Air University Review, September-October 1976

The primary utility of nuclear weapons lies in their nonuse. Recognition of this seeming paradox has been a cornerstone of our long-standing national strategy of deterrence. According to AFM 1-1, United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, deterrence is 

a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction to an enemy's hostile actions. The intent is to deter an adversary-- to prevent an act by fear of the consequences--or to impel him to take some action acceptable to the United States. . . Deterrence depends upon a potential enemy's perceptions, attitudes, and judgments concerning the power that can be applied against him. He must be convinced that power exists, that it can be effective, and that there is the will to use it against him.

The essence of this definition is found in the explicit recognition that deterrence is psychological—"a state of mind." Nonetheless, we often overlook this essential ingredient and focus our attention on hardware and forces that will support its inhibitive intent--"that power exists, that it can be effective." Generally, Air Force analyses of deterrence effectiveness tend to revolve around models, war-gaming, numbers, and the like. While wrapped around this quantitative axle, the qualitative psychological and political aspects of deterrence quite often are ignored or relegated to secondary importance. The result is that much of our future force analysis is focused solely on war-fighting capabilities. This important ingredient is presupposed somehow magically to produce the desired psychological and political effect, but it does not always work this way.

Realistic analysis of deterrence requires both qualitative and quantitative assessment, moving back and forth from one to the other. Neither is most important. They work together and are mutually supportive. Most operations researchers would agree with this fundamental proposition. But too many force structure analysts today pay lip service to the qualitative measures and trundle down the "number-crunching" yellow brick road like the Foolish Scarecrow, Cowardly Lion, and Tin Woodman on their way to the Land of Oz, shouting to the qualitative Munchkin* "word merchant" over their shoulder to the effect: "Operations research shall inherit the earth!"

To be sure, the "state of mind" psychological and political gray area and "that power exists, that it can be effective" black-and-white, computer-quantifiable area are sometimes unwilling bedfellows in a single analytical world. The problem is that the psychological ingredient of deterrence is elusive. It is subjective, difficult of definition, and based on inference. Precise, unassailable answers that will satisfy all audiences are impossible. We just do not have analytical tools that will give us results based on the hard facts and empirical evidence that are so familiar to, and comfortable for, those who are used to living with numbers and hardware.

*As any seven-year-old can tell you, the Munchkins are the oddly dressed little people of Munchkin Land, the area from which Dorothy started her trek along the yellow brick road to the Land of Oz.

Three qualitative yardsticks or values do offer a helpful framework to use in judging psychological and political effectiveness, but they cannot stand alone. Rather, they must be used in conjunction with quantitative analyses to draw support, reveal trends, and force relationships not otherwise apparent, and provide insights upon which a true picture of world strategic balances and power relationships can be based.

Deterrence Value. A prerequisite to effective deterrence is sufficient forces for an assured second-strike retaliatory capability. War-gaming models playing one force against another can produce invaluable insight on which to base an assessment of the physical state of deterrence. But these results are not the proof of the pudding because deterrence is a peacetime objective--a psychological determinant that works on the potential enemy’s intentions. It is based on perceived power or the effect on reducing the likelihood of enemy attack. Qualitative judgments beyond cold numbers are thus required.

War-fighting Value. For deterrence to be effectively perceived in the minds of adversaries, sufficient forces must exist and be seen as capable of being effective against a potential enemy. This value supports the overall psychological concern, but it is a war-waging determinant that works on the enemy's perception of his own capabilities vis-à-vis our own. It is based on actual power or the potential effect on reducing the adverse consequences of an enemy attack. Clearly, computer war-gaming has a major part to play, but warfighting does not exist independently from a potential enemy's "state of mind."

Psychological Value. This value cuts across both deterrence and war-fighting considerations, tying them together. In peacetime it is a sine qua non for deterrence. Both perceived and actual power determinants have a part to play because they have a synergistic effect which is crucial in demonstrating national resolve and real capabilities to friends, foes, and ourselves. In wartime these determinants continue to be relevant; they work together on the enemy's "risk calculus" in his decision either to continue the conflict or negotiate.

Beauty is altogether in the eye of the beholder"--so is perceived power. Reality often is distorted by our preconceived images. These prisms consist of our values, past experience, and wishes. They are a set of refractive lenses through which we see the world. In terms of perceived power, the quantity and quality of existing weapons and those in the research and development stage play an important role. But these "real" inputs to our images are partially mitigated by psychological factors such as the perceived state of the economy, defense budget trends, national will to protect vital interests, extent of consensus behind national leadership, social cohesiveness, state of readiness and morale of the armed forces, and dynamism of national purpose. These cognitive factors inescapably qualify and warp perceptions of the physical deterrence value represented by existing and potential forces. Although distorted, these psychological perceptions constitute political reality to the beholder. They are the stuff that deterrence is made up of--a state of mind. 

Perceived power is the crucial element. It is the perception of physical might that most often influences both political and military decisions, regardless of whether the perception is accurate. It is certainly the critical political factor in the nuclear balance. Perceived power, which is always relative, will determine which side will "blink" first in a crisis confrontation. It will also influence both U.S. and Soviet propensities for risk-taking and sway third parties in their support of one side or the other.

The most difficult problem of assessing perceived power is, strangely enough, one of developing a sense of empathy for an understanding of an adversary's point of view. We cannot stand in Soviet shoes and gaze upon our own deterrence force structure through their Marxist-Leninist prisms. We are prisoners of our own past, values, and desires. A striking example of this problem is the difficulty that many Americans have had in grasping that the Russian view of détente has been entirely different from our own. Probably the best we can do is view our strategic nuclear forces in real terms and infer what is the likely Soviet outlook. This is admittedly a chancy approach. We have few cold facts to justify "our view of their view" of our forces. But we can explicitly state our assumptions and make some intellectually tough gut judgments. The imperative of adequately assessing deterrence and the contribution of our strategic forces dictate that we at least try to infer perceived power as it might logically (or illogically by our values) exist in our adversaries' eyes. Simple wargaming of "real" force factors with the assumption that it reflects the state of deterrence is not enough.

Indeed, the very preciseness of numbers may overlook important clues that could influence perceptions of deterrence. Operations researchers, for example, might find through computer wargames that the nuclear balance is in rough parity, although one side has a clear superiority in numbers of missiles. A case can be made that the advantages of one side are offset by bombers and qualitative advantages in missile weaponry (e.g., better warhead accuracy and yield-to-weight ratios). However, bombers, compared to missiles, operate at a snail's pace, and qualitative warhead advantages may be hidden from view in stacks of classified documents. Do the Soviets see these qualitative advantages in the same way that we do? How confident are they that their extensive defense network can handle U.S. bombers? Does this quantified view adequately reflect the perceived state of deterrence? Indeed, does the Kremlin view deterrence solely in terms of quickly responding missiles? What about third parties? How do they compare the new huge and numerically superior Soviet missiles with our relatively small Minuteman? What is our own view? How do numbers count in deterrence?

It is to be hoped that the chorus to this brief litany is simply that quantitative analyses of war-fighting capabilities tell us virtually nothing about their deterrence value until they are subjectively evaluated in terms of perceived power. Such judgments of a potential enemy's state of mind are problematical, and little empirical evidence is available. But it is far better to have less precise answers to the right questions than not to ask the questions at all because of their non-quantifiable nature.

It is not so much the operations research folks who are falling short of the mark; those worth their salt have a healthy skepticism of the supposed empiricism of their "number crunching" and realize that quantitative analysis is a tool, an instrument for use by managers in making decisions (i.e., in exercising "judgment"). More often one finds that it is the intermediate-level consumer of the operations research product that ascribes too much certainty to quantified results and fails to use the insight offered in making hard-to-reach gut judgments of the psychological and political state of deterrence. By accepting numbers as representative of reality, one is able to abdicate responsibility for assessment of deterrence viability to the machinations of operations research, avoid the tough questions of what might be the more likely Soviet perceptions, and project a supposed acumen to the "true" state of deterrence. In sum, the "right" questions that might help to interpret the quantified evaluations of war-fighting capabilities in terms of perceived power are not asked.

This intellectual flabbiness appears to spawn from a combination of unawareness and complacency--a lack of perception of the Soviet "state of mind" and the relationship between qualitative and quantitative analyses and a certain smugness with the certitude of numbers. Despite the pervasiveness of these weaknesses, education and individual research in four primary areas hold out a potential for strengthening our knowledge of deterrence and appropriate analytical techniques: (1) The Soviet Mind: A psychological profile of Soviet man and expert assessments of how our deterrence posture is likely to be perceived; (2) Deterrence Strategy: A greater depth of insight to the psychological and political aspects of deterrence and how they interact with war-fighting capabilities; (3) Perceived Power: A broad understanding of the dynamics of images and reality in deterrence and the political nonuse of nuclear weapons; and (4) Qualitative-Quantitative Analysis: A keen appreciation of the interrelationship between qualitative and quantitative analyses in reaching the judgments necessary for evaluating deterrence effectiveness.

A good starting point would be a review of the curricula of professional military education courses offered by Air University to ensure that all essential aspects of the four outlined topical areas are treated adequately. Special attention should be given to the role of images and reality in deterrence and the nature of the qualitative and quantitative analysis, for it is in these concerns that we appear to be coming up short most often. Both officially sponsored and individual research by students at Air University could also add a significant measure of insight in all four areas. "The Soviet mind" should be handled gingerly. Here an in-depth knowledge and appreciation of Soviet history, ideology, cultural predispositions, attitudes, and values would be required to avoid impressionistic results; it would be best to leave such assessments to the experts.

A second method of attacking complacency in our analyses is through practical application. Those of us on the front line of today's analytical world should stop for a second and try to take stock of our efforts to determine whether we are too busy doing things wrong to take the time to learn how to do them right. Operations researchers, for example, should make it clear to the consumers of their product that their "number crunching" has provided a tool, not a panacea for decision-making. Working together with their "word merchant" partners, "number crunchers" should also assist and encourage decision-makers to draw inferences and make judgments of the state of deterrence that go beyond cold numbers.

Education, research, and practical application in the four fundamental areas already discussed should ensure us a sufficient measure of success in correcting some mistaken notions of how to evaluate deterrence effectiveness through operations research. Fortified by such knowledge, we will be able to leave the bedazzling Land of Oz with the unflagging courage of the Lion, the new heart of the Tin Woodman, and the superior intellect of the Scarecrow and enter the mundane world of reality. Here the wizardry of "number crunchers" and the profundity of "word merchants" will work hand-in-hand, producing better analyses of our important deterrence strategy. Our enchanted forest is one of computers and words_, combining the war-fighting and psychological values of deterrence as partners in a single analysis.

Cline, Ray S. World Power Assessment: A Calculus of Strategic Drift. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1975. Provides a superior framework for assessing perceived power.

Kelman, Herbert C., editor, International Behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965. Presents excellent analyses of the role played by images and reality in international polities.

Ra'anan, Uri. "The Changing American-Soviet Strategic Balance: Some Political Implications," Great Issues of International Politics, Morton A. Kaplan, editor, 2d ed. Chicago: Aldine, 1974. Contains an effective appraisal of the psychological inputs to deterrence.

Snyder, Glenn H. Deterrence and Defense. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1961. Provides a useful framework for evaluating deterrence and war-fighting values.