Air University Review, July-August 1976

What's an MBFR?

Donald L. Clark

When it started in January 1973, it was hailed as the second coming of the famous Vienna Congress, but then it almost disappeared from the international press. It began at almost the same time as the recently completed Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)1 and was labeled the more important and substantive of the two, possibly the talks that would bring substance to the words of détente. But now, three years later, if you want to draw a blank look from the average citizen, indeed even those who pride themselves in knowing what is going on, all you have to say is something like, "What is MBFR?" They usually answer, "What’s an MBFR?"2

My goal is to answer that question and go a bit further, not only to describe the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions but additionally to discuss the military contribution to this international negotiation as an example of how the military input into the United States Foreign Policy Process.

MBFR did not just pop onto the scene in 1973. In fact, the U.S. and our allies had been calling for discussions about mutual reductions of U.S. and Soviet forces in Central Europe for more than ten years. Books had been written about how many U.S. forces were really needed to insure the security of Europe, and reputations had been made by men like Alain Enthoven, who argued that our forces not only could but should be reduced.3 Generally, however, the Western approach for an MBFR conference had been turned aside by the Soviets and their allies, who preferred an All-European Security Conference to deal with a much wider range of affairs.

Under great pressure from the U.S. Congress in 1972 to reduce U.S. troops abroad, President Nixon worked out a compromise with Premier Brezhnev at their famous SALT signing summit to hold both European security and MBFR conferences. Some three years earlier, Dr. Kissinger, as the President's National Security Advisor, had already assigned the Verification Panel (VP) of the National Security Council (NSC) to examine and prepare U.S. MBFR alternatives. The VP had been originally created to deal with the issues in SALT, and it seemed the perfect group to pick up this other arms control topic concerned with the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe. The National Security Act of 1947 calls for military participation in the deliberations of the NSC system.4 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sits on the NSC in an advisory capacity, and representatives of the corporate body, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, work with the various working groups and panels in the NSC system to draft, refine, and develop proposals for the NSC as requested. The military input into the Verification Panel Working Group (VPWG)) for MBFR represents a joint effort by all of the Services. It is brought to the table by a Joint Staff Officer from the J-5 Plans and Policy, Deputy Directorate for International Negotiations (IN). The IN representative, however, presents proposals and input to the other members of the working group only after such proposals and alternatives have been through a process of coordination with interested action officers from all Service staffs and then up through the military organization, where finally an agreed position is approved jointly by the Chiets.5

For MBFR, the Verification Panel Working Group is composed of representatives of several agencies besides the military. They are from the State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and a Chairman from the National Security Council staff.

Normally, in the NSC system, once a problem area has been identified, one of the panels produces a National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) on the subject. That NSSM then becomes the basis for a decision called a National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM). The accompanying chart shows the agencies and flow involved in the MBFR decision process. Extremely complex and large issues like MBFR, however, are too difficult to cover in one study, so a building block process ha been developed; here the subject is broken into many issues on which studies are prepared. The purpose of these studies is focus exhaustively on a specific issue, pointing out its interplay with other issues and identifying several alternative ways to handle it effectively.

These studies are the meat and potatoes of the foreign policy formulation process. Each agency involved attempts to shape the study is the way its members perceive the issue. Naturally, since the agencies are composed of personnel with different backgrounds, since the agencies have different charters and outlooks, and since budgetary impacts and power relationships are, rightly or not, involved, the process is seldom simple.6

Let's take a typical MBFR issue—" whose and how many forces to reduce?"--and try to portray this process with emphasis on the military role. The NSC called for a paper on the issue. Before the military and others can effectively contribute to the system effort to produce a study, they have to reach agreement within their agency or department. For rather obvious reasons, the Army initially proposed withdrawal of Soviet tanks for U.S. nuclear weapons and focused their proposal on U.S. Air Force units, arguing that the Army was already stretched thin and that air units could be more quickly returned to the area in a time of conflict than ground forces could. The AF used partly the same argument to reach a different conclusion. They posited that since indeed air forces could be more rapidly returned, air unit withdrawals were less meaningful; and that ground forces were the predominant numerical forces in the area and the forces that could seize and hold territory and were therefore more appropriate for reduction. The Navy played it low key, agreeing that region of greatest danger was the land mass of Central Europe and that the Navy, located only on the periphery of that area, not a logical target for reductions. The Services developed their position through meetings and papers, with responsibility coordination of the task assigned to the Joint Staff

Rightfully, these Service and Joint Staff representatives did not limit their debates and discussions to purely military issues. To do so might work within the halls of the military portions of the Pentagon, but in the past such "limited" considerations were shot down in flames when exposed to the NSC interplay where economic, political, foreign policy, and negotiating considerations hold equal priority.

Thus, the Joint Staff noted the political and economic facts that reductions of warheads and tanks would not provide a satisfactory response to Congressional demands for significant reductions of U.S. manpower abroad and the alleged monetary savings of such withdrawals. Additionally, based on their meetings with representatives of the United Kingdom and Federal Republic of Germany, whose responsible agencies were involved in similar analyses, the Joint Staff experts suggested that our allies were less disposed to accept U.S. air manpower reductions than they were to agree to ground force withdrawals.

The Joint Staff Studies Analysis and Gaming Agency also assisted in reaching a military decision by dynamically gaming various reduction packages in an effort to determine which were militarily acceptable to the U.S. and NATO and what the critical factors are. Their studies included reinforcement capability on both sides, the effects of pre--positioning, and widely divergent reduction packages for both sides. Later on, this agency gamed the refined NSC system alternative proposals and additionally provided an analysis of the British and German gaming results. The Gaming Agency's contribution to MBFR has been considerable.

Security classification and service sensitivities prevent my describing the final military (or so--called JCS) position that was carried by Joint Staff representatives into the interagency arena in competition with State, ACDA, NSC staff, and OSD proposals. Let it suffice to say that it was a compromise position, not the same as any of the Service or Joint Staff initial suggestions. This is the usual result and raises this question: Does the system result in the best military input being sent forward or encourage compromise that provides "less than the best" although "acceptable" proposal?

After the JCS-approved position is reached, a Joint Staff officer takes it into the interagency arena. The military influence on the subject is to a considerable degree determined by his effectiveness. To be successful, he must above all know his subject well and be extremely articulate in arguing his cause. An important trait that contributes to his potential success is his reception by representatives of the other agencies. He needs to have proved to them that he is not limited in orientation but is a man who understands all of the ramifications of a foreign policy decision.

Behind each of the representatives in the interagency system, there is a formidable staff of experts providing input. For the JCS in MBFR, for example, besides the Service staffs and other Joint Staff offices, he has the Defense Intelligence Agency, the U.S. military in Europe, and contacts with defense experts of our allies, all constantly ready to offer expertise and advice. ACDA, State, OSD, and CIA also have active-duty military and civilian analysts (often retired military) who have worked on military issues for years and consider themselves as expert as the military on the problems.

Not surprisingly, the JCS representative to the interagency process found as many divergent solutions to the "what forces and how many?" issue as he had earlier found in the development of the JCS position. The Office of the Secretary of Defense through its special MBFR Task Force clearly weighed more heavily the Congressional political demand for significant reductions of U.S. manpower than did the military. OSD also preferred reductions that centered more on support forces rather than the balanced cut of support and combat the JCS preferred. 7

ACDA advocated the concept of reducing the more threatening forces (reducing U.S. nuclear weapons for Soviet tanks) and worked hard to insure that the West's position emphasized additional restrictions over and above reductions: e.g., limits and preannouncement on numbers and sizes of maneuvers and troop movements, exchanges of observers at maneuvers, stronger verification, etc.8

State, as might be expected, seemed more concerned with lessening the impact of withdrawals on NATO, with meeting the desires of our allies, which initially, for example, included a strong Federal Republic of Germany desire not to reduce their forces along with U.S. and Soviet; a strong British insistence that the West should reduce the very minimum necessary in combat forces; and a strong a "flank state" concern (Turkey, Greece, Italy, Norway, and Denmark) that withdrawn Soviet forces be restricted as to their new deployment.9 The other agencies favored cuts higher than those suggested by the military. All of these ideas were presented, debated, and haggled over, time and again in meeting after meeting. The papers produced by the VPWG were usually quite voluminous. When agreement could not be reached on solutions or treatment of an issue, the paper included each agency's preferred approach and the pros and cons thereto. Usually, one of the agencies initially drafted a paper and then the others hacked away at it, trying at least to insure that their position was presented cogently and effectively. One of the military's shortcomings in this process is that they seldom accept the task of drafting the initial paper on an issue, even though they may well be the best qualified agency to do so. This is the result of an earlier resistance to arms control by the JCS and a hesitancy to take the lead in developing arms control-type proposals. The drafting agency on any paper clearly has an advantage in shaping the issue, and the harder task is to modify the draft in committee.

This whole process of examining the issues both within agencies and in the interagency arena covered three years before the first National Security Decision Memorandum was issued, and that NSDM only dealt with preliminary conference issues like title, agenda, status of participants, etc.10--the gut issues were worked another nine months before an initial U.S. proposal was finally produced.

Since MBFR is multilateral (19 nations) yet two-sided (NATO/Warsaw Pact) negotiation, a system had to be developed for agreeing on NATO-wide positions and how to present them to the other side. This led to an interagency recommendation to (1) reach national decisions on an issue, (2) carry those national positions to the North Atlantic Council (NAC)11 for discussion, modification, and acceptance as a NATO position, and, finally, (3) transmit the NATO position to an Ad Hoc Group (AHG) at the site of the negotiations where the tactics for carrying out the proposal would be decided by consensus. The AHG was composed of the Chiefs of each Western delegation (refer to the Decision Process Chart).

The Decision Process

The Verification Panel Working Group and the VP never mutually agreed on an initial U.S. negotiating position on the question of how many forces should be reduced. Instead, several alternatives were presented to the National Security Council. At such decision-making meetings, all of the NSC members have been carefully prepared by their staff as to what the studies say and of course the advantages of their and the other agencies' preferred solutions. A key impact on that final decision is played by the man who briefs or writes the executive summary sheet on the final issue paper, since the full paper is usually too lengthy for the NSC members to have time to read.

The military chiefs have had a stronger impact on some NSC issue final decisions than on others. In the SALT I agreement, for example, the U.S. would probably have agreed to limits on ICBM'S only if the chiefs had not held out strongly for inclusion of SLBM’s.12

Although the initial U.S. position in MBFR was not the preferred military choice, it was as close to their proposal as any other agency's and, after the fact, found to be militarily acceptable by the JCS. It was presented to the NAC by the U.S. with the help of a military representative and generally became the basis of the West's initial position. Essentially, it called for a two-phased reduction of ground forces only. In the first phase, U.S. and Soviet forces alone would be reduced (about 15 percent each), and in the second phase other direct participants (nations with forces in the area of reductions) from each side would join in the reductions, reducing to a common ceiling of ground forces at approximately 700,000 on each side. The West, as compensation for the Soviets' geographic proximity to Central Europe and the larger Soviet-Pact forces in the area, suggested that the Soviets withdraw a designated tank army and its equipment (approximately 1500 tanks), while the U.S. could withdraw individual soldiers and leave equipment pre-positioned in the area. The basic concept of the Western proposal is to have the superpowers set the atmosphere of confidence by reducing first and to alter the current correlation of forces in Central Europe by replacing it with a more balanced and thus more stable situation of equal numbers of ground forces on each side.13

But in the early days of the talks, the Soviets rejected the Western outline and called for "more equal" reductions and no alteration of the current correlation of forces, which they claim has successfully kept the peace for the last 30 years. The Soviets instead proposed a three-phase reduction involving all "direct participant" states from the outset and including air and nuclear forces as well as ground forces with equal percentages to be reduced by both sides in each phase. Their reduction proposal totals about 17 percent.14

Both sides have made some revisions since those initial positions were proposed. In December 1975 the West made the most substantive addition to their proposal they offered to reduce a significant number of nuclear warheads (one thousand) if the Soviets would accept the other factors in the Western proposal.15 Since the Soviets had been demanding inclusion of nuclear forces in the agreement, it was hoped this Western concession would break the dead-lock. This so-called "nuclear sweetener" had been part of the U.S. position from the earliest days of the talks but had not been agreed to by our allies until recently. The weaknesses of the "add on" are apparent. From a security viewpoint they commit the West to reduce nuclear weapons but not the East, and from a negotiation viewpoint the Soviets are aware that the U.S. had long been considering such a reduction, even unilaterally. As a concession it is rather undramatic; it has not broken the deadlock.

Although talks have continued for more than two years now, there are still major differences between the two sides that have prevented substantive progress. The AHG has proven a most successful vehicle for coordination of Western tactics. Many (and I include myself among the number) felt that the greatest danger in MBFR was its potential divisiveness on NATO, but the AHG, by being a truly democratic and open organization, has prevented this. The group meets three or four times each week and sometimes more often during negotiating sessions. The chairmanship rotates weekly--all are free to speak their piece, and subcommittees, including military representatives, work together drafting speeches, papers, proposals, and tactics. Naturally, there have been some sensitive issues, but all have been resolved by consensus.

The military representation on the U.S. delegation is typical of the West. We have a major general who serves as the JCS representative (he has been from both the Army and the Air Force), and usually he has one to three assistants from the Joint Staff. The assistants rotate every six weeks or so and return to their stateside posts so they can keep up-to-date both on the developments at the negotiation site and in Washington where the U.S. MBFR policy questions are being considered. In U.S. delegation meetings, these military members are free to offer their opinions and suggestions on any issue. They have been selected to chair committees, draft papers, and at times they have acted even as the delegation's Chief of Staff. In Washington, they also play an active role in the interagency apparatus organized to respond to the U.S. delegation's questions and suggestions. No response is sent to the delegation in which the JCS has not played a role in drafting and approving.

MBFR is now at a crucial stage. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has now been successfully concluded.16 "MBFR’ers" long figured that while CSCE dealt with words, MBFR's task was to translate the words of détente and cooperation into a solid accomplishment of reduced forces on the line of East/ West contact. They knew it would be a more difficult task. Still, few are pleased that the talks have made as little progress to date as they have. The slow pace is partly explained the complex, yet needed, process the West requires before reaching a decision. Perhaps, too, the Vietnam outcome, the Communist danger in Portugal, and the Greek/Turk-U.S./Turkish and Angola difficulties have lessened pressure on the U.S. government for reductions. Thus, changes in the Western stance seem tediously slow in coming about. And, should it change? Let's look at the West's proposal for a moment with Soviet eyes.

The common ceiling concept means roughly that 100,000 more Soviets will be withdrawn than American GI’s, and Western numbers of total Soviet forces (air and ground) are accurate, after the second phase the balance would have been reversed and NATO would have a total force advantage since NATO'S larger air manpower exempted from the cuts.17 Also reducing U.S/Soviet forces first means the East reduces its largest "in area" force (the Soviets) while the West leaves its largest "in area" force (the West Germans) untouched, at least until the to-be-negotiated second phase.

The West's initial attempt to exclude air and nuclear forces from the reductions is the key point of disagreement with the Soviets. Soviet delegates and their published commentators often describe this as most unreasonable Since both U.S. and Soviet military strategists have long stressed the importance in modem warfare of integrated force operations. Soviets frequently cite U.S. authorities when making this point and quote comments that have stressed how U.S. air power balances Soviet ground force advantages in Central Europe.18 Their rejection of the "nuclear sweetener" as being insufficient is based on this integrated operations concept and the argument that war-heads alone do not kill--it takes men and aircraft to make the warheads a weapon.

I am not arguing that the Soviet suggestions are more reasonable than the West's, but I am saying that from certain viewpoints both sides' proposals have merit and there is sufficient common ground to find an acceptable compromise if both sides so desire. A U.S.-initiated "reasonable compromise" proposal could test Soviet sincerity. Up to now, each side has offered only proposals that clearly favor its own situation--why not offer one that gives something to both? Of course, if the world situation has changed and a reduction appears no longer desired, then it may prove best to hold firm and let the talks wither on the vine.

A suggested "equal" proposal in outline form would be the following:

1. Include air manpower in manpower-focused force reductions. Each side would agree to pull out the aircraft and nuclear weapons (unspecified numbers and types) that the number of air troops agreed to withdraw would normally fly and support.

2. In Phase I, agree to reduce all "stationed" forces (U.S., U.K., Canada, U.S.S.R.)19 by 15 percent ground manpower and 10 percent air manpower. Actual reductions would be delayed until Phase II is also agreed.

3. In Phase II, include the other "direct participants’ "20 ground forces, another 10 to 15 percent reduction with the U.S./Soviet reduction to be any portion of the total. The larger numerical Eastern cut provides some compensation while recognizing the dual purpose of Soviet forces in the area.21 The common ceiling is dropped. Second phase withdrawals would follow the first phase after a one-year delay.

4. Allow both sides to proposition equipment. The Soviets, once learning the high cost of pre-positioning, are likely to accept the right (equality mandate) but reject the option; if they do not, it will increase their costs and thus add to the West's compensation. Pre-positioning is far more important to the West than to the Soviets due to the distant location of the U.S.

5. Reduce in all cases by units, but each side determines for itself the units it reduces.

6.Verify withdrawals at exit points.

7. Place a ceiling on the manpower (air and ground) and aircraft left in the area after Phase II is completed.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions is at a crucial stage. The U.S. must now decide if the changed international milieu of post Vietnam lessens the need to reduce forces in Europe. If not, the objectives of MBFR are still valid, and the military could suggest changing the U.S. proposal by adding a few air and nuclear forces, by including all "stationed" forces in the first phase, and by dropping the overly optimistic goal of a common ceiling of ground manpower since the required reductions for the goal are far too discriminatory against the U.S.S.R.

The military have the influence to "sell" such an approach in the NSC system and could benefit from such sponsorship if I led to a successful and equitable MBFR agreement. The alternative of sticking to the initial Western position could yet lead t Congressional forced unilateral U.S. reductions, an act the military properly consider to be detrimental to U.S./NATO security.

Bozeman, Montana


1.The CSCE involved 35 nations and resulted in a long document concerning the conduct of interstate affairs in Europe. The nations concurred in the following: their rejection of force as a means of settling differences; their agreement to modify borders by peaceful means only; their agreement to invite observers and preannounce certain military actions; and their agreement to improve human relations via increased contact and freer flow of peoples and ideas. The agreements are not binding or enforceable.

2.MBFR stands for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. It is a Western term and was rejected by the East as the official title of the talks during the 1973 preliminary conference. The East interpreted the word "balanced" to signify that the East, having greater forces in the area, should reduce more than the West. The agreed-on official title, seldom seen in print is Mutual Reductions of Forces and Armaments in Central Europe (MRFACE).

3. "Arms and Men: The Military Balance in Europe," Interplay, May 1969, by Alain E. Enthoven, was perhaps the most discussed early article on the issue of how many men the West or East need in Europe, but Dr. Enthoven was far from alone in discussing the issue. A more recent book, U.S. Troops in Europe, edited by John Newhouse and published by the Brookings Institute in 1972, studies the issue from many angles. The Adelphi Papers Nos. 96 and 98 deal with the issue thoroughly, and most or the renowned authors on strategic affairs, including Kissinger, Brodie, Beaufre, and Bull, have considered the forces in Europe as a key issue in world affairs.

4. This National Security Act created the Air Force, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the position of the President's National Security Advisor who would manage an NSC staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff became a member of the National Security Council as of a revision to the law in 1949. The wording of the law makes it clear that the system must consider international problems, but from both a domestic and international view.

5. This refers to the "famed" white, buff, green, and red stripe system of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The color of the paper signifying the progress of the study as it advances from action officer (white) to Joint Staff Directorate (buff) to Director, Joint Staff (green) to agreed by all (red stripe). Each Chief has the option to footnote a red stripe, indicating his Service's disagreement with it. This is not done often as it weakens the influence of the position in the interagency arena.

6. For an excellent study of these agency differences and their impact, see Morton H. Halperin’s Bureaucratic Policies and Foreign Policy, pp. 26-62.

7. The JCS, in this case spearheaded by the Army, stressed that U.S. combat forces are designed for a more sustained combat than their foes and that only a "balanced" cut of combat and support maintains this capability. Critics, usually but not always civilian, posit that U.S. forces are support heavy and that reductions of support forces could enhance our combat capability at a reduced cost. One such proponent is Stephen L. Canby; see his article in Orbis, Spring 1975, vol. XIX.

8. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe produced a similar agreement, although nonbinding. Soviet reactions in MBFR to such "additional measures" beyond reductions have been quite negative.

9. The "flank state" term refers to the participants in the talks not located in the agreed area of reductions, Central Europe. In the West they are Norway, Denmark, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, and in the East, Romania and Bulgaria, with Hungary's status yet to be fully decided. The Western flank states desire to prevent Soviet forces in Europe being withdrawn and relocated nearer flank state borders. Flank states are officially called "special participants."

10. This preliminary conference offered a preview of the difficult negotiations ahead. It was predicted to last only six weeks but took nearly six months. The agenda agreed on was essentially to "let anyone talk about anything," the title became MRFACE (See Note 2), and the biggest point of disagreement, Hungary's status at the talks, was left hanging to be finally resolved later.

11.The North Atlantic Council is the senior political body of NATO. It is composed of the NATO ambassadors or ministers of state of each member and chaired by the Secretary-General, NATO Facts and Figures, Brussels, NATO Information Services, October 1971.

12. Prior to the last SALT I negotiation session, most U.S. agencies, feeling the pressure of the impending summit, were prepared to give in to the Soviet objection to inclusion of SLBM's in the agreement (the U.S. had more SLBM's than the U.S.S.R.) and agree only to limit land-based ICBM's and ABM's. The chiefs were the last holdouts and wrote a strongly worded letter to the President and all members of the Verification Panel stressing the need to include SLBM's in the initial agreement while U.S. bargaining power was greatest (the Soviet main goal of an ABM agreement was pretty well assured). The chiefs' slogan became "No SLBM, no ABM." Surprisingly, they were joined by the Secretary of State at the final meeting and the point carried. The agreement included SLBM's. This was probably the military’s most effective impact on SALT I (author's view).

13."The Vienna Talks, Problems and Prospect's," by Ambassador Oleg Khlestov (Chief of the Soviet MBFR Delegation), World Economics and International Relations, #6, 1974; press conferences of Ambassador Charles Quarles, Head of Netherland's MBFR Delegation in Vienna, Austria.

14."Difficult Start in Vienna," Izvestia, 5 March 1974.

15."Military Confrontation in Europe: Will the MBFR Talks Work?" The Defense Monitor, December 1975.

16.CSCE was concluded in Summer 1975 with a summit meeting of the participating chiefs of state. It was noted by most Western commentators to have produced far more words than measurable accomplishments.

17.The Soviets have proven most reluctant to reveal official figures on their or Warsaw Pact force totals in the area. If published Western figures are agreed to, the Soviets would have to reduce this 100,000 or so more than the West to reach a 700,000 common ceiling.

18.The Defense Monitor, op. cit., and Izvestia, op. cit.

19."Stationed" forces refers to those forces located in the reduction area of Central Europe (area includes Benelux and Federal Republic of Germany in the West and German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia in the East and perhaps Hungary) that belong to nations outside the reduction area. They are U. S., United Kingdom, Canadian, and Soviet forces. The Canadian and U.K. position is that because of their special relationship in Europe they should not be considered as "stationed" forces.

20.There are two categories of participants in the talks. A "direct participant" (U.S., U.K., Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, U.S.S.R., East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia) is one who is expected to participate in the agreed reductions. A "special participant" (the flank states) is not expected to reduce forces. Hungary is currently a special participant but will reconsider her status at a later date.

21.This approach recognizes that fewer troops are needed to defend than attack and, more important, the fact of life that Soviet forces are not only in Europe to oppose NATO but to hold on to Eastern Europe--this need has been demonstrated frequently. Soviet officers will confidentially note that the military forces of their allies in the area are less dependable (read loyal to the U.S.S.R.) than the U.S.'s NATO allies.

Acknowledgement We are grateful to the Editors of Commanders Digest for the use of photographs.


Donald L. Clark, Colonel, USAF (Ret), (M. A., George Washington University), is Assistant to the President and a Lecturer in Political Science at Montana State University. As a Joint Staff officer from 1971-74 he worked MBFR, SALT, Law of the Sea, and other international negotiations. He was Chief of Staff of the initial U. S. MBFR delegation. His Air Force career included assignments as Assistant Air Attaché, U.S.S.R.; USAF Research Fellow at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; and as a faculty member of the Air Command and Staff College.


The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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