Air University Review, July-August 1976

After the Bicentennial

the end of an era?

Major Barry M. Meuse

The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.

Harry S. Truman
12 March 1949

There was a time when the influence of the United States in the world was unquestioned. Following World War II, the military and industrial power of the U.S. was unmatched anywhere in the world, and the Western world entered an era of American supremacy. In those early postwar years, the U.S. was the undisputed leader of the free world, and its foreign policies reflected that reality.

Today, as Americans celebrate the 200th anniversary of the founding of the republic, it is appropriate that we examine the current state of U.S. influence in the world. It is appropriate even though the focus of many Americans is inward. The social splintering brought about by U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war, the tragedy of Watergate, double-digit inflation, and the worst recession since 1929 understandably has drawn the attention of many Americans to domestic issues.

Unfortunately, however, there have been dramatic changes in the international environment that may affect Americans as certainly and as directly as their most pressing domestic problems. Some observers feel that if present national and international trends continue, the end of the American era may be at hand. The purpose of this article is to examine that possibility and reassess America's position in the international environment.

The State of Democracy

Democracy is like a rising tide; it only recoils to come back with greater force, and soon one sees that for all its fluctuations it is always gaining ground.

Alexis De Tocqueville, 1833

Democracy in America has developed its own meaning; traditionally it has been the "land of liberty," the last bastion of equality and freedom. Indeed, many have come to consider democracy and the American way of life synonymous. We have cried over it, sung over it, and gone to war over it. After the frontier was conquered, making the world "safe for democracy" became an American ideal.

What has become of the "rising tide" of democracy of which Tocqueville wrote in 1833? Was he an accurate prophet? Clearly, the trend in recent years has not been favorable.

international democracy

First, let us look at the new nations. Between 1960 and 1975, 55 newly independent nations were admitted to the United Nations. Of those 55, only three were democracies (West Germany, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago).1

Second, the number of established democracies has also declined in recent years. Robert Dahl has categorized the democratization of nation-states according to the degree of political participation and opposition permitted within each one. By application of his criteria of ten variables,2 only 29 nations qualified as democracies in 1969. Since Dahl 's work appeared, four of those 29 nations have fallen from democracy. On the affirmative side, one nation, Greece, restored constitutional government in July 1974 (although its future is not certain).3 That leaves a current total of 26 democratic nations out of 158 total nation-states.

In short, while the number of democracies has changed only slightly, there has been a veritable explosion of new nations, almost all of which are ruled by other than democratic means. In 1959 one-third of all the nations in the world were democracies; by 1975 this fraction had shrunk to less than 20 percent.

While there is a definable trend of declining numbers of democratic nations in the world, there is also a rising concern for the quality of internal democracy.

accommodation to socialism

One phenomenon affecting established democracies has been their accommodation to socialism--specifically, governmental control of the economy.

One of the core characteristics of democracy is freedom of choice. As a consequence of their system of choice making, the American people have opted for more social programs in recent years. In so doing, they have turned over to the government increasing control of resources and programs. For some, this is an adverse trend.

C. Jackson Grayson, Jr., Chairman of the Phase II Price Commission, has summed up the economic aspect of this problem in very straightforward language: "Our economic system is steadily shifting from a private enterprise, free-market economy to one that is centrally directed and under public control."4

Further, it is estimated that the federal government accounts for one-third of the gross national product (GNP). However, current trends indicate that federal control of the American economy will climb from its 33 percent level today to reach 50 percent by the end of the decade.5 If that happens, former Budget Director Roy L. Ash has made it clear that the U.S. "…may be irreversibly on the road toward a controlled economy."6

The consequences of the world's foremost democracy's moving more and more toward a controlled economy and welfare dependency have implications which go far beyond rhetoric and ideology. As government spending grows in relation to the total economy, taxes must be raised to pay for the programs. As taxes go higher and higher, the motivation for people to produce decreases. As production goes down, the argument goes, so eventually will consumption (since there will be fewer goods and services available). In Mr. Ash's view, when federal spending hits 50 percent of the nation's GNP, the U.S. standard of living would steadily decline.7 For a nation whose power largely depends on a strong economy, this prospect makes increasing government control a major factor affecting U.S. power and influence.

voting

Other factors indicate that democracy is again "recoiling" in America, to use Tocqueville's word. In a land where voting provides a periodic and systematic check on elected officials, the trend is toward lesser participation. In the last election (1974), only a third of all eligible American voters actually cast ballots. This continues a downward trend for off-year elections. Voter turnout in 1974 was the lowest since World War II--not only in percentages, but in total votes cast.8

The irony is that although Americans seem to be opting for increasing government control and social programs, fewer Americans seem to be actually involved in making their "choices" known in the traditional manner. The "choice" not to participate has placed more responsibility in the hands of fewer people.

Strategic Parity in a Multipolar World

Rivalry is inherent in an international system that functions without global consensus.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

The deterioration of America's military superiority is the second reason frequently given for the decline of U.S. influence in the world. As recently as ten years ago, the United States had overwhelming superiority in nuclear bombers, missiles, and total nuclear payload. Starting in 1965, however, Soviet deployments of strategic missiles began to increase substantially. The U.S.S.R. has since surpassed the United States in the number of deployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM'S) and in the number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM'S).10 (See Table 1.)

Table 1
U.S.--U.S.S.R. military balance 1965 and 1975

1965 1975
U.S. U.S.S.R. U.S. U.S.S.R.
Delivery systems (number)
ICBMs 854 230 1054 1587
SLBMs 496 96 656 750
Long-range bombers 696 140 396 126

The U.S. still has the advantage in strategic bombers and the technological edge in multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV'S).11 But the previous superiority of the U.S. has been reduced to the point where, today, the Soviets have effectively achieved rough equivalence with the U.S.

More important, the Soviets apparently are going much further than "equivalence." Indications are that the Soviets clearly are committed not to parity but to superiority. In the words of one observer: "For the Russians, passing the US militarily is a national goal."12

impact of multipolarity

On another level, the shift from the bipolarity of the Cold War to the multipolarity of the 1970s has special implications for the U.S. The concept of a bipolar world began to crystallize after World War II. At the outset of the Cold War all three factors of power--military, political, and economic--were vested in two opposing nations, the United States and the Soviet Union.

In recent years, however, other nations have made inroads into this structure. China has emerged to take its place beside the Soviet Union as a viable center of Communism and model for Asian development. To some degree, it also represents a potential military force--now with nuclear power. The rising economic power of Japan and Western Europe has likewise divided the West into three major power centers.

 The multipolar nature of today's international system reflects this impact of the Sino-Soviet split and a lessening of America's influence on Western bloc countries. As Japan and Western Europe grow in power, their rise will necessarily mean greater independence from the U.S. and, in the long term, a possible movement toward more neutral ground between the two superpowers.

For 30 or 35 years, America was the political center of the Western world, meeting Soviet challenges with collective Western effort. Today, the U.S faces not only military challenges from the Soviets but also economic challenges from the emerging power centers of Japan, Western Europe, and China. In turn, the Soviet Union, noting the decline of America's military and political power, faces the dwindling resistance of a somewhat fragmented Western alliance. The key word now is uncertainty.

The Paradox of Power

. . .  the United States is no longer in a position to operate programs globally; it has to encourage them. It can no longer impose its preferred solution. our role will have to be to… . foster the initiative of others.

Henry A. Kissinger13

There are, however, some significant developments among other international actors. One of the paradoxes of our time is that the greatest nations of the world can have their power restrained, not only by other nations but by other international factors as well.

multinational corporations

Some Americans are not aware of the hugeness of economic power wielded by U.S.-based multinational corporations (MNC'S). If all the nations and all the corporations of the world were rank-ordered according to yearly "production" (gross annual sales and gross national product), General Motors would be the 23rd largest, with Standard Oil and Ford not far behind. Of the 99 largest entities so rank-ordered, more than half would be multinational corporations.14

To some observers, multinational corporations represent an infringement upon national sovereignty.15 Their view is that some 200 large corporations operate virtually autonomously in more than 20 nations, responsible only to their own corporate management.

The counter to this holds that while there may be some instances of abuse of power by MNC'S (such as International Telephone and Telegraph involvement in Chilean affairs in the 1970s), responsible multinational corporations function nonpolitically in nations all over the world. This second view implies that economic activities are nonpolitical in nature and that economics and politics are both separate and separable.

However, economics and politics are closely related, if not interdependent. The historical notion of national power is that it derives from economic power. In three periods of historical development—ancient, feudel, and modern--economic power was essential to the development of political power.16 Even today, gross national product (an economic indicator) has been used to measure national political power.

Other developments bear out the dependence of political power on economic strength. The concept of multipolarity, discussed earlier in this article, stems from the political emergence of Japan and Western Europe on their economic strength. Neither Japan nor Western Europe could have accrued significant autonomous political power until they had achieved economic power in their own right.

Because of the close relationship between economic and political power, involvement in political issues is unavoidable for corporate giants that control so much of the world's resources. Two recent examples illustrate this problem. In April 1974, Argentine subsidiaries of U.S. automotive manufacturers (Ford, General Motors, Chrysler) were faced with a request from the Argentine government to sell 40,000 cars and trucks to Cuba, still under a U.S. trade embargo. If they honored the host country government and sold vehicles to Cuba, the large corporations would violate U.S. trade policies and transgress U.S. sovereignty. On the other hand, if they honored the U.S. embargo, they would undermine Argentine national policy.

The issue was resolved when the American government yielded and permitted the Detroit auto makers to sell to Cuba.17 Some supporters of multinationals saw this as vindication of their view that MNC'S can contribute to international harmony by breaking down the barriers which separate nations. But no national policies were changed in this case. After it was all over, both Argentina and the U.S. retained their respective trade policies.

In the second example, the British government sought to prevent Chrysler from granting what they considered to be an inflationary wage increase to its British workers in 1971. In the view of the British government, holding down wages was an important part of a program to overcome the nation's depressed economic condition. In Chrysler's view, the wage increase was needed to preclude possible strikes and interruptions in car production. In the end, Chrysler refused to yield to government pressure and raised the wages of its British employees, an act which demonstrated the power wielded by the multinationals.18

By their very nature, the goals of the U.S. and those of multinational corporations cannot always coincide. The U.S. is the base for more multinationals than any other nation. Because much of American industrial capacity lies in these corporations, America will continue to be confronted with conflicting corporate-state problems. Based on past performance, it is reasonable to expect that these conflicts will increasingly be resolved in favor of corporate interests.

In addition, multinationals can be hostages as well as shapers of policy. In the interdependent world of the late 1970s and beyond, the spectre of being drawn into international conflict to protect American-owned MNC'S is becoming easier to visualize.

growing interdependence

One of the most significant developments in international affairs has been the growing interdependence of nation-states. With our celebration of the Bicentennial of the founding of the republic, we should recall that for almost 170 of those 200 years, the involvement of the U.S. in world affairs was generally insignificant. It was not until about 1940 that the U.S. was thrust into the world in a leadership role. At that point, the American industrial base was maturing, and the U.S. economy was recovering from the crushing depression of the previous decade. Only since World War II has the U.S. played an active and dominant role in world affairs, for but 30 or 35 years.

Although some might wish to return to the uninvolvement of an earlier age, it is hard to imagine an America today that could retire within its borders and let the rest of the world go by. Indeed, that option possibly is no longer America's to exercise. Because of the needs of industrialized societies for widely diversified imports, all nations are recognizing their growing interdependence with the rest of the world.

For Americans, the oil embargo of 1973 made it clear just how dependent the American economy is on oil. Even though the U.S. is the second largest producer of oil in the world, its demand for foreign oil, as just one of several critical resources needed to keep the U.S. economy strong, has provided significant leverage to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) nations.

Other shortages are forecast in natural gas, chromium, nickel, aluminum, and manganese--all essential for American industry. Whereas the U.S. enjoyed basic self-sufficiency in natural resources prior to World War II, by 1975 the U.S. was dependent on the rest of the world for essential imports. Some experts estimate that the U.S. is already dependent on outside resources for 26 of 36 basic raw materials used by industry.19 Further, the National Academy of Sciences predicts that reserves of U.S. oil and natural gas will be exhausted in 25 years.20

There are, of course, other dimensions to this interdependency. The growing interdependency to which I refer includes not only economic interdependencies among nation-states but also international interdependencies among cultural, industrial, agricultural, and educational agencies as well. Technological advances in communications and travel have brought food, medicines, and education to millions of needy people around the world through many outlets, including the Food for Peace and other U.S. international programs. Now that satellite television can bring live telecasts of starving children into the homes of millions of Americans, affluent Americans will find it difficult to escape the realities of the world they share with unfortunate millions.

U.S. influence, in the interdependent world, must necessarily abate. As America must increasingly rely on other nations for raw materials to keep its economy strong, it can only be as strong and independent as its suppliers permit it to be--an ironic condition for the most powerful nation in the world. Even while considering the two-way nature of this relationship--America's suppliers need U.S. markets, as well--one realizes that the impact of interdependence on the American superpower is to limit its power. Less powerful supplier nations, on the other hand, have much less to lose.

In short, the increasing power of multinational corporations and the growing interdependency of nation-states have combined to lessen the power and undermine the sovereignty of all countries. America is no exception to these forces. Indeed, because it has the most to lose, it may be the one nation-state most affected.

Synthesis

The problem is not a loss of legal sovereignty but a loss of political and economic autonomy. Most states retain control . . . and are able to pursue their objectives. They are just less able to achieve them.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and 
Robert D. Keohane21

Viewed from the perspective of the events of the last few years and, more recently, from the collapse of American foreign policy in Southeast Asia, America's predominant influence in world affairs has certainly declined The competition for scarce resources and political primacy in a world marked by drastic change makes it clear that the world once dominated by the U.S. can no longer be taken for granted.

international trends

It is important to note, however, that the change in America's position is due to fundamental systemic changes in the international order rather than to any "failure" on America's part. While American policy-makers have had a significant impact on other nations, they have never really been "in control" in the sense of being able to shape the international environment more than very lightly. The trends noted in this article are due more to changes in the international system than to any one nation's policy. This can be demonstrated by briefly reviewing the international nature of these trends:

--Ideology (democracy, in the U.S.) is giving way to renewed nationalism around the globe. In Latin America, Asia, and Europe there has been a notable increase in national consciousness, especially among emerging nations. Among Communist nations, ideology varies significantly. The Communist parties of the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Yugoslavia, for example, are divided on issues of party leadership. In domestic affairs, demands for more consumer products and national benefits are being raised in developing countries around the world.

--Multipolarity means that there are more competing spheres of influence for nations to attract client-states. Less hegemonic and more equal spheres of influence for the superpowers mean, in turn, that their allied nations also suffer a drop in power.

--As nations become more industrialized, they will face the same difficulties as the U.S. in conciliating national interests with the goals of multinational corporations. All developing nations have both the benefits and the problems of having multinationals from other nations on their soil.

--Last, the growing interdependence of states affects all nations, not only the U.S. Today, no single nation has the resources to support both development and industrialization concurrently without extensive imports. As the world's population continues to rise and its resources continue to dwindle, all nation-states will be confronted with basic problems of obtaining and allocating scarce resources.

the fundamental issue

Will the Bicentennial mark the end of the American era, or is there hope to reverse, or at least neutralize, these trends? The answers to these questions may lie in the understanding that America has not lost control of its destiny; it has simply been losing its autonomy, a quality which will increasingly elude all nation-states in the future. The age of national sovereignty, in the traditional sense of unobstructed self-determination, appears to be passing in favor of a more highly integrated world, a world where national objectives and policy options are more influenced by other nations--and other international actors--than in the past. In surrendering a certain amount of autonomy, America nonetheless retains great power and influence in world affairs.

Six Policy References

It is at once the weakness and the strength of democracy…that its fate lies largely in its own hands.

Carl Cohen22

The developments I have outlined in this article lead me to suggest six points that may be helpful in restructuring U.S. policy in an international system marked by dramatic evolutionary change.

--codify international rules of operation, specifying opportunities and responsibilities of both multinational corporations and nation-states;

--establish arbitration and enforcement agencies to resolve conflicts between participants; 

--require standardized accounting data and informational systems to preclude misunderstandings and to permit a clear understanding of the impact of multinationals on the international economic system.

While it seems apparent that these actions should be concluded through international organizations (such as the United Nations), it is possible that selective U.S. action could be a successful first step in reducing the potential for conflict.

In the end, more than they wanted freedom, they wanted security . . . . when the freedom they wished for most was freedom from responsibility, then Athens ceased to be free.

Edward Gibbon

The last quarter of the twentieth century promises more explosive technological change and political consciousness than have occurred in all of American history. To be better prepared to meet those challenges, there is no more urgent task today than that of restructuring American interests and goals to coincide with the realities of the world political condition.

Over the past half century America has moved from isolation to involvement to interdependence. However, unless we can reverse the trends noted in this article, we shall have to purge ourselves of the notion that Americans have a "chosen" role in world affairs. We should realize that if the American role is to be chosen, it may well be one determined by other nations rather than by Americans.

Can we forget the vision that America has held for the rest of the world? "So at last," Mary Antin wrote in 1912 in her immigrant classic, The Promised Land, "I was going to America! Really, really, going at last! The boundaries burst. The arch of heaven soared. A million suns shone out for every star. The winds rushed in from outer space roaring in my ears, 'America!' 'America!'23

Mary Antin's words may seem a little dated in the jaded world of 1976. It may be possible, however, that she has captured the essence of the faith humanity has in its ability to shape its future to its highest hopes. It may also be possible that the vision of the immigrant at the start of this century may be what sustains us into the next.

Will the Bicentennial mark the end of the American era? Maybe . . . but not if Americans have the foresight to adapt to the demands of a changing world. But alone or in a more cooperative, international political system of shifting alliances and increasing regionalism, it is quite likely that America will remain the hope of the world for more than just the next quarter century.

Air Command and Staff College

Notes

1. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1971), p. 248; The World Almanac & Book of Facts 1975 (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc.), p. 588.

2. For a complete understanding of Robert Dahl’s classification, refer to his book Polyarchy.

3. The World Almanac & Book of Facts 1975 (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc.), pp. 519, 536, 562, 582.

4. C. Jackson Grayson, Jr., "Let’s Get Back to the Competitive Market System, Harvard Business Review, November-December 1973, p. 103.

5. Howard Flieger, "Can We Afford It?" U. S. News & World Report, January 20, 1975, p. 76.

6."Social Security Benefits Slash Tied to Creeping Socialism Fear," Montgomery Advertiser, January 26, 1975, p. 3A.

7. Ibid.

8. Howard Flieger, "The Real Loser," U. S. News & World Report, November 25, 1975, p. 108.

9. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era, (New York: The Viking Press, 1972), p. 283.

10. Barry M. Blechman, Edward M. Gramlich, and Robert W. Hartman, Setting National Priorities—The 1975 Budget (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 108.

11. Ibid., p. 109; "American Military Power—Sliding into Second Place?" U. S. News & World Report, November 4, 1974, pp. 30-31.

12. Ibid., p. 31.

13. Henry A. Kissinger, "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," Agenda for the Nation, Kermit Gordon, editor (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 612.

14. U.S. Congress, Senate, Multinational Corporations. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Committee on Finance, 93d Congress, First Session, 26 February –6 March 1973 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 404.

15. Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, The Impact of Multinational Corporations on International Relations (New York: United Nations, 1974), pp. 45-50.

16. Franz L. Neumann, "Approaches to the Study of Political Powers," Comparative Politics, Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown, editors (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1972), p. 52.

17. "Pressure for Deal with Castro," U. S. News & World Report, May 6, 1974, p. 33.

18. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Multinational Corporations in World Politics, " Foreign Affairs, October 1974, p. 169.

19. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "U. S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus," Foreign Affairs, July 1973, p. 710.

20. "Newsgram," U. S. News & World Report, February 24, 1975, p. 6.

21. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., and Robert O. Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion," Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1972), p. 393.

22. Carl Cohen, Democracy (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1971), p. 288.

23. Saul K. Padover, Sources of Democracy: Voices of Freedom, Hope and Justice (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), p. xxviii.

From the Diary of King George III, 4 July 1776 
"Nothing happened today."


Contributor

Major Barry M. Meuse (USAFA; M. A., University of Arkansas) is a faculty instructor at Air Command and Staff College. His career includes flying T-37 and T-38 aircraft in ATC and F-4s in TAC, PACAF, and USAFE. He served as Wing Chief of Stan/Eval at Da Nang AB, Republic of Vietnam, where he flew 150 combat missions. He later spent four years in USAFE, first as a staff officer at Seventeenth Air Force and later at Hq USAFE. Major Meuse’s articles have appeared in TAC Attack and Airscoop. He is a Distinguished Graduate of ACSC.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.


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