Air University Review, January-February 1977

Deterrence: Reckless Prudence

SHOULD we buy more or less of gadget A? Should we reduce deployment B by a few percentage points or not? Most current articles on defense policy stay at the level of asking such questions as these. What is missing in nearly all of the contributions to the debate is an examination of some fundamental assumptions and implications of the cornerstone of American defense policies, nuclear deterrence: hoping and confidently expecting to persuade the Soviet

Union not to attack us by threatening thermonuclear counterattack. Most public officials, writers, and ordinary folk deem deterrence to be reliable and proper. Deterrence is widely accepted as one of the few "givens" in contemporary affairs.

But if a principal function of the intellectual is-almost by definition-to subject society's "given" operating assumptions to continuous scrutiny, then surely few topics are more in need of this ongoing critical examination than deterrence doctrine..

According to this doctrine, the government in Moscow can be counted on to behave like a rational individual. It will value survival more than any other goal. It will be well-informed. It will carefully calculate all the consequences and all the pros and cons of each option in every crisis. It will be sensible. And it will cautiously adopt limited objectives in the international arena so as not to incur American wrath and revenge.

flawed mortals

But the Soviet government is run by a collection of people. And most of what we know about both human behavior and governmental decision-making should make us skeptical about the rosy picture the confident proponents of deterrence paint.

People can be counted on to behave rationally only part of the time, nonrationally and even irrationally the rest. Frequently throughout history they have held some. things more dear than "mere" survival-honor and glory come to mind. To some extent people are also usually captive of habit or ideology or public opinion. And they may be poorly informed, especially about secrecy-shrouded military capabilities and intentions. They are clearly capable of evil and folly, error and accident, misperception and delusion, incompetence and passion.

The problem may be compounded when such decisions are made by small groups of people rather than by single individuals. What psychologist Irving Janis calls "groupthink" sets in, with all the members of the group so anxious to get along with each other, maintain their power positions, appease the group leader, and push the interests of their respective bureaucracies that they suspend the critical thinking required for rational decision-making.

The problem is certainly further aggravated in a crisis situation when time pressures, poorer information, fear, exhaustion, higher risks, and a tendency toward belligerent machismo all cause a deterioration in the already low level of rationality we can expect from the Hawed mortals hovering over the buttons.

Can we really count on the Soviet system always to work so well, producing wise leadership groups that will behave so rationally on into the 1980s and beyond even in the gravest crises? Most of us know too much history to have that kind of confidence in the performance of any political system, perhaps especially highly personalistic authoritarian regimes lacking institutionalized controls on executive discretion. Paradoxically, those in our society most critical and suspicious of the Soviet government--call them conservatives or hawks--who ought to have the gravest doubts about Kremlin dependability are, nonetheless, the staunchest and most confident supporters of deterrence doctrines and attendant weapon systems and budgets..

"But," someone is sure to say, "deterrence has worked pretty well these past . thirty years, hasn't it?" Can we really be sure, though? Perhaps, like the fellow standing on the corner waving his arms and blowing a whistle who had managed to convince himself that he was thereby successfully keeping the elephants from attacking, . we have convinced ourselves that the only reason the Russians have not conquered Europe is because we have frightened them into restraint. They, of course, have likewise managed to convince themselves that the only reason their system has not been overthrown by angry Westerners is that they have frightened us into abandoning such goals. Historians may well conclude that neither side ever had the intentions the other feared and thought it had discouraged with threats of nuclear retaliation.

And, anyway, even if it could somehow be proved that nuclear deterrence has kept the peace for the past thirty years, these same historians would be quick to point out that thirty years is not a very long time, that devices for keeping the peace in other times have worked as long only to fail later.

It ought to be clear to all of us that deterrence--really a form of applied psychology--is historically, psychologically, and politically naïve to a dangerous degree, our confidence in it quite unwarranted. One of these days--if, alas, the balloon goes up--I suspect the survivors will say: "Of Course deterrence was bound to fail; how silly that we ever had any faith in it!"

ethical doubts

Since government policies also ought to be judged on ethical as well as practical grounds, we should look, too, at some of the more troublesome ethical implications of nuclear deterrence policies.

Our government openly and unabashedly contemplates the deliberate killing of tens of millions of people, most of them noncombatants. In the authoritarian countries of Eastern Europe and Asia against which the United States would retaliate, the people we hold hostage have so little to say about their governments' decisions that they could hardly be deemed culpable of aggression and thus deserving of annihilation. And in neighboring countries not even parties to the quarrel, the citizens and ecological support systems would notwithstanding suffer permanent radioactive poisoning. Could this undiscriminating genocidal and ecological destruction even conceivably be deemed justifiable vengeance? For that matter, is vengeance of any kind consistent with our deepest moral convictions?

Second, if decisions to retaliate must be virtually automatic and instantaneous, how can the decisions of our President and his associates possibly be based on moral choice which requires time-consuming reflection and consideration of alternatives, as well as--under our democratic system--at least some role for public opinion?

Finally, might society's values that deterrence is designed to protect be endangered by the nuclear deterrent itself? Can a constitutional polity governed by elected civilians endure even as military men and military thinking gain in political influence during a time of continuous national insecurity? Can a traditionally liberal and humane society survive as such even as its people and their leaders become calloused by their acceptance of nuclear holocaust as an instrument of national policy? And, if deterrence fails (as it has, of course, countless times throughout history), whatever Americans survive the catastrophe will surely not enjoy the blessings of liberty and democracy during the extended, harsh recuperative period. Of what moral character is a means which itself endangers or surrenders the end?

beyond nation states

If deterrence, then, is not only unreliable but also morally bankrupt, what shall we do, now that we realize our predicament? Or, you might say, "OK, suppose nuclear deterrence is dangerous and repugnant; what alternative do you suggest?" Well, less reliance on threats and other negative sanctions and more reliance on positive incentives would be a start; people ordinarily seem to react better to offers of mutually beneficial deals than to scare tactics. We are now betting our lives that the Soviet leaders are ordinary and sensible enough to be dependable custodians of nuclear weapons and advanced delivery systems. Presumably, they are thus likewise sensible enough to be manipulable with inducements. So let us have less self-righteousness and more détente, arms control, expanded trade, and improved diplomacy--the usual liberal approaches that have finally caught on even with conservative administrations. Shifting our emphasis increasingly away from negative and toward positive approaches may help, Developing and relying increasingly on programs with a positive cast and moving the violent tools back into their proper place of final resort would be an improvement over the present threat system in global relations, Such a shift of emphasis would also, of course, result in more ethically agreeable policies.

But maybe one day soon we will have to concede that there is no way to reconcile continued national sovereignties on the one hand and the nuclear weapons that have rendered governments unable to perform their key function of protecting their citizens on the other. Just as gunpowder, revolutionary ideals, and industrial commerce spelled doom for the feudal system of castles and moats 400 years ago, thermonuclear weapons and ICBMs may force the replacement of obsolescent national states and governments. If deterrence is no defense, perhaps there is none to be found. The whole effort to "improve" deterrence may be just as doomed as were the efforts that I suppose were made by sixteenth century' defense intellectuals and military planners to "improve" their moats and castle walls to protect against threats that they could not quite see were undermining the entire social and political order. We are probably now living in the transition period between the age of nation states and whatever era is around the corner.

Purdue University

Dr. James A. Stegenga (PH.D., UCLA) is Professor of Political Science at Purdue University. A specialist in international relations and military affairs, his writings included The Politics of Military Policy, The United Nations Force in Cyprus, and The Global Community as well as articles and reviews in professional and popular periodicals. As an Army enlisted man, he spent 1960-61 in Korea, a news writer and TV announcer with Armed Forces network.

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