Air University Review, July-August 1976

Major General Robert Ginsburgh and Major Edd Wheeler, in an Air University Review article in which they outlined the development of American air power and its use in warfare, identified the lighter-than-air balloon as having been an important milestone along the road to Kitty Hawk. While they were correct up to that point in their analysis, they were far less accurate in their appraisal of what occurred after the first Civil War balloon was launched:

Had it not been for the personal interest and foresight of two Presidents, the air role might have been established much later; and having been established, it might have enjoyed a considerably less meteoric development. President Lincoln impressed upon an unbelieving Union Army the tactical value of military balloons . . .¹

The authors appear to commit the rather common error of attributing a much greater role to the effect balloons had on later developments in aviation than the evidence shows.

Literature on the subject is not voluminous, but it does describe in some detail the formation of the Union Army's Balloon Corps and the work of its founder, Thaddeus S. C. Lowe.² And practically every work includes the familiar story of President Lincoln personally escorting Lowe to see the early commander of the Union armies General Winfield Scott. The general had found all sorts of excuses to keep from meeting with Lowe, even disregarding a personal written request from the President. Most authors feel that without the President's direct intercession Lowe would have made little progress by himself. They discount Lowe's connections in high places (viz., his friendship with Professor Joseph Henry, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution) as well as the fact that a number of prominent balloonists were able to make their military preparations without help from the Chief Executive.

Probably because there has been little serious research into the subject in recent years, there has been a tendency to assume that Lowe and his aeronaut colleagues were actually an indispensable step in the continuous evolution of military air power. The important exception to this thinking may well have been F. Stansbury Haydon, whose Aeronautics in the Union and Confederate Armies (1941) still remains the classic work on the subject. Haydon, however, never completed the second volume of this work, which, I feel, would have disproved (or at least discounted) the evolution theory.³

Instead, I propose, first, that while balloons did indeed provide Union commanders with potentially important advantages, they were not always realized on the battlefields; and, second, that because the tactical and even strategic value of aerial reconnaissance was not fully realized or appreciated, the development of air power might actually have been impeded by several generations. The major thrust of this article is to point out the value of the balloon as a reconnaissance vehicle and to enumerate those factors operating to keep that significance bidden from view.

Balloons were used during the period of the French Revolution and later by Napoleon in some of his campaigns, and early experiments in this country were conducted at the College of William and Mary as early as 1786.⁴ The first serious proposal for using balloons in American military operations appears in 1840 during the Seminole War. On October 12, 1840, Frederick Beasley joined at least two other "patriots" in asking Secretary of War Joel R. Poinsett to consider using balloons to aid in defeating the Seminoles in Florida:

A small number of Balloons, under the direction of skillful and experienced aeronauts, will serve all the purposes of so many telegraphs established in the atmosphere to communicate any desirable intelligence from one part of that country to another.⁵

Beasley went on to add that even if the balloons failed as observation stations, they might still prove useful as psychological tools of war.⁶

There was apparently some thought given to dropping bombs from balloons in the Mexican War,⁷ but the science of conducting war from the air received its greatest impetus and its first major test during the 1860-1863 period.

In the Spring of 1861, a number of well-known balloonists quickly offered their services to commanders in the Union Army. Of primary importance were James Allen, John Wise, John La Mountain, and Thaddeus S. C. Lowe.

On April 18, 1861, Allen joined the First Regiment, Rhode Island Detached Militia, under the command of Colonel Ambrose E. Burnside. Allen brought his balloon with him, and he can be credited with having been the first military aeronaut to serve with American forces.⁸ On June 9, he made the United States Army's first trial captive balloon ascent, but according to Juliette Hennessy, two of Allen's balloons were later accidentally lost at Falls Church, Virginia, in July 1861. This terminated his service.⁹ Later in the war, James Allen and his brother joined Lowe's Balloon Corps, where they provided valuable assistance.

John Wise of Pennsylvania had been asked by the Army to submit an estimate for constructing an observation balloon. His bid was accepted, and on July 21, 1861, he brought to Washington a balloon which quickly was detailed for use in the Battle of Manassas.¹⁰ Wise was placed under the command of Major Albert J. Meyer, Chief Signal Officer, who was determined to move the balloon into action as soon as possible. What followed was a comedy of errors, largely responsible for Wise's losing his job:

A ground crew walked the balloon, already inflated, up Pennsylvania Avenue to Georgetown, up the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, and across the Potomac to Fairfax Road, where Maj. Meyer . . . fastened it to a wagon and the trip was continued. As the party neared its objective, Major Meyer became impatient to reach the scene of the battle; against the better judgment of Wise, he ordered the driver to whip up the horses. Almost immediately the balloon was snagged in the upper branches of the roadside trees; when Meyer tried to force it free, great holes were torn in the bag. Actually, this was not the tragedy it then appeared to be, for had the balloon arrived in time to be of use, the Confederates very likely would have captured it. ¹¹

All four aeronauts were men who had gained some degree of fame in the years immediately preceding the Civil War, and John La Mountain was no exception. According to Eugene Block, he had "aroused widespread public interest with an ascension which landed him in a Canadian wilderness where he remained for days without food or shelter."¹² On May 1, 1861, he submitted to the War Department an impressive list of names of prominent New York citizens who recommended him highly for balloon service in the Union Army.¹³ On June 5, he was placed under the command of Major General Benjamin F. Butler, then commander of the Department of Virginia at Fort Monroe. This position allowed La Mountain to make some valuable contributions to the art of balloon observations until his dismissal from the service some seven months later.¹⁴

At the time La Mountain was preparing to go to work for General Butler, Professor T. S. C. Lowe¹⁵ was busy making ready his own equipment and submitting his requests for military service. For a period of about six months both men worked for the Union Army, although never as a team (for reasons which will be discussed later).

In December 1860, Lowe's avowed intent to make the first crossing of the Atlantic by free-flight balloon had attracted the attention of Professor Joseph Henry of the Smithsonian Institution,¹⁶ a fact that probably had some bearing on Henry's intercession with Secretary of War Simon Cameron on Lowe's behalf in June 1861.¹⁷ Although Lowe never made that flight, he did embark on a journey over the United States which, like La Mountain's trip into Canada, gained him some publicity. On April 20, 1861, he set off from Cincinnati on a free flight. Almost nine hours later he touched down nine miles west of Unionville, South Carolina.¹⁸ J. Duane Squires makes an interesting commentary about that flight:

On the day previous to Lowe's balloon trip, President Lincoln had declared his first blockade of the Southern ports…. So quickly indeed did Southern sentiment against the North and all its works mount that Lowe had the very greatest of difficulty in extricating himself from charges that he was a Yankee spy and in getting back across the Ohio River at all. Only after a circuitous and tedious trip through the back country of the Confederate West did he succeed once more in reaching Cincinnati, bringing back his balloon with him.¹⁹

On July 29, 1861, Captain A. W. Whipple of the Topographical Engineers offered Lowe a position with the U.S. Army, stipulating that he would be paid $30 per day "for each day the balloon is in use for reconnaissance on the Virginia side of the Potomac" and authorizing him twenty men to assist in the operations.²⁰ Lowe declined the offer, opting instead for a contractual arrangement that would guarantee him a longer term of employment, even at a smaller salary. On August 2, 1861, Captain Whipple informed him that the Army would pay him "$10 per day as long as the Government may require your services."²¹ In addition, he was informed, "the materials you will purchase immediately, the best the markets afford and at prices not exceeding ordinary rates."²² It was an accommodating offer, and he thus began an association with the Union Army that would last for slightly more than three years.

While Lowe was still busy constructing balloons and finding assistants, La Mountain was already engaged in actual observations at Fort Monroe.

After some initial delays, La Mountain made a successful ascension near Hampton, Virginia, on July 31, 1861. Rising to a height of 1400 feet, he discovered a concealed Confederate camp with several hundred men near Sewall's Point.²³ Haydon points out that La Mountain made a number of successful ascents at Fort Monroe during the summer of 1861, enjoying the full confidence and support of General Butler:

It is greatly to his [Butler's] credit that he encouraged a branch of military science then in its infancy in this country, when his administrative superiors failed or refused to recognize its possibilities.²⁴

But in August Butler was replaced by Major General John E. Wool. In view of Butler's reliance on and frequent use of La Mountain's balloons, it is rather strange that he failed to impress upon his successor the importance of the observations. Never again did La Mountain have the support of his immediate superior, a prerequisite for successful balloon operations at a time so little was known about this novel operation. His luck appears to have gone from bad to worse, for on November 16, 1861, he lost his largest balloon, Saratoga, at Cloud's Mill during a heavy wind.²⁵

In early December he applied to General William Buel Franklin in Washington for a new balloon, specifically one of Lowe's that was then waiting to be placed in service. Haydon states that in La Mountain's application he "charged Lowe with deliberately storing the new balloons, first to prevent his rival from using them even though they were idle, and second, with the plan of buying them, unused, at the end of the war for a mere trifle."²⁶ Despite the unusual tone of the request, Franklin recommended to McClellan that it be approved. On December 27, the Commanding General informed La Mountain of the following:

It is his [General McClellan's] wish that all balloons shall be under the superintendence of Mr. Lowe. Upon this basis if you can come to an understanding with Mr. Lowe, it may be of interest to yourself and the service.²⁷

Because of the intense rivalry between the two aeronauts, there was little likelihood that La Mountain could reconcile his differences with and then subordinate himself to Lowe. On February 19, 1862, McClellan directed that La Mountain be dismissed from the service,²⁸ thus leaving the field clear for Lowe.

In passing, it is enlightening to examine the nature of the conflict between these two men to gain some insight into their personalities, goals, and what prevented them from working together. On September 20,1861, Brigadier General Fitz-John Porter, acting on instructions from McClellan, conducted a joint interview with the two men. In his report to Colonel R. G. Marcey, Chief of Staff, Porter wrote:

I think the Commanding General can rely upon the cordial cooperation of both to forward his views in working for the service. Both are jealous--Mr. La Mountain has a powerful incentive to action--the desire to obtain a subsistence, and no doubt will work to the best of his ability--of which I know nothing. Professor Lowe is also actuated by powerful motives--not the least of which is (as stated by him)--from the science of the aeronaut, and its perfect utility to the purpose to which applied.²⁹

It might appear that McClellan simply grew tired of the bickering between Lowe and La Mountain and chose to go with the former as being the lesser of two problems.

Any attempt to define the relevance and significance of balloon operations must necessarily focus on determining the value of the observations. Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, British army officer and historian, commented on the role of reconnaissance during the Civil War:

Lack of reconnaissance was a fruitful source of indecisive success and of unnecessary loss. Movements were projected and carried out without previous exploration of the ground or selection of the most effective line of advance. Little care was taken to discover the weak points… and the Confederate divisions attacked exactly where the adversary wished them to attack.³⁰

Henderson's analysis, when compared to the type of information the balloon observers actually discovered, is a curious anomaly. Lowe began his observations for the Army of the Potomac near Fort Corcoran, Virginia, at the beginning of September 1861, and as early as September 11, General Porter informed him that "you are of value now."³¹ An early report by Lowe revealed what he was able to discover and the somewhat general terms he used to describe his sightings:³²

During my observations this evening I noticed a pretty heavy picket force on Upton's Hill and several camp smokes at Taylor's Corners. On the west slope of Munson's Hill there appeared to be a full regiment with a set of colors, their bayonets glistening in the sun as if on parade. I could see nothing of the horses you [Porter] spoke of, but as soon as I can get the balloon inflated again I will go nearer and examine the woods.³³

It should be noted that on September 24 Lowe directed artillery fire from a balloon. The instructions he received were quite simple: "If we fire to the right of Falls Church, let a white flag be raised in the balloon; if to the left, let it be lowered; if over, let it be shown stationary; if under, let it be waved occasionally."³⁴

Up to this point it is evident that Lowe's work was satisfactory, for on September 25, Quartermaster General M. C. Meigs authorized him to construct four additional balloons along with the necessary inflating apparatus.³⁵ By the end of November, he had a total of five new or fairly new balloons (Eagle, Constitution, Washington, Intrepid, and Union) in addition to several older ones from the prewar era.³⁶

During these early months Lowe apparently aroused the interest and curiosity of his superiors to such a degree that they often wanted to obtain a firsthand look themselves. Lowe stated that Generals McDowell, Porter, and Martindale all made ascensions, and on September 7, near Munson's Hill, McClellan himself made the first of several ascents.³⁷

During the first two months of 1862, Lowe maintained balloons and equipment at Budd's Ferry, Maryland, for General Hooker; at Poolesville, Maryland, under General Stone's command; and at Port Royal, South Carolina, for General Sherman. A balloon was also stationed at Cairo, Illinois, where it was used by Commodore Foote for artillery direction during the attack on Island No. 10.³⁸ On March 7, General Berry, one of General Heintzelman's staff officers, ascended several times and observed the evacuation of the Occoquan. According to Lowe, this sighting was the first evidence the Army of the Potomac had of the enemy's retirement from the area near Manassas.³⁹

On April 3,1862, Lowe was ordered by McClellan to accompany General Porter in his advance to Yorktown, and on April 6 Porter himself made an ascent of 1000 feet within one mile of the enemy's works, where he remained for an hour. Toward evening General Butterfield also made an ascent.⁴⁰ Later that month Lowe was able to determine that the Confederates had evacuated Yorktown, and he and General Heintzelman sent this information to the Union Army below by means of telegraph apparatus located in the balloon basket.⁴¹

In retrospect, Haydon maintains that during the fall and winter of 1861-1862, the type of service provided by the Balloon Corps gave the Union commanders information which "though not of vital importance, had been accurate and reliable, and had provided the various commanders with a knowledge of the strength and position of the hostile forces confronting them that they would not have otherwise been able to obtain."⁴² But the best was yet to come.

The high point of Lowe's service occurred during the Battle of Fair Oaks, southeast of Richmond, which began on May 31, 1862. The day before a violent rainstorm had flooded the Chickahominy valley, and McClellan found his army spread out over the area. Confederate General Joseph Johnston attacked, but McClellan was able to reinforce Heintzelman in time to prevent a major disaster, credit for which Lowe fully assumed:

I think that I have reason to presume that the cause of this favorable movement of our troops was mainly due to my report that the enemy were moving down and strengthening in front of Fair Oaks.⁴³

In his report Lowe cited Prince de Joinville's narrative of the battle in which the latter stated, " 'There was some doubt whether the enemy were making a real attack, or whether it was merely a feint; but this doubt was soon removed by reports from the aeronauts, who could see heavy columns of the enemy moving in that direction.' "⁴⁴

Lowe's role at Fair Oaks is further corroborated by General A. W. Greely, Chief Signal Officer, United States Army, who commented on the battle some 38 years later:

The balloon observations of May disclosed to General McClellan the intentions of the enemy to attack Heintzelman, and the reserves moved up to support him were just in time to check this contemplated movement. Had it not been for this concentration the advanced Union forces, which had crossed the Chickahominy, would unquestionably have been driven back on the rapidly rising stream and totally routed. Indeed, it may be safely claimed that the Union Army was saved from destruction . . . by the frequent and accurate reports of Lowe, which clearly discovered to McClellan the determined intentions of Johnson [sic] to overwhelm an army divided by the practically impassable river and swamps.⁴⁵

A contemporary account of balloon operations by General Robert McAllister reported significant observations near Bottoms Bridge even three days earlier. In a letter to his wife dated May 26, McAllister wrote, "I found that in the baloon assention [sic] of yesterday morning a large Rebel force was seen moving towards the center of our line at Bottoms Bridge. "⁴⁶

Even taking into account exaggerations and fading of memory caused by the passage of time, it is evident that Lowe's Balloon Corps in fact played an important service in the Battle of Fair Oaks. This role was duplicated about one month later at the Battle of Gaines Mills, where on June 27 Lowe's observations revealed that Confederate forces were attempting to outflank the Union right. Again, Lowe took credit for saving a large part of the Army of the Potomac:

I have no doubt that the information given in the above reports . . . saved a large portion of our troops then engaged from being taken prisoners, and also caused a strong guard to be placed at Bottom's Bridge and other crossings below, which prevented the enemy from getting into our rear.⁴⁷

Because of administrative haggling and the fact that Lowe had had his transportation train taken from him by higher headquarters, balloons did not participate in the Battle of Antietam.⁴⁸ Lowe's comments provide an insight into McClellan's later feelings about this:

During the battle of Antietam General McClellan remarked on several occasions that the balloon would be invaluable to him, and he repeated this to me when I arrived, assuring me that better facilities should be afforded me in future. It was evident that he was extremely anxious to obtain information of movements at certain points which could be furnished only by the aeronaut, which if he had obtained might have resulted in the complete defeat and utter rout of the enemy while trying to effect his escape across the Potomac. On this occasion he greatly felt the need of reports from the balloons, which, having been on so many previous occasions furnished without even being called for, were perhaps not sufficiently valued.⁴⁹

Lowe later participated in the Battles of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Edward Stackpole questions the manner in which data from observations were used in the first battle:

Burnside received valuable information from this source concerning the roads, troop movements, and dispositions of infantry and artillery during and before the Battle of Fredericksburg. It is questionable that he correctly evaluated and used this information.⁵⁰

At Chancellorsville, Lowe's "two captive balloons opposite Fredericksburg were up and down like jumping jacks on April 29 and 30, sending in items of accurate intelligence. . . . with the result that . . . both the balloon observers and signal stations kept Butterfield informed of enemy movements."⁵¹

While the balloons were relied on to a great extent by the Army of the Potomac, they saw at best only limited action in other theaters of operation.

On December 9, 1861, Lowe informed Brigadier General Thomas W. Sherman that McClellan had ordered him to send an aeronaut and equipment to the Union forces at Port Royal, South Carolina.⁵² Charles Starkweather, an able balloonist with considerable experience, was sent there, but Haydon states that Starkweather remained idle for three months and then performed very little.⁵³ Much the same situation occurred in the West, where Lowe had sent John H. Steiner to General Pope's forces in February 1862. Four months later Steiner still had not seen service and complained to Pope, "I cannot see why I am kept out of active service so long. I am anxious to be placed in proper relation with your command if agreeable to you."⁵⁴ He was able to assist Commodore Foote, but that was the extent of his work.

The Battle of Chancellorsville actually marked the end of the practical service provided by the Balloon Corps. Despite McClellan's alleged assurances to Lowe after Antietam, support rapidly disappeared, reaching its nadir with the appointment of Captain Cyrus B. Comstock, an engineering officer, to supervise all balloon operations in April 1863. Lowe resigned on May 7, 1863, and the Balloon Corps itself was disbanded a month later. Lowe's departure marked the end of practical Army air operations until General Greely resurrected a balloon detachment in 1892.⁵⁵

The weight of the evidence up to this point shows that observation balloons were more than mere toys in the hands of eccentrics. Reconnaissance observations, ambiguous and sketchy at first, were eventually refined into meaningful intelligence data about enemy movements and strength which were of value to field commanders. Also significant was the speed with which this information could be relayed to commanders. Equally important was the effect this speed had on the enemy.

Freeman notes that at the Battle of Fredericksburg Jubal Early "observed that one of the Federal balloons had risen, most inquisitively, as if Professor’ Lowe had known that 'the rebels' had afoot some new treason against the Union. Early concluded that the Federals had discovered his move and be anticipated the worst."⁵⁶

Haydon cites numerous examples of the Confederates' taking elaborate measures to conceal their positions from the balloons and in some cases actually trying to outsmart the observers by constructing such ruses as Quaker Cannon:

The Confederate efforts to vitiate the effect of the aerial observations clearly indicate that Lowe's operations were regarded as a serious threat to the security of the Southern army.⁵⁷

But, as the adage so succinctly states, "Imitation is the sincerest flattery." Accordingly, the Confederates went into the balloon business themselves in the spring of 1862. General Johnston had obtained a captive balloon and secured the services of Captain John Randolph Bryan to serve as an aeronaut.⁵⁸ Only one ascent was made--the balloon's rope broke, taking Bryan on a hair-raising free flight across Union lines and back again--and Bryan's trip is the only recorded account by a Southern aeronaut.

General McClellan himself made an analysis of Lowe's operations and aeronaut an excellent report:

To Prof. Lowe, the intelligent and enterprising aeronaut, who had the management of the BALLOONS, I was indebted for information obtained during his ascensions. In a clear atmosphere, and in a country not too much obstructed by woods, balloon reconnaissances made by intelligent officers are often of considerable value.⁵⁹

In trying to assess what went wrong--why the Balloon Corps's usefulness was never fully exploited, and why it was allowed to disband and the concept of air operations remain buried for almost 30 years--three factors emerge: first, and probably least important, there were some physical factors that limited the employment of balloons; second, there was the nature of the administrative bureaucracy of the Union Army to contend with; and third, the personalities of the aeronauts themselves often hindered their efforts.

McClellan's tribute to Lowe indicated that balloons could not always be used effectively in all tactical environments. Weather conditions obviously could create problems, especially moderate winds and fog.

Another problem which had to be considered was the fact that the balloons frequently drew heavy artillery fire from the enemy guns. Although no balloon was ever lost to hostile fire, a number of near misses were recorded.

Lowe's ground crews changed frequently, but he was apparently able to train them quickly. Still, he himself recognized that it took approximately three hours to inflate a typical balloon, even using his sophisticated hydrogen-generating equipment.⁶⁰

While the balloons and the men who operated them were administratively grouped into a "corps," organization was at best loose, and the chain of command changed frequently:

In relation to the other branches of the service it was an orphan, imposed as an unwanted ward upon the Bureau of Topographical Engineers, the Quartermaster Corps, and the Corps of Engineers. At the close of its existence, the Signal Corps was also selected as its unwilling guardian, but the chief signal officer refused to accept the added responsibility.⁶¹

Several authorities have indicated their belief that had Lowe and his chief assistants been given actual officer commissions, they would have had sufficient authority to exercise the control and supervision needed to obtain maximum effectiveness from the corps.⁶² Without this formal structure, the best that Lowe could hope for was to arrange the best possible working agreement with whoever happened to be commanding the Balloon Corps at any given time.

The last straw in the circle of administrative problems perplexing Lowe was the appointment of Captain Comstock as his immediate supervisor. Each quickly took a dislike to the other, but it is obvious that Comstock's attitude probably left something to be desired. In addition, he lacked the necessary expertise to manage and lead the corps effectively. Almost immediately upon assuming command, Comstock reduced Lowe's salary and fired his father, who had been assisting in aeronautical operations for some time. In a letter to Assistant Secretary of War Watson, Comstock's personality emerges:

On taking charge of this establishment--I found it--as I thought--unnecessarily expensive and reduced Mr. Lowe's pay from $10 to $6 per day and the number of men (civilians) under his control from four to two . . . . In my opinion any aeronaut is capable of taking charge of one of these balloons; so far as managing them in the field is concerned, leaving repairs aside, a man of intelligence can learn it in a week. It seems that Mr. Lowe in reference to these balloons has been acting without the knowledge or authority of any one connected with the army of which he is an employe--prompted without doubt by a stronger sense of his own interests than of those of the government.⁶³

Comstock's all-too-efficient analysis contrasts sharply with Lowe's equally subjective parting comments in his final report to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton:

I feel assured that whatever may be the estimate of my own services, it will redound to the honor and credit of President Lincoln and his Administration that they have availed themselves of every means to crush this rebellion which loyal minds could devise or loyal men be willing to execute. . . . To gain this knowledge has cost me many years of hard labor and nearly $30,000 in money, and for which the United States Government alone is daily reaping the benefits. . . . I have never shrunk from the discharge of my duty, however hazardous, and holding no commission, I have often been perplexed and put to inconvenience in doing the business of the aeronautical department. . . . I have also been at all times exposed to the danger of being treated as a spy had I fallen into the hands of the enemy.⁶⁴

And finally there was Lowe himself. An examination of his character and personality through his correspondence and reports reveals his tendency to maximum self-promotion. His feud with La Mountain and his inability to accept criticism⁶⁵ denote the jealous personal attachment he displayed toward balloons and anything associated with their function.

He was not a careful administrator, and despite the latitude which the Army initially allowed him in making purchases, bills still went unpaid. A letter from Captain John B. Howard of the Quartermaster Office to his superior about an overdue bill for some lumber is only one example of Lowe's lackadaisical attitude:

In reference to the delay in the payment of the account of Messrs. E. Pickrell and Co., I would respectfully state that the bill has never been presented to this office and that Prof. Lowe has neglected to inform me of the fact of his having made the purchase of lumber.⁶⁶

This particular bill had even been sent to Secretary Stanton for payment before it was placed in the proper channels.⁶⁷ Obviously, incidents like this did little to enhance his standing as an efficient manager in the eyes of those who could have furthered his cause.

His neglect in financial transactions extended into his private life as well. In 1862 Mrs. Lowe sent him the following telegram: "We are well. Nothing new. You must send money immediately."⁶⁸ In February 1863, she followed with another reminder of her financial plight: "Did not receive money. Need it badly. We are well." ⁶⁹

Considering his personal and administrative shortcomings, one can perhaps accuse Lowe of being a bit eccentric and neglectful of specific details--but only in his eagerness to prove the practicability of an innovation by showing its compatibility to the demands of modern warfare. Whether T. S. C. Lowe could be hailed as the prophet of military science which he certainly envisioned himself is really quite academic.

There can be hardly any question concerning the success of the Balloon Corps. The only problem is in trying to determine the degree of that success since it is obvious that there really were no long-range objectives established. There were no criteria by which to measure the extent to which the balloon observers were able to provide field commanders with tactical maneuverability. The relationships which existed between Lowe and his assistants and the commanders to whom they were assigned were fluid, ill-defined, and drifted from one day to the next, depending on the battlefield situation and the personalities of individuals assigned.

In spite of it all, it must be recognized that the aeronauts were able to develop an innovative concept of military science--tactical reconnaissance on a scale never before thought possible. Unfortunately, the lessons were not retained and would have to be relearned some fifty years later in a world war.

Why the concept of balloon observation was allowed to ripen and then die on the vine was due to a number of reasons. Three contributory causes have already been discussed: physical factors, military bureaucracy, and the nature of Lowe himself. However, all three were only contributory and not insurmountable.

The Army was hastily disbanded after the end of hostilities, and there is little to indicate that the government did much to analyze and record the lessons it had learned on a hundred battlefields. Had a competent review board been established, it is possible that the significance of Lowe's work would have been recognized and the proper impetus and encouragement given to continued research and experimentation in the use of lighter-than-air vehicles. Had Lowe himself pushed strongly for recognition in the proper channels after the war, it is possible that his work would have received greater attention. Instead, he merely submitted his final report to the Secretary of War, a document which was properly included in the Official Records. His disillusionment with the Army was probably responsible for his not taking further action.

In a sidenote, it should probably be pointed out that there appears to be no record of President Lincoln's further involvement with balloons other than his introducing Lowe to General Scott. Despite the Ginsburgh-Wheeler claims, the Union Army in 1863 still remained unconvinced of the tactical value of military balloons.

That the Balloon Corps performed a valuable service is evident today. However, there is certainly nothing to suggest that the Civil War balloons were a necessary evolutionary element. They were not an essential link in the chain which eventually led to Kitty Hawk. It is more probable that the "meteoric development" of air power occurred totally independent of the events of the Virginia Peninsula during the 1861-1883 period. But there is every reason to speculate that, given the proper circumstances, the balloons could have played a much more important role, adding a dimension to warfare even at that early date that would have to be rediscovered a half-century later.

1. Major General Robert N. Ginsburgh and Major Edd D. Wheeler, "The Evolution of Air Warfare," Air University Review, March-April 1972, p. 5.

2. Without reference to their respective depth of scholarship, some of the available works include: Thaddeus Lowe: Uncle Sam’s First Airman by Lydel Sims, 1964; Aeronautics in the Union and Confederate Armies by F. Stansbury Haydon, 1941; and Above the Civil War by Eugene B. Block, 1966. Lowe is mentioned in many works on the Civil War.

3. F. Stansbury Haydon, Aeronautics in the Union and Confederate Armies, Vol. I (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1941). According to researchers at the National Archives, Haydon never published Volume 2 of this work. Volume 1 is a comprehensive history of the use of the balloon in the Civil War, including operations on the Potomac lines, November 1861-March 1862. The volume ends with the operations in the South and the West.

4. Haydon, p. 23.

5. Letter, Frederick Beasley to Hon. Secretary Poinsett, October 12, 1840, enclosed in QM Consolidated File, "Balloon" Box 87, Letters Received, National Archives. (Hereafter referred to as QM Consolidated File, NA.) It is interesting to note that many of the suggestions made by Beasley were actually adopted by T. S. C. Lowe some 21 years later.

6. Ibid.

7. Haydon, p. 28.

8. Ibid., p. 40.

9. Juliette A. Hennessy, "Balloons and Airships in the United States Army, 1861-1913,"Aerospace Historian (Winter 1969), p. 42.

10. Ibid.

11. Ibid.

12. Eugene S. Block, Above the Civil War (Berkeley, California: Howell-North Books, 1966), p. 98.

13, "Petition Recommending Mr. La Mountain for Army Service," May 1, 1861, QM Consolidated File, NA.

14. Haydon, p. 85.

15. The title "Professor" was lightly conferred on anyone connected with science in the nineteenth century.

16. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series III, Vol. 3 (Washington Government Printing Office, 1884), p. 253. (Hereafter referred to as III OR, 3.)

17. Ibid.

18. J. Duane Squires, "Aeronautics in the Civil War," The American Historical Review, XLII, No. 4 (1937), p. 656. The author cites as his source an account in the New York Times for April 19, 1936.

19. Ibid.

20. III OR, 3, p. 258.

21. Ibid., p. 259.

22. Ibid.

23. Haydon, p. 93.

24. Ibid., p. 109.

25. Ibid., p. 130.

26. Ibid., p. 131.

27. Ibid., p.143.

28. Ibid., p.148.

29. Letter, Brigadier General F. J. Porter, Headquarters Porter’s Division, Fort Corcoran, Virginia, to Colonel R. G. Marcey, Chief of Staff, Army of Potomac, Washington City, September 21, 1861, enclosed in Record Group 94, Office of the Adjutant General, Civil War, Pilots—Balloons and Construction Corps, National Archives. (Hereafter referred to as RG 94, Civil War Balloons, NA).

30. Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, C.B., The Science of War (London: Longmans, Green, & Co., 1905), p. 221.

31. III OR, 3, p. 261.

32. Haydon, pp. 314-18. The author describes numerous indicators and signs that were used as aids in gathering intelligence.

33. III OR, 3, p. 262.

34. Ibid., p. 263.

35. Ibid., p. 264.

36. Squires, p. 659.

37. III OR, 3, p. 260.

38. Ibid., p. 269.

39. Ibid., p. 271.

40. Ibid., p. 273.

41. Ibid., p. 276.

42. Haydon, p. 374.

43. III OR, 3, p. 280.

44. Ibid., p. 281.

45. General A. W. Greely, "Balloons in Wars," Harper’s Monthly, June 1900, p. 42.

46. James I. Robertson, Jr., editor, The Civil War Letters of General Robert McAllister (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 165.

47. III OR, 3, p. 291.

48. Haydon, p. 294 and III OR, 3, p. 292.

49. III OR, 3, p. 292.

50. Edward J. Stackpole, Drama on the Rappahannock (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1957), p. 44.

51. Edward J. Stackpole, Chancellorsville (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1958), p. 163.

52. Letter, T. S. C. Lowe, Chief Aeronaut, USA, Old Point, Virginia, to Brigadier General T. W. Sherman, Commanding Forces at Port Royal, South Carolina, December 9, 1861, enclosed in RG 94, Civil War Balloons, NA.

53. Haydon, p. 381.

54. Letter, J. H. Steiner, Aeronaut, Cairo, Illinois, to Major General Pope, Army of the Mississippi, June 16, 1862, enclosed in RG 94, Civil War Balloons, NA.

55. General A.W. Greely, "Balloons in War, " Harper’s Monthly, June 1900, p. 45.

56. Douglas Southall Freeman, Lee’s Lieutenants, II (New York: Charles Scribner’s Son, 1945), p. 609.

57. Haydon, p. 217.

58. "Balloon Used for Scout Duty," Southern Historical Society Papers, XXXIII (January-December 1905), p. 32.

59. George B. McClellan, McClellan’s Own Story (New York: Charles L. Webster and Company, 1887), p. 135.

60. Letter, T. S. C. Lowe, Chief of Aeronautics, Army of Potomac, Headquarters Aeronautic Department, Camp near Falmouth, Virginia, to Brigadier General S. Williams, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Army of Potomac, March 30, 1863, enclosed in RG 94, Civil War Balloons, NA.

61. Haydon, p. 280.

62. Haydon, p. 302; Hennessy, p. 40; and Robert V. Bruce, Lincoln and the Tools of War (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1956), p. 88.

63. Letter, C. B. Comstock, Captain of Engineers, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, to P.H. Watson, Esq., Asst. Sec. to War, April 25, 1863, enclosed in QM Consolidated File, NA.

64. III OR, 3, p. 317.

65. Letter, Lowe to Williams, Ibid.

66. Letter, Captain John B. Howard, Office of Assistant Quartermaster, Headquarters Army of the Potomac, to Brigadier General R. Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac, March 26, 1863, enclosed in RG 94, Civil War Balloons, NA.

67. Ibid., endorsement on letter.

68. Telegram, Mrs. T. S. C. Lowe, Philadelphia, to Prof. T. S. C. Lowe, Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, Commanding Balloon Corps, no date, enclosed in RG 94, Civil War Balloons, NA.

69. Telegram, Mrs. T. S. C. Lowe, Philadelphia, to Prof. T. S. C. Lowe, Chief Aeronaut, USA, February 10, 1863, enclosed in RG 94, Civil War Balloons, NA.