators were thus provided with only limited access to the professional development opportunities (e.g., responsible jobs, service schools, advanced education, etc.) that are so necessary for promotion and preparation for higher level positions.³

Those navigators who wished to assume the additional responsibilities of command were forced to transfer to other career fields where, though penalized initially by a lack of technical expertise, they were eventually able to progress on individual merit. Even then their horizons were limited; few advanced as far as general,⁴ and the position of Air Force Chief of Staff has never been held by a navigator. Obviously, then, Colonel Scott’s assignment takes on particular significance, for it may well mark the beginning of a new era in Air Force leadership.

However, it is far too early to assume that the pilot's overwhelming domination of the Air Force command structure will change significantly. This author finds it difficult to believe that the Air Force program designed to bring navigators into command positions will, as currently structured, effect, much significant or lasting change on the leadership composition of the Air Force. Mere identification of a problem and elimination of administrative barriers do not equate to change in a large, complex bureaucratic organization like the Air Force. Historical precedence lends some credence to such pessimism. Captain Chris L. Jefferies cites the experiences of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the post-World War II era. Of particular significance to the USAF is that:

. . . RAF articulation of the policy [equal career prospects for navigators] was insufficient. Because of lead times insisted upon to allow navigators adequate preparation for command assignments, together with a hesitancy to move in a new direction, the system continues much as before, . . . even though equal opportunity was the policy, pilots were still receiving a disproportionate share of promotions and command assignments.⁵

As any student of organizational behavior would have forecast, without a strongly enforced implementation plan the bureaucratic inertia and the pilots' vested interests in the existing structure effectively countered the stated policy objective. Jefferies thus concluded:

In effect, an "affirmative action" policy was [eventually] necessary; that is, a conscious effort to identify flying units that navigators could command, "reserving" them for navigators. Unless the USAF undertakes a similar approach, the same problem is likely to affect the USAF navigator.⁶

The U.S. Navy provides a more recent and positive perspective on the subject. The naval flight officer (NFO) is the naval aviation equivalent of the Air Force navigator-a rated, nonpilot officer variously responsible for navigation, bombing, reconnaissance, radar intercepts, electronic warfare, antisubmarine warfare, etc, Prior to 1970, NFOs suffered under similar Title 10 restrictions concerning command of flying organizations-although in theory, if not in practice, they were eligible for command of all surface vessels, including aircraft carriers.

In 1969 the Navy petitioned Congress for relief from the Title 10 restrictions, and in February 1970 they received the implementing legislation.⁷ The first NFO commanding officer, a marine, assumed command of an F-4 squadron in October of that year.⁸ Since then, more than 40 NFOs have completed command assignments, approximately 20 more are currently serving in command billets, and 100 more have been identified, by the Navy's command screening board, for future command positions.⁹

It would appear that the Navy's program for integrating NFOs into the command structure is operating successfully.¹⁰ As important, the NFOs also believe it is working.¹¹ The obvious question, in light of the RAF experience, becomes, "Why?" What is different about the Navy's approach to the problem that has made it succeed? Or, do the differences lie not in the program but within the structure of the Navy itself? The answers to these questions may be of great significance to the Air Force. For if it is possible to identify those elements or combination of elements, which have contributed to the success of the NFO program, it may be possible to incorporate those factors as the core of a progressive Air Force program to expand navigator command opportunity.

Before we identify positive elements of the Navy’s program, it will be desirable to review some background concerning the role of the NFO and his position in the naval aviation community. An excerpt from the House Armed Services Committee report on NFO command provides some historical perspective:

The requirement for a non-pilot aviation officer in naval aviation dates back to 1922 when a formal training program for such officers was first initiated. These officers were called Naval Aviation Observers (NAO). Their function was to relieve the pilot of aeronautical duties related to the mission of the aircraft other than the actual manipulation of the aircraft. This basic function remains unchanged and is the function of the Naval Flight Officer today.

Since the Naval Aviation Observers of that era were unrestricted surface line officers temporarily assigned to aviation duties, it was considered fitting that they be considered competitive for command of aircraft carriers and aircraft tenders but not aviation units organized for flight tactical purposes, aviation schools, or air stations. The Observers were so afforded these privileges and restrictions under 10 U.S. Code 5942 which was enacted into law in 1926....

The immediate post World War II era saw a rapid technological advance in aircraft design and electronic sophistication. This was further accelerated by the Korean conflict. By the 1950s the Navy was developing various multiplaced aircraft with an increasing emphasis on the total mission concept. Such aircraft placed a heavy reliance on electronic sensors for the accomplishment of their particular mission. Aircraft such as the A3B and WV-2 (now EC 121) required from one to four nonpilot officers to operate the various types of electronic equipment.

As the number of aircraft which relied on electronics to accomplish their mission grew, the NAO program also expanded to nine different types of airborne specialists who were being recruited, trained, and who flew as unrestricted line reserve officers.

As the need for these nonpilot, aviation-oriented officers increased, it became obvious that a program to procure and retain highly skilled officers on active naval service in these specialties was urgently needed. As a result, in 1959 the development of a full-term unrestricted line NAO career pattern similar to that or the naval aviator was promulgated and in 1960, the opening of regular commission status . . . was afforded the NAO. In 1964, the career advantages of this program were enhanced by instituting a permanent flight pay status . . . and the . . . title [was] changed . . . to naval flight officer (NFO)…¹²

In the late 1960s, as increasing numbers of NFOs approached eligibility for the rank of commander (0-5), it became evident that the Title 10, U.S. Code restrictions would prevent them from obtaining the normal sequence of aviation commands that the Navy requires for a flyer to be competitive for the rank of captain (0-6) and above. The importance of command in Navy career progression cannot be overstated. This is dramatically highlighted by the fact that less than 5 percent of the rated officers selected for 0-6 have not held a command billet.¹³ Hence, if the NFO career field was to remain viable and attractive, the Navy felt that it must obtain immediate relief from the Title 10 restrictions.

In a 1969 House Armed Services Committee report, the Navy indicated, "The Title 10 legislation is urgently needed this year."¹⁴ This sense of immediacy is further noted in a letter (dated 30 September 1969) from Admiral T. H. Moorer; Chief of Naval Operations, to Representative L. Mendel Rivers, Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services:

. . . [The Legislation] to permit Naval Flight Officers to be eligible to command certain naval activities is of vital interest to the Navy. Early consideration of this legislation would assist greatly in the retention of those Naval Flight Officers already on active service, whose continued service is vital. Your assistance in scheduling an early hearing on this bill would be sincerely appreciated.¹⁵

The resulting legislation was passed by both houses of the Congress and signed into law by President Richard M. Nixon on 26 February 1970. Since that time equal competition for command billets and equal career opportunity appear to have become fact for the NFO.

The willingness of the Department of the Navy to take the prompt action necessary to resolve the conflict between NFO career development and the Title 10 restrictions is probably the one singular factor that contributed most to the smooth transition of the NFO into the command structure.

The timeliness of the Navy's action is manifested in two aspects: First, the action was taken before significant numbers of NFOs reached a point in their career where the Title 10 restriction was a serious limiting factor. Thus, wholesale alienation of a large group of officers was avoided. Second, the Navy action was taken before the organizational bureaucracy had developed and institutionalized a system to cope with the apparent inconsistencies in the existing policies. Thus, the Navy was able to avoid the necessity of overcoming deeply ingrained, nonproductive behavioral patterns during the implementation of its NFO command program. "A stitch in time saves nine" seems particularly appropriate in this instance.

A second factor that has greatly aided the NFOs in their transition into command billets lies in the broad background of squadron-level duties they accumulate prior to assuming command. Aviators simply do not have an experience advantage in the Navy. Even prior to 1970 squadron duty assignments were made largely without distinction to rating, and now the NFO competes equally among all his contemporaries for the available jobs.¹⁶ The editor of Naval Aviation News comments:

A pilot/NFO comparison isn't even applicable anymore since their jobs (except in the aircraft) are completely interchangeable. Other than landing signal officer, there are virtually no billets within a squadron, or non-squadron sea or shore duty assignments. which cannot be filled by pilots or NFOs.¹⁷

Equal opportunity also exists at the department head level. A typical Navy flying squadron is organized like that illustrated in Figure 1. Headed by a commanding officer (CO) and his vice commander, the executive officer (XO), the squadron is divided functionally into several operating departments. Assignment as department head carries large responsibilities and is vital in the command and career progression of any advancing officer. It has consistently been Navy policy to appoint the best qualified individuals, regardless of rating, as department heads.

As valuable as a background of squadron duties was to an NFO, it was no substitute for the real-time command experience that accrued to an aviator by virtue of being an aircraft commander. Major A. G. Bartel, USMC, writing in the Marine Corps Gazette, addressed this issue:

Command of aviation operational missions has long been the basic stepping stone for aviator pilots to aviation squadron command. In the interest of improved mission performance, officer manpower utilization and retention, the stepping stones to command must be equally available to both naval aviators and naval flight officers.¹⁹

Lieutenant Commander Peter T. Smith, writing in a similar vein, stated:

Until an NFO has successfully demonstrated proficiency as an aircraft commander he will not even be considered by a command selection board, no matter what Title 10 says.²⁰

Navy precedent for use of nonpilot officers as aircraft/mission commanders dates back as

far as 1919. In that year, a Navy NC-4 successfully accomplished the first airborne crossing of the Atlantic Ocean. The commander of the NC-4, Commander A. C. Read, was not the man with his hands on the controls but was, rather, the aircraft's navigator.²¹

In today's environment, OPNAVINST 3710.7G provides current guidance in this area. Specifically, this instruction states:

A naval aircraft or formation of naval aircraft shall be flown under the command of the pilot in command, mission commander or flight leader as appropriate, so designated by the reporting custodian or authorized representative. The status of each individual participating in the flight shall be clearly understood prior to flight. . . When a flight schedule is published the pilot in command, mission commander or flight leader as appropriate, shall be specifically designated thereon for each aircraft and flight respectively. ²²

Given this discretion, the commanding officer is able to select the best qualified officer on a crew or within a formation to function as the mission commander. The instruction further elaborates on the mission commander's responsibilities:

The mission commander shall be a properly qualified naval aviator or naval flight officer designated by appropriate authority. He shall be responsible for all phases of the assigned mission except those aspects of safety of flight which are related to the physical control of the aircraft and are considered beyond the qualification of the mission commander's designator/MOS [Equivalent of Air Specialty Code] . . .. The mission commander shall direct a coordinated plan of action and shall be responsible for effectiveness of the flight.²³

While the mission commander must be respecified for each recruiting flight, in some areas of the aviation community--primarily the Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Force--it is not unusual for the best senior qualified officer to be designated on a recurring basis. In these cases, he also assumes the duties of a "crew commander," generally directing the crew activity on the ground (or on-board ship) as well as in the air.²⁴

It is in the role of mission commander that the NFO gains the background and skills that truly allow him to compete with aviators on an equal basis. The experience is instrumental in forming the sound judgment and leadership skills that are prerequisites for higher level command billets. Without doubt, the policy that provides for NFO mission commanders is one of the major elements enabling NFOs to assume successfully the demands of higher level command duties.

The Navy process that selects officers for command opportunity is formalized and centers around a command screening board which meets annually in November. Chaired by an admiral, the board reviews the records of eligible lieutenant commanders (0-4) and commanders (0-5) and identifies the best qualified -individuals for subsequent assignment to command billets. The hoard considers all unrestricted line officers from the various Navy communities-submarine, surface, aviation (both aviators and NFOs) and special (UDT, SEALS, etc.). An officer normally receives four screenings (one year below the zone, two years in the primary zone, and one year above the zone) before being rejected for command. Overall, approximately 40 percent of rated officers are selected for command within their period of eligibility.²⁵ This process has provided two distinct advantages to the NFOs in their transition to equal command opportunity.

First, because board selection is a consensus, arrived at in a logical, systematic fashion, it is difficult for one or two biased individuals to influence the command opportunities of any given group. Thus, NFOs have been ensured an honest, unprejudiced appraisal of their individual potential as Navy commanding officers.

Second, although board results are not formally published--as are promotion board selections--the information is widely available to the officer corps. Selected officers are notified officially by letter, and statistics concerning the performance of a particular specialty group are as close as a phone call to the appropriate "detailer" in the bureau of Naval Personnel. It is not difficult for the NFO to ensure that his opportunity for command equals that of his pilot contemporaries.

Once selected for a command assignment, the naval officer is initially assigned to the unit as the executive officer for a period of 12-15 months. This duty allows him to become familiar with the organization and its operations before assuming command. His tour as commander is similarly limited to 12-15 months. At that point, the successful commander may receive a higher level "bonus" command within the aviation community, or he may be assigned to a surface vessel to begin his progression toward command of an aircraft carrier.

Current Navy policy limits NFO squadron commander assignments to those units with aircraft that carry NFOs as part of the integral crew.²⁶ In these squadrons, the Navy attempts to alternate aviators and NFOs as commanders, although crew manning ratios sometimes preclude a one-for-one rotation cycle. The envisioned ideal situation is one which would ensure that when an aviator is serving as the squadron commander, be would have an NFO functioning as his executive officer. Then, when the NFO moves up to the CO's position, the Navy would assign a command-screened aviator to serve as his XO. This rotation of the aircrew specialties through the squadron's management positions has ensured an equal command opportunity for all selected officers.

The career progression path for a naval officer is highly structured and strongly relates promotional opportunity and career continuity to successful performance as a command is the keystone to continued career advancement Consequently, each naval officer is literally "groomed" for command through a series of duty assignments as a junior officer. Those officers identified as best qualified and formally identified by the command screening board for subsequent assignments in executive and commanding officer positions.

The relative ease with which NFOs were able to enter this structure hinges on three major points: First, the Navy took prompt action to bring them formally into the system before large numbers of disenfranchised officers were created, Second, the Navy "grooming" process ensured that eligible NFOs were well prepared to assume their roles as commanders. And finally, the naval officer corps was already structured to accept nonpilot officers as commanders-aviators are, in fact, a minority group in the Navy. While NFO commanders met some initial resistance within the aviation community, the Navy, as a whole, was willing to accept their legitimacy.

What, if any, of this can be applied to the Air Force navigator? It must be initially recognized that the Air Force and the Navy aviation community, while similar in many aspects, are not duplicate organizations. It would be folly to assume that policies which have been successful for the Navy will be equally successful when applied to the Air Force navigator However, there is merit in the Navy program, and it should receive careful consideration.

The Air Force problem of integrating the navigator into the command structure is far more complex and difficult to deal with than that which faced the Navy. The time for early problem identification and prompt corrective action has long since passed. Any program that the Air Force undertakes will have to overcome long-standing prejudice and deeply entrenched bureaucratic procedures, both formal and informal, to achieve success.

Initial Air Force efforts are concentrating on a review of rated staff and supervisory positions with an eye to redesignating those which can be held by both pilots and navigators. If navigators are to succeed as unit commanders, they must be provided the same broad background of experience in squadron and wing level jobs that is currently available to the pilot. The traditional steppingstone jobs-flight commander, chief of standardization and evaluation, operations officer, etc.--cannot continue to be reserved for the pilot force.

More important, and an issue that is currently being ignored, is the implementation of a mission/crew commander concept which includes the navigator. This function will be critical to the overall success of the navigator command program. For it is only in the day-to-day arena of crew interface and mission responsibility that a future commander gains the experience and credibility required of a leader. In all instances, the senior mission qualified officer assigned to a crew (pilot or navigator) should ultimately be responsible for the activity of the crew and its efforts toward mission accomplishment.

Several of the major air commands, particularly SAC and MAC, are in a unique position to provide such an opportunity; but to date, they have not chosen to do so. These commands are already structured around the concept of the integral crew, with its attendant assignment of a "crew commander." It would appear to be a logical extension of Air Force policy to widen the eligibility for this position to include the assigned navigators. However, more than a year and a half after the rescinding of the Title 10 limitations, this position continues to be reserved for the senior pilot on the crew.

In the face of this continuing discriminatory behavior, the Air Force needs to find some highly visible vehicle to assure the navigator force that it is truly making progress toward the promised equality. In the Navy, the command screening process accomplishes a large portion of this function.

The Air Force process for selecting commanders is far less structured and much more informal. In all cases, the senior commander in the chain of command has the prerogative to designate his subordinate commanders. However, the process that identifies eligible officers varies widely. The Ad Hoc Committee on Removal of the Title 10 Restriction to Command comments:

Although MAJCOM [Major Air Command] procedures for selection of flying unit commanders vary in degree of formality, all have the objective of assigning the best available officers to the jobs. Some commands publish the selection criteria, but in most cases there are no major efforts to publicize the selection procedures to their officer force. Most commands have a ''list" containing the names of the selected commander candidates, but in no case is the list published for dissemination.²⁷

Given the closeness with which the command selection process is held and the long perceived tendency on the part of the "Pilot's Protective Society" to perpetuate itself, is it really surprising that navigators are skeptical that equal command opportunity will become fact?

The Navy has provided an example that the Air Force would do well to emulate. The individual elements may be adapted or discarded as necessary, but the background of a formal, highly visible program that receives consistent top-level review is essential. Until we no longer judge a man's leadership potential by the wings that he wears, equal command opportunity for navigators will continue to be a concept, not a reality. The Chinese philosopher Lao-tzu commented, "A journey of a thousand miles must begin with a single step." Rescinding the Title 10 restrictions was but the first step; the difficult journey is yet to follow.

1. "Navigator to Head Combat Flying Unit," Air Force Times, 12 February 1975, p. 2.

2. Section 8577 of Title 10. U.S. Code, stipulated that: "Flying units shall be commanded by commissioned officers of the Air Force who have received aeronautical ratings as pilots of service types of aircraft."

3. William J. Richardson, "Command Opportunities for Navigators," Unpublished Research Report, USAF Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, n.d.

4. Chris L. Jefferies, "The Navigator: An End to Professional Discrimination?" Air University Review, September-October 1974, pp.87-92.

5. Ibid, p.90.

6. Ibid.

7. Robert P. Lukeman, "Navigator Command of Flying Units: Perspectives and Prospects," The Navigator. Summer 1975, pp. 11-22.

8. A.G. Bartel, "NFO: Equal or Second Class," Marine Corps Gazette, May 1973, pp. 72-73.

9. Letter from J. R. McGuire, Bureau of Naval Personnel, to Michael E. Richardson, 22 February 1976.

10. In December 1973, in response to a House Armed Services Committee request for data, the Navy concluded, "Unified command opportunity for pilots and NFOs is viable, credible, and (what’s more) really works."

11. The results of a survey conducted at the Naval War College concerning the NFO and his command and career opportunities strongly support the contention stated here. See Appendix, especially entries 4,5,8,9, and 15.

12. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, House Report 91-576: Pertaining Naval Flight Officers To Be Eligible To Command Certain Naval Activities, And For Other Purposes, 91st Congress, 1st sess., 16 October 1969.

13. U.S. Air Force, "Repeal of Title 10, U.S. Code 8577 Restriction to Command of Flying Units." Ad Hoc Committee Report, Randolph AFB, Texas: Air Force Military Personnel Center, 29 July-3 August 1974, p.8.

14. U.S. Congress, House Report No. 91-576, p. 3. Emphasis added.

15. U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Subcommittee No. 4, Hearings on H.R. 11548, 91at Congress, 1st sess., 10 October 1969.

16. The survey conducted at the Naval War College also reflected on this point. Additional comments of both aviators and NFOs were strong in this regard. See Appendix, entries 9 and 10.

17. Paul N. Mullane, "Naval Flight Officer," The Navigator, vol. 2, 1973, pp. 11-15.

18. Malcolm W. Cagle, The Naval Aviation Guide (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1972), p.182.

19. Bartel, p. 73.

20. Peter T. Smith, "The NFO and Squadron Command," U.S. Naval Institution Proceedings, April 1970, pp. 40-45.

21. William A. Cohen, "The Military Navigator in Aerospace Warfare," Air University Review, March-April 1967, p. 102.

22. "NATOPS General Flight and Operating Instructions Manual," OPNAVIST 3710.7G, Washington: U.S. Office of Naval Operations, 1 January 1973, pp.2-7.

23. Ibid.,  pp. 2-8.

24. Interview with Commander David S. Thompson, Instructor, Naval Staff Course, naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 7 November 1975.

25. U.S. Air Force, Ad, Hoc Committee Report, pp. 7-8.

26. See Appendix, question 6, for aircrew reaction to this policy.

27. U.S. Air Force, Ad Hoc Committee Report, p. 16.

Author’s note: As the article was originally written in the fall of 1975 while I was a student at the Naval Command and Staff course, some of the data may no longer be current. Certainly the NFO statistics have changed since my last update in February 1976. Similarly, the MAJCOM positions concerning navigator mission/crew commanders may have changed in the ensuing two and one-half years. M.E.R.

Major Michael E. Richardson (M.S., Air Force Institute of Technology) is Chief, Resource Plans Division, 67^th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing (TAC), Bergstrom AFB, Texas. His operational experience includes duty as a navigator in MAC’s RC- and WC-130s, as a weapons systems officer in the F-111A, the B-57G, and the Pave Nail OV-10A--the latter two during an eighteen-month tour in Thailand--and as an instructor in the Navigator-Bombardier Training Program. He is a Distinguished Graduate of both Squadron Officer School and the Naval Command and Staff College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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