Air University Review, January-February 1977

Nuclar Proliferation and U.S. Security

INDIA'S DETONATION of her "peaceful nuclear explosive" in May 1974 was held by some to be a noon-event, while others saw it as epoch-making. For the first time a country other than one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council had demonstrated a nuclear explosives capability. ¹ While no additional members have publicly joined the nuclear weapons club since that initial jumping of the firebreak, world events give little encouragement to hopes that membership will be held to six. Informed sources have charged that Israel has already constructed six to ten atomic weapons; ² an Argentine legislator recently called for the construction of a nuclear weapon as a means of gaining prestige for Argentina; ³ and the world's energy crisis will make it progressively easier for countries to indulge in nuclear weaponry as nuclear power stations produce more and more reactor by-products that can be processed into weapons-grade fuel.

Nations might wish to construct nuclear weapons for any number of specific reasons, but these reasons can be generalized into a few broad categories: to increase military power to counter an immediate military threat; as an extra measure of insurance against the 'capriciousness of an unpredictable future, such as situations in which a more powerful nation would attempt coercion; or to display the capability to the world solely for its prestige value in order to increase the country's status in subjects not necessarily related to military matters.

Lincoln Bloomfield has estimated that the construction of new nuclear power stations will give present nonnuclear weapons countries a potential by the early 1980s to make 50 atomic bombs per week. ⁴ The prospects of such a widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons have resulted in an extensive body of literature concerned with general disruption in the world order and dangers to world peace resulting from such proliferation. ⁵ Herman Kahn has estimated that 50 small nations could have impressive nuclear arsenals by the year 2000 and predicts that under such conditions the international system would be in a virtual state of anarchy. ⁶

Although such dire predictions may eventually prove true, they also may have obscured the need to give more attention to what can be expected in the immediate future: the future toward which we must develop plans, against which we must allocate resources, and in which we must deploy weapon systems. While it may be theoretically possible for 50 more nations to have constructed atomic bombs within the next 25 years, our immediate concern must be what can be expected to take place over the next few years. Only in a more restricted time frame can useful predictions be made and practical measures taken to counter perceived threats. Therefore, ten years into the future will be the far horizon of this study. Any attempt to forecast beyond that is too speculative to be useful when examining specific countries' capabilities. The discussion will be further restricted by limiting it to the direct military threat of nuclear proliferation to the security and vital interests of the United States during that period.

THE NUCLEAR powers have shown an understandable reluctance to share control or give away their atomic weapons. With the exceptions of the United States toward Britain and Russia toward China prior to 1961, the nuclear powers have shown a similar reserve in sharing the secrets of weapons development. Fortunately for the country that wants to build an atomic device, however, there are very few secrets standing in the way. In fact a newspaper article has told of a young college student who designed an atomic bomb, using technical data widely available in unclassified sources. ⁷

The theory is simple: bring together enough of anyone of several fissionable materials to form a critical mass. If this material is brought together quickly enough, the energy released by the spontaneous chain-reaction splitting of the atoms of the substance will result in an explosion. For instance, a mass of plutonium can be constructed just below its critical mass, which is from four to seven kilograms, ⁸ depending on the purity of the material, and an additional amount of plutonium can then be fired, like a bullet, into the first. If the total mass is greater than the critical mass, and if the "bullet" is fast enough, an explosion will result from the sudden release of energy involved in the chain-reaction fission. While this particular technique has not proved very efficient, it illustrates the basic requirements for producing a nuclear explosion.

Whereas the theory is well known, in practice several problems arise. The first is getting the fissionable material. Since two of the materials that can be used are isotopes of uranium, U233 and U23S, it is possible to make atomic bombs out of uranium. Naturally occurring uranium, however, has very little of the fissionable isotopes. * For instance, only 0.71 percent of natural uranium is U23S. ⁹ Natural uranium can be enriched; through physical separation techniques, the percentage of fissionable isotopes can be increased. It is possible to enrich uranium until it is of weapons-grade quality, but this is, at present, a very expensive undertaking.

*Isotopes of a given element have the same number of nuclear protons but differing numbers of neutrons. Naturally occurring chemical elements are usually mixtures of isotopes so that observed atomic weights are average values for the mixture.

Another fissionable isotope is the plutonium isotope PU₂₃₉. This isotope is a by-product of virtually every nuclear reactor now in operation. Thus, while reactors may be designated in a variety of ways, such as "military" or "power" reactors, even the peaceful electrical power station reactors produce plutonium that can be extracted from other waste products and transformed into bombs. This method is not inexpensive either; but it is less expensive than enriching uranium to a weapons-grade quality, and the growing number of nuclear power reactors in the world is increasing the available supply of plutonium from which nuclear weapons can be made.

If a country embarks on a program to deploy a nuclear weapon system, the first obstacle to be overcome is the research that would be required to develop the final configuration as well as a delivery system for the weapons. Another significant factor, of course, is cost.

William Van Cleave and Leonard Beaton have attempted to place a cost on programs necessary to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Beaton estimated in 1966 that a $450 million investment over a ten-year period could support a minimal nuclear force of five bombs a year. This sum included the costs of modifying its existing commercial or military aircraft, for delivering nuclear bombs. His estimates included $100 million for refining uranium to fuel grade, a reactor, and a plutonium separation plant. He allotted another $75 million for constructing and instrumenting a test range. Twenty million dollars per year went for production costs for the bombs after a $25 million research and development (R&D) effort to develop the first one. He estimated $5 million per year to adapt and maintain a rudimentary, nonspecialized delivery system. ¹⁰ His estimate for a modest program of more sophisticated smaller bombs and a specialized delivery system was between $230 and $310 million per year over a ten-year period. Finally, Beaton also analyzed the well documented British and French programs to establish the cost of a small force of superpower quality. He found that the British program cost $300 million per year and the French $336 million per year over a twenty-year period. ¹¹ These estimates are for programs starting from scratch. Further, the annual costs are averages for the respective ten- and twenty-year totals, but a few of the yearly figures are very much higher than the average while others are lower.

Nearly a decade later, in 1974, Van Cleave noted that "non-electrical generating reactors capable of producing enough plutonium for a half dozen to a couple of dozen bombs per year are available on the open market for prices ranging from about $15 million to $75 million, perhaps including the initial fuel loading." ¹² He estimated the cost of a fuel fabrication plant at $3 million and pointed out that India's plutonium separation plant cost $7 million. He put the cost of a weapons laboratory at $3 million. ¹³

Many countries have decided to build nuclear reactors for power production. If they later decide to use the plutonium waste products for weapons, additional funding will be required only for separation plants, weapons laboratories, initial R&D costs, and delivery systems. A rudimentary system, assuming the reactor is already available, should be on the order of $350 to $400 million over a ten-year period. The percentage of the costs associated with offshoots of peaceful nuclear technology can be expected to account for less of the total costs, as the military programs get more ambitious. Thus, even discounting the costs of nuclear power reactors, the total costs of a modest or a superpower-quality force would be approximately $3 billion or $6 billion respectively, over ten- and twenty-year periods.

As Beaton pointed out, both Britain and France spent approximately $6 billion over a twenty-year period to reach the level of sophistication that he termed "superpower quality." Since there are no nations other than the existing five major powers presently committed to a goal of building a superpower-quality force, it is highly unlikely, and probably impossible, that any present nonnuclear weapons country could, under any set of circumstances, develop a force of that quality within the next decade. The possibility that even one could do if is so remote that the question will be pursued no further; therefore, only the possibilities of minimal rudimentary or modest nuclear programs will be considered.

THE PROBABILITY of a specific country's embarking on a nuclear weapons program is dependent on several factors, the most important being whether it can afford such a program. The sacrifices that a country will undergo to support a program are, in turn, dependent upon its motivation for desiring nuclear weapons. A very poor country may desire nuclear weapons but not be able to afford them, while a country that could easily afford them may have no need. Political and geographic factors could drive one country to expend a large amount of its gross national product (GNP) on developing nuclear weapons; another country with the same economic capability and GNP might opt for a very small conventional military force.

The Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a useful analytic tool that gives a rough indication of which countries do not wish to pursue a nuclear weapons program and those that might wish to do so. The very act of signing and ratifying the NPT is strong indication of an intent not to build a nuclear force. While signing and ratifying the NPT could be a subterfuge, the difficulty of keeping such a program secret would make such deviousness impractical. It is also possible that a nation may have signed the NPT with every intention of abiding by it, yet a future change of government, widespread proliferation, or some other unforeseen event could cause that country to renege on the agreement. Nevertheless, since there is no logical way to take such random events into consideration, it will be assumed that a signature on the treaty plus its ratification removes that country from contention for nuclear weapons status in the near future. Even so, this still leaves the rather large number of 61 nations that have not signed the document or ratified it. ¹⁴

Walter Hahn has identified 26 of these as countries that he considers potential nuclear weapons candidates. The 25-in addition to India, which has already demonstrated the capability-are listed in Table 1.15 These are the countries that either have significant natural uranium deposits or own, or soon will own, operational nuclear reactors that could provide adequate amounts of fissionable uranium or plutonium for bombs if enough money and national commitment were to be applied.

Of the several general reasons for a country to initiate a nuclear weapons program, the need to counter an immediate threat may be identifiably related to existing defense programs. If a country feels immediately threatened or extremely vulnerable, a significant percentage of that country's GNP should already be going toward conventional forces. Such a country should then be considered a prime candidate for a nuclear weapons program in the next few years. The large percentage of the GNP's devoted to defense (Table 1) do appear to the author to reflect an approximate relationship to known trouble spots in the world. Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are countries that seem to have the prerequisite motivation for pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Another nine nations (Algeria, Belgium, India, Libya, Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, and West Germany) are in a lower category, which may imply a definite concern with military security but to a lesser degree than the top seven. Of the nine, India's 3.1 percent appears low when compared to the adversary Pakistan because her GNP is so much larger. South Korea's 4.1 percent would probably be much larger except for the military aid being provided by the United States. Bangladesh's percentage would probably be much larger also if not for her unfortunate economic situation.

Another reason for a country to go nuclear could be to gain prestige and serve as a status symbol. Any country acting on such an ambiguous impulse would probably not be willing to spend as much on a nuclear program as it would to counter an immediate threat, but if it could become a nuclear power at a relatively insignificant cost, the temptation would be very great. As already indicated, a country would be facing an average annual increase to its defense budget of $35 million for a minimum nuclear force, or $300 million for a modest nuclear force in order to achieve its objective within ten years. The last two columns of Table 1 are the percentages by which the annual defense budgets must be increased to accommodate additional $35 million and $300 million programs respectively.

It must be noted that these cost figures are only estimates. World inflation would almost surely have increased the expenses delineated by Van Cleave and Beaton. On the other hand, new technology may have reduced others or may do so in the next few years. The estimates are probably as reasonable as any.

Argentina was mentioned as one country that is at least discussing the possibility of developing a rudimentary nuclear weapons program for prestige purposes. If Argentina can contemplate such a program, other countries with comparable or bigger defense budgets should also be considered potential status seekers; specifically, those countries which could develop a program with the same, or a lesser, percentage increase in their defense budgets as Argentina's 3.4 percent must be considered candidates, from an economic standpoint, for small status seeking programs. Only Algeria, Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, and Libya would require more than a rather modest five percent increase in their defense budgets to develop a minimum nuclear force. On the other hand, only Egypt, Israel, Italy, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and West Germany could develop modest programs for less than a ten percent increase. Thus, for only a five percent increase in their annual defense budgets, most of these countries could develop a minimum program, and a few could develop a modest program for less than ten percent. Even a ten percent increase might come at great sacrifice, however, where the defense budget already constitutes a large percentage of the GNP (e.g., Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia); Israel is a special case since it may already have developed nuclear weapons and included the cost in its present and several previous budgets.

One of the requirements for developing a delivery system for a minimum program is an existing conventional delivery system that can be modified for nuclear warheads or bombs. "The Military Balance," compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, and published by Air Force Magazine, was used to determine which countries have operational weapon systems that could conceivably be used as a nucleus for developing a nuclear capable delivery system. At this point, those countries that could deploy a tactical delivery system will be discriminated from those that conceivably could deploy a delivery system capable of placing nuclear weapons on American targets.

Although an atomic bomb delivered by an F-4 might be quite spectacular, it is of little military significance within the context of this discussion. To engage a nuclear power in nuclear warfare without the capability even to threaten the enemy's homeland would be foolish to say the least. Such a scenario may not be completely beyond the realm of possibility, but common sense seems to dictate a capability to reach American sovereign territory in order for another nuclear power to be considered a direct military threat to the U.S. None of these countries possess missiles with intercontinental capability. None of them possess long-range bombers, and only Israel owns air refueling tankers, so the threat to the U.S. from long-range air or space attack is nonexistent at this time and into the foreseeable future, unless Japan should embark on a program to develop military ICBM's and, at the same time, turn hostile toward us. Many of these countries do have oceangoing naval vessels, however, which could be used to carry surface-to-surface missiles, cruise missiles, or, in two cases, jet aircraft. The Argentine and Indian navies both have a single aircraft carrier.

Table 2 is a summary of these military capabilities as well as a summary of the naval capabilities of each country. An X in the first column indicates the country may feel a need for more than a minimum military establishment because of critical regional hostilities or some, other undefined fear about security reflected in substantial military budgets. An X in the second column indicates the country could develop a nuclear force with less than a five percent increase in the defense budget. An XX indicates the country could develop a modest force with less than a ten percent increase. An X in the third column indicates the country possesses at least three oceangoing naval ships such as cruisers, destroyers, frigates, or submarines. A conventional force of such ships implies the existence of the critical infrastructure of harbors, dry docks, refueling ships or friendly ports, and fuel supplies, as well as trained personnel and training facilities.

Table 2 shows that some of the countries do not have the military weapon systems available for reconfiguration into nuclear-capable delivery systems. While this does not completely rule out the possibility of a country building a navy or air force with intercontinental capabilities, to do so would be both costly and time consuming. This means that out of the twenty-two countries which might be tempted to build nuclear weapons for either military security or prestige, only fourteen-Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, and West Germany-pose a potential direct military threat to the U.S., based upon a potential capability to modify an existing weapons delivery system for nuclear weapons.

NONE OF these fourteen countries identified as likely to opt for nuclear weapons in the near future are particularly hostile to the U.S. at present. It seems unlikely, then, that any of them would be a threat to the U.S. in the very near future. This is not to say that the political climate will remain static. A few of even what are now considered friendly countries could become hostile. The potential power of West Germany and Japan is often mentioned. While it is not absolutely impossible, the present political situation in Japan and the geographic and economic situations in Japan and West Germany do not support an expectation of a fully rearmed nuclear-capable Japan or West Germany in the foreseeable future.

Even more important, perhaps, the original assumption that only the nations that have not signed and ratified the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty are potential nuclear powers may prove false. Iran is a good example of a signatory that has been seen by some as a possible nuclear weapons state if other Middle East nations develop them first. Another special case is Taiwan. Even though it signed and ratified the NPT, it was as a nuclear power. Taiwan claimed to be the legal government of China and, as such, the possessor of nuclear weapons. As an existing nuclear power, Taiwan insists it is not limited by the restrictions placed upon nonnuclear weapons states by the NPT.

In general, however, it seems that the world political picture and the high costs of the larger nuclear weapons programs do not support a conclusion favoring a significant, direct nuclear threat to the U.S. in the near future. A few countries could develop small nuclear forces; but none, other than Japan's and West Germany's, is large enough to be a viable threat to a major nuclear power. For instance, a small naval-based force of surface-to- surface missiles could theoretically be posed as a deterrent force preventing the U.S. from coercing the small country into some undesirable action, but the imagination balks at the image of a small nation threatening to detonate a handful of nuclear warheads over the U.S. Only the suicidal would contemplate such bravado.

This does raise the question, of course, of the madman who might attack an overwhelming adversary in spite of the obvious outcome. There is the possibility that such a madman might come to possess some nuclear weapons, and the probability must increase as the number of nuclear nations increases. As nuclear weapons do proliferate, we may reopen the debate over a light-area-coverage antiballistic missile (ABM) system. The utility of such a system against accidental firings or small intentional attacks is obvious, but the U.S. has decided for the time being that the present disadvantages of an ABM system outweigh the advantages. Whether an eventual proliferation of nuclear weapons and the world situation at that time would alter this decision is a question which would be answered then but is not a question for the immediate future. The problems to be expected from the acquisition of nuclear weapons by a very few, probably non-hostile countries over the next decade will continue to be overshadowed by the strategic balance between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Continued competition between these two superpowers will keep them so overwhelmingly superior to any aspiring new power that any question of a military threat from new nuclear powers will remain unimportant for a long time to come.

Table 3 is a summary of all weapons presently held by the five existing nuclear powers. It can be seen that for a present nonnuclear weapons state to achieve a level of nuclear capability, even in the same general magnitude as the U.S. or U.S.S.R., is unthinkable.

Even if the SALT negotiations should miraculously result in a permanent freeze or slight decrease in the number of nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, much less the number of weapons in the U.S. and U.S.S.R., it would be many years before even Japan or West Germany could build a' first-strike capability against the U.S. That they would embark on such a progress is so unlikely at this time as to be inconceivable.

THE EXISTING nuclear capabilities of the U.S. and the time and expense of developing a large, modern nuclear weapons program preclude any credible direct military threat against the U.S. by any presently nonnuclear-capable country in the next ten to twenty years. On the other hand, it is possible that several countries could develop very small nuclear forces within the next ten years. While they would very likely be friendly, it is also possible that a few could be in a position and be tempted under certain circumstances of crisis or unstable leadership to launch a few aircraft or short-range missiles against American targets. Since such an attack could have no hope of militarily defeating the U.S., its purpose, probably political, could presumably be accomplished by striking at American coastal cities. The variety of methods of delivering such weapons, perhaps even covertly, would seriously limit the effectiveness of anyone defensive system, but there are measures which might be helpful.

First, the U.S. should make it a publicly stated national policy that any nuclear threat, blackmail, or attack will be answered with extreme measures. Any nation that would take such actions would do so at the price of its very existence as a sovereign nation. Any attempt at a clandestine or anonymous action would be to risk everything if discovered.

Second, military intelligence-gathering activities must include the capability to detect newly acquired nuclear capabilities and to identify anonymous delivery systems such as unmarked submarines, ships, or aircraft anywhere in the world. The technique and equipment needed to perform this type of surveillance for everything except the submarines are probably available but would require additional funds for expansion of existing programs. Positive identification and constant tracking of all nuclear-weapons-carrying vessels combined with our present 474N submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) detection and warning net and our satellite-based early warning system should give credence to a policy of assured retaliation. Lack of an extremely reliable and accurate method of tracking all nuclear weapons-carrying vessels could even invite catalytic and anonymous attacks. Missile-carrying submarines obviously present the greatest challenge, and submarine detection R&D must receive more and more emphasis if additional nations achieve a capability for submerged missile-launching platforms.

IN SUMMARY, any nation wishing to join the ranks of the nuclear powers must be forced to observe the same ground rules that have ostensibly governed the strategic relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for the past 25 years. Each adversary must be made to believe that a nuclear attack on another will result in a retaliatory blow. Each nation must realize that a decision to use a nuclear weapon must be taken with the understanding that it has done so in the face of the very gravest danger to itself. If this holds true for future nuclear powers, the chances for nuclear attacks against the U.S. will be minimized, which may be the best that can be expected in a world of nuclear proliferation.

March Air Force Base, California

Notes

1. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, "Nuclear Spread and World Order," Foreign Affairs, July 1975, p. 751.

2. Los Angeles Times, October 19, 1975, Part I-A, p. 1.

3. Bloomfield, p. 747.

4. Ibid., p. 750.

5. For instance, see A World of Nuclear Powers? Edited by Alastair Buchan (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and The Future of the International Strategic System edited by Richard Rosecrance (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1972).

6. Herman Kahn, Thinking about the Unthinkable (New York: Horizon Press, 1962), pp. 210, 212.

7. Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, November 18, 1975.

8. Leonard Beaton, "Capabilities of Non-nuclear Powers," A World of Nuclear Powers? edited by Alastair Buchan, p. 17.

9. William Van Cleave, "Nuclear Technology and Weapons," Nuclear Proliferation Phase II, edited by Robert M. Lawrence and Joel Larus (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1974), p35.

10. Beaton, p. 32.

11. Ibid., pp. 33-36.

12. Van Cleave, p. 57.

13. Ibid.

14. Walter F. Hahn, "Nuclear Proliferation," Strategic Review, Winter 1975, pp. 17-18.

15. ibid.

16. The GNP's and defense budgets are given for each country in the December 1975 issue of Air Force Magazine, which presents "The Military Balance" compiled by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, pp. 43-104. The percentages were calculated from these figures.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

Major Wayne L. Morawitz (M.A., University of Southern California) is assigned to the telecommunications branch, SAMTEC, Vandenberg AFB, California. A distinguished graduate of Officer Training School in 1963, he served as communications chief of maintenance at Ellington AFB and Ramstein AFB and as a base wire officer at Tan Son Nhut. Prior to his present assignment, he was Chief, Operations Division, Directorate of Communications-Electronics, Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force, March AFB, California. Major Morawitz is a graduate of the Communications-Electronics Staff Officer Course.

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