Air University Review, November-December 1976

An aura of glamour seemed to surround many of the air activities of World War II. One so appealed to the public imagination, in fact, that it continued for some time to be the subject matter of one of the most popular comic strips of the day, Milton Caniff’s "Terry and the Pirates." Colonel Philip G. Cochran, first commander of the Air Commandos, was the model for "Flip Corkin" of that famous cartoon series, and through Corkin and his covert adventures in Southeast Asia, the activities of the Air Commandos, undoubtedly much fictionalized, had a popular following.

The adventures of today's Air Commandos are not so widely glamourized and publicized, but the tradition of the Air Commandos continues in the Tactical Air Command's Special Operations Forces (SOF). Those airmen now assigned to special operations are part of the 1st Special Operations Wing (SOW), whose headquarters is at Hurlburt Field, Florida.

Today's SOF must be capable of rapid worldwide deployment and employment throughout the full spectrum of conflict. Using assigned resources with augmentation from other active or reserve forces as required, SOF must be ready to conduct both conventional and unconventional warfare as well as per-form other activities.¹ It is important to realize that while these forces constitute only a small portion of the U.S. military, they can provide flexible options to our Commander in Chief. In fact, timely employment of SOF may well prevent the escalation of conflict or commitment of large-scale conventional forces.

In some areas of the world or under certain circumstances, it may not prove feasible or even possible to commit conventional forces; the threat may dictate employment with unconventional or special tactics. The remote location of the operation as well as its international implications may also require that activities be rapidly conducted under austere or low-visibility conditions. Proper employment of SOF can produce savings in human life, prevent political entanglements, and reduce expense. As an example, strained relations between the United States and another country could deteriorate to the point of international crisis without an early American response. In such an event, swift, short-term action involving small numbers of personnel would reduce exposure to hostile fire and provide flexibility, especially during rapidly changing conditions. SOF units, which by design consist of a minimum of personnel and equipment, could be the ideal solution. On the other hand, SOF is not an answer to long-term engagements. In fact, SOF participation should be terminated if the desired results are not attained in a relatively short period of time.

The recovery of the beleaguered United States merchant ship Mayaguez from the Gulf of Siam in May 1975 illustrates SOF responsiveness. Although the Mayaguez was recovered by a mixture of forces, that mixture included fast-reaction SOF personnel, equipment, and tactics augmenting conventional forces in a joint operation. The fact that both the ship and crew were recovered demonstrated to potential adversaries that the United States is determined to respond rapidly to suppress efforts at intimidation.

The special employment of air power has a considerable history. During World War II, special operations forces were developed under the air commando concept, and participants became known as "Air Commandos." These men first saw action in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater, providing mobility for the forces fighting against the Japanese. Their roles included airlifting troops over nearly impassable terrain, resupplying guerrilla forces, and giving fighter support; Colonel Philip Cochran, of course, was one of these CBI "Commandos." Specially trained units, such as Doolittle's Tokyo Raiders, functioned within the special operations context during World War II, and the concept was operative in the Korean conflict as well.

During the fifties, our national defense posture focused primarily on the Eisenhower-Dulles doctrine of massive (nuclear) retaliation. Therefore, military emphasis was directed toward developing the necessary strategic capability, and it required most of our defense dollars. This philosophy prevented retaining special units as well as many regular tactical forces. Thus, we witnessed the demise of Special Operations Forces because of a major shift in national policy.

During the early sixties, however, a significant event occurred that led to the gradual reincarnation of special operations: Nikita Khrushchev announced the Soviet intention of dominating world affairs. The Soviets, aware of the U.S. potential for nuclear destruction, were not willing to risk general war. As their means to world domination, Soviet leadership chose to capitalize on wars of national liberation. The Soviets believed that supporting such wars was both justifiable and inevitable and would circumvent nuclear retaliation.

President Kennedy recognized that our military forces were neither organized nor equipped to cope with this type of warfare. He ordered the Department of Defense to strengthen our ability to meet the threat of smaller wars and guerrilla movements posed by our cold war enemies.² In response to these tactics the services began to study the threat, develop contingency plans, establish schools for educating personnel in this brush-fire warfare, and form units specifically tailored to combat insurgency. Thus, special operations forces in all services re-emerged.

The first positive Air Force action was to establish a special air warfare capability, nicknamed "Jungle Jim." The original Jungle Jim concept was to develop a low--profile force designed to operate in limited-involvement, low-intensity conflicts under austere conditions.³

Much of the equipment used by sop then was of World War II vintage. This equipment was suitable for the level of expertise and sophistication found in countries that were to be targets for so-called wars of national liberation; it was selected on the basis of simplicity, ruggedness, and compatibility with the air forces of other countries. Generally, it either was in use or retrieved from storage to reduce cost—e. g., the A-1, AT-28, C-46, C-47, C-123, and A-26. The Jungle Jim personnel were highly trained, flexible, and resourceful, with a detailed knowledge of the areas of the world in which they could be expected to serve. Their key requirements were to understand the cultural, military, and political complexities of certain key areas; to be able to serve in those areas under austere conditions; and, when needed, to develop proficiency in the language of the host country. The personnel were all volunteers and were selected on the basis of technical qualifications, motivation, and resourcefulness. Emphasis, therefore, was on people and training, not just equipment.

The Jungle Jim organization initially sought to develop and test Air Force Special Operations tactics and to select and train personnel who could make them work. Formed in 1961 as a composite squadron, it developed light air strike, airlift, as well as photoreconnaissance capabilities. Jungle Jim originated as the 4400th Combat Crew Training Squadron but later became a group. Under the Special Air Warfare Center, it evolved into the1st Air Commando Group and. more recently became the 1st Special Operations Wing, as it is known today.⁴

Shortly after Jungle Jim was formed, training teams were deployed to Southeast Asia to aid the Vietnamese, Laotians, and Thai in improving the capability of their air forces against the growing North Vietnamese threat. It was during this period that we saw the initial introduction of aircrew and aircraft maintenance instructors for such aircraft as the C-47, T-28, and A-1.⁵ Those early efforts may well have been responsible for preventing the quick demise of the South Vietnamese government. Similarly, in 1964, a team was deployed to Thailand to train Royal Laotian Air Force pilots in tactical operations. At the time of deployment, the Laotian Air Force consisted of only a few T-6s, L-19s, and C-47s and thus had almost no combat capability. But over the years, as a result of this project, the Laotians achieved the ability to mount up to 3000 strike sorties per month. During the mid-60s, as the conflict progressed, general purpose forces were introduced into Vietnam, and as this occurred, the theater SOF elements were integrated into the larger effort.⁶

Undoubtedly the most notable SOF-oriented mission in Vietnam was the Son Tay prisoner of war (POW) camp raid. Staged in the closing days of the Vietnam conflict, this operation was an excellent example of special operations employment of air power. While the mission was supported by conventional forces, U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army special operations units were its mainstay because of the nature of the operation and the need for tight security. Although the POW's had been moved from the camp, the operation was worth the effort in terms of the improved morale and treatment of the POW's.

During the Vietnam era, SOF presence was active in other areas of the world. Most notable were the internal security programs m Latin America, where the emphasis was on nation building and host-country civic actions. In this connection, SOF units were based in the Canal Zone, deploying training teams to countries such as Guatemala, Colombia, Chile, and Brazil.⁷ Of particular interest is the fact that Colombia and Brazil eventually developed their own indigenous special operations units. However, SOF activities in this area of the world have ceased for the most part, due to realignment of mission priorities.

All U.S. military forces derive their basic mission from a variety of documents published by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS guidance is further expanded by the respective services as a key part of the chain describing the specific mission and functions of their forces. The forces tasked for special operations are instruments of national policy to be used as directed by the national command authorities. All Air Force commands are prepared to support special operations; the Tactical Air Command, however, has been singled out as the focal point for Air Force special operations.⁸

As Air Force Manual 1-1 states:

Aerospace special operations forces conduct counterinsurgency [foreign internal defense], psychological operations, unconventional warfare, and functions which may be considered adjuncts to or in support of various other operations. Aerospace special operations forces are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct special operations at all levels of war-fare . . . particularly suited to subtheater and localized conflicts.

The gamut of special operations includes airlift, strike, and reconnaissance, using both fixed- and rotary-wing assets.

Foreign Internal Defense. A focus of the SOF mission is foreign internal defense. FID is the term used to describe assistance provided to selected foreign governments in a wide range of programs, including political and diplomatic activity, economic and military assistance, military civic actions, public works, and other specialized activities such as psychological and counterinsurgency operations.⁹ FID operations are conducted on request from the host country and are intended to enhance the internal security of the nation. The role of SOF in these operations is to encourage, advise, and train indigenous personnel in nation building and internal security activities. The fundamental principle of FID is that indigenous effort must dominate the defensive effort. To guide indigenous efforts requires area-oriented, specially trained personnel whose activities are closely coordinated with other U.S. civil and military programs to ensure continuity and efficiency.

FID is an extension of the Security Assistance Program. In response to national command authorities, the Air Force prepares and implements tailored security assistance training programs.¹⁰ These programs are tied to the foreign military sales or grant-aid programs, and our interest in these areas is continuing. When properly applied, they are an effective method of assisting allied nations to attain a level of military self-reliance. A prime example of special operations in this role is the mobile training team (MTT), which may be composed of Air Force personnel sent temporarily to a foreign nation for instructional purposes. The idea is to help people to help themselves. Under this concept, one or more persons are deployed to instruct the host country's instructors in subjects that vary from academic to technical.

Since the termination of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, SOF has deployed three C-123 MTT’s: one each to Thailand, Korea, and the Philippines. The deployment of these teams illustrates the ability to tailor special operations MTT's to the equipment possessed by the host country: the three MTT's were deployed after all C-123s were deleted from special operations and reassigned from the active forces to the reserves. Active-duty personnel with previous C-123 expertise were identified, temporarily assigned to the reserves to regain C-123 currency, then deployed as an MTT. An OV-10 MTT has been deployed to Venezuela, and similar training was recently completed stateside for Indonesian OV-10 pilots and ground crew personnel.

Another example of training assistance is the fact that SOF provides area orientation for personnel who have been assigned to support a recent development known as the Technical Assistance Field Team (TAFT). This training is offered through the USAF Special Operations School at Hurlburt Field. Selected civilian and military personnel are schooled in the mission of a TAFT and the cultural aspects of their area of assignment. Presently a TAFT course for Iran and Saudi Arabia is in progress.

Psychological Operations. A second aspect of the Special Operations Forces mission is psychological operations (PSYOP). In basic terms, PSYOP consists of actions (active or passive) taken to influence or change the opinions, behavior, or emotions of the target audience. This audience is always foreign and may be friendly, neutral, or hostile. When PSYOP programs are directed exclusively against a hostile foreign audience, the term is "psychological warfare."¹¹

The primary function of PSYOP is to gain sympathy or support for national objectives or to deceive, confuse, or break the enemy's will to resist. PSYOP is not a recent concept, having played a role in conflict for centuries. Sun Tzu long ago understood the importance of psychological operations when he wrote,"…for to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill."¹²

The Air Force has a number of ways to exploit PSYOP. Programs can be carried out either unilaterally or with the assistance of the indigenous population. Methods include a show of force on the low end of the conflict spectrum, activities to reduce enemy effectiveness, humanitarian assistance to gain support, and information programs or propaganda to gain support or psychological advantage.

On occasion, actions can be more effective than words. General Jiminy Doolittle's epic raid on the Japanese mainland is an excellent example of a single action causing repercussions far beyond those anticipated. On 18 April 1942, sixteen American B-25s launched from the aircraft carrier Hornet to effect the first Allied strike against the Japanese homeland.

The destruction wrought by the bombs dropped from the sixteen planes was relatively small, but the psychological effect upon the Japanese was devastating. Their war leaders boasted that they would reach the western shore of the United States, march to the east and dictate terms of surrender in the White House. Intelligent exploitation of the initial assault on Pearl Harbor and subsequent early success in island warfare had convinced the people of Japan of the complete invincibility of their armed forces. What quickly became known as the Doolittle Raid destroyed that myth; it showed them the awful power of the country which lay four thousand miles across the Pacific.¹³

Tangible consequences resulting from the psychological pressure exerted by the raid were soon realized: it proved the vulnerability of the imperial capital, and the Japanese High Command subsequently dedicated four badly needed fighter groups to the protection of the national territory from future raids. Moreover, the Battle of Midway was an indirect result because the Japanese believed that the capture of Midway Island and key points in the western Aleutians would preclude similar attacks in the future.¹⁴

Another interesting example of the effective use of PSYOP occurred in Vietnam and centered on the North Vietnamese belief in astrology. The United States secured the cooperation of certain North Vietnamese astrologers who, in turn, published erroneous astrological information for general consumption. As a result, many echelons in the North Vietnamese hierarchy believed certain times of the year would not be propitious for launching major offensives. The United States created this deception to avoid attack during the monsoon season, when the flying weather was particularly poor. At such times, air cover for the American and South Vietnamese forces would have been minimal.

The Air Force PSYOP programs mainly support the U.S. Army and are usually planned and directed by unified commands. SOF emphasis in PSYOP during Vietnam was limited primarily to leaflet delivery and loudspeaker broadcasts. However, the widespread use of civic-action teams in Vietnam and other areas had inherent psychological effects, particularly in gaining sympathy and support for our national objectives.

The Air Force is expanding its knowledge of PSYOP by conducting formal academic training to expose personnel to the strategic and tactical value of such operations. This training, incorporated in a relatively new course conducted at the USAF Special Operations School, enhances the ability of our personnel to influence others through the use of PSYOP. Finally, USAF special operations personnel participate regularly in joint training exercises in which practical experience in PSYOP can be gained and operating procedures can be tested and improved. Principles learned and techniques developed can thus be retained for future use.

Uncoventional Warfare. The third major feature of the SOF mission involves support of the unconventional warfare (UW) forces of the Army and Navy. UW covers a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy, enemy held, enemy controlled, or politically sensitive territory. UW includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, direct action missions, and other low-visibility operations. UW most often is a function of supporting or assisting friendly military, irregular, or guerrilla forces against enemy conventional, police, or paramilitary targets.¹⁵

The interrelated fields of UW are rarely a unilateral service function; they are almost always conducted with our sister services or allies. SOF provides the necessary airlift, resupply, radio relay, communications, navigation, surveillance, and firepower in areas where the presence of conventional air power may not be feasible or expedient. In this context, special operations assets such as the C-130E(C) "Combat Talon," AC-130 "Spectre" gunships, and helicopters can be made available to support theater commanders.

The principal application of the Combat Talon involves specialized equipment for terrain-following navigation to and from landing and drop zones, high-speed, low-level resupply, and the Fulton recovery system. With the Fulton Surface to Air Recovery System, nicknamed "skyhook," the Combat Talon can snatch up to 500 pounds of cargo or two personnel from the ground. This is accomplished with a helium-filled balloon, associated life lines, harnesses, and special aircraft equipment. A typical mission might involve the recovery of a downed pilot in an area inaccessible to conventional aircraft or helicopters. During such a recovery, gunships can provide protective air cover.

The AC-130 "Spectre" was originally designed to attack close-air-support and interdiction targets. Throughout its evolution, however, gunships have proven suitable in the UW environment. In addition to close air support and interdiction, gunship applications extend into roles such as base defense, real-time armed reconnaissance, strike control, and armed escort, particularly for SOF helicopters.

SOF helicopters provide a vertical airlift capability. Their applications include infiltration, exfiltration (recovery), resupply, and support of psychological operations. Many remote areas are not suitable for landing the Combat Talon. When more than two personnel are to be exfiltrated, a helicopter is best suited to perform the mission. This can be accomplished by either vertical landing, low hover, or hoist operations.

It is important to reiterate that SOF assets can operate unilaterally, but most often they support the special operations elements of the other services or conventional forces.¹⁶ Moreover, a given situation may progress to the point at which interface between UW and conventional forces becomes necessary. For this reason, SOF planners include both unilateral and joint operations as part of worldwide contingency plans.

The interface of SOF unconventional forces with conventional forces may be illustrated by Project BONUS PRIZE, the nickname for the JCS-sponsored, U.S. Readiness Command-directed effort to improve mutual support between tactical aircraft/missile forces and unconventional warfare forces.¹⁷ All unified commands participate in the project, which uses joint training exercises as the vehicle to develop new methods for using existing hardware.

The distinguishing characteristics of the SOF mission are the variety of responsibilities to FID, PSYOP, and UW operations, as well as to supporting functions. SOF provides numerous capabilities to unified commands upon direction from the JCS. Since almost all special operations are conducted in support of the other U.S. services or other nations, a wide range of direct communication is required with other major commands, unified commands, and other services, and TAC has provided this latitude to SOF. To understand the necessity of this latitude, however, one must also have an understanding of the 1st Special Operations Wing organization.

The 1st Special Operations Wing of the Ninth Air Force is not a standard Air Force wing. Since the peak of activities Vietnam, Air Force Special Operations has been reduced from a numbered Air Force level of command with subordinate wings, groups, and squadrons to the 1 SOW and two theater C-130E (C) "Combat Talon" squadrons reporting other commanders.

Since the 1 SOW is the focal point for Air Force special operations matters the planning and employment agent unconventional warfare, variations from the standard wing organization are understandable. One example is in the structure of the wing staff, where both the wing Plans and Intelligence Directorates report directly to the wing commander. It is here that much of the activity concerning unified and major air commands or the other services is concentrated. Operations Plans, a separate division, reports to the Deputy Commander for Operations as in other wings. The wing also has responsibilities to war-time gained Air Force Reserve special operations units as some SOF contingencies involve the Reserve. Unlike other Regular Air Force wings, the 1 SOW acts not only as their parent advisory assistance unit but also as their intermediate gaining command during mobilization.

The 1 SOW is the only wing-level command in TAC to gain reserve units directly upon mobilization, and it therefore has two concurrent responsibilities: normal day-to-day wing operations and mobilization responsibilities as a gaining command. Presently, two Reserve units are gained--the 302d Special Operations Squadron, equipped with CH-3E helicopters, and the 919th Special Operations Group, equipped with AC-130A gunships.

To form the total force nucleus required for special operations, Reserve and regular personnel are trained through large-scale participation in joint exercises and through formal academic courses conducted by the Special Operations School (USAFSOS) and the Air Ground Operations School (USAFAGOS). Both schools provide the wing an unusual capability to maintain conceptual expertise and operational ability in their respective specialties. The USAFSOS provides specialized courses in FID, PSYOP, and UW, thereby emphasizing awareness of needed expertise in the SOF arena. The purpose is to provide the basic framework of understanding in special operations so that personnel are capable of carrying out their assigned specialties in any situation, anywhere in the world. The USAFAGOS, on the other hand, provides formal training to all services in tactical air operations with ground forces during joint or combined operations. Assigned to the 1 SOW, but not a SOF asset per se, it trains individuals in functions and operation of the USAF tactical air control system and the Army air ground system. This expertise is tied to the formal aircrew training conducted by the 1 SOW in the O-2 and OV-10 forward air control aircraft and other USAF/USA tactical units.

Three unique assets are also assigned to the wing. They include the special operations deployable photo processing cell; the special operations combat control team; and the special operations combat weather team, which is provided by the Military Airlift Command. All are trained for and regularly participate in SOF roles as needed.

It is obvious that the 1 SOW organization varies from the norm due to its unusual assets and mission. Latitude for direct communication is provided, both vertically and laterally. With this arrangement, the 1 SOW functions effectively, helping TAC fulfill both present and future responsibilities to the Air Force.

SOF will continue to be a highly specialized force. Active duty special operations day-to-day resources need not be large. In the interest of economy, we need retain only a small nucleus of special operations personnel which can be rapidly augmented by conventional and Reserve units with a repository of special operations expertise, updated to current requirements.

For the short term, SOF will probably continue much as it is today. Although a small force, Air Force special operations units have contingency commitments to theater and unified commanders, particularly in the area of unconventional warfare. SOF will continue to maintain expertise through exercises with these commanders and through training and deploying our special teams.

Joint training exercises permit individuals to maintain proficiency in their assigned specialties. These exercises also provide the stage to test new techniques and develop requirements for follow-on equipment and tactics. In addition to maintaining contingency capability, the 1 SOW will continue to provide a training base for special operations units located worldwide.

Over the long term, the emphasis of Air Force special operations will probably fall in two broad areas: continuing support of security assistance and improved direct-action capabilities. Thus special operations will be strengthened without a proportionate increase in the size of the force.

In support of security assistance for selected nations, as directed by national command authorities, SOF may be committed to engage in low-intensity conflicts. The orientation will be toward a capability with our sister services' operations units in countering brush-fire type warfare in the interrelated fields of FID, UW, or PSYOP. The indigenous effort must be predominant, assisted by USAF SOF units, U.S. Army Special Forces, and U.S. Navy SEALS. Direct-action missions conducted exclusively by U.S. forces probably will be the last resort. Joint special operations forces may be the first committed to hostilities and withdraw or augment conventional forces if required.

Training will represent the bulk of SOF support of security assistance. SOF assets can be used to instruct employment techniques in weapon systems procured under this program. The concept is a logical follow-on to the various successful training programs conducted in A-1, T-28, A-37, C-47, and C-123 aircraft during years past, whereby aircrews were instructed in employment procedures and tactical air operations.

To accomplish these missions, SOF will need a limited variety of equipment other than that on hand. Equipment determination must be based on the projected requirements of those countries considered as foreign military sales or grant-aid candidates and the training missions required to support security assistance. To accommodate the scope of activities in low-intensity conflicts, aircraft such as the OV-l0, A-37, F-5, and C-l30 are logical but not exclusive choices.

The fundamental principle underlying special operations is the joint effort. Increased joint training across the board with our sister services' special operations units seems to be the best means of improving capability. Emphasis in this area will improve interservice liaison and enhance the uniformity of procedures, particularly if all units can be collocated. Joint contingency plans may be expanded and more tightly integrated.

Beyond FID, UW, and PSYPO, new missions could be developed to include sea surveillance and countering international terrorism. For the former, SOF assets such as the Combat Talon and gunship could augment ongoing activities by providing additional "eyes and ears" with our airborne sensors and monitoring devices. Selective use of these assets could add significantly to our nighttime surveillance and early warning capability. For the latter, a joint force could be trained and dedicated to recover U.S. citizens abroad who are held in captivity by terrorist groups.

We will also have the continuing need to update current equipment with improved cap abilities as they become available, All SOF aircraft will require state-of-the-art electronic defensive systems. The Combat Talon will need updated engines and sensors. The gunships will require improved sensors and monitoring devices as they become available; and the effectiveness of our helicopters would be enhanced by an air-to-air refueling capability and off-the-shelf all-weather navigation equipment.

In the next decade, replacements will be needed for the SOF Combat Talons, gunships, and helicopters. The focus will be primarily on aircraft with performance proven superior to existing platforms, combined with follow-on electronic defensive and sensor systems.

SOF capabilities should also be enhanced with short-field utility aircraft and reconnaissance aircraft. Equipment selection will be based upon ruggedness and the capability of effectively operating in remote locations under austere conditions. In all cases, versatility is the key to multipurpose capabilities. With these assets, SOF will continue to provide commanders with a wide variety of employment options.

Special Operations Forces play a significant role in the support of our national policy and objectives. A well-trained nucleus of SOF personnel should remain intact, as time may not permit their formation after the need becomes apparent and valuable expertise has been lost.

The relatively short history of special operations has clearly demonstrated the recurring need for flexible and versatile forces dedicated to applying specialized techniques throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. Although the international position of the United States has undergone continuing reassessment, the value of SOF capabilities has remained evident to high-level planners and decision makers. The predominant emphasis will continue to be that of maintaining a deterrent posture while at the same time retaining the capability to respond rapidly when required, fulfilling the motto of the 1st Special Operations Wing: ^"Anytime, anyplace."

1. For SOF capability, see AFM 3-5 (draft), e.g., humanitarian actions, pp 1-1-1-4.

2. Air Force Special Operations Force Objective Study Guide- 1975, Eglin AFB, Florida: Headquarters, USAF Special Operations Force (TAC), p. 4.

3. Letter, CSAF/AFOOB, subject: Final Operational Concept "Jungle Jim," 27 April 1961.

4. Special Air Warfare Center and 1st Special Operations Wings, Unit History, 1963-1972.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. United States Southern Command History, 1964-70.

8. USAF War and Mobilization Plan, Vol. I, p. H-1-4, June 1978, Change 1, May 1974.

9. AFM 3-5 (draft), p. 3-1.

10. Ibid., p.3-2.

11. Ibid., pp. 4-1-4-23.

12. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Samuel B. Griffith (New York Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 77.

13. Quentin Reynolds, The Amazing Mr. Doolittle (New York: Appleton-Century-Croft, 1953), p. 169.

14. Carroll V. Glines, Doolittle’s Tokyo Raiders (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Norstand Company, Inc., 1964), pp. 393-96.

15. AFM 3-5 (draft), p. 5-1.

16. Organization and Mission--Field, 834 Tactical Composite Wing, TACR 23-42, 22 July 1974 (redesignation to 1 SOW effective 1 July 1975).

17.Message, USC1NCRED/RCJ5-PO, subject: Improvement in Mutual Support between Tactical Aircraft/Missile Forces and Unconventional Warfare Forces, 31 October 1973.

. . . there is the virtually untouched issue of war-prevention. This is one of the few sectors of international politics where the social scientists have produced potentially usable insights and techniques, virtually none of which are yet taken seriously by governmental or UN decision-makers. In a world where early warning of incipient conflicts can easily be monitored by modern data systems--in which the lessons of past disasters and present irrationalities are plainly written for all to read--there is no longer any reason why the frantic midnight reinvention of peacekeeping has to be viewed as the outside limit of man's political ingenuity.