Air University Review, September-October 1977

Watching the Pendulum Swing

A Look at the Works of the
National Strategy Information Center

A TITLE can make or break an article, for it can tell much, lie, or say nothing. Ours is no exception. Watching the pendulum swing has been a dangerous but fascinating occupation of peacetime soldiers for centuries. But the idea implied by the title is a faulty one. It suggests that history is change and that the change follows a regular rhythm in only two dimensions. Would that it were so! Even if that would not make the future predictable, at least there would be comfort in knowing that things would indeed change and do so in an orderly way. Unfortunately, history is change and continuity, and its change is irregular.

That is what makes the business of the peacetime soldier uncertain, for he must predict the ways in which future wars will be fought and won. If the pendulum swings and he is not watching, the penalties will be enormous. The Yankees' failure to see that the coming of the minié ball had undermined the effectiveness of the Napoleonic offensive and enhanced the strength of the defensive caused them to drench the slopes of Fredericksburg with their blood. Less obvious is the fact that a prediction that the pendulum has swung when it has not, or one that is premature, can be equally disastrous.

In the late fifties, some were saying that the age of push-button warfare had arrived and that prop-driven aircraft would not long be required. In consequence, all of the multiengine pilot schools were shut down. Then the war came, and the "gooneys" and "dollar-nineteens" were demothballed in droves. We trotted out a host of tired old lieutenant colonels and restless young lieutenants to Vietnam to fly the things. Thus, that time the premature prediction of the swing was not disastrous—there were enough old and young men around to pick up the slack.

But what of the manned bomber? Is its day gone by? Who can say? We can systems-analyze the thing to death, but in the end the intuitive judgment will make the final choice. If our judgments must be partly based on intuition, then why bother to reason? Why bother to study at all? To eliminate as many imponderables as possible through study and analysis—that is why. That is the way to improve the odds that the final intuitive judgments will succeed in correct identifying the elements of continuity and those of change! The purpose of the Air University Review book reviewing program is to aid the Air Force officer in selecting material for this study and analysis.

We have occasionally published "Books and Ideas" articles to examine the works of institutions that specialize in national defense matters. The first of these, "Swords into Ballpoints" by Colonel Harley E. Barnhart, covered Strategic Review" the work of the United States Strategic Institute (USSI); it was presented in our November-December 1973 issue. Our second survey of national security literature was "Something New under the Sun" by this writer in the May-June 1976 issue. It covered the work of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and especially its journal, Armed Forces and Society.

Another such organization, the National Strategy Information Center (NSIC), antedates the USSI and has an authorship that tends to be less associated with the armed forces and federal government. Based in New York and affiliated with New York University (NYU), the NSIC does not publish a periodical. However, it is very active in soliciting a variety of topical studies concerning national security and in conducting seminars and conferences on the subject throughout the nation. A body of important literature has emerged from this effort. NSIC publications in print at the time of writing cover four principal areas: general studies, works on the use of the political instrument of national policy, books on military affairs, and essays on the economic sinews of our national security policy.

The National Strategy Information Center was founded in 1962 and is headed by Professor Frank Barnett. Among the many prominent scholars associated with the organization are Klaus Knorr, Frank Trager, Fred Sondermann, Gerald Steibel, and Bernard Brodie. Only a few of the participants made their names in the military world: General Harold K. Johnson, USA (Retired) and Major General Richard A. Yudkin, USAF (Retired), to cite two. More of the directors and advisers come from the business world. 

The NSIC is a nonpartisan organization dedicated to an educational program in international affairs based on the assumption "that neither isolationism nor pacifism can provide realistic solutions to the challenge of 20th century totalitarianism." It has been granted tax-exempt status by the federal government. The NSIC receives no financial support from the U.S. government. Rather it is supported by donations from individuals and organizations, mainly businesses. Its 1974-75 budget was close to one million dollars.

The institution is involved in a variety of activities designed to influence public opinion through the intellectual elite that leads the way. The work is done with a program of publication and the conduct of seminars in several different settings. Of course, few of our readers will have the chance to attend one of the seminars, so it is the other part of the NSIC's work, the publishing, that has the greatest interest for us. These works are produced in three series: general teaching tools, Strategy Papers, and Agenda Papers. For this review, I have divided these series into the following categories: general works, political studies, military affairs, and economics.

Tools for the
Study of National Security

The general works are ones that, for the most part, were designed as teaching tools. The three works in print at the time of writing are presented first.*

*Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, editors, National Security and American Society: Theory, Process, and Policy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1973, $8.95), 612 pages.

Alden Williams and David W. Tarr, editors, Modules in Security Studies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1974, $3.50), 229 pages.

Frank R. Barnett, Alternatives to Détente (New York: NSIC, 1976, $1.00), 25 pages.

The keystone to the entire publishing effort may be said to be Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg's National Security and American Society. The average anthology is a spotty affair. Usually, some of the chapters are worth reading, but the rest just tag along for the ride. Not so here. Trager and Kronenberg have done a remarkable editing job in that virtually all of the pieces are of good quality. The book is logically organized, and there is little excess baggage. Given the rate of political and technological change, this work, like all others in international affairs, tends to become dated rather rapidly. Though it was published only four years ago, parts of it need updating to account for some of the events of the recent past (the October War, energy crisis, fall of Vietnam, and Watergate). I am told that a new edition will be prepared presently. Meanwhile, officers serving in a technical specialty would not go far wrong in using this book to update their knowledge on national security policy, strategy-making, and internal problems related to our national security affairs

Another of the general works from NSIC and NYU's National Security Program is Modules in Security Studies. This book should find a wide audience among the students and faculties of Professional Military Education schools and ROTC detachments. It is a handbook composed of vignettes on a wide variety of national security topics. Each includes a preliminary bibliography. Some of the topics covered are Military Power, Deterrence Theory, Strategic Nuclear War, Arms Control, Strategic Weapons Systems, The Sea in United States Strategy, Psychological Reactions to Combat, and many others. Modules in Security Studies would be an excellent starting point for a wide variety of studies from lesson planning to term paper writing.

The entire tone of the National Strategy Information Center's work can be found in Frank Barnett's compact Alternatives to Détente. His is the voice of caution in a world of enthusiasm for détente. Barnett holds that there is a fundamental difference between the Russian and American definitions of détente, which could lead to disaster for us. The United States tends to look on détente as an end in itself, whereas the Russians see it as a means to an end--the goal of Communist World domination. He remarks that the Russians look on detente merely as the continuation of the old struggle by other, nonviolent means--or means without total war, anyhow.

Political Instruments
of National Policy

We turn now to an examination of the NSIC works loosely classified as "political."* The collective voice of these works tells us that the pendulum is swinging in important ways; economic difficulties, the Nixon Doctrine, the fall of Vietnam, and the Yom Kippur War--all suggest that the U.S. can no longer play an omnipotent role in world politics. A reappraisal of our foreign policy has been undertaken and should continue, but the reaction must not be too extreme. We cannot allow the pendulum to swing all the way back to the old isolationism.

*Frank R. Barnett, Seven Tracks to Peace in the Middle East (New York: NSIC, 1975, $2.00), 28 pages.

Donald G. Brennan, Arms Treaties with Moscow: Unequal Terms Unevenly Applied? (New York: NSIC, 1975, $2.00), 29 pages.

Alvin J. Cottrell and Walter F. Hahn, Indian Ocean Naval Limitations: Regional Issues and Global Implications (New York: NSIC, 1976, $2.00), 42 pages.

James E. Dougherty, How to Think about Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973, $2.95), 202 pages.

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., and Howland H. Sargeant, Soviet Political Warfare Techniques: Espionage and Propaganda in the 1970s (New York: NSIC, 1972, $1.00), 82 pages.

Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus, editors, Nuclear Proliferation: Phase II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1974, no price given), 256 pages.

Franz Michael and Gaston J. Sigur, The Asian Alliance: Japan and United States Policy  (New York: NSIC, 1972, $1.00), 92 pages.

Jay B. Sorenson with Bill F. Francis, Japanese Policy and Nuclear Arms (New York: American-Asian Educational Exchange & NSIC, 1975, $1.00), 60 pages.

Gerald L. Steibel, Détente: Promises and Pitfalls (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975, $2.95), 89 pages.

James D. Theberge, The Soviet Presence in Latin America (New York: Crane, Russak, 1974, $2.95), 107 pages.

George G. Thomson, Problems of Strategy in the Pacific and Indian Oceans (New York: NSIC, 1970, $1.00), 42 pages.

The books on arms control (Brennan, Dougherty, and Lawrence and Larus) constitute a warning signal. One emerges with the idea that arms themselves are not and never have been a prime cause for war, though it is admitted that arms races have exacerbated conflicts that had their roots in other causes. James Dougherty tells us that general and complete disarmament has been a pipe dream from the outset, and the best we can hope for are some partial disarmament measures that will contribute to the stability of deterrence. Donald Brennan is no more enthusiastic about the outlook. He feels that the U.S., so far, has gotten the short end of the SALT arrangements. Those areas where we were behind have been limited, and the ones in which we had an advantage were left unlimited. Thus, the U.S.S.R. has a free hand in catching up with our technology in MIRV and accuracy, but we are prevented by treaty from overcoming our lag in throw-weight and numbers of missiles. In general, Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus give us an equally dark picture. Though some authors do not feel that proliferation need be destabilizing, the consensus is that the Non-Proliferation Treaty will not prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and the diffusion will be dangerous to world peace.

What is to be done now that all the kids on the block are certain to have their own "nukes"? Mostly wring our hands. We can only hope that possession of nuclear weapons will make some of the statesmen involved more responsible than they have been in the past, and we can and should cooperate with them in every way in the development of their nuclear safety and antiterrorist programs.

One of the clichés of the historical profession holds that humanity is condemned to reinvent the wheel endlessly because of the lack of perspective resulting from an incomplete education--insufficient history, of course. Gerald Steibel adds substance to that idea in his discussion of détente as he shows that the phenomenon is really nothing new. The history of United States—Soviet relations is marked by a series of détentes interrupted by various confrontations. The Soviets, starting with Lenin, have deliberately promoted periods of improved relations as tactical measures that would contribute, in the end, to the objective of the grand strategy: the achievement of the Communist World revolution.

Lyman Kirkpatrick and Howland Sargeant issue a similar note of caution in their essays on espionage and propaganda. In spite of détente, it seems, the Soviets are making as large an effort as ever to gain information and to win friends and influence people. Both their espionage and propaganda programs have an advantage in timeliness and cohesiveness that arises from centralized direction, but their interpretation of intelligence often misses the mark because of the sheer volume of material collected and the Russian tendency to look at things through Marxist-tinted glasses.

The Russians are also trying to give the pendulum a shove in their own direction in Latin American politics. They are doing it in a cautious, pragmatic way. While they try to take advantage of every opportunity, they do avoid direct confrontation with the United States. James Theberge's The Soviet Presence in Latin America argues that in spite of the fall of the Allende government in Chile and of the tremendous costs of supporting Cuba, the Russian position in Latin America is better than ever before. Though the U.S.S.R. is not ready to risk détente for the sake of Latin American gains, and though her advantages there are more psychological than strategic, Theberge does warn us that the long-term threat is significant and that we ought to plan to counteract it.

Two books deal with the growing importance of the Indian Ocean basin, a subject that has not received enough attention in the U.S. military periodicals. It is a faraway place, but the area has inherent importance that has been obscured by various cultural factors. However, it is now gaining a new significance that makes it vital to our national security. A large portion of the world's population lives in lands whose shores are washed by the waters of the Indian Ocean, and it is a population whose poverty and undeveloped economies tend to make it hostile to an affluent America. It is unfortunate that the energy lines of communication (LOCs) of both our major allies, the NATO nations and Japan, run through the ocean. Both are utterly dependent on them, and there is little hope of developing adequate alternate routes. As Alvin Cottrell and Walter Hahn point out, the growing dependence of the West on the petroleum of the Middle East and the ability of the U.S.S.R. to project power into the Indian Ocean basin by land make our interest in the free use of the sea lanes there much more vital than is that of Russia. They further argue that this asymmetric vulnerability makes it imperative that we do not allow the adversary to swing the pendulum against us by the diplomatic means of a naval limitation treaty. George Thomson's view is that a political vacuum cannot exist in the area. This would permit only two outcomes: dominion of the place by one of the superpowers or condominium by the multitude of states in the region in cooperation with both the superpowers. The implication is that the U.S. cannot dominate the ocean because of distance and domestic factors and that Russian domination would be inimical to the local powers. Thus, Thomson's advice to his own country (Singapore), the other regional states, and Japan is that they should strive for a condominium. Whatever the case for them, it seems clear to this author that there can be little argument about U.S. policy: the oil must get through.

Not only must fuel get through to Japan but she is also dependent on the sea for most of the other inputs to her great industrial machine. She is so vulnerable that peace and stability are even more vital to her than they are to the rest of us. There is a good deal of consensus between the two NSIC books on Japan: Japanese Policy and Nuclear Arms and The Asian Alliance: Japan and United States Policy. Both go through a process of elimination in analyzing the various Japanese foreign policy options to arrive at the conclusion that her foreign policy must remain pretty much as it has been for a long time. Japan is so vulnerable at sea that she cannot hope to go it alone. The record of the League of Nations and the United Nations is such that reliance on a system of collective security would be a precarious undertaking. Cultural, historical, and strategic factors inhibit an alliance with either side of the Sino-Soviet dispute. The construction of an alliance with the Third World powers of the region would be allying one's self with weakness. Thus, as far as Japan is concerned, the pendulum still seems to favor the interest of the United States. Nevertheless, the Japanese recognize that the Vietnam verdict means that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is no longer as reliable as it once was and that Japan herself will have to pick up a greater share of the security bill. The NSIC scholars do not think there is much immediate prospect of Japan's going nuclear, but neither is there much hope that she will endorse the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The risks and social costs inhibit the former; the absence of real rewards prevent the latter. Still, if she does decide to build a nuclear capability in the future, it is well within her technical and economic competence. Jay Sorenson and Bill Francis feel that the U.S. should neither oppose nor encourage such a development. The problem is only hypothetical, for the social inhibitions to the acquisition of nuclear weapons in Japan are very strong and will not be quickly overcome.

The security of the oil LOC to Japan is only part of the security problem. The stability of the source is equally important, and the problems there are even more complex than they are in the Indian Ocean. Seven Tracks to Peace in the Middle East is a provocative little pamphlet that presents some imaginative ideas for solutions to those problems. First, there is the underlying assumption that stability in the Middle East and the health of NATO are vital interests for the United States, and no price is too great for the protection of those interests. Barnett proposes solutions that would capitalize on one area, technology, in which the pendulum is still firmly on the American side of things--the technology of agriculture and, to a lesser degree, the technology of military security. He would have us use this advantage to build Israeli defensive systems that would assure their physical security in a way that diplomatic guarantees never could and use it to remove some of the base causes of the timeless conflict. Here he makes an assumption, it appears, that the chief roots of the problem are economic, an assumption that doubtless is partially correct but questionable to many. He would use technology to turn the Middle East into a garden that would support all and have us develop a kind of a peaceful foreign legion/Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) to go to the Middle East and get between the antagonists. Through technology, sociology, and just plain brotherhood, the eternal struggle would be eliminated. Doubtless some conservatives will look on these ideas as visionary—yet, perhaps radical solutions are now in order since nothing else seems to have had more than temporary effect.

All in all, the political works of NSIC are and impressive group of books. They take the middle ground. No longer can a sneeze in Washington make the whole world tremble, but to write the American story as "The Decline and Fall of the United States" would be decidedly premature. Those desiring a balanced survey of our present status in relation to the rest of the world would be well advised to use these studies.

Military Affairs
and National Policy

Eleven of the NSIC books and pamphlets have to do with the military aspect of things.* Taken collectively, these works seem to say that the military pendulum is swinging against America even more clearly than is the case in the political arena. The impression that emerges is that the United States is spending a lesser portion of her substance on defense than she has at any time since before the Cold War, and her will is seriously weakened. Yet the Russians are spending more in both relative and absolute terms than ever before, and they have not wavered in their ultimate goal of making the world safe for communism—by making it all Communist. Our scholars urge us to give immediate attention to the rebuilding of our defenses. In both strategic and naval weapons, the pendulum is swinging rapidly against the West. Our writers are not alarmists. The West still has important advantages, but it must recognize the danger and utilize them to reverse the swing.

*W. A. C. Aide, Oil, Politics, and Seapower: The Indian Ocean Vortex (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975, $2.95), 98 pages.

Frank R. Barnett, et al., The Military Unbalance: Is the US Becoming a Second-Class Power? (New York: NSIC, 1971, $1.00), 65 pages.

J. Bowyer Bell, The Horn of Africa: Strategic Magnet in the Seventies (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973, $2.25), 55 pages.

Angus M. Fraser, The People's Liberation Army: Communist China's Armed Forces (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973, $2.45), 62 pages.

Wynfred Joshua, Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance (New York: NSIC, 1976, $1.00), 60 pages.

Norman Polmar, Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the 1970s, revised edition (New York: Crane, Russak, 1974, $2.95), 129 pages.

___, Strategic Weapons: An Introduction (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975, $3.95), 164 pages.

William Schneider, Jr., and Francis P. Hoeber, Arms, Men, and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1977 (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976, price not given), 288 pages.

William F. Scott, Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy (New York: Crane, Russak, 1975, $2.75), 72 pages.

If the reader is not moved to look at any other volume discussed in this essay, he should examine Arms, Men, and Military Budgets. * He is not likely to find such an up-to-date treatment in book form nor one that covers the field in a more comprehensive and understandable way. The message is a grim one and, expressed in the simplest terms, the U.S. is spending but 5.4 percent of her large gross national product (GNP) on defense compared to the Russian expenditure of 13.5 to 14.5 percent of a smaller product. Even in absolute terms, the Russians are outspending America by a very substantial margin. Hoeber and Schneider also cite the asymmetrical effects of SALT I and recommend that the U.S. should definitely proceed with both the B-1 and Trident programs to compensate for the fact that the Russians can and are improving their position in MIRV technology as allowed by SALT while the U.S. can do nothing to overcome its limitations in numbers of missiles and throw-weight. They also point to the fact that the West has always relied on superior technology to overcome its disadvantage in numbers among the general purpose forces. Now, the Russians, while they maintain their numbers, are moving rapidly to eliminate their lag in technology. This is most apparent in naval affairs. Though the number of Russian ships has not increased substantially, the qualitative change has been dramatic. The vessels are bigger, have more sophisticated armaments, and greater range. It seems obvious that there has been a basic change in doctrine. The Russian navy used to be only a coast defense force. Now Schneider and Hoeber (and many others) hold that the scheme is to build a naval force capable of projecting Russian power overseas. What is to be done? Arms, Men, and Military Budgets, in addition to its B-1 and Trident recommendations, suggests that the West should be careful not to give away something for nothing. Especially important is the tendency to export technology to the Soviets. Here, America has a very substantial advantage but one that we are in danger of losing. The labor input to production in America is approximately 66 percent of that required in Russia. We must be careful not only to maintain but to increase that margin. We can do this by modernizing the management of our own research and development (R&D) so as to guarantee that we have the maximum number of new starts. This will ensure that we will be able to outproduce the Russians despite our disadvantage in numbers.

*The NSIC is making this work a recurring feature of its program. Since the time of writing, the second annual version of this book has appeared as Francis P. Hoeber and William Schneider, Jr. editors, Arms, Men, and Military Budgets, Issues for Fiscal Year 1978 (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977. $5.95). 354 pages. The message of this later work is basically the same, and it should be high on the reading list of every officer.

Also suggested in Arms, Men, and Military Budgets are some major revisions to the personnel program designed to see us through the long haul. Generally, the idea is to change to a system of much longer initial enlistments with fewer re-enlistments. This would have the dual benefit of raising the experience level and reducing the retirement liability incurred. This is the one area of the book that seems suspicious to this author--too pat! The implications of it are farreaching and certainly merit detailed study. Would that tend to make us a more mercenary force than we already are? What happens to professionalism under this system? Would it further aggravate the growing racial imbalance among the ground combat arms? Some career personnel may deplore the tendency here to express hardware costs in terms of declining portions of the GNP but to leave personnel costs in dollar figures and then conclude that the latter are getting out of hand! Yet, anyone who cares to compare the size of pay raises to the inflation rate since the coming of the All Volunteer Force must conclude that the latter has exceeded the former in every instance and that, consequently, the real take-home pay of all concerned has been going down, not up!

Frederick Seitz and Rodney W. Nichols, Research and Development and the Prospects for International Security (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973, price not given), 74 pages.

Lawrence L. Whetten, The Soviet Presence in the Eastern Mediterranean (New York: NSIC, 1971, $1.00), 50 pages.

One of the best studies in the NSIC series, The Military Unbalance: Is the US Becoming a Second-Class Power? handles the "intent" problem in analyzing the psychological bases of deterrence. The conclusion is that there is, and will continue to be, a strong streak of Russian thinking that impels them toward an aggressive, expansionist attitude toward the rest of the world. But for the fact that this is accompanied by a generous measure of caution, it would constitute a strong impulsion toward a first strike. However, caution motivates the Russians to an opportunistic policy: to take a step forward when possible and bide their time when it is not. But this whole calculus depends on the will to resist on the part of their capitalist adversary. And that is the rub for America—our problem is to maintain not only the capability to resist the strategic onslaught but also the will to do so. Only then will it be reasonable to hope that the onslaught will never come. In short, the essay by Professors Richard Pipes and Leonard Shapiro argues that it is the duty of all thinking Americans to educate their fellow citizens against the dangers of neoisolationism. Not only must this will to resist exist but it must also be perceived by the adversary.

One of the ways in which we can build the perception of our firm will is to make sacrifices in the acquisition of the tangible means of resistance. If it were possible to get the American public to make the sacrifice of slowing down from 65 mph to 55 mph, that would be tangible evidence that, the nation possessed some resolution to defend itself through making its fuel supply more secure. If such a nation is also willing to defer spending on new color TV sets to field the B-1 weapon system, for example, that might be perceived as a go-slow signal among the adversary's opportunists. Frederick Seitz and Rodney Nichols cogently argue that military R&D spending has been going down while investment in civilian projects has been going up. The numbers of engineers and scientists employed in the private sector have not been declining as rapidly as in military enterprises. The authors say that this is especially serious when considered in light of what they see as higher personnel costs and the massive effort the Russians are making in R&D. The authors insist that the trend must be reversed. Costs can be reduced by new technological applications. Basic science research should be increased. This must be done not only for the sake of the greatest possible effectiveness (and cost effectiveness) for our own force but also to give us the capability to understand the threat and avoid technological surprise. Further, in view of the general reluctance of our NATO partners to increase the sizes of their general purpose forces, technology is our best option for increasing the effectiveness of the West's deterrent power in Europe.

But the first step in eliminating the disarray of NATO, according to Wynfred Joshua, is not a matter of technology. It is more basic than that. The Vietnam trauma had its repercussions in Europe, and they were serious. The validity of the American nuclear umbrella has again been called into doubt. Consequently, the first step of the restoration process must be a political one: the restatement of the objectives of the alliance. And it must be done in the strongest possible terms in order to make the coupling of our nuclear deterrent to the military security of Western Europe as credible as possible. Once the political objectives are restated, then the strategy of the alliance needs to be re-examined. Some features of Joshua's revised strategy would be:

• A reaffirmation that there would be no quick or radical drawdown of American ground forces in Europe.

• MBFR (Mutual Balanced-Forced Reduction) cannot be achieved on a truly equitable basis and ought therefore be rejected.

• The coupling cited above should be made very perceptible in Moscow by tangible force disposition measures by the U.S.

• The nuclear threshold should be established at a low, but still uncertain, level.

• The U.S. should support the further development of the British and French nuclear deterrents.

• The addition of some missiles in place of the aerial portion of the U.S. deterrent in Europe would be permissible as long as it were done gradually and in a way that would avoid the appearance of decoupling.

• The enhancement of the defensive capabilities of all NATO forces through the massive deployment of the new technology--such as PGM (precision-guided munitions).

• Maintenance of strong naval force the NATO flanks.

Of course, many Americans will want to question some of those ideas. They all seem to point to an even greater strain on the American economy, and if Japan is to pick up a greater share of the common security bill, then a similar action in Europe would not be too much to ask. This is especially true since the nuclear deterrent to which the NATO defenses must be coupled weighs most heavily on the American economy.

The elements of that nuclear deterrent are explained by one of the most effective authors of the entire series, Norman Polmar, in Strategic Weapons, which was reviewed by Kenneth Werrell in our September-October 1976 issue. This book is a primer of the first order and should be read by all who are not directly involved in that part of our Air Force's work. Still, Polmar's long experience as a naval writer and as a member of the editorial staff of the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings does seem to show through. He (correctly, I think) is worried about the growing strength of the Russian strategic forces and of the effects of SALT. Yet he understates the value of the high operation readiness rate and relatively low cost of the ICBM force, the recallability of the bomber force, the high yield of manned bomber weapons, the ability of the B-52 to seek out and destroy targets missed by missiles, and the importance of having reliability proved under combat conditions—specifically, and most recently, the significance of the Linebacker II operation is not fully appreciated. Still, there is no intent here to run down the book; it is a first-class handbook, useful to all but the experts on strategic weapons.

So FAR, our discussion has been mainly concerned with one-half of the forces acting on the strategic pendulum, the American and friendly ones trying to swing things our way. We turn now to that other set of forces, those of the potential adversaries.

The most fundamental factor governing a nation's organization for and conduct of war is not its raw material supply or its human resources. Rather, it is the body of ideas that guides the marshaling of these material and human assets into an effective organization. Consequently, an analysis of a potential adversary's war capability should start with an examination of his military thought. Colonel William F. Scott, USAF (Retired), one of the few military scholars who have written works for NSIC, has provided an authoritative tool that will facilitate this examination: Soviet Sources in Military Doctrine and Strategy. When Major General Pavel A. Zhilin, Director of the Soviet Institute for Military History, visited West Point a few years ago, he remarked that our military history program was very impressive but that it did not give enough attention to Soviet military affairs. Colonel Scott would certainly agree that Soviet military thinking is insufficiently known in America, but he contends that it is certainly not unknowable. He argues that one of the main channels of communications that the Soviet leaders use for the dissemination of strategic doctrine to the lower levels is the published literature, a good part of which can be found in English translation. Scott's book amounts to a guide to that literature from the early 1960s onward. No student of Russian military affairs should allow this book to escape his notice.

Norman Polmar's fine book on strategic forces was discussed in our analysis of the military situation of the West. Of course, important parts of it are devoted to the nature of Russian strategic forces as well. He brings his special expertise and fine writing style to bear in an even more impressive work Soviet Naval Power: Challenge for the 1970s. There might be a strong tendency among Air Force officers to see an element of alarmism in any work of this sort, but I must admit that Polmar exercises a good bit of reserve, and I am convinced that the Soviet naval threat is a real one. Polmar shows that we clearly outclass the Russians in one major area, attack carriers. Some argue that this gives us a decisive advantage at sea, but he cites a train of thought that discounts these carriers as being no longer as decisive as they were in the Pacific War. In terms of SLBMs he implies that it is difficult to come up with a definitive statement, but that it seems that neither side is radically ahead. We have a technical lead; the Russians have the numbers. But the thing that worries Polmar most (and rightfully so, I think) is the growing power of the Soviet surface forces. Given the disaster along Battleship Row on 7 December 1941 and the fates of the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, this is an ironic twist of fate. According to Polmar, the worrisome thing is the potential advantage the Russians may derive from their lead in ship-to-ship missiles. Some think that the Soviets might be able to wreak havoc among our carriers with missiles from their surface forces before our ships could steam to a point close enough to launch an air strike. Given the new interest in the Air Force's collateral mission to aid the Navy in sea control, it would behoove all of our readers to look over this book. One wishes the author had explained why the Russians have not built greater numbers of nuclear attack submarines for use against our highly vulnerable energy LOC and, also, that he had given greater attention to the naval forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact powers. That might have modified his argument a bit.

Lawrence Whetten, writing on a related subject, demonstrates something of the perishable nature of NSIC's work. His essay was written in 1971 before the October War and the ensuing energy crisis. He has, therefore, underestimated the importance of the oil resources of the Middle East, the Arab military prowess, and the Arab capacity for unified action. He concluded that the Soviet presence in the eastern Mediterranean was but a limited threat. The constraints that made it so, according to Whetten, included the lack of good allies, the route of the Soviet line of communication through the Dardanelles where it can be easily interdicted, the lack of tactical air support (now modified by the appearance of the Kiev class carriers and their VSTOL fighters), fewer numbers of combatants on station than those of the NATO allies, and a doctrine that is not fully proved in war. Though this writer believes that Whetten has underestimated the threat a bit, the experience of trying to succor Malta in World War II showed that sailing about the Mediterranean without air cover is likely to be a pretty dangerous proposition.

The Indian Ocean is much bigger and less restricted by land masses than the Mediterranean. Here, the Russian LOC for its naval combatants is longer and must pass through yet another of Mahan's narrow seas, Suez, or at least around the Cape of Good Hope. It is highly vulnerable. Still, the stakes are so high and our lines to the same area are so long and must also pass through the narrow seas that we cannot afford to be complacent about it.

W. A. C. Aide's work goes farther than it should in saying that the hullabaloo about a naval confrontation in the Indian Ocean is blown out of proportion. The routes to the Persian Gulf from Japan and Europe are so vital that we must keep an especially watchful eye on them. Aide, an Australian, warns his countrymen that the fall of Saigon is not the end of the world and that it would be premature to throw themselves at the feet of Peking or Moscow because of it. The greater part of NSIC's attention is given to Soviet problems, but the Indian Ocean is an area where both the Russians and the Chinese have interests. Aide does point to Chinese activities in Central Africa but sees that as only a very limited threat. Not only is the Chinese power to project overseas rather weak but the nations there are insufficiently developed to constitute a crucial factor in international politics. J. Bowyer Bell paints a similar picture of the states around the Horn of Africa: they are so undeveloped and poverty-stricken that their chief importance is their location close to the exit of the Persian Gulf.

Another soldier-scholar, Colonel Angus M. Fraser, USMC (Retired), surveys a different part of the potential adversaries' military forces in The Peoples Liberation Army: Communist China's Armed Forces. Because it was written in 1973, it needs some updating, but the bulk of the study remains current. According to Fraser, the Chinese Communist army is good and is developing at a decent rate. The air forces are respectable when operating above the home turf. The navy is more or less a coastal defense force that does not even have the capability of projecting across the Straits of Taiwan. Industry in China is concentrated and soft, and internal communications are improved since the Korean War but still vulnerable. Nuclear capability is progressing but destined to remain useful only in a defensive role for a long time. The guerrilla doctrine is certainly an asset, but not in areas where the cause could not be painted as a defensive one. One advantage the Chinese do have is that the eastern provinces of the U.S.S.R. are still sort of a hostage in that they are at the far end of the (so far) single-roadbed Trans-Siberian Railroad--and subject to incursion from the south. In short, Fraser's message is that the People's Republic is not a fearsome threat away from its own backyard but that it is ready, and probably willing, to fill any political vacuums around its borders.

THE WORKS of the NSIC having to do with the military instruments of national power form an impressive collection. Their general tone will meet with little criticism from most military officers. It is one of concern, but one that avoids alarmism. Most of the authors come from outside the military establishment; yet, their technical competence seems quite good. Though the goal is to educate the general public to the need for preparedness, there is a good deal within these volumes for the professional officer whatever his specialization. The NSIC has so far left one area of interest uncovered. At first glance, one would think that the subject of tactics is beyond the realm of the organization. Yet, there have been a few times in the past where tactical trends have had an unexpected and profound effect on strategy, grand strategy, and national policy. Much of Napoleon's success lay in his audacity, his willingness to move quickly and take the offensive. In those days, the slow rate of fire and inaccuracy of infantry weapons and artillery made a cavalry charge or a head-on infantry thrust a reasonable proposition. The ineffective musket made it possible for the attackers to be upon the foe before the latter were ready for the second volley. Technical change ruined all of that. The coming of the long-range minié ball weapon, the repeating rifle, breechloading artillery, machine guns, and barbed wire greatly enhanced the power of the defensive.

By 1914, the new power of the defensive had been amply demonstrated in the American Civil War and the Russo-Japanese War. Yet, French doctrine and, consequently, their strategy had not yet appreciated that fact. The plan was to make a Napoleonic thrust through the very rough terrain on the southern end of the border. The result was defeat and then the grinding stalemate on the Western Front. Later the pendulum swung the other way, but this time the cycle was much shorter. The tank, airplanes to serve as flying artillery, motorized transport, and soft-spot tactics all reversed the swing back in the direction of offensive warfare. The losers of the Great War were watching that pendulum swing, and the result was a series of smashing victories for blitzkrieg tactics in 1939, 1940, and 1941, which ruined the defensive strategy of the Allies.

The question before us now is whether the pendulum has swung again. The implications of this question are profound. If, as some periodical writers are saying, the "lessons" of the last phases of the Vietnam struggle and the October War are that technology of the PGM and all sorts of restricted-visibility sensors have made anything that moves on the battlefield a dead duck, what does that mean for the Russian blitzkrieg strategy—and the NATO counterstrategy? If the heat-seeking, portable antiaircraft missile and the wireguided antitank missiles have made it impossible for the air and armored elements of the blitzkrieg to live, what does that mean for European strategies and force structures? If mininukes delivered with precision at any hour and in any weather can prohibit the massing of forces for the offensive, what are the implications for the strategy-makers of NATO?

Of course, the position of the pendulum is not clear. Some are saying that the October War cannot be definitive. The European weather is much worse than it is in the Middle East, and, after all, the Israelis did contrive to make some impressive advances before political factors shut down their operations. Still, if the pendulum has swung back to favor the defensive, it may be a ray of light. The ratio required to mount a successful offensive in the Great War was something like 3 or 4 to one. As the ratio of forces is something like 700,000 for NATO to 900,000 for the adversary and if the 1914 calculus were applied, then the future would be much brighter than it has seemed for a long time—but we would have to go to work to provide the equipment and tactical doctrine that would guarantee us the advantages of the defensive. The question is a crucial one, and perhaps it would be a good thing were NSIC to marshal some scholars to help us toward an answer.

But some would argue that a brilliant answer to that question would be of no avail without the economic bases to provide the requisite equipment and manpower. Accordingly, we now turn to NSIC's analysis of the situation with the economic instruments of national power.

The Economic Sinews
of National Security

The present generation could hardly escape the notion that the economic pendulum has swung heavily against us. The National Strategy Information Center has four works in print on the subject.* The prophets of gloom tell us that the era of plenty is gone and we will soon be victims of a merciless age of poverty. The collective theme of our economic studies is that the idea has a measure of merit, of course, but America has some assets in the coming struggle. She has a superior technology, the prospect for some alternate fuels and fuel sources, a very strong agricultural base, and a population growth rate that is less than that of many other nations. What is required is the will and intelligence to use these assets, and others, to try to guarantee the security and prosperity of ourselves-and the rest of the world.

*Klaus Knorr, Toward a US Energy Policy (New York: NSIC, 1975, $2.00), 45 pages. 

William Schneider, Jr., Can We Avert Economic Warfare in Raw Materials? US Agriculture as a Blue Chip (New York: NSIC, 1974, $2.00), 46 pages.

____Food, Foreign Policy, and Raw Materials Cartels (New York: Crane, Russak, 1976, $2.95), 122 pages.

Yuan-li Wu, Raw Material Supply in a Multipolar World (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973, $2.45), 50 pages.

The most crucial raw material is oil. Klaus Knorr, in Toward a US Energy Policy, argues that the situation is serious here, but not hopeless. The OPEC cartel has a very powerful weapon. Not only is the embargo capable of killing the economies of the western industrial nations but even a significant price rise can have a disastrous effect. The United States is better off than her European allies and Japan because she has some domestic supplies and large beds of coal. If one assumes that the struggle is lost without the allies, then their vulnerability is our vulnerability. We made just that assumption in both the World Wars. Still, there are some things that the West can do to strengthen its position. The basis for any effective energy policy, according to Knorr, must be conservation through a petroleum price rise. Not only would this hold down consumption but it would also encourage exploration for new sources as well as research to develop alternative fuels. The problem must be overcome through domestic measures and diplomacy because Knorr feels that military coercion is out of the question or almost so. Diplomatic solutions are not altogether hopeless. The Arabs seem to realize that there is little hope of regaining their land through confrontation, and only the U.S. has sufficient leverage on Israel to affect her policy in significant ways. Whatever the diplomatic prospects, Knorr's cogent pamphlet argues that there is an urgent need to develop a coherent and effective energy policy in the United States.

Oil is not the only problem. Since World War II, according to Yuan-li Wu in his essay Raw Material Supply in a Multipolar World and many others, the raw materials suppliers have come to enjoy a seller's market. For a long time, they did not take full advantage of their leverage, but they are beginning to learn some things from OPEC. But several factors make the raw materials situation slightly less threatening than it is with petroleum. Often, we use overseas suppliers only because it would be more expensive to extract the same resources from our own soil—in a pinch, we can go back to using the more expensive domestic materials. A goodly portion of our ore supplies are to be found in the Western Hemisphere or Australia where the threat of interdiction is less than it is with the oil supplies of the Middle East. Synthetic substitutes, such as the case with rubber, can be used in many applications even if they are less efficient. Oil is a consumable commodity; the other raw materials tend to be made up into more durable products, and many of them, like tin and iron, are recyclable. Even though the situation with other raw materials is not quite as critical as it is with energy, our position is especially weak in iron ore, bauxite, manganese, zinc, copper, and lead. This is particularly true in terms relative to the Russians who are nearly self-sufficient in all raw materials. There are some things we can do. We can employ our technological advantage in a variety of ways. Methods might be discovered to recover metals more efficiently from ores that are of marginal quality—and this would become increasingly promising as the prices of foreign materials go up. Research should be continued and expanded to find substitute materials for those in short supply. In some cases, alternate sources and lines of supply can be developed. Wu also argues that positive steps should be taken to aid less developed countries in their development plans. This could not only have the effect of increasing world stability but will also increase the market for U.S. goods, technology, and services, to offset the inevitable rise in raw material prices. Finally, stockpiling can provide a hedge, at least for the short term, against crises.

William Schneider's two essays are essentially the same. They provide additional data on raw materials and suggest another solution: the manipulation of our strength in food supplies to overcome our weaknesses in energy. One of the problems with air interdiction tactics in our last two wars was that the experience at Normandy led the American public to expect too much of it. So, too, according to Schneider, we have given economic warfare a bad name because we have set its objectives too high. He argues that it can be a valuable supplement to the other instruments of foreign policy even if it is seldom capable of carrying the day unassisted. Schneider would have us buy up the surplus in our food crop to create a strategic reserve. This reserve would be used for two kinds of emergencies: humanitarian aid in the case of natural disasters and as a lever to counter the coercion attempted by any of our raw material suppliers. He says that we have a practical monopoly in conjunction with Canada and one or two other countries in the Western camp. This practical monopoly will increase because the rate of growth of our food crop will continue to exceed that of our population, but the reverse will be true of our raw material suppliers. And, he states that we can find substitutes for Middle Eastern oil more quickly and cheaply than the petroleum suppliers can develop alternative food supplies.

Schneider's arguments are very attractive. However, others have said that in an all-out confrontation the West will run out of oil more rapidly than the Middle East will run out of food and that cultural factors within the United States will prevent a sufficiently ruthless use of the food weapon. Schneider did anticipate one of these criticisms in saying that the food instrument had its best prospects as a middle or long-term measure. 

In the end, the message that emerges from the NSIC essays on economics is that our situation is worrisome but that there are many things that we can do to overcome the problem. The days of plenty are gone, but we are not at the end of our rope. The measures necessary to achieve solutions demand will power. The question that now needs to be asked is not an economic one. It is a moral problem. Can the American will be restored, or did it disappear forever in the swamps of affluence and the paddies of Vietnam? The books considered herein suggest many ways in which we could give an optimistic answer to that question. Perhaps the best starting place would be the formulation of a rational and vigorous energy policy.

FEW Air Force members will have the time to read all of the Strategy Papers, Agenda papers, and other publications of the National Strategy Information Center. But the mere fact that so many distinguished civilian scholars have taken the time to write responsible papers on threats to our national security is a hopeful sign to all in the military. Some of the volumes are worthy of the special attention of the Air Force generalist. The Schneider and Hoeber work, Arms, Men, and Military Budgets is a handbook that is extremely competent, timely and relevant for practically every officer in the service. Frank Barnett’s Alternatives to Détente is a concise, well-written pamphlet that gives a fine summary of our national security situation. Norman Polmar’s Strategic Weapons: An Introduction is a splendid primer for the intelligent layman, and his Soviet Naval Power will alert the reader to the hard facts about the contest on the high seas. Our generalist might gain some valuable insights on the energy problem for Klaus Knorr’s 1975 Toward a US Energy Policy.

If America is to survive and prosper in a world full of potential threats, it will not be because of her numbers or material riches. If hose factors are to be decisive, she could only lose! Only the strength of her ideas will see her through—and that is one of the beauties of her system: she is blessed with a multitude of sources of new ideas. In the realm of thought on national security, Air University Review has previously pointed to the U.S. Strategic Institute, the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, and others as the sources of wealth of ideas. To these, I would add the National Strategy Information Center; I commend it to your attention.

Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Lieutenant Colonel David R. Mets (USNA; Ph.D., University of Denver) is Associate Editor of Air University Review. His last assignment was as commander of an AC-130 gunship squadron in Thailand. He entered the Air Force in 1953 after seven years in the Navy and has served as MATS instructor-navigator, ATC instructor-pilot, SAC aircraft commander, assistant professor of history at both the Air Force Academy and West Point, and as C-130 aircraft commander in Vietnam. Colonel Mets's articles have appeared in Aerospace Historian, Military Review and United States Naval Institute Proceedings.

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