Air University Review, May-June 1977

The Integrity of the Warsaw Pact 

Part II

THE first part of this report, published in the March-April edition of Air University Review, provided an overall assessment of the reliability of the East European members of the Warsaw Pact. The political, military, economic, and social unifying and divisive factors were considered with the conclusion that, on balance, the unifying factors were the more decisive.

The examination of the Pact as an entity was made on the basis of a scenario that assumed a rough balance in conventional forces in Europe between NATO and the U.S.S.R. In such a scenario it appears that collectively the East European states would support their Soviet ally. However, the countries in question vary considerably geographically, historically, and in many other ways. Therefore, before any conclusions can be drawn, these differences must be examined in detail.

NSWP National Assessments

Historically, the area occupied by the Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) states has been an area of conflict, a region in which the Russians, and now the Soviets, have traditionally clashed with the nations of Western Europe. The whole of this area has now been dominated by the Soviets and Soviet-style Communist governments for more than 27 years. Few of the states concerned have experienced true Western style democracy and, therefore, have no basis for comparison.

How many of the national Communist parties are prepared to declare their independence of the U.S.S.R. in exchange for the risks of free contact with, and possibly a degree of domination by, a Western capitalist country? Which of the NSWP countries has a population sufficiently dissatisfied with its government and sufficiently well organised to overthrow its Communist leadership? With these types of questions in mind, a study of each member of the NSWP in turn might indicate whether, it would remain loyal to the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact or elect for neutrality or an alliance with the West or seek some other Communist champion.

Geographically, Poland is bordered to the east and west by two nations that have traditionally been her enemies; paradoxically, both the U.S.S.R. and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) are now her allies. At the end of World War II the Soviets compensated the Poles for the east Polish territories that she annexed by establishing the Polish western borders on the Oder-Neisse Line, thereby giving Poland territory that was German prior to World War II. In discussing Polish loyalty or adherence to her obligation to the Warsaw Pact, we must keep her geographical position in mind. Should Poland take independent action, she would certainly be confronted by enemies on both her eastern and western borders unless the GDR acted in concert with her. The likelihood of this will be discussed later, but certainly in either case a change in the GDR—Polish border would be a risk. If the GDR acted against Soviets, the possible reunification of the Germanys would have to be considered this might provide an even greater threat Polish territorial integrity from the West, notwithstanding the Polish—Federal Republic of Germany treaty in 1969 that recognised the Polish Oder-Neisse border. ¹

Although a Communist government imposed upon Poland following World War II, the Polish people periodically have been able, to some extent, to influence the actions of their government. In 1956, the workers at Poznań revolted and, with the support of other groupings, were instrumental in causing a change in the leadership that brought Wladyslaw Gomulka, an indigenous Communist, into power. This was achieved, political and social stability was re-established without the use of Soviet forces--unlike Hungary the same year. In 1970 the workers at Gdansk and Lodz revolted, and, although some 600 people died, ² a change in leadership was achieved again without the use of Soviet troops. Both revolts were prompted by poor wages and standards of living, and both brought a degree of liberalisation. In the 1956 case this liberalisation was short-lived, but, since Edward Gierek replaced Gomulka in 1971, a measure of general economic improvement has been enjoyed; when dissatisfaction is felt, a degree of freedom to express it is permitted. Even as recently as November 1975, according to an Agence France Presse report,³ a debate between satisfied housewives and the Polish party leaders was televised. Thus, since 1970 the liberalisation trends have continued, some intellectual freedom and social contacts with the West have been allowed through travel, films, and books.⁴ Furthermore, if progress in meeting consumer demands and the standard of living can be improved steadily, many of the causes of dissatisfaction with the government will have been removed.

Caution must be exercised in putting too much faith in Communist economic planning, but if the results of the first three-quarters of 1974 can be used as a guide, then Poland’s economic growth shows promise. Although trade with the West increased rapidly in 1974, despite some political problems, economic plans also involve greater trade other Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON) partners and further measures coordination of Polish and Soviet industry in order to increase the rate of modernisation.⁵

Socially and culturally the Poles have become relatively independent of the Soviet and, as has already been said, contact with the West is not that restricted in spite of official censorship. The resurgence of Polish nationalism is being satisfied, as perhaps indicated by the official restoration of the historic White Eagle of Poland. The White Eagle represents the visible symbol of Polish patriotism. The banners under which the Poles defended their country in 1939 bore the same symbol. During the Gomulka regime there was considerable conflict between the state and the Roman Catholic church, but these conflicts have largely been resolved under Gierek. The youth in Poland tend to react against the authority of the Communist party at times, as they do against authority in the West. However, party influence is being extended deeper into the youth organisations. Whether the party will be successful in obtaining the loyalty of the national youth is uncertain, but there are indications that, while not fully understanding all the ramifications of the Communist ideology, the youth no longer reject the present social order.⁶

The present Communist leadership is firmly in control in Poland, and this centralised control was probably further strengthened by the elimination of 314 district, middle level administrations in May 1975.⁷ The leadership has indicated the extent of the actions it is prepared to take to retain control by the events of 1970 with the killing of Polish people by the Polish army. The armed forces also demonstrated their loyalty to the government at the same time. The liberalisation and, at least, limited satisfaction of consumer demands under Gierek can only increase the people's willingness to accept their present form of government, particularly if continued progress is made in these respects. Although trade with the West is increasing more rapidly than that with its COMECON partners, it is still much lower in absolute terms. Economically, Poland has displayed no disloyalty to COMECON in its general trading policy.

Politically and economically Poland appears firmly lodged in the Soviet Communist bloc. The Communist leadership appears likely to be able to retain control of the country and is progressively removing the causes of popular dissatisfaction. In any conflict between the Soviets and NATO, therefore, the Poles would have to balance the present situation against the risk of yet another revision of their Western border and the total collapse of her political and economic system. In such circumstances it seems likely that Poland would actively support the Soviets through the Warsaw Pact and, perhaps, seek a further degree of independence as the price for doing so.

The GDR differs from its Warsaw Pact partners in that it was created as a separate state only by the post-World War II confrontation in Europe between the Soviet bloc and the capitalist West. Thus, while trying to assess the loyalty of the GDR towards the Warsaw Pact, one must continually judge by how much the artificiality has become reality. How much do separate values and attitudes differ between the GDR and Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)?

Since the end of World War II, the GDR has been modelled on the U.S.S.R. and has had Soviet troops based on its soil continuously. The Socialist Unity Party (SED) was imposed on the GDR people by the Soviets and has had the task of building its own economic structure—a difficult one since its industry was either destroyed during the war or was sent to the U.S.S.R. in the form of postwar reparations—and creating a national identity.

Economically, the GDR has made good progress by East European standards and has probably the highest standard of living of all the Warsaw Pact members. The GDR economy has been structured to meet Soviet and COMECON demands which, under Walter Ulbricht, who was in his latter years extremely nationalistic, would seem to have worked to the GDR's advantage, at least compared with other COMECON members. In 1970, 43 percent of all imports and 40 percent of all exports were to and from the U.S.S.R., which is indicative of GDR dependence on the Soviets and the degree of their economic integration.⁸ The GDR, while seeking advantageous trading arrangements with the West for herself, gives the impression of trying to deter other COMECON members from doing the same; this is understandable since her steady economic development and relative success is based on the availability of the COMECON market for her more advanced industrial goods. The GDR is also in a relatively good position to influence COMECON policies as she provides the chairman for three COMECON Standing Commissions.⁹ All this may not endear the GDR to some of her partners, but it does lock her fairly firmly into the socialist economic system of Eastern Europe.

The creation of a solid, socialist political system has provided the SED leadership with many problems, the most significant of which was, and probably still is, the underlying anti-Soviet feeling in the GDR. This anti-Soviet feeling, engendered by their occupation of the GDR after World War II, was further reinforced when Soviet troops we used to put down the workers’ revolts 1953. There was another revolt by both party and nonparty intellectuals in 1956, but this was anti-Stalinism/anti-Ulbricht rather than anti-Communist. These revolts, and the reaction to them, accelerated defections to the West. Officially, 2,759,922 East Germans fled to the FRG between 1949 and 1962.¹⁰ In the long term this may have been to the advantage of the GDR leaders, in that many those likely to have provided an active opposition to the government left the country. However, economically the GDR could not afford to allow further depletion of its labour force. The Berlin Wall in 1961 and a fortified border prevented more mass defection. Both the wall and the border fortifications remain, and one cannot help assuming that the SED leadership believes them still to be necessary. This view is supported by a poll taken of juveniles in January 1975 that showed an "overwhelming number" who would defect to the West, given the opportunity.¹¹ This may be another case of youth reacting against authority since it trends to conflict with other reports: between 1962 and 1966 there was a steady increase in popular support for the SED leadership.¹²

Although Erich Honecker, to whom power was transferred in 1971, is less nationalistic in outlook than Ulbricht, he has led the GDR back to the Soviet model with regard to foreign policy while maintaining the national identity that Ulbricht worked so hard to achieve. With economic progress, national confidence also appears to have increased as has international recognition. It is probably in the Soviets' best interest to allow a degree of GDR nationalism since it can only increase the division between the two Germanys and act against a strong reunified Germany in the future. Certainly the Soviets have displayed a remarkable degree of confidence in the GDR National Peoples Army (NPA), many units of which are directly subordinated to the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG). The NPA also receives more advanced Soviet weapon systems earlier than other NSWP armed forces;¹³ for example, the Scud-B surface-to-surface missile appears to have been supplied only to the GDR so far.

The SED leadership certainly is firmly in control in the GDR and appears to have the confidence of the Soviets. Under Ulbricht, who lost the support of the Soviet leaders not because of his nationalistic attitudes but because he was "rocking the détente boat," the GDR was a staunch supporter of the Soviets in keeping the other NSWP members in line; they played a leading role in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Under Honecker, who is following the Soviet line more closely, the GDR is likely to be even more supportive of the U.S.S.R. Undoubtedly, there remain those wish for German reunification, particularly those with close relatives in the FRG, but the number so affected is decreasing with time, thus reducing one of the major incentives for reunification. The GDR people have now developed a national identity and are, therefore, more likely to support their, who in turn would undoubtedly meet their full obligations to the Warsaw Pact in any conflict with NATO and the FRG since their whole separate identity would be at risk to do otherwise.

Although Czechoslovakia fell under Communist rule through the intrigue of her indigenous Communist party in 1948, it must be remembered that even before World War II the party had considerable support throughout the country.¹⁴ In the Czechoslovakian democracy of that time, the Communists possessed one of the four largest parties in parliament. Maybe this is not too surprising in view of the threat to which she was exposed by fascist Germany and the lack of support she received from the rest of Western Europe. Thus, for many Czechoslovaks the invasion by the "Mother of Socialism" in 1968 must have been even more traumatic than it would have been for some of the other NSWP states. It must also be remembered that although the liberalisation by the Dubcek regime may well have produced a multiparty state, Alexander Dubcek himself was a "socialist," and he enjoyed increasing popular support. One should not, perhaps, put too much faith in East European public opinion polls, but in one such poll conducted in August 1968, Dubcek received a "political trust" rating of 96.1 percent and at the same time only five percent preferred a return to capitalism.¹⁵ Indeed, it has been suggested—although it is not clear who was on which side—that there was some disagreement between Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and Marshal Andrey Antonovich Grechko (Soviet Defence Minister) over the invasion,¹⁶ and it may have been the views of the other NSWP countries involved in the invasion, and the GDR in particular, which tipped the balance. For the majority of Czechoslovaks the invasion of 1968 engendered nothing but hatred for the Soviets and the NSWP countries that helped them.

Prior to 1968, Czechoslovakia was considered one of the most reliable members of the Warsaw Pact and Gustav Husak, who succeeded Dubcek, has had the task of trying to recreate that "normal" situation. Some quarter of a million of the previous party upper echelons and about half a million Communist party members were purged following the removal of Dubcek; when one adds to this about 100,000 people, presumably those with some initiative, who fled to the West ^l7 it is not difficult to understand the economic and intellectual stagnation that occurred in the years immediately following the invasion. Replacements for the purged elite had to be found from those who, prior to the invasion, had shown little interest in politics, and some degree of "political normalcy" now has been restored. However, this normalcy is regarded by a number of Western observers as a stability created by political apathy rather than one brought about by genuine political interest.¹⁸ Doubts still exist, however, in the minds of the present leadership, and presumably the Soviets, since it was only in August 1975 that Dubcek was expelled by a Czechoslovak trade union. One can only assume that it was believed that he might still become a focal point for at least token opposition to the Husak regime and that this was a final attempt to rob him of any standing in the country. Furthermore, continued official criticism of the interpretation of science and ideology in education¹⁹ would indicate that normalisation is by no means complete, although this could be merely a facet of the increased ideological propaganda effort throughout the Warsaw Pact.

The political apathy of the people has had a twofold benefit to the current leadership. Since the people failed in their attempt to seek political freedom, they have now turned their efforts towards seeking freedom in the area of consumption; as a result they tend to work harder to earn the money to buy consumer goods, and the economy has improved overall. Yet, since political loyalty produces better job opportunities, many are prepared to pay lip service to the Husak leadership in order to secure better jobs. While the economy is improving and Husak dares take no real economic initiatives that would signal a departure from the Soviet line, and while Czechoslovakia remains a full participant in COMECON, she is also increasing her trade with the West. Czechoslovakia does almost half as much trade with the West now as she does with her Communist partners.²⁰ However, it would be an extreme Western optimist who would forecast that these trade contracts would be likely to influence the Czechoslovak leadership or produce any political adventuring in that country, particularly bearing in mind the almost total lack of Western reaction to events of 1968.

One interesting facet of the Czechoslovak political scene has been the increasing conflict between the Czechs and the Slovaks; this conflict is supported by the opinion polls to which reference was made earlier. Husak is a Slovak and a consistent federalist; it is possible that these were among the reason his selection by the Soviets. Although the Slovakian Communist Party is led by the "ultras" (hard liners), Husak has had considerable Slovak support. However, the Slovaks, who comprise only 30 percent of the total population, are now equally represented with the Czechs in the national government. The Slovaks also enjoy their own ethnically separate Communist party while the Czschs have to be satisfied with the national Czechoslovakian Communist Party.²¹ This has given rise to at least hints of an increase in Czech nationalism and is certainly not conducive to political stability within the country whole.

In any conflict between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, one of the most significant factors dictating Czechoslovak actions would undoubtedly be the presence of Soviet troops within the country. The Soviet troops are there under a Czechoslovakian/Soviet Friendship Treaty—a manifestation of the Brezhnev Doctrine—and the Czechoslovak people would think twice before openly changing sides after the 1968 debacle, even if the Soviet troops were actively engaged in hostilities in the border area. Husak is a Soviet puppet, and on the face of it he appears to be unwilling and incapable of taking an independent line. No other dominant figure has, as yet appeared from the apparently politically disinterested party administration. The Czechoslovak armed forces took little or no action to resist the 1968 invasion, and there is no reason to doubt that they will follow the national government and Soviet directives in the future. At present the people of the country seem interested only in improving their material well-being, but their reactions in the future might depend on the potential conflict that exists between the Czechs and Slovaks. The Slovaks would seem unlikely to wish to jeopardise their new-found parity with the Czechs, but the latter, from whom Dubcek received most of his support, might conceivably allow their hatred of the Soviets to overcome their earlier disillusionment with the West and react against the Soviets in some numbers. Certainly it would easier for the Czechs, who live predominantly in West Czechoslovakia, which has a common border with the FRG. Much will depend on the continued satisfaction of consumer demands and the possible return of political elite of pre-1968.

The relationship of Hungary with the Warsaw Pact need only be traced back to 1956 when she tried to resign from the Pact and establish a multiparty system of government. (Incidentally, the Warsaw Treaty made no visions for withdrawal until one year prior to the twentieth anniversary, and no member was "bold" enough to do so—even assuming they wished to.) Soviet troops were used in "persuading" the Hungarians to remain within the Pact. The Hungarian revolts 1956 were really the result of factional conflict between the pro- and anti-Stalinist, accompanied by individual protests by workers and students. The Hungarian armed forces did not act effectively on either side.²² Strangely enough, the Russian troops garrisoned in Budapest were sympathetic to the local population, and they had to be replaced hurriedly by Mongolian troops from Siberia.²³ The Mongolian troops were brutal in their suppression of the Hungarians, and the memory of their action has undoubtedly been passed on to the generations that have followed. Thus, if the European/Asian balance in the U.S.S.R. continues to swing in favour of the Asians, it is unlikely to contribute to any pro-Soviet revival!

Janos Kadar, who came to power after the revolts, has been successful in gaining a real measure of popular support by his liberalising actions, despite the terrorist oppression that occurred during the first few years of his regime. At the same time Kadar has exercised care not to offend the Soviets who installed him as the leader of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP). Kadar has confined his national initiatives primarily to the domestic scene and has followed the Soviet line on foreign policy; although having said this, and perhaps because the domestic successes have increased the confidence of the Hungarian leaders, they are as bitterly opposed to the Brezhnev Doctrine as Romania, although less blatantly so. Kadar is a dedicated international Communist and a genuine friend of the U.S.S.R. ²⁴ He is also regarded as a believer in the "more humane type of socialism." Prior to 1968 the Hungarian leadership enjoyed particularly good relations with the Dubcek administration in Czechoslovakia, and it is by no means obvious why the Soviets have allowed Hungary some of the latitudes they were not prepared to accept in Czechoslovakia. Whatever the reasons, Kadar has retained the leadership against domestic opposition from both right and left.

The heart of Kadar's domestic success has been the 1968 introduction of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM), which reduced the centralised economic control to the minimum consistent with an authoritarian, one-party state.²⁵ Certainly the country has benefited economically from the NEM, but a profit-motivated economy has brought problems for the party; bourgeois attitudes have developed as has a management-worker differential to the extent that trade unions have become more militant and the government has had to act to meet their demands.²⁶ It is interesting to note that organised labour, as opposed to party organisations, has the power to influence government decisions! However, Hungary has few natural resources, and her economy is based on raw materials and fuels imported almost exclusively from the U.S.S.R.²⁷ Although Hungary has made strenuous efforts to increase her trade with the West, including the U.S.,²⁸ she is firmly tied to COMECON with which she does about 75 percent of her trade. While trade with the West may bring the technology required to continue to meet her consumer demands, her balance of payments in convertible currency is unfavourable, and her basic economic structure would suffer if she had to compete on the open market for raw materials that are still available from the U.S.S.R. at lower-than-world prices.

There are now signs, however, despite the continuation of economic and social reforms, that there has been a degree of ideological tightening-up;²⁹ Soviet pressure could have dictated this, but it is also common to the other members of the Warsaw Pact since the beginning of the détente era. In 1973, a sociologist and two prominent philosophers were expelled from the party because their work was politically unacceptable; and, in 1974, three early reformers, Rezsō Nyers, György Aczél, and Lajos Feher, were removed from the HSWP Secretariat. Furthermore, the guidelines for the party congress in March 1975 dictated that while party members were entitled to hold their own views they were not to be voiced if they clashed with those of the party. However, even as recently as September 1974, "Janos Kadar said that relations between the European Economic Community (EEC) and COMECON should facilitate contacts rather than direct economic exchanges,"³⁰ which certainly open to favourable Western interpretation.

It would appear that while reforms are likely to continue in Hungary, as perhaps indicated by concessions continuing to be made towards the Catholic church, there has been a slowing down of such reforms to a rate acceptable to the Soviets and to enable the HSWP to retain control of the situation. Economically, the state is dependent on Soviet raw materials but also on Western technology to progressively improve the standard of living of the people. Kadar also appears to be in a position where he is certainly influenced by public opinion as is manifest by his acquiescence to trade union demands—rather like a number of Western leaders!

The Hungarian people are no doubt aware of the success of their "taste of capitalism," as the leadership must be, even if they are now a little embarrassed by it. Given the opportunity, it is unlikely that either the leadership or the people would wish to risk another 1956 by openly siding with the West. However, despite possible initial economic difficulties, it is conceivable that the nation as a whole could opt for a neutral attitude like that of Yugoslavia, with which there is considerable social contact, a lengthy common border, and strong economic ties. Hungary might well see neutrality as a means of retaining economic ties with both East and West and a means of continuing, with relative independence, its experiment in "goulash Socialism." Without doubt, few reports written on contemporary Hungary indicate a great love of the Soviets and most suggest a marked lack of Marxist-Leninist revolutionary fervour while they all confirm a leadership that is prepared to continue reforms, albeit at a limited rate, to satisfy national public opinion. This assumes a continuation of present policies in Yugoslavia after Tito's death; a pro-Soviet Yugoslavia would undoubtedly influence any decisions made by Hungarian leaders.

In 1945, Dr. Petru Groza, the Prime Minister of Romania said, "We wish to guarantee [our people] a development based on the deserved participation of the masses. . . and the weeding out of irritating privileges. . . political stability amid the instability of international politics, in which small states risk being absorbed and crushed."³¹ The Romanian Party statement on 26 April 1964, plainly rejected the supranational control and planning of COMECON as having the most "serious political and economic implications" and went on to delineate the absolute sovereignty of socialist states to decide their own route to a socialist society.³² The Romanian Communist Party's (RCP) resolution at the 11th congress in November 1974 contained the following: "The Congress commissions the party to attend a conference of European communist and workers’ parties, bearing in mind the need that it be conducted in a democratic spirit and that the full equality of all parties in preparing and discussing the relevant matters be ensured."³³

These quotations serve to illustrate the economic and politically independent line that Romania has attempted to follow from the end of World War II to the present time under the leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu, who came to power in 1965. Despite Ceausescu’s Stalinist approach to government and the very limited freedom of any sort allowed the Romanian people, his policy of independence has appealed to Romanian nationalism, and the support that it has brought him has enabled a continuance of that policy. Romanian has been anything but an active member of the Warsaw Pact since 1964, when she refused to allow the Pact to hold multinational military exercises on her territory. In recent years Romania has had but a token representation in the form of observers at most Pact military exercises. In 1968 she was the only NSWP member who did not participate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia and even formed an armed militia, which was undoubtedly a response to that invasion.

Economically, the Romanian leadership has refused to remain a peasant nation, solely to provide food and raw materials to the U.S.S.R., and has attempted to industrialise. Since dependence on the Soviets was deemed unacceptable, Romania, under Ceausescu, has increasingly turned to Western trade as a means of obtaining the industrial goods and the technology required by its industry. Certainly Ceausescu can justifiably claim some successes in improving the material well-being of his people, but the price has been to become increasingly indebted to the West. For example, the trade deficit in 1974 was reported to be somewhere between DM. 3,000 million and DM. 892 million with the FRG alone. ³⁴ This could be the reason why the Romanians plan to halve their exchanges with the West in the next five years. Furthermore, although in March 1971 a law was passed allowing for the setting-up of joint West/Romanian industry in the country, only a very limited number of Western companies have taken advantage of this opportunity so far. Overall, Ceausescu's Western trading policy, while having some initial successes, is now foundering, and, whether through economic necessity or political pressure, there are indications that Ceausescu is increasing Romanian participation in COMECON.³⁵

Despite the fact that the Political Executive Committee (PEC) of the Romanian Communist Party met on 14 October 1975 especially to discuss food and consumer goods, indicating a desire to meet some of the demands of the people, there is no doubt that Ceausescu is firmly in control of the country; the mass media are heavily controlled, and travel, even to other Communist countries, is restricted to the privileged few. Ceausescu's task is made somewhat easier since in modern times the Romanian people have never known a stable, free society. Thus, in assessing Romanian reactions to a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict, one need only assess the reactions of the RCP and its leadership, namely Ceausescu, who seems likely to occupy that position for some time.

There are already signs that Ceausescu's Western trading policy has not paid off, and he is moving into the COMECON and Soviet economic fold. While in the past Romania has become increasingly an inactive member of the Warsaw Pact, a complete break and an alternative alliance with the capitalist West would mean a considerable risk of unsettling influences, which the increased contacts of such an alliance would bring; this is a risk that Ceausescu would be unlikely to accept. An alternative policy would be one of neutrality, again rather like that of Yugoslavia. Although such a policy is more conceivable since the emergence of the PRC as an alternative centre of world Communism, unlike Yugoslavia, and Albania too, Romania "enjoys" a lengthy border with the U.S.S.R. The latter would most likely deter the Romanians from really taking advantage of the support that she would receive from the PRC, with whom she maintains fairly good relations. Furthermore, Romania has no common border with the NATO nations.

Romania's most likely course of action would be to side with the Soviets and try to retain, and perhaps increase, its domestic independence as a reward for its loyalty. One could also draw the conclusion that the Soviets have made the same assessment of Romanian reactions and that is why her independent economic and foreign policies have been tolerated. The likelihood of Romania adopting this course of action is further increased if one considers how Bulgaria might react.

Since World War II, Bulgaria has been the Soviets' most consistent ally, both economically and politically. Because of this, and because of her strategic value in relation to the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean the Soviets have cultivated this loyalty and tend to treat Bulgaria as the "favourite" of the Warsaw Pact.

At the end of World War II, Bulgaria was placed firmly in the Soviet orbit. The Bulgarian was Communist Party (BCP) had no difficulty in consolidating its political position, with Soviet support, and has been in power ever since. The natural stoicism of the Bulgarian people has made it easier in many respects for the BCP to retain its effective authoritarian control over the domestic scene.³⁶ There were internal party problems in 1965, and a conspiracy against Todor Zhivkov, the BCP leader, failed and resulted in the trial of seven party members, five of whom were involved with the military; one of the ringleaders, Ivan Todorov-Gorunya, shot himself in April of that year.³⁷ However, there are no apparent indications that any pro-Western elements were involved in the conspiracy; it was either between pro- and anti-Stalinist factions or between local factions since there is a strong sense of localism within Bulgaria.

In the 1950s the Muscovites (those who were Moscow trained with obvious primary loyalty to the Kremlin) within the BCP were replaced with younger, indigenous Communists, but despite this the BCP is an aging party. Many of the older generation of ideologists nave been retained in the leadership because there is a general feeling that the younger generation desire more freedom and lack the revolutionary fervou of their fathers. Ideological pressure is now being directed at the Bulgarian youth, and the BCP has "expressed concern at the apparent reactivation of church and religious activities, especially in regard to young people." ³⁸ The BCP has also experienced some problems of nationalism. To some extent an outlet has been found for nationalism by means of the Macedonian problem with Yugoslavia. However, this has not satisfied all demands, and in February 1975, "Secretary Lilov, in report to the plenum. . . noted that ‘nationalism based on the anti-Soviet grounds' has 'unfortunately recorded some success.' "³⁹ Although these minor perturbations in the otherwise stable domestic scene could, conceivably, develop into significant problems, the BCP remains firmly in control and its foreign policy precisely follows that of U.S.S.R., including its policy towards the PRC.

Economically, Bulgaria has benefited considerably by her loyalty to the U.S.S.R., particularly when compared with Romania. Bulgaria is the Soviets' fourth largest trading partner, and economic and industrial development is virtually integrated with that of the U.S.S.R. The Bulgarians are investing in the development of Soviet raw material and energy resources not only in financial terms but also with Bulgarian labour. Reportedly, between 30,000 and 45,000 Bulgarians are employed in the U.S.S.R. ⁴⁰ although this "investment" has been criticised by some Bulgarian experts. Bulgaria can now be regarded as an industrialised nation, and in 1960s her growth rate in industrial output was the highest in the world after Japan. ⁴¹ Although trade with the West, and the FRG in particular, has been indispensable to Bulgarian industrial growth, she has a considerable trade deficit and will, inevitably, have to cut back this Western trade to some extent.

Culturally, Bulgaria cooperates more closely with the Soviets than any other East European country, even to the extent that all Bulgarian children are taught Russian. ⁴² Thus, one can detect no evidence of significant political, economic or cultural deviation from the Soviet line either domestically or in foreign policy. Bulgaria has made considerable progress with its past policy, and therefore, one must conclude that she would meet her full obligations to the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact in any future conflict with NATO.

WITH the assumption of an even balance of Soviet-to-NATO military force in Europe, one must also assume that any future conventional conflict would take place, at least initially, adjacent to the present NATO/Warsaw Pact borders. If one excludes the southern and northern flanks, all NSWP countries that have a common border with NATO, plus Hungary which-borders on neutral Austria, have Soviet troops based on their soil. Therefore, even if Soviet first echelon combat forces were diverted from any East European "policing duties," the second and third echelon forces moving through, and the support elements within, those countries would have a considerable deterrent effect against any unilateral action by those NSWP countries.

Politically, there is reasonable accord between the Communist party leaders in all of the NSWP countries and the U.S.S.R., with the possible exception of Romania. Even Romania, which has been permitted a degree of independence in its foreign policy, was careful to sign new treaties of friendship with the U.S.S.R. and Poland within two years of the events in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Internally, the national Communist parties are firmly in control. In Bulgaria and Romania the degree of freedom of the people is quite limited, and there would appear to be little likelihood of any coordinated opposition of significant size to overthrow their current leaders. In the remaining NSWP countries public opinion appears to have some influence over governmental decisions, and attempts to satisfy public demands are made; if this policy continues, then national leaderships are likely to be able to retain control, not only through repression but through increasing popular support. In Czechoslovakia political apathy has been the consequence of the 1968 invasion, and, regardless of political policies, no cohesive opposition is likely while the material demands of the people continue to be met. Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, only Poland, in 1970, suffered any significant internal disturbance, and this was put-down by national armed forces. Politically, the NSWP countries' leaders would most likely support their fellow Warsaw Pact members and appear to have sufficient control of their populations and armed forces to prevent significant opposition.

Ideologically, the Warsaw Pact countries recognise a threat in the increased contacts likely in a period of détente and are collectively taking action to boost their ideological integrity. Even Romania is taking great care to limit contact between the Romanian people and the West, and only the favoured few are permitted to make such contacts. Economically, all the NSWP members are heavily dependent on each other and the U.S.S.R. In a resource-scarce era, they are investing jointly with the Soviets in exploiting Soviet raw materials. Certainly they all trade with the West to obtain the technology to further their own industrial development, but without exception they are operating a trade deficit with the capitalist countries and are likely to turn more towards trade with their Soviet and other COMECON partners. Furthermore, there is some opposition to trade by COMECON with the West by some of the specialised industrial states since they cannot compete for the COMECON markets with Western suppliers. One country that could suffer considerably from a reversion to a COMECON integrated economy would be Hungary; she has experimented with capitalist techniques and had a measure of success. A degree of social liberalisation has followed the Hungarian economic initiatives and while a slower rate of reform might be accepted by the Hungarian people, a halt and a reversion to earlier policies might well produce sufficient dissatisfaction to trigger some pro-Western actions. However, the memory of 1956 remains, and the Hungarian people would be unlikely to defy the Soviets openly; a passive reaction would be a more likely course.

There has been a resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe, but in general this has been successfully channelled into support for national leadership. The only country where nationalism could be a problem for the leadership is in Czechoslovakia, between the Czechs and the Slovaks; if this should develop into real conflict, then it is conceivable that the Czechs, sharing a common border with the FRG, might seek to break away despite the lack of support they have received from the Western allies in the past.

Overall, the assessment of the reliability of the NSWP countries can only be a positive one. Prior to any future armed conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the battle will be waged on the economic and ideological front. Trade has its advantages and disadvantages, but the trading contacts that are made must also be used to further ideological interests. This type of attack is feared by the Communist Party and, hence, the stepping-up of ideological propaganda, The West must not just ignore Eastern Europe and must, whenever possible, actively encourage nationalism in the area. To do otherwise could result in progressive "Estonisation" of Eastern Europe.

Until such time as the ideological battle begins to show real results, in planning for the contingencies of a conventional war in Europe, as postulated in the scenario for this examination, one must draw the conclusion that the Warsaw Pact would act in concert against NATO, with the possible exception of Hungary and part of Czechoslovakia, and that all the other NSWP states would meet their full obligations to the Pact.

Air War College

Notes

1. Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact, Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1971).

2. Richard C. Longworth, "Eastern Europe: Where Life Is Not So Good, Yet Not So Bad," Saturday Review, March 8, 1975, p. 11.

3. Times (London), 11 November 1975, p. 5.

4. Daniels Weiss, "Poland's Sense of History," Swiss Review of World Affairs, August 1975, p. 8.

5. Quarterly Economic Review--Poland, East Germany, No. 1-1975, The Economist Intelligence Unit.

6. Weiss, p. 9.

7. Thomas E. Heneghan, "Poland," Radio Free Europe Research, RAD Background Report /1l6 (Eastern Europe), 18 July 1975.

8. Robert Culver, "East Germany," World Survey (London: The Atlantic Education Trust, December 1971).

9. Peter Christian Ludz, "Two Germanys in One World," The Atlantic Papers 3/1973 (Farnborough, England: The Atlantic Institute for International Affairs).

10. Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., The German Democratic Republic (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 7.

11. Lawerence Griswold, "Warsaw Pact: "The Brood of the Bear," Sea Power, pp. 27-32.

12. Hanhardt, p. 124.

13. Ibid, pp. 103-4.

14. Paul Neuburg, The Hero's Children--The Post War Generation in Eastern Europe (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1973), p.

15. Peter Grothe, "Public Opinion in Eastern Europe," Problems of Communism, July/August 1975.

16. Carl Beck and Karen Eide Rawling, The Military as a Channel of Early into Positions of Political Leadership in Communist Party States, Air University Conference on the Role of the Military in Communist Societies, November 1975, p. 54.

17. Radoslav Selucky, "Czechs Respond to Normalisation with Consumption and Apathy," International Perspectives, March/April 1975, p. 31.

18. Ibid., See also Longworth, p. 54.

19. Situation Report, "Struggle against Revisionism in the Social Sciences," Radio Free Europe Research, Czechoslovakia/31, 6 August 1975.

20. Thomas E. Heneghan, "Czechoslovakia," Radio Free Europe Research, RAD Background Report/116 (Eastern Europe), 18 July 1975.

21. Selucky, p. 34.

22. Beck and Rawling, p. 20.

23. Griswold, pp. 27-32.

24. William F. Robinson, The Pattern of Reform in Hungary--A Political, Economic and Cultural Analysis (New York and London: Praeger, 1973).

25. Paul Ignotus, Hungary (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 277.

26. "Hungary: Expanding Contacts," Australian Foreign Affairs Record, March 1975, p. 127.

27. Ibid., p. 125.

28. "Czechoslovakia and Hungary," No. 1-1975, Quarterly Economic Review, The Economist Intelligence Unit.

29. Ibid.

30. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Trade and Détente Challenge Uniformity in Eastern Europe," International Perspectives, March/April 1975, p. 24.

31. Carol Kormos, "Rumania," World Survey, The Atlantic Education Trust, July 1974, pp. 3-4.

32. Jonathan Steele, editor, Eastern Europe since Stalin (New York: Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1974), pp. 125-27.

33. Situation Report, "Rumania/40," Radio Free Europe Research, 16 October 1975, p. 2.

34. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

35. Ibid., pp. 3-4.

36. Joseph Rothschild, "Communism in Bulgaria," Problems of Communism, July/August 1975, p. 75.

37. J. F. Brown, Bulgaria under Communist Rule (New York and London: Praegar, 1970), pp. 173-5.

38. "Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania No. 1.1975," Quarterly Economic Review, The Economist Intelligence Unit.

39. Robert R. King, "Socialist Internationalism in Action," Radio Free Europe Research, RAD Background Report/89 (Bulgaria), 26 May 1975, p. 7.

40. Ibid., p. 8.

41. Rothschild, p. 74.

42. King, p. 8.

Wing Commander Peter M. Papworth, RAF, (Royal Air Force College, Cranwell) is Royal Air Force Advisor to the Commandant, Air Command and Staff College, Air University, and a member of the Air University Review Awards Committee. His flying assignments have been in RAF Training Command as a pilot instructor, squadron commander, and wing commander/chief instructor. His staff tours have been in Training Command, on missile staff duties, and as Senior RAF Liaison Officer at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. Wing Commander Papworth is a graduate of the RAF Staff College and of the USAF Air War College.

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