Air University Review, September-October 1977

Specialized Air-To-Air Combat training

THE CONTROL of the air has always been a primary mission of the United States Air Force and is the key to victory in any conflict. Yet the ability to perform an air superiority mission via air-to-air combat has not received the continuous emphasis it deserves in terms of pilots and aircraft until recently. The introduction of the F-15 and future F-16 has provided the superiority needed in aircraft. However, we need to look closely at the basic fighter and operational training to determine if the pilots are adequately trained to exploit the capabilities of these aircraft and accomplish the mission.

The utilization and effectiveness of air-to-air combat have fluctuated between experimentation and adventurism to high-level resolve since its introduction into the military as a viable method of waging war. The fact that we have generally been more effective than our enemies is directly attributable to the skill, courage, and training of our pilots rather than to the aircraft they flew. A look at the statistics of air-to-air credits during World Wars I and II reveals that a very small number of pilots accounted for a significant number of the total victories.^l Why one pilot is better than another can be attributed to many factors: courage, aggressiveness, self-confidence, natural ability, and training, to name a few. However, of these factors, training is the one that normally can be manipulated to produce higher quality. The air-to-air successes of the Israeli Air Force in the last two Arab-Israeli wars are thought to be directly attributable to the superiority of their training, not necessarily to the aircraft they flew. ²

Assuming that training is essential to success, I propose a method to provide more effective training to develop the pilots necessary to gain and maintain control of the air. In particular, I will focus attention on air-to-air combat training in aircraft designated to perform the multipurpose role, the F-4 and F-16.

A brief look at the past and the evolution and employment of the air-to-air fighter is revealing. Douhet proposed as early as 1921 that the primary mission of an air force in war was to gain and maintain command of the air by eliminating the enemy's air power.³ In every war in which U.S. air power has been involved, this mission has been attempted and, to a degree, accomplished--but not always as efficiently as possible. The need to have pilots and aircraft specialized for air-to-air combat was normally not realized until after a war was in progress, as was evident in World War II⁴ and Korea.⁵ As a result, little command guidance was given to air-to-air combat training and tactics until we were in the middle of the air battle. However, in every war or conflict one group emerged with the primary mission of engaging the enemy in air-to-air combat, many times with ill-suited aircraft and training.

This reluctance to prepare for the air-to-air mission can be attributed to many factors: the concept that the most effective way to destroy enemy air power was to strike his airfields and aircraft on the ground (true, but not always possible or feasible, as will be discussed later); the technological advances in aircraft long-range radar, fire control systems, and missiles, which theoretically allowed the pilot to become a "button pusher" and kill his target at long range with little skill required; ⁶ the implications of flight safety concerning air-to-air combat training; and the restrictions produced by fiscal restraints and reduced flying time forcing a trade-off between air-to-air and air-to-ground training. As a result, until the late 1960s the USAF concentrated primarily on air-to-ground tactics and training while air-to-air training was reduced to intercept practice with minimum emphasis on fighter-versus-fighter dogfighting. ⁷

It took the air war over North Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli wars to bring us back to reality. The average pilot was not adequately trained to engage in a dogfight with the enemy, the long-range missiles were of limited value when visual identification was required prior to engaging (usually inside of minimum range) or had to be launched against a maneuvering target, and the tactics and maneuvers currently taught were largely ineffective against a highly maneuverable enemy. The reaction to this dilemma was the same as in the past: increased emphasis on air-to-air training and tactics in tactical fighter training (TFT) courses, the initiation of top-off courses in advanced air-to-air training, and, finally, the creation of a special squadron to provide dissimilar air combat training employing enemy tactics. ⁸

Today the USAF has made a quantum jump in air-to-air combat training from the conditions that existed in the 1960s. We have a fighter lead-in program to screen aspiring young fighter pilots and provide better training in an effort to produce a higher-quality pilot.⁹ Air-to-air combat training has reached new highs by the expansion of dissimilar air combat tactics training in the U.S., Europe, and the Pacific. The tactical fighter training program has been expanded to provide more sorties per student. Operationally, specified F-4 units have air-to-air combat as their primary mission, and most of their training is concentrated in this area. As for aircraft, the F-4 has improved maneuverability with leading edge slats (LES), the 20-mm cannon is installed in all our latest fighters, missiles have been improved in an effort to provide a dogfight capability, and the need for an air superiority fighter has been realized in the F-15 and future F-16.

We would be mistaken, however, to assume that these advances are sufficient to assure air superiority. This is only a start, quite long overdue, and there are still many problems to be solved if we want to ensure command of the air in the future.

A look at the Warsaw Pact air order of battle and defensive capability highlights some of the future problems. What the Pact lacks in quality is well compensated for in quantity, which leads to the conclusion that the air battle will be massive. In an all-out conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Paet countries, many aircraft tracks per day could be possible, seriously degrading the employment of ground-controlled interception (GCI) and radar missiles.¹⁰ The probability of destroying enemy air forces on the ground is seriously degraded by their sophisticated air defense systems and dispersed and hardened aircraft shelters. With the probability of radar and communications jamming, the air war could quickly be limited to many visual, multiship engagements, the outcome resting on the individual pilot's ability. The examples could continue, but to win the air war, we must specialize a significant portion of our fighters and pilots in close-in, maneuvering air-to-air combat, and the kill ratios must be highly in our favor. Now the question becomes, Considering the likely threat posed in Europe, are we organized and trained well enough to ensure air superiority?

To answer this question, one must take a critical look at our present air-to-air combat training conducted at the F-4 TFT schools and the situation in the operational units. The following points stand out:

1. A significant portion of the training is conducted in the F-4C which has limited maneuverability and marginal air-to-air fire control system. ¹¹

2. Of the 21 air-to-air training sorties each student receives, only 20 percent to 40 percent of each sortie will be used for actual engagement training; the rest of the time will be spent transitioning to and from the training area and repositioning for subsequent engagements.¹²

3. The training progresses rapidly from basic fighter handling and maneuvers to advanced air combat tactics. It is highly complex, covering all aspects of air-to-air combat rather than concentrating on the basics of offensive and defensive maneuvering.

4. Even though the student may be assigned to a unit with a primary air-to-air mission, all TFT provides the same general instruction. However, one may be weighted a little more heavily than the other toward the air-to-ground mission. This places an added burden on the operational units by forcing them to devote a portion of their critical training time to further basic training with the new pilot to make him operationally capable.

5. Operational units having a primary air-to-air mission must also devote a significant amount of their training time to their secondary task, possibly an air-to-ground requirement. Although this concept provides a flexible force, it does so at the expense of proficiency in the primary mission.

To sum up the current trends in air-to-air training, we have increased our awareness of the need for air combat training both in the tactical fighter training and the operational units. However, TFT produces a multi-trained pilot with limited capabilities in either air-to-air or air-to-ground employment procedures, and most operational units are faced with the problem of maintaining a proficient capability in both missions. The complexities of present and future conventional warfare do not lend themselves to the multipurpose role as in the past. The technological advances in air-to-air-capable aircraft and their increased maneuvering potential will greatly challenge the pilot's ability to fully exploit their tremendous potential. The air-to-air arena will be more confusing because of the numbers involved. However, we are developing systems and procedures to meet the threat with Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), advanced missile and fire control systems, and higher level tactical employment concepts. We are faced by a quantitatively superior enemy, and to win the air battle, we must recognize these factors and further refine our air combat capability.

The need for better air-to-air combat training becomes evident with an appreciation of the first priority of battle: accomplishing the counterair campaign. As General Robert J. Dixon said in 1974, "Ground forces that do not enjoy protection from an attack and are without benefit of substantial air support will not prevail over a force possessing these essentials." ¹³ Although the least efficient method of gaining air superiority is by air-to-air combat, past experience and future considerations make this method plausible. Past examples such as the enemy sanctuaries of the Korean War (north of Yalu), political considerations as in North Vietnam, and the present strong defenses and hardened aircraft shelters characteristic of Eastern Europe may preclude or minimize the effectiveness of attacks on enemy airfields. These considerations imply that a major portion of our air effort will have to be expended in meeting the enemy in the air. This leads to the role of the F-4 and follow-on F-16 as the "swing fighters" capable of both air-to-air and air-to-ground employment. Although the aircraft will be fully capable of the multipurpose role, maximum effectiveness will be obtained by pilots specializing in either the air-to-air or air-to-ground mission. This specialization must begin in TFT and continue to include the operational mission of the selected squadrons or wings.

Air-to-air training. Because the new fighter pilot received a general, multipurpose program in TFT, he must receive additional training in operational units before he can be gainfully employed. Besides consuming the pilot's valuable flying time, the unit must consider his limited capabilities in the overall training program that directly affects the level of training and the tactics employed. This problem of inexperience was a major factor leading to the rigid wingman concept employed in air-to-air tactical formations used in the Korean War and Vietnam and is still discussed as a major problem today. ¹⁴ To counter the problem, the new fighter pilot must be adequately trained in the basics of air combat prior to reporting to his new unit so he can be immediately included in advanced tactics training. This basic instruction must be the task of TFT.

The present F-4 and future F-16 TFT should be structured to provide primary training in either air-to-air or air-to-ground employment. In consideration of air-to-air training, the primary objective would be to develop a high level of proficiency in basic maneuvers and tactics. The course of instruction would generally include a transition proficiency phase, an air-to-air proficiency phase, and an air-to-ground familiarization phase. The aircraft utilized for the training should be compatible with the mission and those used by the operational units.¹⁵

The transition phase would require 25 percent of the training and would provide the same training as currently specified in the TFT syllabus.

The air-to-air phase would constitute 60 percent of the training and involve a controlled progression through the basics of air combat. This phase would be subdivided into three units of instruction: techniques concerning flight characteristics and one-on-one maneuvers; two-on-one maneuvers and tactics; and air-to-air gunnery.

(1) The basic handling and one-on-one maneuvering unit would comprise the major portion of the air-to-air phase, approximately 55 percent. Besides the obvious requirement to be able to maneuver against the opponent, this training provides the basis for the more advanced tactics that depend on the individual's ability to position and attack successfully.

(2) The two-on-one tactics training unit would involve another 20 percent of the phase. It would be designed to demonstrate and effect the practical application of the one-on-one maneuvers as they apply to teamwork and mutual support employed by the two ship formation. The use of dissimilar aircraft is necessary for at least half of the one-on-one training and all of the two-on-one tactics training. The value of dissimilar training is considerable, and it must be introduced into the program as ready as possible.

(3) The remaining 25 percent of the air-to-air phase would be devoted to aerial gunnery training. The importance of gunnery training cannot be overemphasized, for during most close-in maneuvering engagements the majority of the opportunities for a kill have come with the gun.

Overall, by concentrating the air-to-air training only on the fundamentals, a base will be established that can be more readily expanded by the operational squadrons to advanced tactics and multiship engagements.

The air-to-ground gunnery phase would comprise 15 percent of the total TFT and would involve only an introduction and basic familiarization. Instruction would be limited to controlled air-to-ground delivery techniques and would not extend to the tactical applications.

Operational squadrons. The operational squadrons selected for a primary air-to-air mission should be specialized to the degree that approximately 80 percent of their training involves air-to-air employment. Their purpose must be to maintain a high degree of proficiency through constant training, refine their current tactics to optimize their capabilities, and develop new tactics as necessary to counter the enemy threat. When their secondary mission involves air-to-ground employment, it should be limited to maintaining a familiarization level in deliveries and not include the more sophisticated elements of weapon employment and advanced tactics. This specialized emphasis must also extend to the higher-headquarters evaluation process and readiness inspections. The overriding indicator of the operational squadrons' performance must be based on their ability to develop and maintain a high level of expertise and capability in the primary mission.

Impact. The general impact of the proposed solution will be examined in for areas: personnel policy, TFT orientation, operational force structure and levels, and costs.

Personnel policy would have to be expanded to include the follow-on operational assignment when assigning a pilot to specialized TFT. This could be accomplished prior to or during the course as long as compatibility was maintained. Reassignment policy concerning pilot transfers to a different unit with the same aircraft would have to consider the pilot’s specialty and that of the gaining unit. If they are not compatible, he must attend an abbreviated course in the new specialty prior to reporting to his next unit.

TFT would require reorientation toward specialized missions, and this could be accomplished either at the wing or squadron level. For the F-4 TFT the governing factor would be the type aircraft possessed. Air-to-air training should be conducted only in the F-4E. This would not be a factor with F-16. Specialized syllabi would be required but should not pose a significant problem since syllabus revision is an ongoing process.

The impact on the force level and structure of the operational units would be mainly a reduction in the number of pilots capable a reduction in the number of pilots capable of performing both the air-to-air or air-to-ground mission. Presently all F-4 (and future F-16) pilots are capable in ether mission with the inherent advantage of flexibility. Under the more specialized concept, the advantage would lie in the attainment of higher proficiency and capability levels to accomplished both missions. There would be a residual capability in the secondary missions, but a combat-ready level of proficiency would be lacking.

A major cost generated by specialization would be attributed to the increase in the dissimilar aircraft training support. Approximately twice the support presently required would be necessary for the air-to-air TFT. No major personnel or aircraft/equipment changes should be necessary.

The overall impact involves the trade-off between flexibility and specialization and the associated quantity-quality advantages and disadvantages. However, an appraisal of the air threat, the requirement to have air superiority, the sophistication of future tactics and weapons systems, and the quality needed to maintain the advantage imply the need for greater specialization and concentration of effort.

The requirement for highly trained pilots and quality aircraft in the air-to-air combat arena has existed since the beginning of aerial warfare and will become more important in the future. With inclusion of the F-16 in the inventory to augment the F-15 force, we have the highest quality aircraft available today and for the near future. To capitalize on this potential effectively, however pilots must be well trained and specialized. The tremendous power of specialization and training is evident when considering that the top 15 German aces of World War II accounted for 3574 kills. ¹⁶

My proposal to specialize the F-4 and F-16 TFT schools and operational squadrons is based on the contention that the pilots cannot effectively maintain the proficiency necessary to accomplish both the air-to-air and air-to-ground missions. Survival in the modern aerial battlefield will require intimate knowledge of the mission, and we may not have time to reorient our training after the battle has begun.

Given the nature of the threat and the requirement for air superiority, we must have a significant air-to-air force capable of performing consistently with the highest degree of excellence. Even a few capable fliers trained in the best air-to-air fighters can carry out this mission with the highest probability of success.

Langley AFB, Virginia

Notes

1. Annals of Reliability and Maintainability, New York, 5th Reliability and Maintainability Conference, July 1966, p. 305.

2. "10 Men—3,176 Kills and a Goal to Shoot For," Armed Forces Journal International, May 1974, p. 34.

3. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (New York: Coward McCann, Inc., 1942), p. 31.

4. Edward H. Sims, Fighter Tactics and Strategy, 1914-1970 (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 88.

5. Pierre Grasset, "Dogfighting Makes a Comeback," Interavia, December 1974, p. 1188.

6. Ibid., p. 1189.

7. Ibid.

8. Advanced air-to-air combat training was conducted at Nellis AFB in the early 1970s for selected F-4 RTU graduates and instructor pilots. The 64th FWS (Aggressor Squadron) was organized in 1973 to provide the dissimilar aircraft and enemy tactics training.

9. Lawrence R. Benson, "The New USAF Fighter Lead-in Program," Air University Review, March-April 1975, p. 57.

10. "New Look at the NATO Air War," Armed Forces Journal International, May 1974, p. 32.

11. The F-4C has limited maneuverability compared to the F-4E modified with leading edge slats.

12. The time consumed during transition to and from the area depends on the training base and relative location of the training area but in general averages about 50 percent. The time used to reorganize and reposition will average about 50 percent of the time in the area depending on student and instructor proficiency. The training time per sortie is further reduced, depending on the number of students per flight.

13. General Robert J. Dixon, "The Range of Tactical Air Operations," Strategic Review, Spring 1974, p. 24.

14. USAF 1975 Tactical Fighter Symposium (U), (Final Report), p. 1-21 (U), Secret.

15. The F-4E modified with leading edge slats must be used for the air-to-air training.

16. Sims, p. 255.

Major Robert A. Heston (M.B.A., University of Utah) is currently in the F-16 System Management Division, Headquarters, Tactical Air Command. He was an air-to-air combat instructor in the F-4D, the CF-104 (RCAF), and the F-104G with the USAF/ GAF Fighter Weapons School, Luke AFB. Other assignments include Cam Ranh Bay, RVN and Cold Lake, Canada (Canadian Exchange). Major Heston is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College.

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