Document created: 6 February 03
Air University Review, March-April 1977

Myths and Vietnam

THE title Neither Peace Nor Honor* is deceiving. Author Robert L. Gallucci has written an objective analysis of how isolation of key government officials during the Vietnam war's early years (up to 1967) led to a morass in which decision-making became a matter of increasing participatory exclusiveness. He homes in on the air war against the Communists and the tactics of "search and destroy," which are subjected to close scrutiny. But there is nothing in the book that deserves the title of Neither Peace Nor Honor.

Gallucci began this work as a doctoral dissertation, which probably accounts for the detailed annotation and bibliography, but he has altered the necessary scholarly approach to make a highly readable and succinctly analytical study of why, not how, things went wrong in Vietnam. Be warned, however; I can recommend this book only to those whose "parochial back" does not stiffen at the touch.

*Robert L. Gallucci, Neither Peace Nor Honor: The Politics of American Military Policy in Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1975, $10.00), 187 pages.

There are some brutal things said about the United States Air Force and its bombing in Southeast Asia. But the brutality is tempered since this is not a strident, antiestablishment work. Such quotes as the following from Senator Stuart Symington to Air Force Chief of Staff John P. McConnell during an appropriations hearing in 1967 provide some idea of the book's tone, however.

If you all don't get after some meaningful military targets in North Viet-Nam, Air Force and Naval airpower will go down the river. People are going to lose confidence in airpower. This country will be left in a position where the Navy will consist of submarines and sealift, and the Air Force missiles in silos and airlift.

Unfortunately, the scope of the book does not extend beyond 1967 so the author cannot bring in a final verdict. The B-52 bombing of North Vietnam around Hanoi in the final months of 1972 and its apparent success in bringing the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table appear to counteract the implied conclusion that the entire bombing effort was a waste of time, effort, and lives. But the strength of the book is that you, the reader, will be disposed to render an objective judgment.

The search and destroy tactics of General Westmoreland are also subjected to a hard look. A fascinating part of the analysis is Westmoreland's maneuvering to get the 1st Cavalry Division, the U.S. Army's first "airmobile" division, to Vietnam. The very presence of this type of highly mobile organization in Vietnam sealed the fate of the defensive enclave concept that was a pet theory of General James Gavin, an outspoken critic of U.S. tactical doctrine in Vietnam. As Gallucci points out, the usual Boy Scout image of Westmoreland holds no credence when one considers that the 1st Cavalry Division was the first major army formation committed to battle. From the very beginning Westmoreland intended to carry the war to the enemy, and he did.

This book fills a vacuum, and it fills it in a highly readable and dispassionate manner. Even if one disagrees with many of the author's conclusions or premises, one will be exposed to some thought-provoking analyses.

ON the other hand, The Myths of National Security** is a strident, argumentative, abrasive work by an ex-CIA specialist who purportedly "pinpoints growing dangers of America's 'secret government.' " The book is published by Beacon Press, "the nonprofit book publishing house sponsored by the Unitarian Universalist Association for responsible exploration of the human condition." But the reader is not privy to this information because the author, Arthur Macy Cox, a former member of Truman's White House staff, starts out from left field and stays there.

**Arthur M. Cox, The Myths of National Security: The Peril of Secret Government (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975, $9.95), 231 pages.

There is no introduction, no statement of purpose, no establishment of bias. Finally on page 205 I found out what ax Cox was trying to grind. He is trying on you, the reader, the need for " . . . an entirely new approach which will implement the sound principles of independent intelligence estimating, for the first time." How this central theme is to be reconciled with the banner title will have to be left to your own determination. I am still not reconciled to either Cox's style or his conclusions, and although he articulates, he does not communicate.

Perhaps if one is sensitive to the events of the past few years, one is suspicious of anything painted in absolutes of black and white. Cox gives the reader little middle ground to maneuver in, and an adversary relationship is soon established between the printed word and the reader. How does one separate the critical elements that are components of such statements as these?

The principle to be remembered in considering all these measures is the desirability of providing greater openness and freedom of information while protecting essential secrets. We should be careful not to mix considerations of espionage with issues of freedom of information, as Congress did in 1959 acting under the influence of McCarthyism and Stalinism.

Grand as they are, they say too little. And so goes it throughout the work. But be warned, this is a book of argument, not of analysis or even of chronology. The author knows his battleground well, but one is not tempted to enter the lists against him. The title is his battle cry, and one is certainly drawn at least to consider contesting his many simplistic hypotheses. Frankly, I do not think it is worth it.

It is too bad that the reader cannot read the flier that preceded publication of the book. It would do yeoman service as a foreword or introduction and allow one to set his frame of reference at the beginning of the book, not in the middle.

All in all, Mr. Cox has his say, but his approach turns the reader off and in doing so vitiates the impact of his argument. It is a short, compact work one might thumb through in a library while researching contemporary politics.

NOT so The Wars of Vietnam 1954-1973* by Edgar 0'Ballance. O'Ballance is an experienced and objective chronicler of military activities. He first came to my attention when he wrote a definitive piece on the 1956 Sinai campaign and the events surrounding it. Since then his name has appeared on a number of military works.

*Edgar O'Ballance, The War of Vietnam 1954-1973 (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1975, $13.95), 224 pages.

O'Ballance is true to form in this book that easily qualifies as a primer on the conflict in Vietnam from 1954 to 1973. But one could only wish he had waited until the collapse of the American will to meet its commitments in 1975 to finish it. Having also written The Indo-China War 1945-54: A Study in Guerrilla Warfare, he must now decide whether or not to write a Vietnam trilogy. He might best wait, however, until final peace is assured in that now-united country.

This is a lively account that moves the reader along fast. It is not extensively documented, but then the author makes no pretense that it is or should be. But his index appendices, and list of abbreviations contribute to its value as a Vietnam chronicle. Objectivity must be stressed as a strong point, but it seems strange to read of oneself in the U.S. as "the enemy" on the battlefield.

Although there is much to praise here, a couple of areas must be criticized, too, areas where authors often lose control over their work. Improperly captioned pictures--never to my knowledge has there been an M-42 light tank or a production model M-144 armoured personnel carrier--detract not from the interest or even the credibility of a work, but they do reflect negatively on the professional expertise of the author. This failing seems most frequent in writings about foreign military establishments: O'Ballance is an English author.

The second problem area is the maps, which are very poor. Names to be named are missing. Maps are improperly juxtapositioned to the text. Some of them contribute nothing to the book at all. Unfortunately this malady seems to be the rule rather than the exception in many military works.

O'Ballance makes many valid points, but one seems particularly pertinent. He accuses the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MAC/V) of treating the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) as a second class army and laments the failure to treat Vietnamization seriously until too late. Hindsight being what it is, I agree with the author emphatically. Undoubtedly the U.S. soldier's arrogance, vocalized in such appellations as "gook" and "slope," really worked against our efforts. The imprint of U.S. values--as for instance the conventional and outmoded regimental organization--on the Vietnamese coupled with our desire to do it all ourselves did not and probably could not come to fruition.

Had the United States started a valid program of Vietnamization in 1966 rather than in 1969, more ARVN units would have performed as some did in 1972 along the My Chanh River in northern South Vietnam. Unfortunately, one cannot be sanguine about our ability to learn from this mistake since our sights have now been turned almost exclusively to that area where we would best like to fight-Europe.

For those who want a broad survey of the action and an easy pocket reference, this book should prove to be quite useful. And it will be useful, too, for those who want to do without emotion and have the story told ". . . as it really happened, which may not be quite as many would have liked it to be told."

Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York

Contributor

Raymond E. Bell, Jr., (USMA) is a lieutenant colonel in the New York Army National Guard. He is presently working on his doctoral dissertation on unions in a professional army, concentrating on the only volunteer army ever to have had a labor union--the Postwar World War I Austrian Army. Recently, he was in Vienna, researching military unionism. Mr. Bell is a graduate of the Army War College's Correspondence Studies Course.

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