Air University Review, May-June 1977

Rethinking the Unthinkable

Limited Strategic Nuclear Options—credible or dangerous?

The dynamics of American security in a nuclear world have fostered vigorous debate over the military capabilities required to protect and preserve national freedom. Defense intellectuals and strategists generally agree that our principal security objective is to avoid a nuclear war, but there are disagreements on the military forces required to meet this objective and the capabilities these forces should have. For many years this country has felt relatively safe under the security blanket of our assured destruction forces, but there has been a growing suspicion that today this is not enough. The Soviet Union's continued strategic force buildup far in excess of what would be reasonably needed for the assured destruction task has initiated a fundamental reexamination of the doctrinal basis of American defense policy. To this end, the key issue as resurfaced is the question whether the President of the United States has need of a capability for engaging in limited strategic nuclear options (LNO) as an optimal response in acute crises with a nuclear-equipped adversary.

The cornerstone of American military strategy has been the deterrence of nuclear war. Deterrence is basically a psychological phenomenon, based on forces in being and the enemy belief in both the effectiveness of forces and in our willingness to employ them decisively if necessary. Because deterrence finds its strength in what the opponent thinks his, adversary can do and, more importance do in response to any outside provocation, perceptions become a key component. And in large measure, perceptions are solidly rooted in strategic force capabilities across the entire spectrum of conflict scenarios. 

For the past decade or so deterrence of nuclear war has been based on the doctrine of assured destruction—the United States possessed sufficient strategic forces so as to be able to withstand a Soviet first strike and respond with a second strike of sufficient magnitude to destroy the Soviet Union as a viable society. Eventually the Soviet forces were expanded sufficiently to obtain a comparable assured destruction capability against the United States. It became customary to refer to this condition as "mutual assured destruction"—each side had enough nuclear strength to destroy the other with a retaliatory strike. In the United States it soon became the practice to determine the desired strength of the strategic forces by their contribution to the assured destruction role; thus the scenario of spasm war, the least likely type of conflict because of its suicidal nature, tended to become the typical case. Because of this practice it is now thought that American strategic forces will perform very well in the least likely kind of war. But it has become increasingly difficult to visualize the President, or even his opposite in the Soviet Union, unleashing assured destruction forces for all possible scenarios.

It was the growing conviction that mutual assured destruction was not a panacea for survival that led President Richard M. Nixon to ask his thought-provoking questions in 1970:

Should a President, in the event of a nuclear attack, be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the mass slaughter of Americans? Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only measure of our ability to deter the variety of threats we may face? ¹

The needs were amplified by Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger in his fiscal year 1975 report to the Congress:

Rather than massive options, we now want to provide the President with a wider set of much more selective targeting options. Through possession of such a visible capability, we hope to reinforce deterrence by removing the temptation for an adversary to consider any kind of nuclear attack. ²

The theory behind flexible options or limited strategic nuclear options encompasses the capability to use a single or several nuclear weapon systems to strike carefully selected military targets in the Soviet Union, not for revenge but as an additional option short of full nuclear response. It is not a question of seeking new systems but of improving the current forces through modest improvements in accuracy and greater targeting flexibility. This second requirement provides the "option" characteristic; with it the President could select and order an attack on one or several military targets depending on defense objectives.

When one reads the numerous articles that gushed forth on the heels of Dr. Schlesinger’s report to Congress, he cannot fail to be impressed by the scholarly examination to which all facets of the problems have been subjected, on the whole with more clarity than emotion. ³ In general, there are two sides of the debate. On the "stability" side are those who believe that the concept of limited strategic nuclear options (or flexible operations) embraces nuclear gamesmanship which could bring the world to the brink of disaster. They believe that American strategic forces are already adequate and sufficiently flexible, and, therefore, new programs designed to modernize strategic weapons will needlessly jeopardize the balance of nuclear forces and fuel the bilateral arms race. Arrayed on the "flexibility" side are those who question a continued reliance on an assured destruction policy for deterring nuclear conflict at all levels. This school of thought believes that the "stability" argument fails to come to grips with the central issue: because total reliance on an all-out response is essentially suicidal, if deterrence fails, how is the United States to respond to a Soviet limited nuclear attack? To aid in arriving at some conclusion about flexible options, the major arguments advanced by the two schools of thought will be examined.

"Stability" arguments. There are three basic arguments against more flexible nuclear options: (1) arms competition between the superpowers "will almost inevitably result"; (2) a capability for "limited counterforce options will make limited nuclear war more credible and therefore more likely"; and (3) more flexibility and "improved accuracy may lead to instability in time of crisis." ⁴ There are refinements to these three points and also several minor arguments such as the claim that costs of force modernization are excessive and that continued modernization in an era of détente is counterproductive. We shall present the three basic arguments in some depth and then briefly review the two minor issues.

LNO is criticized by the "stability school for the arms-building interaction between the superpowers that will surely result; that is, if the United States deploys forces designed for flexible options, the Soviet Union will not stand still. Then, as the Soviet Union reacts, the United States must respond further; thus, the arms competition spirals upward. Our greatest assurance for deterring political probes as well as preventing nuclear or conventional weapon strike, the argument continues, is the reliance on our assured destruction forces—a mutual hostage strategy, Furthermore, for this role we have more than enough strategic forces; actually the United States possesses a wasteful and dangerous capacity for "overkill." ⁵

The second "stability" argument is that if nuclear weapons become more usable and less mysterious, it will become more "thinkable" to resort to their use during a crisis and, therefore, more acceptable. And as nuclear war becomes more acceptable, it becomes more likely. Many opponents of LNO seem have one fear underlying their opposition—nuclear warfare, with all its potential for an Armageddon, simply cannot be tolerated. In other words, the consequences of nuclear warfare are so horrible, so destructive to humanity, that nothing must be done with our strategic forces that would seem to disturb the "mutual balance of terror"; it is "unthinkable" to experiment with strategic forces lest a destabilizing process result. Built-in "flexibility" will only tend to increase the suitability of nuclear weapons for use during a crisis, particularly when our backs are to the wall—again a dangerously destabilizing condition. Thus culminates a vicious circle that returns us to the war we must avoid. The underlying assumption behind these beliefs is that, as in most physical conflicts, the use of force would escalate automatically, that is, any exchange of nuclear violence would bring the human race to the brink of extinction. The "stability" school insists, in other words, that "controlled" nuclear warfare is a myth; once the nuclear threshold has been crossed, escalation to general nuclear war is inevitable.

This leads to the third principal argument opposing flexible nuclear options: the counterforce danger. LNO, if "counterforce" weapons are involved, is considered to be destabilizing in that the opponent, on viewing the enemy's counterforce arsenal during a crisis, may perceive his own nuclear force to be in imminent danger from an enemy first strike. Hence he may initiate (or will be tempted to initiate) a pre-emptive strike when negotiations deteriorate because he believes that if he does not attack first his strategic force will be destroyed, before being launched, by a counterforce strike from the opponent.

Two minor arguments focus on détente and defense spending. Many writers believe that in this era of détente a deliberate attack by the Soviet Union is very unlikely. Therefore, because détente  has seemingly obviated the need for strong defenses, continued force modernization is seen by some to be inconsistent and self-defeating. Furthermore, the current condition of strategic force parity, mutual assured destruction, the avoidance on both sides of explicit threats, and the mutual determination to preserve an atmosphere of détente have persuaded many that it is now safe to relax defense spending. Much of the opposition focuses on the high price we shall have to pay, on plea of a problematic threat, to provide for research, development, production, and operational costs of new, more sophisticated weapons of war. The opponents of defense spending want dollars saved from unneeded and costly new military systems to be devoted to domestic needs, for example, more and better medical and social programs.

"Flexibility" arguments. The argument concerning arms race inducements has a logical basis, but in reality, claims the "flexibility" school, the action-reaction syndrome is based on intuitive feelings as little hard evidence exists which demonstrates that the Soviet Union is impressed by American force initiatives to the point that it attempts to "mirror-image" United States modernization programs. A review of historical events reveals that the Soviets have sized their forces and modernized their weapons for reasons generally independent of American actions. Past behavior suggests it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would attempt to duplicate specific American modernization programs; students of Soviet arms policy generally agree, the argument continues, that the Soviets adopt policies, commit scarce resources to research and development programs, and expand strategic forces for reasons other than to copy American efforts in these same areas. They point out, for example, that the stimulus to the arms race must already have occurred, as evidenced by the current land-based missile force asymmetry. The American intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) restraint of the past few years did not succeed in constraining the Soviets from major expansion and modernization of their strategic offensive forces, and there is no guarantee that it will do so in the future. The "flexibility" school believes, moreover, that the United States must take advantage of new technology and strive to maintain qualitative superiority because quantitative expansions are counter to implied and explicit arms control agreements reached during SALT I and the Vladivostok discussions. These latter discussions essentially placed a lid on unabated force-building initiatives; therefore, an arms race in the uncontrolled sense is no longer a useful objective for either side. Furthermore, claims the "flexibility" school, taking advantage of inevitable technological advances to modernize forces is not a true arms race.

The "flexibility" side also takes issue with the "unthinkable" tag placed on limited nuclear exchanges. The more we broadcast that all nuclear responses are "unthinkable," the more the pragmatic Soviet leadership will be tempted to seek political advantage in those areas where the threat of total nuclear retaliation is not logical, hence not credible. If all nuclear responses are considered unthinkable, then surely forces that are structured exclusively for an all-out nuclear response, and a nuclear strategy that is limited to revengeful retaliation, are of no use for demonstrating resolve during a serious crisis. If the use of conventional-force options was unsuccessful in responding to a Berlin occupation or a penetration of the Federal Republic of Germany—German Democrat Republic border by Warsaw Pact armies should a nuclear fusillade be the only option open to the President? The Middle East offers further possibilities for such a confrontation. If our conventional forces are ineffectual at the lower conflict levels and it is unrealistic to launch the total nuclear force in response to a political probe or even a limited conventional intervention, could not this bring in question the credibility of a deterrent policy based solely on the use of those "unusable" forces? This is a dilemma the Soviet leadership may find beneficial to exploit, and, if so, the American decision-maker could find himself in a crisis situation where he has no options but to give in to the coercive threats of the Soviet Union or resist and demonstrate "resolve" by calling on the full destructive power of United States strategic forces. The mutual assured destruction posture, because of its suicidal nature, makes this second alternative highly irrational. It is on this repugnant note that the "flexibility" argument essentially rests.

The "flexibility" school disputes the argument that a counterforce capability produces destabilization with four counterpoints. First, both sides have nearly always possessed some counterforce capability, for in reality a counterforce target is any military target whether it be a soft airfield, depot, radar, or control center or, more to the point, a hardened missile silo, nuclear storage area, or launch-control facility. Second, regardless of the pre-emptive provocation, the side that attacks first must have extremely high confidence in the kill probability of its force or else must accept being left wide open to a counterattack from the enemy's many residual ICBMs, bombers, or submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Uncertain kill probabilities and unsolved technical problems (such as fratricide and dust and debris) raise serious doubts regarding the usefulness of engaging in nuclear duels. In other words, as between opposing strategic system, while some counterforce capability is difficult if not impossible to avoid, a decisive first-strike capability is likewise difficult if not impossible to achieve. The third point is that any first-strike or pre-emptive plans must acknowledge that the enemy may adopt a launch-under-attack" tactic. This in itself would essentially negate the anticipated disarming nature of a first strike. The final point advanced by the "flexibility" school is that, even if successful in destroying over 95 percent of the opponent's ICBM force, the preempting side would still be exposed to a retaliatory strike from the enemy's undamaged undersea missile force and alert bomber force. Questions concerning disarming first strikes or preemptive actions must consider the synergistic relationships of the total strategic force. For example, the compounding effects of the Triad of land- and sea-based missiles and manned bombers would make it almost impossible for the Soviet Union to contemplate, much less carry out, a planned, coordinated strike that could successfully destroy or negate all three components of our strategic nuclear force.

As for excessive defense spending and détente  the "flexibility" school acknowledges that such things as medical and social programs are worthy requirements. But the school also insists that the stark realities of the strategic arms competition, aggravated by continued inflation, oblige the United States to maintain or even increase levels of defense spending. Furthermore, states the argument, we must be careful not to become enchanted with détente . Regardless of surface relationships, a healthy skepticism of Soviet claims for peaceful coexistence is warranted as long as the Soviet Union continues with its major strategic force modernization programs. Prudence dictates that we adopt a political or psychological tool used by both sides and approach proposals for force reductions carefully. In sum, it is important to recognize that détente does not afford the United States the luxury of decreasing military strength unilaterally.

Because the purpose of any nuclear deterrent policy is to deter a perceived or known threat, the major threat factor should be considered when treating proposed alterations to this policy. Policy-makers can issue more useful guidance, and planners can better devise successful strategies if the attempt is made to understand the potential adversary's underlying politico-military philosophies and war-making capabilities. This scrutiny is relevant if we are to assess the Soviets' strategic force buildup during the past decade that has given them a level of forces far in excess of what is needed for a secure second-strike capability.

We know that the Russian view of the fundamental values of human life is different from the usual Western attitudes. A constant in Russian history has been, for most of her people, an existence on the edge of terror; it is a culture created by frequent chaos, the extreme tensions caused by stifling government controls, and the desire to survive. The Russians have lived with hunger, violence, unimaginable deprivations, the ever-present fear of secret police, exile to labor camps, and torture—these have become a way of life to the Soviet citizen whether under the Czar or Marxism-Leninism. The savage, prolonged purges under Stalin (during which as many as 15 million Soviet citizens may have died ⁶) offer stark examples of the carnage that lurks in the background of Russian existence. Experiences such as these have produced a view of the world that cannot be perceived with any degree of confidence using American attitudes and experiences. Thus, it is likely that the current generation of Soviet leaders does not have the same perspective of the world that American leaders have and is not likely to assess a crisis situation using the same criteria that we in this country might use.

Of most importance is the Soviet view of strength and power in the international arena. Given their firm belief in the decadence and corruption of capitalism, they are certain that the fall of capitalist governments is inevitable. Capitalism is still seen as the enemy of Marxism-Leninism, and the Soviets appear not to be completely confident that the capitalist states will not one day turn on the Soviet Union and seek to destroy it. At the same time, they remain convinced that time is on the side of Marxism-Leninism, that patience is a virtue; "adventurism" is to be avoided, but weaknesses can be exploited.

In the meantime the Soviets are striving for a higher ratio of strength vis-à-vis the capitalist societies. The Russian philosophy has always emphasized mass, whether it be in the size of armies or numbers of tanks, airplanes, missile forces, and soldiers. Any increase in quantity provides a qualitative change in the nature of reality, and superior forces are sought to enable them to overcome the inferiority by which they are still so obsessed. With nuclear forces, a superiority in numbers may present the Soviets with a new kind of military potential. If the Soviet strategic force becomes so strong that the correlation of forces shifts decisively in their favor, the West may no longer be able to withstand Soviet political initiatives. The Soviets are extremely conscious of power relationships; if they perceive the balance to have changed in their favor, they can be expected to seek political advantages. ⁷

This is not to say that they will launch reckless military attacks; historically, they have not been reckless. Furthermore, they may believe overt military action to be unnecessary. Once the weaker non-Communist countries become convinced of the invincibility of Soviet strategic might, if the United States appears to be at a disadvantage, the Finlandization of nearby non-Communist countries may well follow—the latter selecting their positions on international issues so as not to alarm or annoy the Soviets. If this occurs, the international political equilibrium may be fatally disturbed, with Soviet influence expanding as American influence wanes. The potential consequences are awesome. This may not be a brilliant plan, but, as evidenced by their philosophy and their continued buildup of military forces, it appear; that this is the way the Soviet leaders see it. ⁸

Given the Soviet determination to preserve what they have accomplished and to survive capitalism, it would be unrealistic expect that the Soviets would invite disaster by initiating purposely all-out city-busting warfare. However, conditioned for struggle as they are, they may be less inhibited than we are about the employment of armed force for political purposes. Consequently, would be imprudent of us not to recognize the possibility that the Soviets are better prepared than we are to employ military forces for political objectives. If this is true, we might presume that if nuclear war comes it will be initiated with a modest test Soviet Union seeks to manipulate perceptions of resolve and will. This should not be an unexpected by-product of a superpower force imbalance; unless the United States can meet the Soviets on an equal-capability footing, we could expect assertiveness from the Soviet bloc.

As between the stability/flexibility arguments, the choice is not an easy one, in light of the threat discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Although the Soviet Union usually duplicate American military programs, arms competition is a real problem. As one nation perceives new capabilities being incorporated by the other, it is not unreasonable to expect the first to explore the feasibility either of obtaining the new capabilities for itself or of developing offsetting capabilities. Whether emerging technology or mere duplication is the stimulus, whether it means an antiship cruise missile for the United States or the first aircraft for the Soviets, and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles for the Soviets or a mobile ICBM for the United States, there is, and will continue to be, costly competition between the two superpowers. It is doubtful that unilateral efforts, on sincere pleas that someone must be first to stop the "insane" arsenal buildup, will be successful alone in dampening the competition in arms. Unilateral cutbacks would only succeed in permitting the other side to grow stronger, and this is too great an advance give to the power-seeking Soviet government. As long as communism and capitalism are opposing political systems, each side will continue to modernize and limits military forces in order to improve its military forces in order to improve or strengthen its security position. As insane and costly as this may be, it appears that only through additional arms-limiting negotiations will there be any hope for real success in slowing or ending arms competition between the rivals.

The arguments against counterforce capabilities have been convincingly answered by the "flexibility" school. The relationship between LNO and a counterforce capability that threatens a disarming first strike would seem to be valid only if associated with active or passive defenses capable of thwarting all three components of the strategic Triad. It is highly improbable that this situation will ever occur as both sides are intent on seeing that perfect defenses are not developing, as evidenced by the antiballistic missile (ABM) agreement reached during SALT I. For flexible options, the President needs only a limited force; this point is important to LNO advocacy. A small, accurate, and flexible offensive counterforce capability need not suggest an intent or capability to install a disarming first-strike force against the Soviet strategic forces. As emphasized previously, the relative invulnerability of the undersea force and the rapid reaction of which an alert bomber force is capable makes a first-strike tactic inconsistent with rational strategy even if the possibility of a missile launch-under-attack tactic is discounted.

Nevertheless, the fear that more strategic flexibility would make nuclear war more likely is certainly not entirely without justification. This is the most difficult objection to LNO to refute; if during a crisis a President's choices of actions involving nuclear weapons are not limited to unleashing the total strategic force, he may well be substantially less hesitant about ordering a nuclear attack, albeit one limited in numbers and expected damage. Conceivably he might do so in lieu of exploring all the diplomatic initiatives that could possibly dampen the situation. Even more disturbing is the possibility that, once nuclear exchanges begin, the tempo of the conflict would increase and uncontrollable escalation would be difficult to prevent. However, the threat of uncontrollable escalation also lends support to the case for LNO. Today most strategists are agreed that deterrence of nuclear war is not perfect; there is no guarantee that deterrence will never fail. If nuclear war does erupt, it is difficult to believe that the systems required for LNO (such as highly reliable sensors and command and control systems) and possessed by both sides would not aid in preventing escalation to massive exchange levels. The question, then, is whether the LNO capability will unacceptably diminish the inhibition to initiate limited nuclear actions.

confrontation

The most critical test thus far between the Soviet Union and the United States began in October 1962, when reconnaissance photographs revealed that the Soviet Union was installing offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba. It is probable that the world came closer to nuclear holocaust during the subsequent 13 days than at any time before or since. In the end President Kennedy was able to convince Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership that American resolve to have the missiles dismantled and removed was such that even a shooting war was not too high a price. In retrospect it appears that American naval and strategic force strength provided the United States with sufficient politico-military leverage to convince the Soviets to back down and remove the missiles. ⁹

There were cogent lessons to be learned from this remarkable episode. For American leaders the need to couple restraint with resolve probably was foremost. For the Soviets the lesson was also significant—a political venture in the international arena that is not backed by superior conventional and strategic forces is a bad risk. It appears to many analysts that this lesson had a catalyzing effect on Soviet force planners, and the missile imbalance that we face today may well have had its roots in the outcome of the missile crisis. It appears that since then the Soviets concentrated research and development efforts on what they knew they could accomplish first: a quantitatively superior buildup of their long-range strategic missile force. Their massive missile program has given them a superiority in both size and numbers of ICBMs, although not yet in numbers of warheads or accuracy. ^l0

Recent arms control efforts have tended to put a roof on the continued buildup. SALT I was not an end in itself but the important first step of several that hopefully will reduce the competition between the superpowers. It was a political agreement as much as it was a military one in that both sides essentially agreed to mutual vulnerability—no real ABM defensive system was to be constructed by either side. But the Soviets were conceded some advantages in missile throw-weight. The Vladivostok framework agreement between President Ford and Secretary General Brezhnev essentially placed an upper limit; a ceiling, on the aggregates of the central strategic system, but not before the Soviet had achieved a quantitative lead in missile forces.¹¹ Now, with a limit on numbers, quality becomes the stimulus rather than quantity. If throw-weight and yield increase accuracy and reliability are improved, counterforce capabilities will result whether are desired or intended. It will be unsettling if to all of their large throw-weight missiles the Soviets add multiple warheads with improved guidance and thereby gain a qualitative superiority as well.

There is an aspect of power relationships that does not seem to be well understood in the United States; it centers on "political" or "psychological" advantages that are likely to be perceived by all actors involved—the Soviet Union, the United States and her allies, and countries of the Third World. International stability can best be serve by a perception of equilibrium of strategic forces as well as by fact. If American allies and friends, and neutral countries, that the Soviet Union possesses a marked quantitative superiority vis-à-vis the States, we can reasonably expect increasing doubt as to American capabilities to withstand Soviet political pressures. Possibly emerging from this would be an eventual weakening of our alliances as confidence in American resolve eroded. There is an additional consideration; qualitative inferiority also significant and would add to the handicap of quantitative inferiority if both were present. 

This concern is exacerbated if American leaders begin to doubt the utility of our own strategic forces. The assured destruction philosophy is based on the fears associated with the awesome destruction that accompanies thermonuclear war. Whether we have convinced our potential adversary that nuclear war is too horrible to contemplate is a question we can never answer with any satisfactory degree of certainty. However, we may well have succeeded in convincing ourselves of this, and in a time of crisis we may become gripped by the paralysis of fear. If our missile force is considered to be more vulnerable and less effective than the Soviet Union's, we could lose faith in its deterrent value. Flowing from this could be a subsequent erosion of courage or resolve during any major confrontation with the "superior" Soviet Union. To counter this eventuality, we need a symmetry of capabilities to provide faith in our ability to meet each strategic blow with an equivalent, adequate, but prudent, counterblow.

Is there any reason why we should be disturbed by an inequality of forces? Of what value is all of the nuclear power possessed by he two superpowers? That is, can this power be translated into useful political instruments for other than straightforward deterrence of an all-out first strike? How can these devastating forces be brought into play at the lower levels of political confrontation? Heretofore, the Soviets have fallen back on rocket rattling" threats, and the United States has placed strategic forces on alert status, but then what? Because of the strategic; realities of the "two scorpions in a bottle" situation, one can get only a limited amount of coercive mileage from tough attitudes that threaten mutual annihilation.

Today and in the foreseeable future the probability of a deliberate all-out nuclear exchange between the United States and the Soviet Union is very low. The decisive consideration, however, is that the Soviets may find ways to use their expanding nuclear force for political purposes other than massive, instantaneous nuclear exchanges against urban-industrial areas. It is unlikely that the Soviets will challenge us directly, but there remains the possibility of the development of a crisis situation wherein the President may suddenly find himself contesting issues that both he and his Soviet counterpart consider "vital" to national security. Crises are likely to occur for unexpected reasons and may well be the result of client-state actions in the "tinderbox" areas of the world (World War I revisited?) and an inability on the part of one or the other superpower to control adequately his competing client state (e.g., the Middle East arena). It is possible that either superpower might initiate military intervention or provide direct military assistance to a client so as to prevent that client from being defeated. The other superpower may then attempt to counter participation by his opponent, and in subsequent negotiations he could miscalculate objectives and resolves and fall back on coercive threats backed up with missile rattling. If, in such a situation, the confrontation escalates to the point where the Soviets use or threaten to use nuclear weapons to coerce the United States, the President will need strategic-force options that do not involve either surrender or the high probability of mutual suicide. He will need a range of alternatives between the two extremes corresponding to the Soviet threats or actions; that is, the capability of threatening to respond or, if necessary, of actually responding with a limited nuclear strike against military targets. The most dangerous condition during a major crisis would be a unilateral capability for flexible options; for the United States to forfeit an LNO capability would provide the Soviets a trump card to play during a crisis and expose us to nibbling aggression. If it must be assumed that the Soviets will find that specialized nuclear capabilities are useful for demonstrating resolve and determination during an acute crisis, then the United States must also incorporate capabilities to use her strategic forces in something other than spasmodic exchanges. Indeed, if the Soviet Union recognizes that the United States possesses capabilities and plans for flexible responses, the Soviet leadership may be less likely, not more likely, to experiment with nuclear coercion; hence, the effectiveness of deterrence should actually be improved.

The basic question confronting American leaders and policy-makers is twofold: (1) how to escape a nuclear paralysis if we find ourselves confronting Soviet conventional-forces victory or Soviet exploitation of its limited strategic operations capability, while simultaneously (2) minimizing the risk of uncontrollable escalation. The military strength of a nation during a crisis depends, in the final analysis, on capabilities and on resolution. The United States needs a deterrence posture that is adaptable and credible across the entire spectrum of military scenarios. This calls for nuclear weapons that can be used to threaten, and conceivably to carry out, carefully planned, long-range "demonstration" strikes.

The primary purpose for a small attack capability is to provide options short of an all-out nuclear strike that should aid in deterring the Soviets from using their counterforce advantages against this country as a means of coercion during a crisis. LNO forces then would be designed for a selective and flexible capability able to demonstrate: (1) an ability to make discriminate attacks, (2) a desire to avoid escalation, and (3) a resolve to avoid capitulation on enemy terms. The capability for LNO requires improvements in such area as command and control mechanisms, secure communications systems, rapid retargeting capabilities, and improvement in current missile guidance systems. Suggested improvements are relatively inexpensive and none of the proposed programs would be in violation of any arms agreements or would they require new missile silos. The concept of limited strategic nuclear options is directly related to our national security in time of severe crisis situation and is developed or the basis of our perception of the Soviet threat and corresponding capabilities designed to deal with that threat.

IN CONCLUSION, the theory of flexible responses—nuclear options—is not to be feared; thinking the "unthinkable" need not mean that nuclear war becomes more likely. On balance, a mutual superpower capability for LNO should tend to reduce the likelihood of a nuclear war rather than increase its likelihood. What is dangerously destabilizing to the superpower nuclear balance is a unilateral ability to employ nuclear weapons in a finite measure in order to blackmail or coerce the side that lacks a flexible response capability. Indeed, unilateral capability may induce the possessor to open the crisis game with a small nuclear strike designed to demonstrate resolve and determination to achieve perceived objectives. A response-in-kind capability possessed by both sides should discourage experimentation with nuclear gamesmanship by either side; deterrence of limited nuclear attacks becomes real, and the international political equilibrium is maintained and strengthen at emerges from this is an unambiguous necessity to be able to deter a Soviet coercive strategic for the rest of this decade and on into the 1980s.

Offutt Air Force Base, Nebraska

Notes

1 "President Richard M. Nixon's Message on Foreign Policy for the 1970’s to the Congress of the United States, February 18, 1970," Nixon: The Second Year of His Presidency (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, 1971) p. 76-A.

2. "Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979 Defense Program" (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 4, 1974), p. 4

3. Example include Ted Greenwood and Michael L. Nacht, "The New Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense?" Foreign Affairs, July 1974; Lawrence Martin, "Changes in American Strategic Doctrine—An Initial Interpretation " Survival, July-August 1974; and Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "The Rise of the Schlesinger Strategy," Washington Post, July 14, 1974. Also see Orbis, Fall 1974, for eight related articles by authors such as G. W. Rathjens, Donald R. Westervelt, and Colin S. Gray.

4. G.W. Rathjens, "Flexible Response Options," Orbits, Fall 1974, pp. 683 & 687-8.

5. For a detailed exposition of this argument see Barry E. Carter, "Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Weapons," Scientific American, May 1974, pp. 20-31.

6: Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: Stalin's Purge of the Thirties (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 533.

7. For a scholarly discussion of the Soviet view on the use of nuclear weapons and their relationship to conventional warfare, see Dallas C. Brown, "Conventional Warfare in Europe—Soviet View," Military Review, February 1975, pp. 58-71.

8. For current Soviet polltico-military philosophies, doctrines, and views see Marxism-Leninism on War and Army; Colonel General N. A. Lomov et al., Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs; V. Ye. Savkin et al., The Basic Principles of operational Art and Tactics; A. S. Milovidov and V. G. Kozlov, The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War; and A. A. Sidorenko, The Offensive, all translated and published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force, Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1970-1974.

9. For an easily read analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the rationalactor viewpoint, see Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1966).

10. For the quantitative factors that are germane to deterrent relationships, see Ian Bellamy, "The Essential Arithmetic of Deterrence" Journal of the Royal United Services Institute, March 1973, pp. 28-34.

11. See Edward Luttwak, "The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Nuclear Weapons Balance," The Washington Papers, vol. 11, no. 13, 1974, for a comparison of U.S. and Soviet Union strategic nuclear forces (data obtained from unclassified sources).

Colonel William M. Charles, Jr., (USMA; M.A., Central Michigan University) is Executive to the Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command. His assignments include flying B-47, B-52, and F-100 aircraft: as an Air Officer Commanding at Air Force Academy; at Hq USAF in the Directorate of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives (DCS/P&O); as assistant deputy commander for operations of a B-52H wing; and Deputy Director of Operations, Hq SAC. Colonel Charles is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Army Command and General Staff College, and Naval War College, and has completed Air Command and Staff College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

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